Robert Hadow : a case study of an appeaser by Michie, Lindsay W.
 
    ROBERT HADOW :                                                             
A CASE STUDY OF AN APPEASER 
 
 
Lindsay W. Michie 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 




Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           













This item is protected by original copyright 
 
 
Robert Hadow: A Case Study of An Appeaser 
Lindsay W. Michie
Presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, D epartm ent of 
Modern History, University of St. Andrew s
ProQuest Number: 10166690
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10166690
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346

I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the 
conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for 
the degree of Ph.D. in the University of St. Andrews and that 
the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in 
application for that degree.
Date; 25/8/88 signature of supervisor.
'A W
Abstract
H isto rians differ over the origins of B rita in ’s policy of 
appeasem ent, and  m any analyses concentrate on the objectives of 
policy using the  grow th of overseas obligations or m ore recen t 
historical m arkers such as the  Japanese invasion of M anchuria. 
The approach of th is thesis involves relating appeasem ent to the 
personal beliefs and  decisions of those responsible for foreign 
policy. By pin-pointing Robert Hadow, a  F irs t Secretary  in  the 
Foreign Office, as an example of an  appeaser, such an  approach 
dem onstrates how in te lligen t and capable m en in  B rita in  fell 
victim  to a policy which, in  re trospect, ap p ea rs  b lind  and 
irra tiona l.
An exam ination  of Hadow 's fear of w ar, b ias ag a in st 
bolshev ism , and  sy m p a th y  for th e  G erm an  m in o rity  in  
Czechoslovakia is made in  this thesis through detailed research of 
Foreign Office despatches and Hadow's reports, m em oranda, and 
personal correspondence. M uch of th is  h ith e rto  unpublished  
m aterial sheds new light on the course of events from the collapse 
of the  K redit A nstalt in  A ustria to the outbreak of W orld W ar II. 
By following the course of Hadow's career during th is  period, th is 
thesis seeks to explain the m entality  th a t  produced the  foreign
policy followed by B ritain  in  the 1930s.
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1 U nlikely Diplom at
Since the  years of th e  Second W orld W ar the  word 
appeasem ent has become a ta in ted  one w ith regard  to foreign 
policy. A ttem pts to redeem its true  m eaning since th is time have 
failed, however valian t these attem pts m ay have been. Churchill 
tried  in  1950, stating  th a t appeasem ent from weakness and fear 
was "futile and  fatal"; however, appeasem ent from streng th  was 
"m agnanim ous and noble" and  could be "the su rest and perhaps 
only p a th  to world peace"[l]. N onetheless,the word is seen to 
im ply weakness, passivity , or a backing down in  th e  face of 
th rea ts , and it is tem pting to be intensely critical of the  noble 
character appeasem ent assum ed in  the 1930s. The carrying out of 
th is  policy in  the belief th a t i t  was reasonable and rational and, 
even when consistently thw arted by Mussolini and H itler, still the 
best policy for Europe, reflects a  serious m ishandling of foreign 
policy. To decide th a t  th is  policy was the  only course open to 
countries which had  undergone the  experience of the F irs t World 
W ar appears, in  retrospect, to be naive and simplistic. Because a 
g rea t num ber of people a t  the  tim e encouraged th is  policy, 
however, and because the foreign policy of B ritain  and Germ any 
in  the 1930s have since been subjects of, a t times, severe historical 
debate, i t  is no longer feasible to dism iss i t  m erely in  term s of 
weakness and idiocy. The m otivating forces behind appeasem ent
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itself, having been exam ined extensively since the Second World 
W ar, a re  found to be complex and often contradictory. They are 
frequently a ttributable to a  philosophy of thought and psychology 
of m ind characteristic of the time.
Robert H enry Hadow, a  B ritish  diplomat posted in  Vienna, 
P rague and London in  the  1930s, was absolutely a rden t in  his 
su p p o rt of appeasem ent. He shared  th e  m ajo rity  of the  
characteristics associated w ith appeasem ent and rem ained loyal 
to th is policy through the outbreak of w ar in  1939. Hadow was not 
a  significant figure in  the 1930s as he did not hold a high position 
in  the Diplomatic Service, b u t his despatches of th is tim e give a 
very clear and detailed account of his increasingly enthusiastic  
support of the policy associated w ith Neville Cham berlain. They 
also illu s tra te  Hadow's efforts to do all possible to prom ote 
appeasem ent to the point of indiscretion and risk  to his position 
and career.
Hadow was born in  K ashm ir in  1895 and educated a t 
Harrow. In 1914 he enlisted in  the  London Scottish Regiment, 
serving in  France, M esopotamia, and  Palestine. He was twice 
wounded, m entioned in  despatches, awarded the M ilitary Cross, 
and  re tired  w ith the ran k  of C aptain. He entered the  B ritish  
Diplomatic Service in  1919 and was transferred  to the  Foreign 
Office in 1920 where, in  the same year, he was promoted to Second 
Secretary . He was th en  tran sfe rred  to T eheran  in  1921, to
Constantinople in  1925 where he was promoted to F irs t Secretary, 
and back to the Foreign Office in 1928. On October 13,1928 Hadow 
was Seconded for service as Adm inistrative A ssistant on the  staff 
of the  H igh Commissioner for C anada from M ay to Septem ber 
1930. On May 2,1931 he was transferred to Vienna.
Serving three years in  Austria, Hadow began to take note of 
the  G erm ans, sym pathising w ith the ir grievances regarding the 
Peace S e ttlem en ts of 1919 and  urg ing  conciliation of th e ir  
dem ands. He was transferred  to Prague in  December 1934, and 
there  he developed a strong sym pathy for the  position of the 
G erm an m inority  in  Czechoslovakia as expressed  by the  
Sudeten-deutsch Party. Hadow re tu rned  to London in  October 
1937 where he vigorously promoted m eeting Germany's claims on 
the Sudetenland. When, despite h is firm conviction th a t H itler 
w anted peace, w ar broke out in  Septem ber 1939, Hadow was 
posted to Argentina.
The psychology of appeasem ent in  the  1930s is, to some 
ex ten t, an enigma[2]. A superficial study of H adow ’s papers 
m ight lead to the conclusion tha t, a t best, he was a m an lacking 
perception; a t  w orst, a m an of little  in te lligence  and  no 
im agination. Hadow, however, was none of these, no more th an  
the  m ajority of supposedly well-educated and cl ear-thinking men 
who embraced the policy of appeasem ent. He had a cosmopolitan
 ^Won as^ h ob rsh ip  io (uhich k d id  notuSL c i e l b t e  w W t b e
age of 17, spoke seven languages fluently, and was felt to have 
shown g rea t promise in the 1920s while working in  Persia  and 
Turkey, especially in  the  sphere of economics. Given such 
potential, it  seems a tragic contradiction th a t Hadow should have 
m isread  H itle r’s in ten tio n s so extrem ely in  the  1930s and  
consistently prom oted conciliation of Germany, as did so m any 
p rom ising  or respec ted  p o litic ian s and  d ip lom ats . B u t 
appeasem en t was no t necessarily  a  policy stem m ing  from 
w eakness or m en ta l lassitude . I t  had  a strong  optim istic 
character whose outward rationality  held a  certain  a ttraction  for 
those exploring possibilities in  the m aintenance of peace. There 
was a  creative aspect to i t  which was particu larly  a ttractive to 
Hadow.
If  the  role of a diplomat, as well as being a negotiator, is 
also th a t  of an  observer and analyst avoiding extrem e views, 
Hadow, according to m any who knew him, struck  one as an 
unlikely diplomat. Possessing an  overwhelming intellect, he had  
a strong  personality  and a quick tem per, w ith  a tendency to 
"ham m er home" his opinions when dealing out often unsolicited 
advice. Hadow was a stubborn and idealistic m an, and, according 
to h is sister, a t  tim es, "quite impossible"[3]. H is behaviour, 
however, alm ost invariably stemm ed from a strong sense of duty. 
A fierce patrio t and devout C hristian , he expended an  enormous 
store of energy, and a study of his papers gives the impression of a
m an whom people, however they felt about him, were unlikely to 
forget. A younger cousin adm its th a t on the first occasion th a t he 
m et Hadow, "I was paralysed by his intellectual reputation  and 
found i t  alm ost too daunting to open my m outh let alone engage 
him  in  m eaningful conversation[4].
Lord Gladwyn, who worked w ith Hadow in  Teheran, writes 
th a t  the  la tte r  was incapable of delegating work, preferring  to 
keep i t  entirely in his own hands: "He was a kind and good m an of 
very considerable intelligence, and likable too if  you didn’t  m ind 
being bossed about"[5]. His daugh ter sta tes th a t  he enjoyed 
struggling and  fighting[6] and  it  was perhaps th is  characteristic 
th a t propelled his adam ant stand  in  promoting appeasem ent in  
the 1930s. Appeasement had an emotional appeal and Hadow was 
both emotional and excitable. Because the appeasers were m en 
w ith "a mission", Hadow, w ith his strong often violent views, was 
perhaps destined to follow this course w ith alacrity.
I t  was in the 1930s - the decade of appeasem ent - th a t the 
e lem en ts  of H adow 's ap p easem en t becam e a p p a re n t an d  
solidified. His abhorrence of w ar punctuated his despatches, his 
susp ic ion  of F ran ce  found an  o u tle t in  A u s tria  as h is 
anti-com m unism  did in Czechoslovakia. H is sym pathy tow ards 
G erm any found g rea te r expression in  h is affin ity  w ith  the  
A ustrians and focus on the  Sudeten-deutsch in  Czechoslovakia, 
w hile h is en thusiasm  for B ritish  m ediation in  all E uropean
concerns increased. These aspects of Hadow were encouraged in  
the 1930s, b u t they  did not necessarily originate in  A ustria  and 
Czechoslovakia. The 1930s may be the time when the sentim ents 
of appeasem ent made them selves felt, but the roots of th is policy 
can be traced fu rth er back and clues to Hadow's behaviour in  
A u s tr ia  an d  C zechoslovak ia , a lth o u g h  n o t n e c e ssa r ily  
im m ediately obvious, can nonetheless be elicited from his earlier 
experiences. His rejection of w ar as an  instrum ent of policy, for 
example, is clearly the direct resu lt of his own experience of war, 
as well as the public encouragement of this sentim ent in  the years 
following World W ar I. Signs of Hadow's anti-communism can be 
extracted from his suspicions of Soviet activity in  the  1920s while 
he was posted in  Iran  and Turkey, while the trend  of European 
and B ritish  approaches to the settlem ent of questions and conflicts 
a t  V ersailles which arose after the  F irs t World W ar also had  
the ir effect on Hadow. Finally, changes within the  Foreign Office 
had  begun in  the 1920s and Hadow, however junior he m ight have 
been, was likely to feel th e ir  consequences and find h is own 
response.
D uring the 1920s, although the memory of w ar for Hadow 
w as still sharp , i t  was ra re ly  m entioned in  h is le tte rs  and  
despatches. At th is tim e there was a general mood of hope and 
optim ism  th a t  m ade any cautioning against fu tu re  aggression 
seem ingly unnecessary. A ttem pts a t peace, although actually
fragile, were outwardly encouraging and Hadow probably felt no 
need m uch less any desire to concentrate on the futility of war in  
reports and correspondence. In the 1930s the mood had changed 
as illusions of peace began to crum ble, and  Hadow 's fears 
reaw akened his memories.
Some sm all d iaries Hadow kep t while figh ting  in  the  
trenches in  France in  1915 and in  Mesopotamia and Palestine in  
1916-1918 contain  sho rt sporadic en tries w hich nonetheless 
m anage to give a vivid picture of Hadow's experience and explain 
the  lasting  im pression m ade on him  by war. The first en tries 
were m ade during tra in ing  and were full of enthusiasm : "Heard 
all Elliot's war experiences. A ball one evening, a  shooting party  - 
rabbit stalking all during advance from Arles to M am e; w ar has 
i ts  en joym ents especially  for A [rm y].S[ervice].C [orps].!"[?]. 
D uring  h is tim e as a  Second L ieu tenan t in  France Hadow's 
d ia ries  do no t con tain  m ore th a n  sketches of ru in s  and  
countryside. T hat he made few entries during th is tim e is a  likely 
illustra tion  of the difficulty of coming to grips w ith w hat he was 
now experiencing.
While fighting in  the Middle E as t in  1916 Hadow was shot 
in  the  lung and sent to India to recover. The notes in  his diary 
had  now become more serious and reflect particu lar concern over 
the casualties of the war: "Men and officers packed on deck like 
sardines. No adequate arrangem ents...Private died on board. No
tea , w ater, food or d ressings for anyone. A ho t and  long 
night...M en h it in  legs lying in  ra in  outside. Fellow next to me 
w ith gangrene...H e was h it th ree  days ago and has had neither 
food nor medical attention. Nobody to attend  to him"[8].
In  1918, while fighting in  Palestine, Hadow wrote of one 
battle, "Our Regiment had taken the b run t of the fighting and we 
lost M acDerm ott, McKay, and Jackson, my best friends in  the 
regim ent as well as others wounded. R ather a stiff price as far as 
we were personally concerned...It's horrid  losing friends in  th is 
way"[9]. L a te r on th a t  year Hadow contracted m alaria . He 
rem ained in  Palestine until the end of the war.
Unlike m any who fought in  the  F irs t World W ar, Hadow 
did no t become disillusioned w ith the  w ar effort, despite the 
growth of his views on the futility of w ar itself. The la tte r  change 
in  Hadow is comparable to th a t in  a soldier m entioned in  John 
Laffin's Letters from the Fronts who w ent to w ar in  1915 a t the 
age of n ineteen full of enthusiasm : "it is all so delightfully fresh 
after England th a t unpleasant side of i t  doesn't strike me, though 
all m y friends have been try ing  to in stil into me the  gospel of 
'frightfulness'". Two years la te r  the  sam e soldier wrote from 
Somme: "I shall never look on w arfare as e ither fine or sporting 
again"[10].
W hat Hadow experienced was equally disheartening bu t he 
rem ained  a p a trio t throughout and  a fte r the  w ar. His views
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echoed the sentim ent expressed in  an  Oxford pam phlet in  1914: 
"we can endure all the suffering and horror which w ar involves if  
we can su sta in  ourselves w ith the  hope th a t we shall m ake a 
recurrence  of such th ings im possible for our ch ild ren "[ll] . 
Hadow's defence of his actions in  1930s are sim ilar to the words of 
Captain Michael Kettle who was killed in France in  1916: "If I live 
I m ean to spend the rest of my life working for perpetual peace. I 
have seen w ar and faced m odern artillery , and know w hat an  
outrage i t  is against simple m en...[12].
A fu rth e r aspect of the  w ar which no doubt influenced 
Hadow and contributed to his sense of urgency in the 1930s was 
the effect of the experience on his younger brother Kenneth. A few 
years after the w ar Kenneth suffered a nervous breakdown which 
his sister Cicely believes was largely a  resu lt of his fighting in  the 
war. He apparen tly  never fully recovered, and, as Hadow was 
quite protective tow ards his younger brother, he probably took 
th ese  sufferings to h e a r t , hav ing  been th ro u g h  th e  sam e 
experience. T his gave h im  fu r th e r  reaso n  to ignore any 
subconscious worries over potential aggression from right-w ing 
d ic ta to rsh ip s in  the  1930s, and  concentrate  on the  m oral 
argum ent in  h is motives for upholding appeasem ent. In  1934 he 
wrote th a t  he would do anything on earth  to prevent his sons from 
sharing  the  fate of his brother, "whose nerves were wrecked and 
his career ru ined - in  common w ith millions of others"[13].
While Hadow's pacifist feelings are  directly related  to his 
experience of war, the origins of his a ttitude towards communism 
and  the  Soviet experim ent are not so clear-cut. Hadow was 
extrem ely anti-com m unist and rem ained so throughout his life. 
According to h is daughter, he w anted to fight communism w ith 
his la s t  b rea th : "He felt i t  was an  insid ious danger, and  so 
w ell-planned and  engineered th a t  i t  would be an  undetected  
take-over...He felt the non-Communist world was much too naive 
and trusting"[14]. This a ttitude  was made plain  in  the 1930s, bu t 
was a  legacy of a ttitudes emerging in the 1920s, and was probably 
a product of an  in itial reaction to the R ussian Revolution shared 
by m any in  B ritain. Signs of an increasing aversion to the Soviet 
experim ent can be found in  Hadow's despatches while in  Persia  
and Turkey, and the circumstances of both countries' relationship 
w ith  the  Soviet Union m ost likely helped perpe tuate  Hadow's 
feelings. In  Persia, Hadow worked under Sir Percy Loraine who 
was less th a n  sym pathetic to the  Soviet regim e (Loraine had  
allegedly la te r  been the ta rg e t of an  assassination  plot by an 
Arm enian. The plot was believed to have been ordered by the 
Soviet m ilita ry  a ttache  and  Soviet agents were to provide the 
w eapon and  protection[15]). C om intern  a ttem p ts  to s tir  up 
revolution in ternationally  included the  Middle E as t and aroused 
suspicions in  the  B ritish  Legation of R ussian  dealings w ith  
Persia. In  1922 Loraine sen t a telegram  to the Foreign Office
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which stated, "Bolshevism in  Persia continues unabated"[16].
In  1924 Hadow, A ho had been assigned Secretary in  charge 
of Com mercial Affairs, began reporting  trad ing  tactics of the 
Soviet Union in  Persia. It was Hadow's belief th a t the Soviet 
au thorities were attem pting  to recover commercial suprem acy in  
N orthern  Persia: "The determ ination of the Soviet authorities to 
carry these designs into execution is, as usual, mainly dictated by 
the desire to strike a  blow a t B ritish  in terests and influence" [17]. 
Hadow apparen tly  was told confidentially by the D irector of 
Persian  Customs th a t the R ussian Legation, in  negotiations over 
trade , had  shown no sym pathy tow ards Persian  needs, and was 
merely bent on securing the most favourable term s for Russia.
Although Hadow's disapproval of Soviet tactics was evident, 
he seemed m ainly concerned with the ir effect on British trade. In 
Hadow's eyes, the  Soviet Union had  in itia ted  a trade  w ar w ith 
B ritain  in  Persia, bu t he noted tha t, "in the long run", the Persian 
m erchant usually paid dearly for m aking transactions w ith Soviet 
agen ts and  was therefore suspicious of Soviet advances[l 8]. 
R egard ing  Soviet im ports in to  P e rs ia  Hadow reported  th a t  
R ussian organisations would not forward foreign goods to or from 
Persia  unless they in  some way became Russian property: "This 
accords w ith the comm unist doctrines of the Soviet Government 
and gives the Russian organisations an  opportunity of passing the 
goods as R ussian  - a  practice w hich is known to have been
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extensively  pursued"[19]. Hadow adm itted  th a t  he had  not 
succeeded in  g e ttin g  definite proof from P e rs ia n  m erchan ts 
"because of their alleged fear of Soviet vengeance"[20].
Clues to Hadow s antipathy  to the Soviet Union while in  
T urkey can be found in  his observance of T urkey’s leanings 
towards the E ast. Hadow noted th a t Constantinople had  initially 
been nam ed the  centre  of com m unist p ropaganda in  Egypt, 
Greece, Syria and North Africa, but observed in the  early stages of 
the  new republic which had been established in  Turkey under 
M u stap h a  K em al th a t  com m unists w ere o ften  hanged  by 
Independence T ribuna ls . I t  was H adow 's hope th a t  the  
"destructive" character of Soviet influence would become clear in  
a few years to the  Turks and th a t country would th en  tu rn  to 
B ritain  as an  ally. Conflict had arisen between B ritain  and Turkey 
over her new republic which B ritain  a t first fought to quell b u t 
eventually resigned herself to, and Hadow implied th a t the Soviet 
Union desired a certa in  am ount of conflict or tension  betw een 
B ritain  and Turkey to continue.
From  early  on the Soviet Union, to Hadow, w as a sinister 
elem ent in  Europe. Since both Turkey and  R ussia  were not 
m em bers of th e  L eague of N ations, H adow  saw  a close 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een the  two as n a tu ra l, a lthough  perhaps 
unbalanced. In  1927 he suggested th a t the inclusion of Turkey in 
the  League of N ations or some sort of W estern  alliance would
12
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m ake th a t  co u n try  m ore com fortable  w ith  th e  idea  of 
concentrating on railway projects as opposed to m ilitary  concerns; 
"But", he added, "th is desirab le  even t can n o t easily  be 
encompassed so long as Russia is a t  her back, a  well-armed and 
outw ardly friendly bandit, sm iling broadly, b u t ever ready to 
th rea ten  if  Turkey took a step towards the European Powers"[21]. 
W hen in  1928 M ussolini a ttem p ted  to e s tab lish  a special 
rela tionsh ip  betw een Italy  and Greece and  T urkey through a 
tripa rtite  agreem ent, Hadow believed th a t the Soviet Union would 
be definitely antagonistic to th is arrangem ent or any agreem ent 
which would indicate "that Turkey is breaking  away from her 
recent isolation and turning her face towards the West"[22],
The antagonism  Hadow la te r  felt tow ards the  Czechs as 
well as his suspicion of communism were partia lly  derived from a 
certain  am ount of prejudice against the Slavonic race, which can 
again be seen as a  legacy of his experiences in  the  1920s. Even 
before h is a ttitu d e  tow ards the Slavs was m ade p lain , his 
despatches in  Turkey contain references to "E asterners" as a 
whole w hich illu s tra te  the  early  developm ent of th is  type of 
prejudice in  Hadow. Of the  Turks he wrote in  1927, "As rulers 
they are hopeless today as yesterday because w ith all the ir slavish 
im itation of progress they neither take the trouble to understand 
th e  m eaning  of the  work nor rea lly  w an t to un d ertak e  the  
responsibilities w ith the  fru its  of th is  word...tom orrow has no
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place in  E astern  minds because continuity, peace and tranquillity  
have never existed among them"[23]. L ater th a t year he wrote th a t 
pr igress was a lien  to the  E as te rn  m ind and  s ta ted  more 
forthrightly of the  Turks, "I like not th is race; an  uninteresting 
w ar-m ad trib e  of prim itive nom ads w ith  no c ivilisation or 
trad itions o ther th a n  th a t  of blood and  rape  and  lu st behind 
them "[24]. Hadow 's opinion of the  T urks echoed th a t  of the  
Am bassador to Turkey Sir Ronald L indsay who wrote in  1925, 
"The T u rk  will not look fa r ahead, and  he will not m ake 
p re p a ra tio n s  befo rehand  to m eet e v e n tu a litie s  th a t  a re  
approaching even obviously"[25].
Hadow disapproved of the Turkish trea tm en t of the Kurdish 
race; a  feeling which presaged his reaction to Czech dealings with 
the  Sudeten-deutsch. In  1927 he wrote th a t  in  London and in  
W ashington, "the praise of the T urk is sung and we lend a deaf 
ear to the  cries of the Kurdish nation who, to the  tune of over a 
m illion, a re  undergoing the sam e m assacre as they  were used 
unw ittingly during the w ar to visit upon the Armenians"[26], The 
reference to the  A rm enians w as p a r t  of H adow 's revulsion 
towards the  m assacre of th is nationality a t the end of World W ar I 
and th e ir absorption by Turkey and Russia - an  elem ent fu rther 
helping to increase Hadow’s E astern  prejudice.
While in  Canada in  1929 to 1930, Hadow expressed no views 
on R ussia ap a rt from a guarded response to an  inquiry  on the
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B ritish  view of the Soviet Union, in  which he m erely stated  th a t 
the  perm anent effect of the experim ent could not be gauged until 
the  Five Year P lan had run  its  course[27]. This lack of general 
comment on Russia was probably due to the fact th a t his official 
concerns had  little  to do w ith th a t  country and gave him  no 
chance for expression on the  subject. I t  m ay be safely stated , 
how ever, th a t  h is view s on com m unism  and  the  Soviet 
experim ent were by this time pretty  well entrenched as they began 
to emerge after his transfer to A ustria. The danger of Turkey or 
any weak sta te  succumbing to Bolshevism or Soviet pressure was 
now transferred  in  Hadow's m ind to a  g reater degree to A ustria 
and then  Czechoslovakia.
As well as pacifism  and anti-com m unism , Hadow also 
la te r  d isp layed  a  contem pt of F rance  ch arac te ris tic  of the  
appeasers, being critical of th is country's dealings w ith A ustria 
in  the  early  1930s and generally  dism issive of h e r defensive 
a ttitude  regarding Germany. This sentim ent m ay also have had 
earlier origins. There is no sign in  Hadow's w ar diaries th a t he 
felt any an tipathy  towards the French, common to m any B ritish 
soldiers d u ring  the  F irs t W orld W ar; however, his feelings 
towards France could be traced to the years he worked under Lord 
Curzon whom he greatly  adm ired. Through a  series of French 
moves during the early 1920s - including the  occupation of the 
R uhr in  1923 - Curzon grew increasingly hostile to France. This
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hostility  reached its  climax when the Foreign Secretary  sent a 
note to France stressing  the  illegality  of the occupation and 
refused to allow B rita in  to be associated w ith the  French demand 
for the surrender of the German Crown Prince. He hinted th a t if  
F rance 's a ttitu d e  persisted , B rita in  would w ithdraw  from all 
in te r  a llied  com m ittees. The th re a t eventually  succeeded and 
F rance backed down. Curzon’s growing d isillusionm ent w ith 
France never made him consistently pro-German, b u t i t  did result 
in  an  advantage to Germany[28], A fu rther influence on Hadow 
m ay have been the fact th a t France provided arm s for M ustapha 
Kemal during the Greco-Turkish War.
W ith the  progressive a ttem pts a t m ain ta in ing  peace in  
Europe in  the 1920s, i t  is possible to pinpoint certain more general 
elements of the 1920s which, if  not obvious in  Hadow's despatches, 
m ay still have had  a  subtle influence on his la te r  opinions. At 
Locarno, for exam ple, B rita in  w as perceived  as hav ing  
reestablished herself as arbiter of Europe[29]. Hadow clung to this 
perception of his country throughout the 1930s. Also a t Locarno, 
conciliation replaced enforcement as the basis for peace as major 
powers became reluctan t to take any decisive action in  the risk of 
ano ther conflict. Hadow m ay not have in itia lly  recognised the 
lim itations of the  League of N ations in  th a t i t  was ineffectual 
w ithout an  enforcem ent system; or m ay have m erely used it  to 
support his argum ents in  the early 1930s w ithout really focussing
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on it. He m ay also have felt in  secret ag reem en t w ith  the  
argum ent of the Ita lians and H ungarians during the  1920s th a t  
the Allies should have restored the A ustro-H ungarian Empire as 
i t  was a  good economic un it if  not successful politically.
Due to his lack of experience during the 1930s of Central 
European affairs, Hadow may not have bothered to fcMî Wi%€. a
g reat deal on the  actual details of the V ersailles T reaty  or its  
after-effects, and merely embraced the popular conception of its  
unfairness, th is being compatible w ith his other views. Much of 
Hadow's perception of the  Sudeten G erm ans and Germ any as 
"underdogs" deserving ju s t trea tm en t or "fair-play" could well 
have been the product of the belief propagated by Germany herself 
in  th e  1920s th a t  she had  been  badly trea te d  a t  Versailles. 
Germ any's resentm ent over the term s arguably stemm ed from a 
desire to regain her place among the G reat Powers of Europe as 
soon as possible, b u t th is country m anaged to convince m any in 
B rita in  - and Hadow was obviously one - th a t  the  Germ ans 
possessed genuine grievances th a t  needed redressing. By the 
tim e he was in  A ustria Hadow, with the m ajority of Britain, was 
dism issing Versailles as discredited, although i t  seems th a t he 
had  not really  studied  the  term s of th is  agreem ent or paid 
a tten tion  to Germ any's p a tte rn  of behaviour since i t  had been 
m ade. P aym en t of rep ara tio n s, for exam ple, h ad  steadily  
decreased w ith Germany being increasingly treated  as an equal a t
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the expense of sm aller nations, and she had m anaged to slide out 
of the m ajority of attem pts to inspect her progress of disarm am ent 
or lessen  the  significance of th e ir findings. Hadow's lack of 
insight in  these m atters was most likely due in  some p a rt to his 
com parative lack of experience in  C entra l E uropean  concerns 
until the 1930s. In the 1920s a subconscious prejudice could have 
bu ilt up in  him  through the effect of factors already m entioned 
plus a  general ignorance of the  sub tler aspects of E uropean 
affairs, and, perhaps faced w ith a slightly h igher position in the 
Foreign Office and greater freedom of expression on a subject of 
increasing  concern, Hadow's views, m atching the  mood of his 
country, erupted into his despatches w ith g rea ter confidence and 
less tact.
Among the  possible influences on Hadow in  the  1920s it  
seems likely th a t the Foreign Office itself played a m ajor role. In  
1926 the Perm anent Under-Secretary of S tate  S ir Eyre Crowe died 
and w ith him  the strong tradition of a policy of collective security 
in  Europe. The death of Crowe seemed to represent the release of 
the  Foreign Office from a tigh ter control over policy and a clarity 
of direction, and probably helped create the divergence of which 
Hadow became an active part. W ith the feeling among m any th a t 
a  new era  of diplomacy had arrived, differences now arose in  the 
Foreign Office not merely on local m atters, b u t in  approaches to 
the E uropean situation  as a whole. In  1925, for example. Sir
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Jo se p h  A ddison, u n d e r w hom  H adow  la te r  w orked in  
Czechoslovakia, took the line th a t a trea ty  of guarantee in  favour 
of France was unnecessary, the T reaty of Versailles and Covenant 
of the  League of Nations being sufficient. B ritain , he argued, 
should not give in  to the closer alliance desired by France; w hat 
was necessary was the addition of Germany w ith the Allies[30]. I t 
was the argum ent Hadow took up  in  the  1930s. The growth of 
controversy in  the Foreign Office in  the 1930s illustra tes the most 
apparen t influence on Hadow and it  could be concluded th a t the 
in itial stages of th is controversy stim ulated him  to a  large degree 
in  his subsequent actions. His pacifism, anti-com m unism, and 
m istrust of the French found a basis in earlier experiences during 
the  F irs t World W ar and 1920s, while the  changing philosophy 
and structu re  of the Foreign Office provided the  m eans by which 
such sentim ents could influence his future actions.
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2 Austria: Appeasem ent Defined
Economics and Disarmament
W hen Hadow w as posted to Vienna in  1931 he faced a 
Europe which had become m arked by turbulence and instability. 
Parliam entary  Government had  already succumbed to dictatorial 
ru le  in  Poland, Italy , B ulgaria, H ungary and Portugal, and the 
weakened W eimar Republic in  Germany, which had  grudgingly 
accepted the  d ictates of B rita in  and  France a fte r the  Peace 
Settlem ents was soon to be replaced by the unsettling  extrem ism  
of H itler and  the  Nazis. The repercussions of the  W all S tree t 
C rash of 1929 were being felt and  economic distress encouraged 
po litical sen tim en ts  a lread y  evoked by the  resu rgence  of 
nationalism . Hadow m ost likely shared much of the  confusion of 
h is countrym en regarding Europe and the rise of dictators, and 
among the  reactions from B rita in , those sentim ents associated 
w ith  appeasem ent began to become apparent, not least in  his 
despatches: his concern over A ustria and the general situation in 
E u ro p e , g row ing  d isa p p ro v a l of F ra n c e 's  b e h a v io u r , 
anti-com m unism , support for the  d isarm am ent process, and 
belief in  the unfai rness of the  Peace Treaties were expressed with 
increasing consistency in the  years 1931-34. More significantly, 
Hadow's pacifist sentim ents rose to the surface a t th is tim e and 
rem ained the basis for all fu ture recommendations in  the  1930s.
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All of these feelings began to find expression in  Hadow's a ttitude  
tow ards G erm any on w hich  in te rn a tio n a l a tte n t io n  w as 
increasingly being focussed. H is conciliatory a ttitu d e  did not 
in it ia l ly  encom pass th e  N azis , for, lik e  m an y  of h is  
con tem poraries he hoped to s tre n g th e n  th e  m o d era tes  in  
Germany in order to tone down her potentially aggressive nature , 
b u t as the  Nazi position solidified in  Germany and as H itler, to 
begin  w ith , re a ssu re d  o th er countries as to h is  peaceful 
in tentions, Hadow came to accept the Germ an leader and  urge 
cooperation w ith him.
Austria, a t th is tim e, was in  the throes of a financial crisis 
w ith the collapse of her bank  the  K redit-A nstalt and the  rise of 
G erm an N ationalism  am ong h e r population. The underly ing  
cause of the  form er was the  break-up of the A ustro-H ungarian 
Em pire which resulted , th rough  the  im poverishm ent of A ustria, 
in  the  loss of cap ita l in  th e  K redit-A nstalt, m aking A ustria  
vulnerable to high ta r if f  b a rrie rs . She had, therefore, become 
d ep en d en t on foreign  loans , an d  th e  re su ltin g  collapse 
represented a  m ajor d isaster for th a t country.
There had  been speculation in  both A ustria and Germ any 
of a Customs U nion betw een the  two countries, and  to m any 
Austria 05 h it ha rd  by economic crises, the idea was particu larly  
enticing because th e ir  country would have the opportunity  to 
sh a re  in  G erm any 's grow ing prosperity . O ther coun tries,
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however, objected to such a union and most adam ant among these 
was France. In  a  Custom s Union France saw the  th rea ten ing  
possibility of an  Anschluss which would streng then  G erm any 
and end the independence of Austria. The prospect appeared even 
more perilous once the  Nazis came to power and  increased the 
aggressive natu re  of Germany. While attem pting to m ain tain  her 
own economic dominance in  Europe, France did her best to inhibit 
any moves tow ards an  economic union betw een G erm any and 
A ustria, and her moves stirred  up resentm ent in  A ustria  which, 
in  his increasing sym pathy for th a t  country, i t  is likely Hadow 
came to share. H is dissatisfaction w ith France w as frequently 
expressed during these years.
R esentm ent of France helped to fuel the  rise  of N ational 
Socialism in A ustria and the  spread of Nazi propaganda. W hen 
Dr. Engelbert Dollfuss became Chancellor of A ustria in  1932 he 
adopted a  stringen t a ttitu d e  tow ards the A ustrian  Nazis, and  
when the Nazi effort was redoubled in  th a t country a fte r H itler's 
coming to power in  1933, Dollfuss banned th e  N azi P arty . 
Pan-G erm anism  was fairly  w idespread in A ustria  during  th is  
time, bu t the whole population was not yet ready to embrace Nazi 
ideology a t the expense of their independence. This is illustra ted  
in the failure of the  a ttem pted  Nazi putsch of 1934 which cost 
Dollfuss his life and from which H itler was quick to disassociate 
himself.
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Hadow followed closely the Nazi movement in  A ustria  and 
Austro-German relations. He was opposed to the Custom s Union 
project, bu t he regarded A ustria as fundam entally Germ anic and 
leaning tow ards Anschluss  due to her trea tm en t by the  Allied 
Pow ers. The N azi influence he regarded  as m in im al, b u t 
nonetheless a  th re a t  to A u strian  independence, w hich he 
supported. If  Hadow could be pinned down to a personal opinion 
on A ustria a t th is tim e, he probably would have been pro-Royalist 
and more sym pathetic to the restoration of the H absburg Empire 
th an  to any Nazi m achinations Like many of his countrym en he 
seemed in itially  averse to, or a t  least wary of, the  Nazi regime 
m ainly  in  te rm s of its  rad ica l tendencies and  influence in  
Austria. His a ttitude  towards Germany as a whole, however, was 
sym pathetic, and  those views which prom pted h is conciliatory 
a ttitude  tow ards th is  country caused him eventually to adopt a 
lenient a ttitude towards H itler.
Hadow’s belief in  revision of the Peace T reaties can be seen 
as his response to the  financial crisis in  A ustria and  European 
economic problem s. Revisionism  was a popular idea among 
appeasers and  had  arisen  out of a feeling of g u ilt over the 
trea tm en t of G erm any ju s t  a fter the F irst World W ar. Almost 
from the  tim e i t  was m ade, defence of the Treaty of V ersailles 
began to dim inish, influenced greatly  by John  M aynard Keynes 
who a ttacked  the economic un rea lity  of V ersailles - especially
Germ an reparations-in  his book The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace. To Keynes the  post-war settlem ent had  hindered any 
progress Germany m ight be able to m ake in  fu ture recovery, and 
h is  denouncem ent p ricked  B ritish  consciences. Increasing  
unease over the severity  of the  Peace T reaties encouraged an 
a tt i tu d e  of m ak ing  allow ances for G erm any  w hich  w as 
continually reinforced during the 1920s and which Hadow came to 
share. By the 1930s i t  was widely held th a t G erm an grievances 
were derived from the  un fairness of V ersailles, and, however 
extremely they were p u t forward, their basis was understandable 
and even reasonable.
In September 1933 Hadow wrote of his support of revision of 
the Peace Treaties on economic grounds and advised th a t  i t  take 
the  form of an economic u nders tand ing  betw een th e  seven 
countries of the  D anube Basin. B ritain 's p a r t  in  the  process 
would be tem porary loss of some of her m arkets which, Hadow 
felt, would possibly come back as purchasing-pow er gradually  
increased in  the  area. She would have to show "leadership" by 
bringing France and Italy  into agreem ent with th is idea, b u t m ost 
im portantly, the  countries should be given a chance of m aking 
th e ir own individual arrangem ents among themselves, under the 
beneficent neutrality  of B ritain, France, and Italy. "Thus we keep 
the countries busy, give them  hope, and tu rn  into other channels 
the formidable energies and bitterness of Germany". To Hadow it
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was im portant to break  Germ any's "appalling sense of isolation" 
which he apparently  felt had been brought on by the harshness of 
Versailles[l].
By 1934 Hadow was urging a  B ritish  lead  in  economic 
conciliation of G erm any and had  no qualm s in  referring  to the  
"catastrophic stupidity" of "uncom prehending C hancelleries" 
and "crass ignorance am ong the  so-called S tatesm en" of the  
Peace-Treaty years[2]. "There is no peace for Europe and no hope 
of a Central E uropean settlem ent un til and unless G erm any is 
included", he wrote in  April of th a t year, and pu t forward a plan 
of renunciation  of most-favoured!-nation righ ts by F rance  and 
B rita in  in  H am burg, Rome, W arsaw , and C onstantinople and 
form ation of a sheltered area  for trade  in th is area  through the 
gran ting  of ta r iff  privileges[3]. To Hadow, the m ain source of 
"German restlessness" was injustice of the Peace Treaties[4], and 
his plan would have the effect of bringing peoples more closely 
together economically and "give us some hope th a t Nationalism  in 
its  p resent acute form would gradually subside, giving place to 
sounder economic relations"[5].
Hadow's concern for economic inclusion of G erm any was 
probably linked to h is in te re s t in  the  economic situa tion  in  
A ustria. The proposed Custom s Union, for exam ple, was a 
project which, although not in  support of, he still felt should be 
denied to A ustria and Germany as carefully and diplomatically as
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possible in  order th a t  there  not spring up a resen tm en t "which 
would be so deep-seated as to give extrem ists even in  th is country 
a chance they are never likely to get by any other means"[6]. To 
Hadow, the  m istake in  the  handling  of the  proposed Custom s 
Union was the assum ption th a t i t  would m ean Anschluss which, 
to A ustria , rep resen ted  "a forbidden cure for the  ills  of both 
countries, which cruel allies would not p u t w ithin reach  of the  
defeated sufferers from the Peace Treaties". He, therefore,in 1934, 
suggested negotiations w ith Germ any concerning C entral Europe 
w ith  particu lar reference to A ustria. Such negotiations would 
involve forcing H itler to recognise the  political independence of 
Austria, in re tu rn  for which France, Italy, and B ritain  would give 
Germ any economic relief. I t was Hadow’s belief th a t the action 
he recommended would not be ill-received by Hitler[73. He had, 
m eanwhile, in  1932, recom mended im m ediate B ritish  loans to 
A ustria, expressing the  opinion th a t B ritain  should concentrate 
on obtaining the cooperation of C entral European Powers "in an 
endeavour to restore the will for self-help which is gradually being 
extinguished in  A ustria and Hungary"[8].
As well as economic cooperation, Hadow 's support for 
m utual d isarm am ent also arose from a desire for inclusion of 
Germany. In  the  Fontainbleau  M em orandum  which preceded 
the Peace Conference of 1 9 1 David Lloyd George had w ritten, "To 
my m ind it  is idle to endeavour to impose a perm anent lim itation
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of arm am ents upon Germany unless we are prepared sim ilarly to 
impose a  lim ita tion  upon ourselves"[93, and in  the  1920s the 
League of N a tions h ad  a ttem p ted  to lin k  secu rity  w ith  
d isarm am en t. P rim arily  F ren ch  fears reg a rd in g  security , 
however, helped provide a  b a rrie r  to these a ttem p ts, and the 
dispute over d isarm am ent carried on throughout the  decade. The 
countries involved professed a desire for disarm am ent, b u t all on 
different term s: the  Soviet Union w anted to p u t an  end to all 
arm ies, navies and a ir  forces, France stipulated  security  a t  the 
same tim e th a t Germ any dem anded equality, while B ritain , as a 
sea-power, opposed large arm ies and disagreed w ith  F rance’s 
position on naval disarm am ent. Not much optimism surrounded 
the disarm am ent conference of 1932, although the  Depression had 
prompted m any policy-makers to believe th a t a cut in  arm am ents 
was an economically sound idea.
To Hadow, G erm an com plaints th a t B rita in  and France 
h ad  no t abided by th e ir  com m itm ent to d isa rm am en t were 
justified and needed redressing. In  1933 he pu t forward plans for 
the scaling-down of B ritish  and French arm am ents in  respect of 
G erm any’s com plaints. "W hat is the  use", Hadow asked, "of 
telling Germany, or the world, th a t we have disarm ed ’more th an  
other nations'? The fact is th a t other nations have not disarmed, 
as they promised in 1919 to do; consequently - and to my m ind very 
na tu ra lly  if  not exactly wisely - Germany, a fte r the  w arnings
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issued by H itler in  May and again before the p resent Conference 
m et, is  w ithdraw ing  from h e r  undertak ings no t to rearm ". 
Germany's argum ent, Hadow contended was th a t both sides m ust 
keep a contract or i t  is not worth keeping. "She is not quite right, 
b u t she is acting very na tu ra lly  after w aiting for 15 years"[10]. 
Hadow's remedy for the situation called for B ritain  together w ith 
F rance and Italy , to commence w ith im m ediate reduction in  
arm s, bringing the level down to fixed lim its, provided Germ any 
would correspondingly agree not to rearm  beyond th e  actual 
requirem ents of her in ternal security. A system  of in ternational 
inspection could then be established[ll].
In  1934 Hadow urged "firm and unyielding" pressure  on 
F rance to d isarm  "in accordance w ith  our fifteen  year old 
unfulfilled prom ise to Germany" in  definite stages and to a 
definite level, and "unrem itting" pressure on Germ any to rem ain 
a t  her p resen t level of arm am ents to be controlled by posting 
B ritish  officers w ith Germ an units[12]. Economic cooperation, he 
felt, should replace security concerns in  a  post-war "enlightened" 
era: "By courageous facing of the facts of the  politico-economic 
situation  in  Europe and judicious sacrifice of 'rights' which are 
today alm ost fictitious, B ritain , and B rita in  alone, can thus, in 
conjunction  w ith  F ran ce , he lp  i ts e lf  by h e lp in g  o thers 
substitu ting  m utual cooperation for the  p resen t vain a ttem pt tc> 
coerce potential adversaries by force"[13].
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The "facts" which Hadow was calling on B rita in  and 
France to face had, however, become an illusion w ith the advent of 
H itle r to power. Hadow 's be lie f in  them  w as nonethe less 
understandab le . H itle r w as b en t on rea rm am en t from  the  
m om ent he gained control of the  G erm an Government, b u t in  the 
early stages of his foreign policy approach, through an  exercising 
of caution in  the in ternational arena, the Nazi leader nourished 
the illusions th a t power would tam e him and th a t the processes of 
Treaty Revision and disarm am ent need not be stopped in  1933.
G erm any 's n eg o tia tin g  position  on th e  qu estio n  of 
disarm am ent had been, a t the 1932 Conference, th a t she should be 
allow ed some rea rm am en t un less  th e  o th er pow ers w ere 
prepared to disarm  to her level and th is position was viewed w ith 
sym pathy derived from a general disillusionm ent w ith w ar and 
the  practical side of decreased spending on arm s. H itle r 's  
accession to poWer, however, alarm ed m any of those previously 
sym pathetic. Alert to th is feeling. H itler muffled the eagerness 
among Nazis to withdraw  from negotiations, and tried  to extract 
w hat mileage he could out of the disarm am ent talks. The different 
proposals on disarm am ent were approached by Nazi Germ any in  
term s which would be m ost beneficial to h er private plans for 
rearm am ent. Hadow's plan would probably not have appealed, in  
th is case, because it  focussed on B ritish  and French reductions 
and  called for G erm any to rem ain  a t  h e r p resen t level of
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arm am ents. H itler wanted no control on the lim its of his m ilitary 
budget, and he similarly wished to make no commitments a t th a t 
point which he would be likely to break. He was sim ultaneously 
careful not to make G erm any appear as if  she was deliberately 
torpedoing negotiations on d isarm am ent and  h is course was 
made easier by British and French disagreement over the  term s of 
d isarm am ent. Both were a t  th e  same tim e re lu c tan t to take  
m ilita ry  action regard ing  increased  G erm an dem ands and 
G erm any could thus aver he r desire for peace while secretly 
rearm ing. H itler finally w ithdrew from the conference in  October 
1933, but, although such an action was viewed in  some areas with 
alarm , he was able to portray to those such as Hadow an  a ttitude 
of frustration  over injustice ra th e r th an  deliberate belligerence.
The w idespread g u ilt over V ersailles and  subsequen t 
trea tm en t of Germany had obviously affected Hadow and already 
blinkered  his vision regard ing  th a t  country as well as the  
possibility of cooperation which provided security. I t  was an  
a ttitude  common to m any B ritish  people. The jo u rn a lis t Shiela 
G ran t Duff, who was a t Oxford during th is time, w rites th a t  in  
her final exams her special paper on In te rna tiona l Relations 
centred  en tirely  on the  1919 se ttlem ents and, above all, its  
consequences for Germany: "By the  tim e I w ent down from
Oxford I was not only filled w ith a sense of gu ilt for all the 
sufferings which so we were taught, were the direct consequences
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of these term s - bu t even felt th a t consequently i t  was we and not 
the Germ an people them selves who were responsible for the  rise 
of H itler"[14]. The exclusion of G erm any from  E uropean  
decision-making had become a  m oral question and m ade i t  all the 
more necessary  to curb h e r rad ical tendencies for w hich the  
post-war treaties were now held alm ost wholly responsible. More 
significantly, the stipulations of the  Peace Treaties were feared to 
be detrim ental to lasting  peace, which, in  Hadow's eyes, m ade 
the ir revision even more essential.
French Interference
While in  A ustria, Hadow's criticism  of France seemed to 
follow na tu ra lly  from his increased confidence over criticism  of 
the  post-war settlem ents and in  recom m endations for economic 
appeasem ent and general conciliation of Germany. Hadow had  
seemingly caught the early mood of appeasem ent and  was keen to 
endorse its  sentim ents. In  his exasperation w ith  F rance he 
largely  centred on th a t  country 's fear of G erm an aggression 
which often found expression in her economic policy and her 
dealings with Austria. I t  seems, however, th a t Hadow also felt a 
more basic antipathy  tow ards France which was common among 
m any of h is countrym en, F rench  in sistence  on G erm an 
im potence was inconsis ten t w ith  the  B ritish  percep tion  of
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fair-play and benevolence tow ard the defeated enemy as well as 
th e  grow ing b e lie f am ong B ritish  policy-m akers th a t  a n  
economically strong Germany would be an advantage to the ir own 
country. Throughout the  post-war years Franco-British relations 
had  become a m a tte r  of increas ing  irr ita tio n ; an ti-F ren ch  
sentim ent developed in  B rita in  through a lack of confidence in  
French stability , s tren g th  and value as a steadying force in  
Europe, and B ritish officials m istrusted  France and held French 
statesm en in low regard.
To Hadow, France, among other things, was alienating  the 
sym pathy of A ustria through h e r dem ands on th a t  country and 
her obvious determ ination to prevent an  Austro-Germ an Customs 
Union. Because of the  grow th of his affinity for A ustria , the 
alienation Hadow observed could have been a projection of his own 
feelings. He may, for example, have been inclined to the rum ours 
th a t the  collapse of the Kredit-Anstalt was largely due to deliberate 
w ithdraw als of credit by F rench bankers, although there  was no 
conclusive evidence to support this[15]. P aris  w as, however, 
certainly unhelpful towards A ustria  during the crisis as France 
herself drew a certain amount of strength  from it: she was not yet 
economically affected by the  collapse and  could m ake w hat 
conditions she liked on any lo.tn; given out. Hadow was quick to 
spot this and in August 1931 wrote th a t as soon as A ustria came to 
the  League of N ations for money, P aris  would "endeavour to
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m anoeuvre the  League in to  m aking the  political stipu la tions 
which France so eagerly and constantly desires of Austria"[16]. » 
In  Septem ber he wrote th a t  the  A ustrian  press w as p a in ting  
France in  violent tones as "a heartless m oney-sucking vam pire 
and a  political tyrant" and he advocated British advice to France 
on her policy towards A ustria and Germany. As Hadow saw the 
situation, France was driving A ustria "willy-nilly" into the arm s 
of G erm any, "which we p resum ab ly  do no t w ant" and  so 
h in d e rin g  C en tra l E u ro p ean  independence  a n d  economic 
stability[17].
In  his criticism  of F rance 's  m ethod of blockage of the  
Customs Union, i t  is apparen t th a t  Hadow was not as averse to 
the  idea h im self as he was officially claim ing. In  1932 he 
reviewed France's a ttitu d e  on the situation, and he noted th a t  
France in  particu lar saw in  the plan the  beginning of Anschluss 
betw een A ustria and G erm any "which she so m uch dreads and, 
despite A ustro-G erm an p ro tests th a t  the  p lan  w as m erely the  
nuc leus of a schem e for h a s ten in g  th e  fo rm atio n  of a 
Customs-Union of Europe (tha t is another and more practical way 
of carrying out French Pan-European proposals) she set her face 
resolutely against the entire idea"[18]. Hadow clearly disapproved 
of th is  a ttitu d e : ’F rench  fears of the  'D rang  nach  Osten*
[pressure to the  E ast] and  of G erm an dom ination of C entral 
Europe m ay be rig h t in  the  long run", he wrote, "but for the
33
m oment i t  is useless to th in k  of tw enty years hence - w hatever 
m ay be the consequences a t  th a t  time - for C entral Europe is on 
the brink of a general economic collapse'll 9].
F rance’s answ er to A ustria 's need of assistance  was the 
"Tardieu Plan" w hich proposed preferential ta riffs  am ong the 
countries in  the  D anube B asin  on a  basis of equality  and was 
offered as a  form of resistance to a plan pu t forward by Germany. 
This la tte r  plan was based on the idea th a t G erm any alone was 
capable of absorbing surplus agricultural products of the  Danube 
sta tes and she was prepared to afford un ila tera l preferences to 
A ustria as long as the other G reat Powers followed suit.
Hadow supported the  la tte r  plan and recom m ended th a t 
B ritish  loans should  follow along these  lines. He fu r th e r  
recom m ended th a t  B rita in  take  from France "the leadersh ip  
which she has enjoyed for some time past in C entral European 
problem s", acknowledging th a t  a  break  in  th e  A nglo-French 
policy of cooperation of recent years would be involved. "But i t  
may be asked", Hadow wrote, "whether th is  substitu tion  would 
not in the long run  work for peace instead of forcing A ustria  into 
the arm s of Germ any as is  seemingly being done a t  the p resen t 
time by French ideas and methods of coercion"[20].
In 1 933 Hadow reported  growing b itte rn ess  in  A ustria  
towards F rance m ainly in  term s of her economic trea tm en t. The 
feeling, Hadow w rote, w as due to "French fa ilu re  to fulfil
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prom ises repeated ly  m ade in  respect of A ustrian  tim ber and 
against Czechoslovakia because of the grasping one-sided na tu re  
of th a t country's tariff-demands"[21]. In 1934 he urged B ritish  
pressure on France to come to an  understanding  w ith  Germany, 
w hich he believed the  la t te r  desired "if only for economic 
reasons"[22].
Hadow's reactions to France while in  A ustria , although 
they  arose from a probable bias, were fairly stra ightforw ard  in  
lieu of Anglo-French relations a t the time. France, a fter the F irs t 
W orld W ar, had  adopted  an  in tra n s ig en t a tt i tu d e  tow ards 
Germany, b u t she had  not been blind to the  danger of isolation 
brought about by a lienation  of former allies; and  th rough  the 
efforts of the French Foreign M inister from 1925 Aristide Briand 
she had  recognised the  need for in te rn a tio n a l reconciliation, 
particu larly  w ith  Germany. France was not, however, keen to 
relinquish  her position of au thority  in  Europe and  was always 
aw ake to the  dangers of an  excessively rev ita lised  Germ any. 
These la tte r  points contributed to friction betw een B rita in  and 
France, as did economic problems during the Depression.
W hen P residen t Hoover proposed a m oratorium  on w ar 
rep a ra tio n s  in  1931 in  response to an  im pending  financial 
collapse in  Europe, F rance  resisted , believing am ong o ther 
things, th a t the proposal had been purposely kept secret from her 
un til the last m inute. She eventually agreed to the  m oratorium ,
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b u t on the condition th a t  the  reparations system  continue to 
operate in  principle. The m oratorium , i t  was hoped, would help 
G erm an trad e  and in d u stry  to recover, create  confidence in  
Germany’s ability  to m eet commercial dem ands, and  check the  
spread of world depression. Hadow certainly took th is  point of 
view and was, therefore likely to feel critical of w hat he saw as a 
lack of reason on the p a rt of France.
On the  question of the  proposed Customs Union, B rita in  
had  attem pted  to adopt a  n eu tra l position due to th e  political 
considerations involved, b u t had  not actually been averse to the 
idea; hence, Hadow's assurance in m entioning its  advantages. 
B ritain 's hope th a t an  a lternative scheme could be devised which 
sa tisfied  F rance , G erm any and A ustria , how ever, ac tually  
implied a b ias tow ards France as Germany and A ustria  would 
then  have to adm it th a t  th e ir  p lan  was a t  fau lt. Hadow had 
recognised th is  and the im plications for Germanic sym pathy in 
A ustria and thus urged a  conciliatory approach in  denying the 
p lan  to G erm any and  A ustria . F rance, how ever, h ad  an  
advantageous position in  th is  case because A ustria  needed her 
help and she could therefore safely sabotage the Customs Unions 
and deal w ith A ustria  on her own term s, a circum stance which 
caused Hadow to feel fu rther exasperation with France and made 
others in  B rita in  condem n French action tow ards A ustria  as 
blackmail. Even the  Perm anen t U nder-Secretary of S ta te  Sir
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Robert V a n sitta rt, who w as generally  felt to be pro-French, 
expressed the belief th a t  the  French a ttitude  was comparable to 
"the stronger m an m aking conditions w ith the w eaker one while 
the house was on fire"[23].
The fact th a t France was still financially strong in  the  early 
1930s fu rth er caused a  certa in  am ount of resen tm en t. The 
Depression combined w ith political problems had left B rita in  too 
weak to p u t pressure  on France or the U nited  S ta tes to revise 
reparations and  improve her financial position. The situation  
was also complicated by a leakage of a  conversation in  Jan u a ry  
1932 in  which the  G erm an chancellor reportedly told the  B ritish  
Ambassador th a t  G erm any could no longer pay any reparations. 
In terpreting  th is sta tem en t as an  ultim atum  in  which i t  seemed 
the B ritish  were im plicated, the French Governm ent ordered a 
concentration of troops n ear the  German frontier. N egotiations 
over reparations were disrupted  and the proposed conference on 
them  postponed. Tension decreased by June 1932, b u t B rita in  and 
German hopes th a t  reparations m ight be ended were disappointed 
somewhat. G erm any w as to m ake a final paym ent of th ree  
thousand  m illion R eichsm arks, and the  U n ited  S ta te s , for 
political reasons, still could not relinquish war debts.
On the question of disarm am ent, B rita in  and France had 
initially  draw n together in  1932 while Germ any faced isolation 
through her am bitions, b u t the  deadlock over w ar debts m ade
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opposition weak w hen H itler came to power in Ja n u a ry  1933. 
In te rp re tin g  B r ita in ’s a tte m p ts  a t  m inim al ag reem en ts on 
d isarm am ent and B ritish  expressions of sym pathy tow ards the  
French position as ineffectual, France began to tu rn  in  1933 to the 
E as t to create an  alliance system  involving the  Soviet Union. 
Hadow probably sym pathised with B ritish  discouragement of th is 
course for ideological reasons as well as tHe fear th a t  Europe 
m ight be divided into two arm ed camps. The move contradicted 
his calls for an economically united Central Europe and generally 
increased the stra in  in relations between B ritain  and France. In  
1934 F ran ce  re jec ted  th e  B ritish  d isa rm am en t proposals, 
c la im in g  th a t  G erm an  re a rm a m e n t "has re n d e re d  a ll 
nego tia tions useless. F rance will henceforw ard a ssu re  its  
security by its  own means"[24]. Thus, to Hadow and m any of his 
colleagues in  London, i t  seemed th a t the disarm am ent conference 
had  failed, no t because of G erm an am bitions, b u t because of 
French recalcitrance.
Hadow's recom m endation th a t B rita in  take  over France's 
leadersh ip  in  European affairs arose not only from the friction 
caused by the la tte r 's  actions^ in the early 1930s b u t also from a 
general feeling in B ritain th a t the Foreign Office was traditionally 
too pro-French in  its policy. Thg Robert
Bernays, for example, wrote to Hadow a t  th is  tim e th a t he was 
alarm ed a t the strength of London's pro-French policy; "Clearly it
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is dom inant in  the  Foreign Office now. No voice is lifted for an  
a ttem pt a t accommodation with Germany on A ustria or any . other 
question"[25]. S ir John  Simon, who was Foreign Secretary while 
Hadow was in  Austria, seemed determ ined to change th is  a ttitude 
and did not believe in  the validity of French anxiety. He hoped th a t 
the  French governm ent could be persuaded th a t  legalisation of 
G erm any's tre a ty  violations was "the inev itab le  outcome" of 
post-w ar circum stances, and reflected the  views of h is Prim e 
M in ister R am say M acD onald by ap p aren tly  con tem pla ting  
isolation from the continent instead  of Anglo-French solidarity.
L ike Hadow, he h in ted  a t  the desirability  of being closer to 
G erm any th a n  F ran ce , and  urged  h is co lleagues to stop 
acquiescing in French policy[26].
A lthough he lim ited  h im self to p a rticu la r criticism  of 
French moves, i t  seems th a t Hadow 5h&rg.d in the  deterioration 
among B ritons in  national em pathy tow ards France. Nicholas 
Rostow w rites in  Anglo-French Relations 1934-36 th a t, to the  
B ritish, Frenchm en became "obsessive, legalistic, unreasonable, 
corrupt or flighty as the  mood required"[27]. I t  seems likely th a t 
Hadow adopted these sentim ents although how deep-seated they 3
were is unclear.
The bias Hadow felt against France during his posting in 
A ustria was thus evident bu t not a t this time unreasonable. His 
objections were based on the idea th a t Europe should pull together
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economically so th a t  countries would be less susceptib le  to 
political u n res t and oppression, and th a t  the  rev ita lisa tion  of 
countries such as A ustria  and G erm any was m ore im portan t 
th an  w hat he saw as old w ar grudges. He recognised F rance’s 
fears regarding a  strengthened Germany b u t chose to deplore 
them  as unrealistic in  the face of European economic problems. 
The fact th a t he m aintained th is position after H itler's accession 
to power dem onstrates the  point a t  which his bias caused him  to  
ignore the  im plications of a now aggressive and  po ten tially  
unreasonable Germ any, and  fail to recognise the  ra tionality  of 
F rench fears.
The Nazi Shadow
In  add ress ing  h im self to the  political an d  economic 
s itu a tio n  in  A ustria , H adow 's focus on G erm any  and  h e r 
influence in  A ustria  was a reflection of B ritish  foreign policy 
concerns as well as the concerns of Europe itself. W hen H itler 
gained power in  1933 these concerns turned to consternation, and 
confusion arose over how to deal with Nazi Germany. Before 1933 
the  redressing  of G erm an grievances was a w idely accepted 
approach to E uropean problems, one reason being th a t  such a 
course, i t  was hoped, would strengthen m oderating influences in
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Germany and quell the rise of national socialism. The increase in 
Nazi power rep resen ted  a  failure for these influences and  its  
repercussions were felt not least in  Austria. As M artin  Kitchen 
points out in  The Coming o f Austrian Fascism, H itler's  trium ph  
in  Germany in  1933 awakened democratic forces in  A ustria to the 
grow ing d an g er of rig h t-w in g  m ovem ents in  th e ir  own 
country[28].
Hadow stressed  the  fundam entally  G erm anic n a tu re  of 
A ustria b u t felt an  in itia l aversion to Nazism  which was only 
superseded by his aversion to communism and war. Some sort of 
major link between A ustria and Germany, he felt, was crucial in  
calming radical elem ents in  both countries, pa rticu larly  before 
H itler's accession to power, b u t he opposed a union of the  two. 
Significantly, however, it  becomes clear in his la te r despatches in  
Vienna th a t the  principal danger he saw in  the  union of A ustria 
and  G erm any w as a  w eakening of H itle r in  th e  face of a 
communist menace; th a t  menace stemm ing from the elem ents in  
the  G erm an Chancellor's p a rty  which Hadow believed to be 
left-wing. Hadow, thus, along w ith m any others, came to view 
H itler as a m oderating influence in Germany.
F rom  1931-32 H adow  c o n ce n tra te d  on German-.c 
sym pathies in  A ustria , the  rise of Nazism  being a subsidiar.- 
consideration. In Ju ly  1931 he was writing th a t the  "underlying: 
note of sym pathy" for G erm any in  the  A u strian  p ress was
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”ummstakable"[29], b u t in  September of th a t year wrote of the lack 
of unan im ity  betw een the  R oyalist, C hristian -S ocialist, and 
Pan-Germ an adherents of the Heimwehr movement; a  movement 
led by Prince S tahrem berg which originally took common cause 
w ith the  G erm an Nazis b u t la te r found g reater profit in gaining 
the  support of M ussolini. I t  was Hadow's opinion th a t  an  
attem pted putsch by the Heimwehr faction which had  occurred a t 
th is  tim e was only significant in  its  pathetic failure and lack of 
support: "It is to be hoped th a t those abroad who lay  stress upon 
the danger of Austro-G erm an solidarity in such m ovem ents will 
tak e  note no t of th is  quixotic ’pu tsch ’, b u t r a th e r  of the  
businesslike m anner in  which i t  was suppressed  and  of the  
apparent unanim ity  w ith which an  a ttem pt to seize the  reins of 
Government by unconstitutional methods has been resisted  and is 
now being condemned by P ress and public alike, even though 
some of the condemnation m ust be accepted as lip-service"[30].
In  A ugust 1932 Hadow wrote a m em orandum  en titled  
"Austria and the Anschluss" which sum m arised recent events in  
A ustria in  the light of the movement for Austro-G erm an union. 
According to Hadow, conservative, na tionalist and particu larly  
Christian-Social political opinion in  Austria had, for jiome time to 
come, been estranged by recent German m anoeuvrt 5 "Of th is 
there  is evidence in  the  press, while Prince S tarhem berg  [who 
had now switched his loyalties to Italy] has, in his latest speeches,
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seen fît to protest against 'attem pts to dictate A ustrian  policy from 
Berlin'". Hadow w ent on to say th a t he had it  on good authority  
th a t  "the rank  and file of A ustrian youths who are now joining the 
N azi s ta n d a rd  in  considerable num bers have  l i t t le  or no 
enthusiasm  for any ideas involving actual or potential Union w ith 
Germany and th a t so long as Prussia appears in  th is country to be 
th e  d o m in a tin g  an d  d o m in eerin g  p a r tn e r  o f G erm an  
confederation A u strian s  as a  whole desired  none b u t the  
theoretical side of the 'ZusammemSchluss' ['final m erging' - see 
first le tte r in  A ppendixT• Hadow concluded th a t, while it  was 
tru e  th a t  G erm any worked h a rd  to keep alive a Pan-G erm an 
sentim ent which, in A ustria took the place of patrio tism  in  other 
countries, the  stren g th  of th is  movem ent and its  v ita lity  lay 
"largely in  the fascination exercised over A ustrian sentim entality  
by a two-edged sword which, i f  left to them selves, A ustrians 
would probably never grasp b u t which, kept tan ta lising ly  out of 
reach by T reaties and Protocols, shines out of th e  economic 
morass of present-day A ustria as a very Excalibur"[31].
In the same m onth he wrote th a t nothing short of invasion 
would persuade the  political groups in A ustria  to  su rren d er 
parochial advantages by handing themselves over to Germany, 
"and invasion I doubt w hether Germany ^ c uld r isk  even in  a 
disguised or H itlerian  form"[32], Hadow was apparen tly  a le rt 
regarding H itler and the Nazis in  Germany, as were m ost of his
43
colleagues. If, however, Germ any succumbed to N azism , he did 
not believe Anschluss w ith A ustria was inevitable not m erely 
because i t  was not the wish of the A ustrians, b u t also because 
even an aggressive Germany would not attem pt to force it.
The rise of Nazism  in  Germany a t th is tim e w as confusing 
B ritish  policy m akers in  th e ir  approach to th a t  country. The 
G erm an G overnm ent u n d er B runing  had  begun to adopt a 
seemingly revisionist policy under pressure from the  Nazis, bu t 
refusing concessions to th is  Government would only streng then  
th e  N azi position. In  1931 V a n s itta r t w rote th a t  F rench  
reluctance to m ake concessions had  w eakened th e  dem ocratic 
forces in  G erm any and played into the  hands of H itler. To 
V a n s itta r t i t  w as now im p o rtan t to base B ritish  policy not 
n ecessa rily  on sy m p a th y  for G erm any 's d e fe a t b u t on 
"enlightened self-interest". By appeasing Germ any the  strength  
of her grievances would decrease and a w ar of revenge would be 
avoided[33]. T his w as H adow 's basic reason ing  regard ing  
revisionism and the  a ttitude  of France, bu t the  potential dangers 
of Nazism he apparen tly  viewed in  a different light. V an sitta rt 
regarded  H itle r as a "half-mad and rid iculously  dangerous 
demagogue"[34], and w arned that Germany's objectives included 
A nsch luss  as well as rearm am er.t and the  recovery of lost 
colonies[353. Hadow had  g rea ter faith  in  the  ra tionality  of the 
G erm an people and, like m ost in the Foreign Office, probably
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regarded V ansitta rt’s fears as too alarm ist.
B run ing '8 G overnm ent, m eanw hile, h ad  fa llen , to be 
replaced first by von Papen, then  General Schleicher. Germany 
had begun to rearm  - a  circumstance which B rita in  was aware of 
and resigned to - and H itle r became louder in  expressing his 
intentions to destroy the Versailles settlem ent. B ritish attem pts a t 
concessions had come too lat^ to stop the rise of H itler and when 
he became Chancellor in Jan u ary  1933, B ritain 's w orst fears were 
realised. S till som ew hat doubtful of the m enace of an  actual 
G erm an takeover of A ustria , however, Hadow now began to 
concentrate on Nazi influence in  th a t country.
In the Spring of 1933 Hadow travelled through the  provinces 
of u p p e r A u s tr ia , S a lzb u rg  and  S ty ria  know n as th e  
Salzkamm ergut. Of the political conditions in  th is area  he wrote 
th a t  the  m ountain  peasan try  was trad itionally  Royalist b u t he 
noted the am ount of Nazi posters on village notice-boards: "No 
village or cross-road, few barns or inns bu t showed in  some the 
form the energy and  system atic propaganda which are being 
showered upon th is d istric t by the new party". Hadow noticed a 
weakness in  the Socialist attem pts a t retaliation and also took note 
of the German broadcasts which were played in  the  tap-rooms of 
m ost inns: "I was asto ru shed not by the custom ary virulence of 
the speeches bu t by the pointed and frequent references to Austria 
and  A ustro-G erm an so lidarity  which m ade i t  seem  to the
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listeners as if the speeches were being broadcast especially for 
A ustrian  consumption". The older listeners, according to Hadow, 
were curious about H itle r b u t little  more, the  m iddle-aged 
"perturbed and  wavering", and the younger ones "violently Nazi".
Hadow concluded th a t he had no doubt of the thoroughness 
and direction of Nazi propaganda, bu t the Salzkam m ergut did not 
rep resen t a large p a r t  of A ustria and, lying close to the  Germ an 
border, w as a  good field for "showy agitation". The A ustrian  
tem peram ent, Hadow wrote, was paradoxically conservative and 
its  instincts were cautious. "Yet the Nazi movement", he warned, 
"has in  i ts  favour growing economic d istress and  trad itio n a l 
d islike of V ienna by the rem ainder of A ustria  as well as an 
ex te rna l driving-force which the  A ustrian  G overnm ent m ight 
find difficult to w ithstand in a sudden emergency"[36].
Hadow's report on these a reas and their political leanings 
in  comparison to Vienna were fairly accurate. Provinces such as 
S ty ria  he ld  a tra d itio n  of n a tio n a lism  as opposed to the  
Catholicism  of V ienna and provided the m ain force behind the  
G erm an N ationa list P arty . Professions in  these  a reas were 
overcrowded and  Jew ish  com petition increasingly  prom inent.
The Torfiijn Cff/cg A n n u a l f o r  1933 (to which Hadow m ost likely 
contributed) sta ted  th a t "the tw in Nazi doctrines of 'more work' 
and  an ti-S em itism  find a fe rtile  field in  th e  in h e re n tly  
an ti-S em itic  and  im poverished  you th  of A u stria " , and  i t
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h igh ligh ted  "the hopeless economic fu tu re  w hich faces the  
m ajority of adolescents as they grow up into manhood"[37].
Nazi pressure was, in fact, dynamic throughout A ustria a t 
th is time. While in itially  consolidating power, H itler, as pointed 
out earlier, reassured Europe of his peaceful intentions. Only in  
the  case of A ustria  was he seemingly unafra id  to express his 
aggressive am bitions. A nticipating th a t  Dollfuss's Government, 
being apparently  weak, would be forced to compromise in favour 
of the  Nazis he stepped up pressure in in  A ustria  the form of 
propaganda[38].
Hadow perceived Dollfuss's position as precarious and 
wrote of the  danger of his government being swallowed up by the 
G erm an Nazis[39]. In  May of th a t year H itle r ordered a tax  of 
1,000 m arks to be imposed on all citizens travelling to Austria, an 
action which, according to Hadow's sources had  the  A ustrian  
cabinet "wringing their hands". Hadow wrote th a t  in  answer to 
th is G erm an intim idation, the Italian  legation was contemplating 
an  approach to London for "quiet" representations in  Berlin, their 
object being removal of the tourist ban and be tter Austro-German 
rela tions, as a necessity to the  peace of C entra l Europe. "I 
vouchsafed no opinion b u t th is  more or less supports your 
[ M i n'lSfCr to Vienna Walford Selby’s] recent suggestions to the 
P.O. which I believe are now an u rgent necessity if  H.M.G. wish 
to avoid - or a t all events put off a gradual bu t steady absorption of
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A ustria by Germ any."[40].
In  A ugust Hadow noted the  rise of Pan-G erm anism  in  
A ustria  and Dollfuss’s growing loss of support. Leaving aside 
economic factors, he believed th a t  the Austro-G erm an "quarrel" 
hinged upon "the loyalty and ability of the arm y and policy to 
resist, and if  necessary to fire, on A ustrian  soil, upon bro ther 
A ustrians of some A ustrian  Legion, tra ined  and  equipped in  
G erm any and  stiffened , i f  necessary , by a backbone of 
incom parably efficient G erm an non-commissioned officers"[41].
In  the same m onth Hadow reported in  a telegram  th a t the 
A ssistan t Chief of the Intelligence W ar Office had  sta ted  to the 
M ilitary Attache th a t  a fter visiting Salzburg and other provincial 
centres and studying the  la te s t reports he was convinced th a t 
A ustria 's days were num bered unless the allies could save her. 
Hadow wrote, "I discount th is information to some extent for the 
disquieting reason th a t  I consider he is wavering in  his loyalty to 
th is Government"; b u t he noted th a t A ustrians in  Germ any were 
being tra ined  to a ssis t the  A ustrian  Legions of A ustrian  Nazi 
exiles in  m aking a  putsch fairly soon: "A good deal of th is talk  is 
a resu lt of nervousness deliberately fomented by Nazi agents bu t 
[the A ustrian Government] is undoubtedly in  difficulties[42].
In  Ja n u a ry  1934 Hadow took care to reaffirm  his own 
objections to an  Anschluss b u t held onto the opinion th a t  such a 
union was not the  true  desire of either country. A lthough he
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contended th a t  over 40% of A ustrians w ere sym pathetic  to 
Nazism, "6-12 m onths after any Gleichschaltung m ost A ustrians 
would, I believe rue th e ir decision to join Germany, and  I fu rther 
believe th a t H itler - as an  A ustrian - realises th a t Germ any would 
do likewise"[43].
Although Hadow m ay have been fairly perceptive regarding 
A u strian  opinion, h is optim ism  clouded h is ju d g m en t over 
Germ an intentions. The enthusiasm  for union w ith Germ any on 
the  A ustrian  side decreased w ith  the coming to power of Nazis, 
b u t i t  was ju s t  th is  occurrence in  G erm any w hich increased 
in te res t in  Anschluss on the Germ an side, purposely prom pted 
by Hitler. In 1931, for example. H itler had told W aldem an Pabst, 
who was in strum en ta l in  organising coups in  A ustria , th a t  he 
would help finance the  national socialist cam paign as well as 
send his best speakers to A ustria in  order to achieve the  success 
he had in Germany[44].
In  Ju n e  1934 a m eeting was held betw een H itle r and 
M ussolini which ra ised  hopes for a negotiated  solution over 
A ustria. The results of th is m eeting were, however, negative and 
on his re tu rn  to Rome M ussolini told the G erm an am bassador 
th a t  "in view of th e  acts of violence ag a in st the  A ustrian  
government he could not advise Dollfuss to s ta rt negotiations with 
the  N ational Socialists"[45]. This outcome caused the  A ustrian  
Nazis to strengthen their belief in a  solution by force. On the 25th
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Ju ly  a group of insurgen ts staged the abort?Ve Nazi putsch in  the 
A ustrian  chancellery w here, am ongst the  confusion, Dollfuss 
was shot and killed[46]. M ainly through a lack of support the 
in su rg en ts  in  V ienna su rren d ered  on th e  sam e day a fte r 
obtaining an  assurance of free conduct, while fighting  in  the  
provinces continued for three days. When it  became clear th a t the 
attem pt had failed. H itler disowned the 8.8. gang involved, closed 
the frontier, dismissed Habicht, and sent a telegram  of sym pathy 
to DoUfuss' widow.
Hadow w rote several m em oranda on the  subject of the 
putsch which he appeared to view as m ainly the  action of young 
"hot-heads", an d  seem ed p a rticu la rly  concerned over th e  
trea tm en t of the  insurgen ts who were denied free conduct and 
arrested  as soon as the  death of Dollfuss was discovered. I t  was 
Hadow's belief th a t  they  had  been cheated  and  th a t  th e ir  
ill-treatm ent by the police would lead to fu rther chaos in  Austria. 
W ith regard to G erm any's responsibility, Hadow described the 
failed putsch as "an unparalleled opportunity" for H itler to "kill 
two birds w ith one stone" by ridding h im self of the  G erm an 
vice-chancellor von Papen's presence in  Germany (of the  pre-Nazi 
regime) and "showing the  world how completely he dissociated 
him self from the insurgen ts in  Austria". According to Hadow, 
the  "Pan-German" elem ents in  A ustria had  m anaged to "keep 
a lo o f from the uprising  b u t the ir sym pathies, although shaken
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regarding Nazi activity, were unchanged in  th e ir  belief in  the 
Pan-Germ an ideal[47].
I t  is unclear to w hat ex ten t H itler was involved in  the 
a ttem p ted  pu tsch  a lthough  i t  seem s defin ite  th a t  he had  
foreknowledge of it[48]. He obviously, however, w as less th an  
happy w ith its  consequences and, while separa ting  him self from 
the insurgents, tried  to extract w hat advantages he could out of it. 
Thus, as Hadow noted. H itler used the  putsch to send von Papen - 
who had become a hindrance to him  through his lack of ta len t 
and openly professed Catholicism - to A ustria as an  envoy where 
he could in trigue w ith the  A ustrian  Nazis while G erm any built 
up enough streng th  to impose a more forceful solution on th a t 
country. In  th is  he would be assisted  by th e  Pan-G erm an 
elements to which Hadow referred. Meanwhile, H itler had to face 
the  in ternational repercussions of the attem pted putsch and play 
down not only his involvement bu t his interest. From  then  on he 
rev ised  h is ou tw ard  policy tow ards A ustria , o rderin g  the  
disbanding of the  A ustrian  Legion (an order w hich was never 
enforced), dissolving the  A ustrian  P arty  Bureau, and postponing 
plans for political union between A ustria and Germany.
Though m any outside A ustria  and G erm any held H itler 
personally responsible for the death of Dollfuss, Hadow's stress on 
H itler's estrangem ent from the event dem onstra tes a growing 
sympathy he was feeling towards Germany regardless of the Nazi
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regime. I t  was a  sentim ent which Sir Walford Selby, who became 
M inister in  Vienna in  1933, recognised and disapproved of. In  a 
personal note to Hadow he wrote th a t he had noticed th a t  French 
and B ritish  contentions came in  for strong criticism  in  Hadow's 
com m ents, w hile th e  G erm an a rgum en t w as accepted and 
supported. "I cannot help b u t feel", Selby wrote, " th a t your 
a ttitude  arises from the ignoring of a good deal of 'background'. 
We should never have come to th is pass b u t for th e  consistent 
policy of concession followed tow ards her[G erm any] from 1914 
onwards" [49].
Sir Godfrey Nicholson, Conservative M.P. for Morpeth, in 
corresponding w ith Hadow, also recognised Hadow's sym pathies 
and warned against the danger of Germany's repressive regimes. 
"When you have public opinion absolutely under your thum b to 
mould in any way you like", Nicholson wrote, "and w hen you can 
suppress any news from abroad which you feel is contrary to your 
ideas, war is a certainty sooner or later". Probably in  reference to 
Hadow's affinity w ith the G erm an people Nicholson wrote, "We 
w an t to m ake friends w ith  the  m an in  the stree t, to see him  
prosperous and happy; bu t we m ust have free access to his mind. 
At the  m om ent he is, in tellectually , a slave and will do his 
m aster's bidding, wherever th a t may lead him  - and Europe"[50].
Hadow, nonetheless, was gravitating tow ards the  form of 
appeasem ent which tended to ignore the excesses of the  Nazi
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regim e or explain  them  away. One reason for th is  was his 
an tipathy  tow ards communism. By 1934 it  seemed th a t  Hadow 
was more concerned over the possibility of a com m unist take-over 
in  Germ any th an  Nazi aggression. To Hadow, any appreciable 
weakening of H itler m eant one more step tow ards a  com m unist 
G erm any 'led  by u tte r ly  unreasonable m en - which I do not 
consider H itler to be". In  Hadow's eyes, th is possibility would 
m ean such an  upse t of the  political and economic s tru c tu re  of 
Europe " that I prefer to help H itler ra th e r  th a n  risk  having a 
worse alternative in  his place!"[51]. Hadow apparently  perceived 
Germ any as a  th re a t to A ustria  and to European peace due to 
w hat he viewed as the  leftist tendencies in  the  H itle r regime. 
The "left wing" of the  Nazi pa rty  Hadow defined as H erm ann 
G oering and  Jo sep h  Goebbels "whose doctrines reflec t the  
influence of Moscow"; and the "right wing" was rep resen ted  by 
H itler and  the  South Germ ans whose views, Hadow wrote, "are 
modelled on the example of Fascist Rome"[52].
As unlikely as Hadow's assessm ent of Nazi politics m ay 
now sound, i t  did have some basis in the first years of post-war 
Germany and the  early  workings of the Nazi regime. J u s t  after 
H itler's rise to power, challenge arose w ith in  th e  N azi pa rty  
among the storm  troopers. A large radical wing took the word 
"socialist" in  the  p a rty  title  seriously and began calling for a 
second round of revolution th a t would curb the  privileges and
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powers of Ju n k e r  landlords and industria l barons and  officers. 
The principal charac ter in  th is  faction, however, w as E rn s t 
Roehm, and not, as Hadow believed a t  th a t  tim e, Goering or 
Goebbels.
Roehm also hoped to absorb the  G erm an arm y into  his 
storm  troopers, b u t the  arm y, as well as th e  conservative 
establishm ent which had long dominated Germany, had played a 
p a rt in  H itler s accession to power, so the danger Hadow saw of 
th is  leader succum bing to any th ing  approaching communism 
was fairly  m arginal. H itler was also in  g rea te r control th an  
Hadow perceived. When the challenge arose from Roehm H itler 
speedily resolved the issue on June  30, 1934 in  the  "Night of the 
Long Knives" in  which Roehm and other potential enemies were 
rouAcfed up and shot.
The advent of H itler to power m arked the  beginning of 
illusions am ong m any, which Hadow shared . There was a 
certain  am ount of relief, for example, th a t political uncertain ty  
had ended in Germany combined w ith the hope th a t  H itler would 
be calmed by his position of leadership. In  Hadow’s case, such 
illusions probably arose from the Germanic sym pathy apparent in 
his despatches, and his anti-com m unism . H itle r had declared 
him self a guardian against communism and while Nazism was a 
new and possibly aggressive phenomenon, the spread of the Soviet 
experim en t w as an estab lished  th re a t  and seem ed to take
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precedence in  Hadow’s m ind as Europe’s principal danger. His 
views were again taken  note of by Selby who was dubious in  his 
assessm ent, despite h is basic respect for Hadow’s work: "Mr. 
Hadow m ay be perfectly righ t about the com m unist m enace in  
Germ any if  H err H itler is pressed too far bu t for m yself I doubt 
w hether we can tak e  account of all these contingencies"[63]. 
Selby’s objections were p a rt of a reluctance in  B rita in  to draw 
close to either Nazism  or communism. One hope was th a t  the  two 
would destroy each other through the ir extrem ist m ethods.
The general in stinc t in  the Foreign Office under Sim on’s 
direction, on the  o ther hand, was to tem porise, and  Hadow 
reflected th is instinct. In  one of his las t despatches from A ustria 
he suggested th a t, through a face-saving approach from  Italy, 
Germ any would be willing to come to an agreem ent over A ustria 
recognising her independence; a suggestion which was m et with 
some scepticism  from some factions in  the Foreign Office b u t 
which illu stra te s  a growing belief in  the  peaceful in ten tions of 
Hitler[54]. It was a belief that, despite the aversion to Nazism  in 
Europe, m any encompassed in  the early years of H itler. Anthony 
Eden, who had been Parliam entary Under-Secretary from 1931-33, 
wrote th a t, a fter v isiting H itler in 1934, the la tte r  had declared 
th a t  G erm any had  no in te res t in  aggression. "The w ar had 
taugh t his country th a t i t  was easier to destroy th an  to buHd up, 
and this formerly m ilitaristic people now saw th a t  peace ought to
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be the perm anent sta te  of mankind", Eden indicated th a t  for all 
he then  knew such sentim ents m ight have been sincere[55].
Hadow certainly in terpreted  H itler's assertions as sincere, 
possibly in  reaction to a cu rren t running through Europe which 
feared the  possibility of ano ther w ar th rough  an  increasingly 
belligerent Germany. H is concern for the  fate  of A ustria  and 
affinity w ith  th a t  country 's people m ight have caused him  to 
readily accept the peaceful claims of H itler in  the secret hope th a t 
they were true  and th a t w ar was not imminent.
Will to Peace versus Communism
As pointed out earlier, Hadow's affinity w ith  Germany, 
a n tip a th y  to w a rd s  F ra n ce , an d  an ti-co m m u n ism  w ere 
underpinned by his abhorrence of war. Well aw are of th is  fact |
himself, Hadow often used th is sentim ent to punctuate  his letters 
and  despatches in  A ustria . W hen urging th a t  B rita in  bring 
Germ any out of isolation in  1933 he wrote tha t, i f  such a course 
was not followed, "I m ust bring up my children for ano ther 1914 
which I refuse to do un til all else has been tried [55]. In  1934 he 
wrote "I take no p a rt in  politics, but a very great in te res t in  the 
future of A ustria, which is, in  my opinion, closely linked up w ith 
the  peace of Europe...Having seen four years of war, not from the
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com fortable ang le  of H e a d q u a rte rs , b u t from  th e  very  
uncomfortable situation  of the  trenches on th ree  fronts, I may 
perhaps be allowed to say to you only th a t I would do anything on 
earth  to prevent my own boys having to do likewise"[67].
Hadow's feelings on w ar were genuine and personal, bu t 
were probably encouraged by a general mood in B ritain  and in the 
Foreign Office. By the 1930s w ar was held to be impractical and 
im m oral and , there fo re , un ju stifiab le . A F ore ign  Office 
m em orandum  w ritten  in  1926 sta ted , for exam ple, "Our sole 
object is to keep w hat we have and live in  peace...We keep our 
hands free in  order to throw our weight into the  scale and  on 
behalf of peace"[58]. Richard Griffiths notes in  Fellow Travellers 
of the Right th a t while 1933-35 m arked the lack of coherent views 
towards Germany, there was a desire for appeasem ent which was 
based on general principles on the  subject of peace[59]. W illiam 
Rock w rites in British Appeasement in the 1930s th a t, although 
all of B ritain  did not convert to pacifism in the 1930s, there was "a 
poignant realisation of the ten ib le  destruction wrought by modern 
war", and  a feeling th a t  w ar was now a barbaric  solution to 
foreign policy[60]. Hadow embraced these views wholeheartedly 
and fu rth er believed them  to be the now rational desire of all 
E uropean nations. He, therefore, felt safe in  urg ing  g rea te r 
Coopertdic>r\ ÎA totem Curcpt SLnd criticising any ostracism  of Germany.
Hadow reflected m any of the opinions of h is countrym en
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during his posting in  Vienna. The rise of Nazism  had  evoked a 
feeling of revulsion in  B rita in  b u t did not w arran t an  aggressive 
challenge from th a t  country which m ight r isk  an o th e r war. 
A part from the  fear of w ar, the  idea of a challenge w as also 
repressed by the  sym pathy m any B ritish  felt for th e  G erm ans 
which arose from several factors including guilt over Versailles, 
the  belief in  the  economic necessity of a revitalised Germany, and 
antipathy  towards France, all of which Hadow encompassed. The 
fu rther less definable factor of a  racial and historical affinity and 
supposedly shared  characteristics such as inner discipline and 
n a tio n a l s tre n g th  also in h ib ited  any form  of challenge to 
Germany. I t  seems likely th a t Hadow, a t least subconsciously, 
was drawn to th is la tte r belief as well.
W hile lying benea th  the surface in  Persia , Turkey, and 
Canada, Hadow’s Germ anic sym pathy found rea l expression in 
h is personal sym pathy for A ustria  and identification w ith  the  
A ustrian  character. Throughout his tim e in  A ustria  he became 
increasingly concerned over the political and economic fate of th a t 
country and conveyed his feelings to colleagues and  friends in  
B ritain. One example is an exchange of letters w ith  M. Rodd of 
the Bank of England in which tlie la tte r displayed a decided lack of 
sym pathy for the  economic pr >blems in Austria. Rodd wrote, "I 
am sure th a t the A ustrians will seize upon any excuse they  can 
find e ither to s ta r t  a new hare  or to try  to m ake m ischief by
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m isquoting everyone's opinions to everyone else". Rodd expressed 
th e  hope th a t  H adow  w ould forgive h im  for a p p ea rin g  
unsym pathetic to the  A ustrians' "hard luck stories" b u t added, 
"We have...had some experience of dealing w ith the  A ustrians in  
the last two years"[61].
Hadow replied to Rodd alm ost immediately: "Do not place 
too much reliance on the traditional idea th a t A ustrian  hard-luck 
stories are merely to be treated  w ith amused tolerance. If  I were a 
banker I would come out here and SEE things for m y se lf . He 
continued, "I suppose th is  will lead you to th ink  more th an  ever 
th a t  I swallow blindly anything th a t I hear in  th is  country and 
th a t, like m ost officials, I have become "more royalist th an  the  
King". B u t you will rem em ber th a t th is has been said of m ost 
officials living abroad by th e ir fellow-countrymen a t  home and 
th a t  failure to see the  cracks in  an  edifice have all too often 
brought the  building about our ears w ithout previous warning: 
witness Russia"[62].
L ater despatches give clues to Hadow’s affin ity  w ith the 
A ustrian  character. In  1933 he wrote in  a le tte r  to Phipps, 
"com prom ise is A u s tr ia ’s t r a d itio n a l  w ay o u t of i ts  
difficulties"[63], and to Simon he wrote, "The A ustrian  likes peace 
a t  alm ost any pnce and seeks natu ra lly  for compromise as the 
end of any quarrel [64]. Such characteristics could be equally 
applicable to Hadow although the question of w hether A ustria
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rubbed off on him  or w hether th a t country m erely brought these 
characteristics to the surface is uncertain.
W hile Hadow w as in  A ustria  appeasem ent w as still a 
vague sentim ent shared by m any b u t certainly no t all in  B ritain.
As yet i t  had  no clear definition in  foreign policy and  was more a 
series of general principles and personal bias. Hadow expressed 
these in A ustria b u t w ith comparative caution and reason. In the 
early 1930s British concern was still focussed on recovery from the 
D epression and  a  general m aintenance of the  s ta tu s  quo in  
Europe, and Hadow’s m ain  concentration in  th ese  years was on %
A ustrian  and European economics. More extrem e political views 
encouraging appeasem ent were nonetheless coming to the  fore 
and probably influencing Hadow. In the sum m er of 1934 a copy of 
a le tte r w ritten  by a B ritish  subject in A ustria was sen t to the 
Foreign Office because i t  gave "an in teresting  p ictu re  of local 
conditions there". The le tter included such sta tem ents as "I know 
quite a lot of people here and decidedly all educated clear-thinking 
people are Nazis; also i t  is noticeable th a t all the really nice people 
one likes to know are Nazis", and "there are a lot of Communists 
here and of course they do a lot and pu t the blame on the Nazis".
E .H . C a rr, h is to r ia n  and  C ounsellor in  th e  S o u th e rn  
D epartm en t, sen t a copy of the  le tte r  to Hadow w ith  the 
observation, "There are m any points of view about A ustria, and 
th is is eridently  one"[65]. There was no comment from Hadow,
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b u t he m ay well have found him self in  p a rtia l sym pathy w ith 
these sentiments.
The years 1931-33 reveal Hadow’s initial leanings towards a 
policy of appeasem ent and i t  is possibly during these years th a t he 
began to feel a personal responsibility for foreign policy in  its  
avoidance of w ar. References in  his despatches to h is own 
experience  of w a r su g g est th is  as do h is  in c re a s in g  
correspondence w ith  in fluen tia l figures in  B rita in  outside the 
Foreign  Office. B rita in , m eanw hile, w as edging  tow ards 
appeasem ent in  a m anner providing greater im petus to Hadow's 
fu ture despatches. The B ritish  Prim e M inister S tanley Baldwin 
had  adopted a laissez-faire a ttitude  towards foreign policy which 
did little in  the way of discouraging Hitler. In  1933 he stated  th a t 
B ritain was "entirely willing to continue to work closely even w ith 
a Germany under the  new order"[66]. The path  on which Hadow 
had  launched  in  A u s tr ia  posed seem ingly few obstacles. 
Baldwin’s a ttitude  did not give H itler the active encouragem ent 
which Neville C ham berlain 's la te r  did, bu t i t  certain ly  did not 
hinder the course of the Germ an leader.
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3 Czechoslovakia: Appeaæment.^p}ied
The Sudeten German Factor
Those who worked closely w ith Hadow or knew  him  well 
often recall his concern for those he saw as underprivileged; a 
concern which would be transla ted  into action w henever possible. 
Lord Gladwyn described Hadow in  his memoirs as "an enormous 
demon of energy" who "not only insisted in doing all th e  available 
chancery work himself, but, devout C hristian  as he was, spent 
hours and  hours befriend ing  Tame dogs' - often  obvious 
ne'er-do-wells "[!]. This characteristic  stayed w ith  Hadow and 
found its g reatest expression in his a ttitude tow ards the  German 
m inority in  Czechoslovakia. His sympathy for th is group of people 
was alm ost immediate, and his exertions on the ir p a rt along w ith 
his m istaken  fa ith  in  the party  which grew to rep resen t them  
seemed lim itless. His sim ultaneous impatience w ith  the  Czechs 
and Czechoslovak Government acted as a fu rther catalyst to his 
behaviour, as did the increasing in terest of H itler in  the trea tm en t 
of the G erm an population in  Czechoslovakia, and  Hadow came to 
believe th is question was directly related to peace in  Europe.
By the  end of 1934, Hadow's affinity w ith  A ustria  had 
p en etra ted  his view of Europe. Possibly caugh t up  with the 
rom antic ism  of A ustria , Hadow seem ed to find  th e  m ixed 
h e ritag e , so c ia lis t e lem en ts, and  lim ited  h is to ry  of the
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newly-formed sta te  of Czechoslovakia less palatable. A product of 
the  F irs t W orld W ar, Czechoslovakia was m ade up  of PolCL'b 
Qncl GS bJCill GS Czechs, Slovaks, R u then ians , and
Germ ans who had all been p a rt of the A ustro-H ungarian Empire, 
and  she derived h e r independence m ain ly  from  th e  W ilson 
program m e of self-determ ination. P reserv ing  h e r new s ta tu s  
through reliance on France who had assisted her during the war, 
Czechoslovakia's foreign policy was oriented tow ards both the  
W est and Slav considerations. These elem ents of Czechoslovakia 
were probably unfam iliar to Hadow and i t  m ay be th a t, in  the  
early  weeks of his a rriva l in  P rague, Hadow searched, in  h is 
in itia l confusion, for a portion of th is country with which he could 
identify. His in te res t landed on the  G erm an population in  the 
border areas of Bohemia and Moravia known as the Sudetenland.
Despite the problem of in tegrating  her national m inorities, 
Czechoslovakia avoided succum bing to any form of dictatorship  
and  incorporated these  populations in  a  rela tively  dem ocratic 
fashion throughout the  1920s. R esentm ent among her m inorities, 
however, did not completely disappear, and was strongest among 
the  Sudeten Germans. The area which they populated had  once 
b een  a p a r t  of and  m any  of them  he ld  strong
P an-G erm an sen tim ents and had  a trad itio n  of despising the  
Czechs. D uring the w ar th is section of Czechoslovakia had 
supported the dependence of A ustrian  policy on G erm any and 
Radomir Luza w rites in  The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans
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th a t the punishm ent of Czechs during th is tim e who sym pathised 
w ith  th e  W est and  R ussia  exposed th e  difference betw een 
G erm an-dom inated A ustria  and the  national asp irations of the  
Czechs. "Defeated, m ourning th e ir  high w ar losses, they  [the 
Sudeten-deutsch] saw behind the  Czech victory and  the  peace 
se ttlem ent a  vicious com bination of Pan-Slavism  and political 
greed, betrayal of promises of national self-determ ination, and a 
decline of courage, loyalty, and  selflessness"[2]. Hadow soon 
began to sym pathise with some of these sentim ents.
The G erm an population in  Czechoslovakia h ad  in itially  
resisted the Czech forces a t the s ta rt of the sta te ’s formation, and, 
although developments in  the 1920s healed th is breach somewhat, 
the prelim inary clashes were never quite forgotten. In  1919, the 
Sudeten-deu tsch  ga thered  in  various towns to p ro te s t th e ir  
inclusion in  the Czech state, and in  Kaaden nervous Czech police 
opened fire on the crowd. This incident became known as "the 
m assacre  of K aaden" and  w as la te r  a sym bol for m any 
Sudeten-deutsch of the  righ t to enm ity w ith the  Czechs. Such 
feelings were brought to the surface a t the beginning of the 1930s 
when the Depression h it  th is Germ an m inority w ith particu lar 
force. The economic dislocation which they faced was largely a 
product of the great shrunken m arket afU r the destruction of the 
H absburg Em pire, b u t the tem ptation to, a ttr ib u te  i t  to Czech 
repression was great, especially when H itler's rise  to power in  
Germany was being watched a t the same time in  these areas with
64
in terest and some am ount of adulation. Czech attem pts to redress 
inequities were regarded as conscious efforts to underm ine th is 
m inority who, consequently, felt th e ir ethnic existence was being 
th rea tened . These factors combined w ith  the  fac t th a t  the  
Sudeten-deutsch were th e  largest G erm an m inority  in  Europe 
and the closest geographically to the  Reich, m ade the  growth of 
in te re s t  am ong th is  popu lation  in  ethn ic  G erm an  politics 
(yolkstumspolitik) practically inevitable.
By 1931, the Czech authorities were banning Nazi and Nazi 
youth uniform s among th is  population, and  in  1933, when the  
Czechs th reatened  to outlaw the Sudeten-Nazi party , i t  dissolved 
itse lf and  w ent underground. The movement w as replaced in  
1934 by the German National F ront led by Konrad Henlein which 
a im ed  a t  u n itin g  a ll th e  G erm an  n a tio n a l  forces in  
Czechoslovakia in  a broad alliance. L a te r know n as the  
Sudeten-deutsch party , (SdP) th is  movem ent achieved a m ajor 
electoral success in  May 1935, polling 1,249,530 votes. At the end 
of th is year the Czech president Thomas M asaryk resigned and 
the former Foreign M inister Edvard Benes was elected to take his 
place.
I t  was in  December 1935 th a t  Hadow first referred  to the 
SdP by suggesting th a t greater contact be established w ith it. He 
had  been studying the  lite ra tu re  of this party  and tried  to base 
conclusions on its  evidence; but, as Henlein's headquarte rs  were 
in North Bohemia as opposed to Prague, Hadow found i t  difficult
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"to m ake even in d irec t contact w ith  his m ovem ent w ithou t 
a rousing  u n d e s irab le  and  undeserved  Czech suspicions". 
Hadow, thus, suggested th e  estab lishm en t of a B ritish  Vice 
Consulate in  N orth  Bohemia, claiming no idleness on the p a rt of 
the  legation, b u t a  "real need" for such contact[3]. One m ight 
deduce from Hadow's subsequent behaviour th a t he felt a  personal 
desire to establish closer contact w ith the SdP as well as believing 
i t  to be a diplomatic necessity. From the outset, h is view of the 
a ttitu d e  of th e  Czechoslovak G overnm ent w as sceptical in  
comparison, and subject to the certainty th a t i t  was re luctan t to 
m ake any real concessions to its  German minority; "Any student 
of history knows th a t  fear is the m ain motive underlying Czech 
repression of the  G erm an minority; and I for one cannot blam e 
them  if  they are ne ither statesm en with a long-sighted* policy, 
nor able to resist the tem ptation to tu rn  the tables upon those who, 
they believe, ha te  and despise them , are racially antagonistic to 
th e ir  ideals and belong to the trad itional "oppressors" of th e ir 
race. But, for the  fu ture  peace of Europe, I could w ish it  were 
otherwise"[4].
The Czechs were suspicious of the SdP, but, by adm itting it  
to the  1935 elections they  had  a lready m ade a sign ifican t 
concession. J.W . Bruegel in  Czechoslovakia Before Munich 
contends th a t  the  Czechoslovak Governm ent would have been 
wiser to dissolve Henlein's party  and accompany th is  action w ith 
generous allowances to G erm ans professing dem ocratic ideals,
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bu t concedes th a t th is was unlikely during a preelection period[5]. 
Luza in  also argues th a t  the Czechs should have begun m aking 
concessions to the  Sudeten-deutsch ju s t after they  disbanded the 
Sudeten Nazis in  1933, They were reluctant, however, and Luza 
adm its tha t, in  retrospect, i t  was likely th a t th is action still would 
no t have draw n the  G erm ans back into cooperation w ith  the 
Republic because the issue, by th a t time, was too complex[6].
In  any event, th e  SdP was highly successful in  th e  1935 
P a rlia m e n ta ry  e lections and  Hadow a ttach ed  considerable 
significance to th is occurrence. In  a despatch which concentrated 
on the Sudeten-deutsch he wrote of "four milestones" lining the 
road trodden by Czechoslovakia’s Germ an m inority . The firs t 
m arked the  period from 1920 to 1933 when d ifferent G erm an 
p a rtie s  had  a ttem p ted  to cooperate w ith th e  Czechoslovak 
Governm ent, "while the  m ajority  of th e ir racial b re th re n  in  
Czechoslovakia looked on w ith increasing b itterness as historical 
feuds, racial discrim ination, and  economic d istress each played 
the ir p a rt in  increasing the  hardness of the ir lot". The second 
milestone was the  "meteoric rise" of Henlein from 1934-35 and his 
success in  the elections. The th ird  was the hope of concessions 
and cooperation from the  Czechoslovak Government: "But the 
la tte r  had no liking for ’outsiders' who m ight, as they  thought, 
provide G erm any w ith  an  excuse for in terfering, in  trad itional 
fashion, on b e h a lf  of th is  C inderella  of th e  Czechoslovak 
household". In Hadow’s opinion, Henlein had repeatedly  offered
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an "olive-branch" to the  Government, bu t had failed and was now 
em barking on "the fourth  stage of his people’s journey  through 
th e  w ilderness", w hich m ea n t en lis tin g  th e  sym pathy  of 
Britain[7].
The economic crisis having  reached its  peak  in  1933, 
recovery in  Czechoslovakia was, in  fact, tak in g  place. The 
industries in  the  Czech area, however, felt th e  effect of the 
recovery sooner th a n  the  G erm an industries w hich produced 
m ainly consum er goods. Unem ploym ent was th u s  still m uch 
h igher am ong G erm ans in  Czechoslovakia th a n  am ong the  
Czechs and Slovaks. B ut the Czechs were now realising the need 
for g re a te r  recogn ition  an d  allow ances for th e  G erm an 
m inorities. W hen Benes took on the Presidency he em phasised 
his policy of cooperation between Germans and Czechs and in  a 
la te r speech he sta ted  th a t  no ethnic group’s culture should be 
threatened, and, as head of state, he hoped to act as m ediator and 
help both sides[8]. These were aims he repeated  to Hadow in  a 
p riva te  in terv iew  and  th e  la t te r  respected them , b u t w ith  
reservations. He reported, for example, th a t he had  learned th a t 
H enlein had  stressed the  need of fairer apportionm ent of public 
contracts and  relief-work; "a point to which Dr. Benes also 
alluded  in  h is conversation  w ith me and  abou t w hich he 
m aintained th a t the Sudetendeutsche had no genuine grievance". 
Hadow refrained  from comment, bu t m erely in  deference to a 
despatch already sen t by the  Legation which apparen tly  sided
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w ith Henlein[9].
The inclination  on Hadow's p a rt to read ily  accept the  
contentions of Henlein's party  and regard efforts on the  p a rt of the 
Czechoslovak G overnm ent w ith  increased  scepticism  became 
standard  to his recom m endations while in  P rague. In  M arch 
1936 he wrote th a t, so far, the Czechoslovak Governm ent had not 
negotiated w ith the  SdP, "whose downfall it  is clearly ben t upon 
encompassing". To th is  end, he wrote, the  G overnm ent was 
doing all i t  could to bolster the Germ an Activist P a rtie s  in  the 
Sudeten area (which encompassed the Germ an Social Democrats 
and  desired  concessions, b u t th rough  cooperation w ith  the  
Czechoslovak G overnm ent and on less rad ical te rm s th a n  the  
SdP). These parties, Hadow claimed, comprised only one-third of 
the  Sudeten G erm an electorate. "To Czech chauv in ists th is 
method of destroying the Sudetendeutsche Partei commends itself 
as decreasing the  danger of Germ an dom ination a t  Prague. To 
the  'Activist' leaders i t  promises elimination of H err Henlein and 
his unwelcome party  which halved the 'Activist' vote in  1935. To 
the  Czech P arties as a whole i t  would m ean a 'sp litting ' of the 
Germ an-speaking vote which would greatly decrease th e  le tter 's  
strength and danger to the Czechs as such"[10].
Hadow become even more certain th a t th is was the case in 
M ay of th a t  year: "The policy of P residen t B enes and  his 
supporters in  the  Government is now definitely to work for the 
disintegration of the  H enlein Movement by encouragem ent of the
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Germ an Minority parties". He th en  added th a t the  semblance of 
in c reased  C zech-G erm an cooperation  th u s  c re a te d  "in an  
endeavour to im press friendly foreign Governments" had  neither 
m eaning nor substance. Thq p lan  for sp litting H enlein’s party , 
Hadow believed, was unlikely to destroy its  m enace and  more 
likely  to drive the  m ovem ent to extrem e and  underg round  
Pan-G erm anism [ll].
In September 1936 Hadow reported a statem ent from "one of 
Prague's most prom inent bankers" th a t no one in business circles 
believed th a t Benes' advisers intended to help any b u t their M ends 
th is w inter; "I m ust regretfully  conclude th a t the  program m e of 
w in te r-re lie f prom ised ...w ill no t appreciab ly  a llev ia te  th e  
economic w ant of the  in d u stria l d istric ts of N orth  Bohemia". 
Hadow saw th is  situation  as increasing the  trend  in  the  SdP 
towards radicalism, bu t believed Henlein him self was clinging to 
m oderation.
"I can therefore only repeat my be lie f, Hadow wrote a t th is 
time, "that if  the Czechoslovak Government could bu t bring itse lf 
to reverse  its  unw ise policy of filling all availab le  - and  
particu larly  m inor - posts in  Sudetendeutsche  d istric ts w ith 
Czechs a beginning would have been made - even a t th is eleventh 
hour - w ith the formidable ta sk  of healing the open sore in the 
body-politic of Czechoslovakia which today is the Sudetendeutsche 
question"[12].
L ater he reitera ted  his view th a t Benes had not transla ted
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w ords in to  deeds on a su ffic ien t scale to re liev e  th e  
"disproportionate m isery" in  th e  Sudeten  areas[13], and  in  
December wrote th a t a petition the SdP had made to the  League of 
Nations had been sm othered "by those who w ant NO action taken  
to redress genuine grievances". To Hadow i t  seem ed th a t  the 
Czechoslovak G overnm ent had  m anaged to shelve "the m ost 
pressing question in C entra l Europe" and th a t  democracy had 
ceased to exist in  th a t country[14].
In his instinctive tendency to gravitate towards the  SdP in  a 
m anner he believed to be open-minded and fair, Hadow took less 
note of the complicated forces affecting the  decisions of the  
Czechoslovak Government a t th is tim e. The psychological effect 
on German m inorities of H itler's rise to power, for example, was 
threatening  in  the eyes of the  Czechs. Professor G erhard R itter 
la te r wrote in Deutsche Runà%ù\aUy "the most dangerous elem ent 
[of Nazism], its  inflam ed, antagonistic nationalism , came not 
from Potsdam, bu t ra th e r  from Bohemia-M oravia and the  other 
A u s tr ia n -G e rm a n  b o rd e r la n d s  w ith  th e i r  [A u s tr ia n ]  
Pan-Germ an movement, unbridled anti-Sem itism , and notions of 
Raumpolitik"\X^V Hadow recognised the  n a tu re  of the  Czechs' 
fear, bu t was less understanding  of their justifiable w ariness of 
Henlein's party  whose claim to m oderation did not im press them. 
W ith the increased power and popularity of the SdP in the Sudeten 
areas, Prague faced the dilem ma of deciding w hether th is  party  
constituted an in ternal problem to be solved w ithin  the  rules of
71
democracy, or w hether i t  was m erely a form of G erm an-N azi 
expansionism in  disguise. The la tte r  came to be assum ed and a 
subsequent program m e w as adopted which ra n  co n tra ry  to 
Hadow's view of the  situation . The Czechoslovak Governm ent 
began a rearm am ent programme and, in May 1936, passed a Law 
for the Defence of the  S tate  which placed restrictions on unreliable 
elements.
Such actions, as well as a lack of red ressing  economic 
grievances in  the  Sudetenland, Hadow believed, were detrim ental 
to the  situation , b u t Benes sim ultaneously a ttem p ted  to gain 
confidence among the  G erm ans in  Czechoslovakia. In  A ugust 
1936 he toured N orthern  Bohemia and expressed his sincere 
desire for cooperation. "The g rea tes t difficulties arise  in  the 
questions of the S ta te  officials. A num ber of the G erm an wishes 
are  in  th is connection justified . Yet there  is the  question of 
confidence. A dem ocratic S ta te  does not w ish to e n tru s t its  
adm inistration  to officials who profess Fascist, T o ta litarian , or 
Communist principles "[16]. As Hadow noted in  th is year, Prague 
had therefore decided to back the German Activists representing 
the German Democratic camp in  Czechoslovakia. Like the SdP, 
the Activists were calling for a larger share in  the adm inistration 
for the Germans, bu t not a t the price of accepting too-nationalist 
or anti-dem ocratic elem ents. Their aim  being resto ra tion  of a 
G erm an democratic m ajority, the  G erm an A ctivists showed a 
w illingness to defer claim s for te rrito ria l and  even cu ltu ral
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autonomy.
In F eb ruary  1937, Benes began negotiations w ith  these 
fac tions re g a rd in g  dem an d s th ey  h a d  p re s e n te d  in  a 
m em orandum  to th e  Government. Most of the  dem ands were 
accepted and concessions agreed upon. They included economic 
concessions, increased  em ploym ent of S udeten  G erm ans, a 
g rea te r m easure  of local control, linguistic  concessions, and 
constitu tional rig h ts  regard ing  tu ition  in  schools. Hadow 's 
assessm ent of the agreem ent was reserved: "It will be noticed th a t 
the  phraseology of these concessions...is both involved and vague". 
Some of the concessions, he noted, would only benefit the German 
Activists, bu t Hadow adm itted th a t "a beginning" had  been made, 
the most concrete concession being th a t of economic relief. "There 
can be no doubt", he wrote, "that alleviation of the sufferings of the 
Sudetendeutsche population as a whole would, and perhaps will, 
m ean a lessen ing  of political b itte rn ess  w hich m ay be the  
forerunner of a  more general reconciliation"[17].
The SdP p ress, however, rid iculed th e  ag reem en t as 
inadequate, and H enlein made a recalc itran t speech ju s t  after, 
denouncing  th e  n eg o tia tio n s  and  re fu s in g  to ad m it th e  
concessions to be a basic solution of the Sudeten Germ an problem. 
Despite Hadow's original feeling th a t a s ta r t had  been made, he 
took pains to defend the  SdP leader, stating th a t  h is speech was 
nonetheless conciliatory ra ther than  provocative in  tone because it  
asked th a t the Czech ru lers accept the Sudeten G erm ans as a
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re a lity  in s te a d  of figh ting  ag a in st them  by, for exam ple, 
recognising the  com m unity of cu ltu ral in te re s ts  betw een the  
Sudeten Germ an and "other parts of the Germanic fam ily"[18].
As m atte rs  grew increasingly complex in  Czechoslovakia 
in  1937, the agreem ent did not m eet with any g rea t success. In 
May of th a t year Hadow wrote th a t he was not confident th a t the 
Germ an-speaking M inority would receive substan tia l redress of 
the ir grievances. "The pessimism of the Activist G erm an leaders 
lends support to th is view and it  m ust be noted th a t those of them  
who, after the  declaration of the 18th of February, came regularly 
to report progress to th is Legation have ceased so to do. This, 1 am 
told by one of their friends, is because they do not like to report 'no 
progress'"[19]. In  Ju ly  Hadow reported th a t in  a  conversation 
w ith one of the  leaders of the  G erm an A ctivist p a rty  Wenzel 
Jaksch, the la tte r  had confided to him  that, while little  had been 
done so fa r for the  Activists on the  p a rt of th e  Czechoslovak 
Governm ent, the  H enlein p arty  was gaining streng th . Jaksch  
was apparently  quite depressed about the situation  and Hadow 
took the  view th a t the February concessions had  been "torpedoed" 
and were, in  fact, dead w ith little  hope of resurrection[20]. In 
A ugust Hadow wrote th a t, for the m inorities in  th a t  country, 
Czechoslovakia had ceased to be a  democracy[21].
By December 1937 Hadow had decided th a t the  balance of 
evidence pointed to the  situation in Czechoslovakia being static, if 
not actually deteriorating. "Henlein is known to have endeavoured
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once more to get some small concessions out of the  M inistry of the 
In terio r as a prelude to some form of cooperation betw een the 
M oderates of the  Sudetendeutsche P artei and the  Czechoslovak 
G overnm ent. H is overture  m et, however, w ith  litt le  or no 
response"[22].
In  his in itia l eagerness to sym pathise w ith  the  G erm an 
m inority in  Czechoslovakia, Hadow's assessm ent of the  SdP was 
becom ing p rog ressively  m isguided . He p laced  as m uch 
confidence in  H enlein 's in ten tions as he placed doubt in  the  
intentions of Prague and th is distorted his view of the situation in 
Czechoslovakia. Through unsubstantia ted  claims and increasing 
dem ands, the  SdP was, in  fact, purposely pulling support away 
from Germ an democratic forces in  th a t country. In  early 1936 
H enlein publicly com plained th a t  in  defiance of th e  existing 
M inority Treaty, Germans were not getting a fair apportionm ent 
of schools in  the  Republic. Hadow had supported th is contention 
a t the end of 1935 by claiming the Czechs were pursuing a  plan of 
infiltration  of G erm an-speaking districts th rough  Czech schools 
and subsequent pressure on Germ ans to send th e ir children to 
these schools[23]. R.W. Seton-W atson points out in  A History of 
the Czechs and Slovaks , however, th a t  i t  w as shown in the 
previous school year th a t  out of a to ta l of 343,000 and 89,000 
G erm an children in  prim ary  and h igher p rim ary  schools, all 
ap art from 10,000 and 6,000 w ent to G erm an-speaking ones. It 
was fu rth er shown th a t  the  G erm ans who were sen t to Czech
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schools were done so by paren ts who wished th e ir  children to 
learn  the  language of the Republic. The controversy was thus 
reduced to a  small m inority of about 3-5%, and the accusation of 
Czechisation discredited[24].
Hadow also took up th e  SdP 's com plaint ag a in s t the  
M achnik Decree of Ja n u a ry  1936 in  which res tric tions were 
placed on the  type of clerk employed to work on na tional 
arm am ents and defence. This complaint was made to the League 
of N ations in  April 1936 b u t rejected when the  Czech Cabinet 
decided not to enforce the order. I t  was followed, however, by a 
new S ta te  Defence Law in  which a m ilitarised zone was created 
ju s t  inside the  Bohem ian frontiers. Such m easures resu lted  in  
more dislocation among Germans th an  Czechs and helped to feed 
d issatisfaction  and increase H enlein 's cam paign for G erm an 
orientation. The demands of the SdP steadily increased in  1936 
and 1937, and evidence of th is can be elicited from Hadow's own 
despatches. In  Ja n u a ry  1936 he reported th a t H enlein and his 
lieu tenan ts  had  independently  indicated th a t  th e  SdP had no 
desire for autonomy[25], bu t in  Septem ber of th a t  year autonomy 
was called for by th a t party. Hadow mentioned th is himself, bu t 
m erely in  term s of H enlein 's a ttem pts to res is t the  "radical" 
trends in  his party; "a proof of the le tte r 's  [Henlein’s] tenacious 
clinging to m oderation is again afforded by his public definition 
las t week of autonomy for the Sudetendeutsche population as 'a 
right to adm inister our own INTERNAL affairs"'[26].
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W ith the influence and financial backing of the Nazis in 
G erm any, H en lein 's  tru e  in ten tio n s  w ere to w ork for the  
d is in teg ra tio n  of the  Czechoslovak Republic e ith e r  th rough  
in ternal disruption or external pressure, or a combination of both. 
In April 1937 the SdP presented  draft proposals to P arliam en t 
w hich im plied  rig id  to ta lita r ia n ism  in  each  rac ia l group. 
N othing came of these proposals b u t they  fu rthered  helped the 
position of the  SdP in downplaying the conciliatory n a tu re  of the 
F e b ru a ry  concessions. By the  end of 1937 th e  SdP  w as 
represen ting  the a ttitude  of the Czechs as unflinching. Hadow 
again supported these claims, reporting th a t Germ ans were being 
denied jobs in the Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, th a t they were 
fu r th e r  being  denied th e ir  constitu tional rig h ts  th rough  the  
M achnik Decree and laws which lim ited the  actions of civilians 
branded as unreliable to the S tate , and th a t  there  had  been a 
steady  decrease in  the  num ber of G erm an-speaking  Czechs 
employed in  Government service[27].
I t  is no t clear from w here Hadow w as receiving his 
in fo rm ation , b u t B ruegel w rites th a t  H en le in 's  rep o rts  on 
conditions were usually accepted w ithout question by the  B ritish  
legation in  Prague[283- Prim e M inister M ilan Hodza
had actually  reported in  November of th a t  year th a t  out of the 
persons engaged in  the  f irs t  q u a rte r  from  th e  F eb ru ary  
A greem ent, 8.52% of the  G erm ans were engaged as S ta te  
employees and 14.83% as labourers. In the next quarte r 12.6%
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were engaged as S ta te  employees and 14.09% as labourers. He 
fu rther sta ted  th a t Germ an firms supplied more th an  40% of the 
req u irem en ts  of S ta te  R ailw ays, and  a t  th e  end of 1937 
German-speaking candidates had been adm itted to the state  police 
and gendarm erie, even though they did not know Czech[29],
B ruegel w rites th a t  from F eb ru ary  1937 th e re  were 
undeniable im provem ents in  the  position of th e  G erm ans in 
Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1937 public investm ent in  road and 
bridge building in  the Czech area was 67%, and in  the Germ an 
area 32.4%. E xpenditure on construction work w as 58.5% for 
Czech te rrito ry  and 41.5% for G erm an territo ry . O rders had 
adm itted ly  been  frequen tly  aw arded  to m etropo litan  firm s 
bringing w orkers from Prague as these were generally  more 
efficient and could subm it lower tenders th an  local competitors. 
After F ebruary  1937, however, all the au thorities issuing work 
contracts were freed from the  requ irem en t of selecting the  
cheapest ten d er and were encouraged to in s is t on using local 
labour. Also, by the beginning of 1938, the proportion of Germans 
employed in the  medical and legal sector had  risen  to 23.32% 
which Bruegel points out was not far short of the  percentage of 
G erm ans in  the  total population[30]. All these improvements, 
including th e  carrying through of the  proposal th a t  ethnic 
representation  in public service be universally applicable were, 
however, insiÿ^ i|iC£w^  by th is tim e because the SdP, through the 
a ttitude  of the  B ritish  Legation in  Prague and the  influence of
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G erm any, h ad  successfully  w orked th e  s itu a tio n  in to  an  
in ternational problem.
German Interest
To do Hadow justice, a lthough  he cam e to accept the  
dem ands of the  SdP as leg itim ate , i t  w as h is concern over 
G erm an in te res t in  the Sudeten G erm ans which caused him  to 
prom ote outside pressure on the Czechoslovak G overnm ent to 
m eet these demands. I t was a reasonable concern, and  one th a t 
was increasingly shared by the Foreign Office. Germ any had 
begun to play a g reater role in  the  m inorities question as H itler 
grew more assertive towards Czechoslovakia in  1936. Henlein, in 
th is year, had  come under fire from the radical elem ents in his 
party , and, in  attem pting to hold his movement together, not only 
exaggerated the  in te rest of B ritain, b u t began tu rn ing  more and 
more to th e  Reich for assistance , th ereb y  m aking  h im self 
progressively dependent on the G erm an Nazis. Hadow kept a 
w atchful eye on Germ any in  rela tion  to the  Sudeten  G erm an 
question and at the end of 1935 had already linked th is question to 
Czech-German relations. He expressed the opinion to the Foreign 
Office th a t  the  situation , "if not of any g rea t im portance by 
comparison with the other problems you have to face ju s t now, is
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apt, like Sarajevo, suddenly to s ta r t a conflagration which we are 
here to endeavour, by accurate and tim ely warning, to help you to 
prevent"[31].
As in te rnal tension heightened in  Czechoslovakia in  1936 
and 1937, Hadow expressed the solution as increasingly obvious; 
in  order to th w art the  Germ an radicals, Prague should make all 
reasonable concessions to the Sudeten G erm ans, recognise the 
SdP, bolster Henlein as the "moderate" faction of th is movement, 
and  come to some agreem ent w ith Germ any. This could be 
achieved th rough  outside p ressure  from B rita in . O therw ise, 
G erm an in te re s t in  her b re th ren  would increase, a  legitim ate 
reason for in tervention  would be created, and Czechoslovakia - 
w ith  sm all chance of help from h e r allies - w ould be left 
defenseless, m ilitarily and morally.
The Foreign Office was reluctan t to follow Hadow's idea of 
B ritish  involvement, b u t accepted his basic argum ents as events 
unfolded. W hen H itler made one of the first of his series of bold 
moves on the  European front by reoccupying the  R hineland in  
M arch 1936, B ritish policy-makers had to reassess the ir responses 
to G erm an aggression and  speculate on possible ta rg e ts  in  
H itler’s plan of expansion. Czechoslovakia - along w ith Austria - 
came high on the  agenda. W hile H enlein  courted B ritish  
sym pathy for his cause through v isits to London, the  Foreign 
Office questioned Hadow on the SdP's sources of revenue and the 
real state  of th is party's relations with Germany[32].
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In  the sum m er of 1936 Hadow reported th a t Germany's role 
in  the m atte r was one of passive in terest, although the continuing 
p a tte rn  of the  Czechoslovak Government's policy could drive her 
to action. "It does not suit Germany's book, a t present, to foment 
an  independence m ovem ent in  N orth  Bohem ia; th e  m ain  
d isad v an tag e  being  economic com petition  betw een  N orth  
B ohem ian  an d  G erm an  in d u s tr ie s  w h ich  w ould re a c t  
un fav o u rab ly  upon th e  s itu a tio n  in  G erm any"[33]. H is 
assum ption appeared to be born out som ewhat in  the  following 
m onth  of th a t  year when Germ any reached an agreem ent w ith 
A u stria  in  which she consented to recognise th a t  country 's 1
independence if  A ustria followed Germany's lead in  international 
affairs.
In  following up his analysis of Germ any’s intentions a t this 
tim e, Hadow wrote of a H ungarian theory regarding th is m atter.
According to th is  theory, if  events "demanded" in tervention  on 
behalf of the Sudeten Germans Germany would only occupy North 
B ohem ia and  would no t advance on P rague. The G erm an 
G eneral-staff apparently  believed th a t th is could be done without 
fighting as the  Czechoslovak arm y would re tre a t a t  once, not 
w anting to defend the territory  (although, in  fact, Czechoslovakia 
would then  be surrendering a strategic frontier). A fu rther point 
of th is theory was th a t Berlin believed th a t F rance and B rita in  
would not a ttack  Germ any to compel the  re tu rn  of "this purely 
Germanic " territory, especially taking into account B ritish public
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opinion. "Czechoslovakia would thus be left a  'rump'; the U.S.S.R. 
could, or would, not help her attack; and the only danger would be 
a  H ungarian  a ttem pt to recover p a rt of Slovakia or R uthenia - 
thus upsetting  the  apple-cart by sta rting  a war". Hadow saw no 
re a so n  to d is s e n t  from  th e se  conclusions[34].
In  December 1936 Charles Bentinck of the  B ritish  Legation 
in  Prague reported th a t Hadow had had a conversation w ith the 
F irs t Secretary  of the Germ an legation a t P rague in  which he 
learned th a t  the  la tte r  had been privately discussing the  Sudeten 
G erm an problem  w ith the Germ an Foreign M inister Baron von 
N eurath . N eurath  had apparently  reviewed the en tire  problem. 
The G erm an M inister Von H alem  s ta ted  th a t  N eu ra th  had  
inform ed him  of the  following policy decided on by H itle r 
regard ing  Czechoslovakia; "To m ake no concessions whatsoever 
to Czechoslovakia so long as the la tte r  afforded no substan tia l 
m easure of redress and relief to the Sudetendeutsche^ b u t not to let 
the  oppression of the la tte r become a cause for arm ed conflict in  
C entral Europe"[35]. On the danger of the situation Hadow wrote 
th a t  both Benes and N eurath  were agreed on th e  necessity of 
avoiding war, "but neither of them  is able w ithout the intervention 
of an uninterested and powerful interm ediary to take adequate or 
proper steps to put an end to this tense situation"[36j.
H it le r 's  a n ta g o n ism  to w ard s  C zechoslovak ia  w as, 
according to G.L. Weinberg, profound and long-standing, and the 
expulsion of the Czechs from Bohemia and M oravia was p a rt of
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his scheme for lebensraum [37]. The plans for carrying th is off 
were, however, not to be considered too closely while Germ any 
w as still bu ild ing  up her strength . H itle r 's  a ttitu d e  tow ards 
Czechoslovakia in 1936 was, therefore, enigmatic and gave Hadow 
to believe th a t the German leader had no definite plans regarding 
th is country, the  only danger being the m istreatm en t of German 
m inorities sparking off an interest.
H itler, however, was not such an  opportun ist, and was 
m aking g radual foreign policy moves w ith  Czechoslovakia in  
m ind. In  an  effort to b reak  up the  L ittle  E n ten te  betw een 
C zechoslovak ia , R oum an ia , a n d  Y ugoslav ia , he  b eg an  
engineering closer relations between Yugoslavia and H ungary in  
th e  hope of focussing the rev ision ist aim s of the  la t te r  on 
Czechoslovakia. He was also keeping in  m ind antagonism  
betw een Poland and Czechoslovakia. The policy projected to 
Hadow from  th e  G erm an legation m ay have been  a public 
relations exercise on the p a rt of H itler in  order to convince the 
B ritish  G overnm ent, having taken  note of h is in te re s t in  the 
Sudeten Germ ans, th a t his concern for th e ir plight was real, bu t 
his in tentions were reasonable. I t  may also have been the  policy 
N eurath  him self sincerely intended to follow. For the  past ten  
years the  G erm an legation in Prague had advocated a policy of 
dem ocratic cooperation between Czechoslovakia and  Germany, 
and th is p a tte rn  only changed a little  when E rn st Eisenlohr took 
over the legation in 1936. Eisenlohr consistently defended the view
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th a t concessions to the Sudeten Germans would be best arrived a t 
in  an  atm osphere free from th rea ts abroad[38].
The G erm an Nazis, m eanwhile, were already financially 
involved w ith  the  SdP, and  w ere increasing  th e ir  political 
involvement. Hadow was aware of active Germ an influence a t the 
end of 1935, b u t downplayed its  im portance: "T hat the  more 
prom inent supporters of the Henlein movement - landlords of the 
old regime in  particu lar - derive indirect support, both moral and 
economic, from  G erm any is c e rta in ...B u t th e  m ajo rity  of 
Henlein's lieutenants, so far as these are known in  Prague, are of 
typical "Sudetendeutsche" stock - m en of no g rea t im agination 
and little  culture...I greatly doubt if  the  leaders of the Henlein 
m ovem ent possess such cunning, or the  ran k  and file of their 
followers such cohesion, th a t hope of G erm an succour can be kept 
alive by word of m outh a t the same tim e as i t  is noticeably absent 
from the  Sudetendeutsche press"[39]. H enlein 's m ain political 
decisions had  been m ade dependen t on th e  "approval and 
support" of Reich authorities as early as M arch 1935, however, 
and  em issaries had  been secretly moving betw een Berlin and 
Prague. W hile the SdP's relations w ith Nazi Germ any grew, i t  
began cooperating with the Reich M inistry of the Interior and the 
Foreign Policy of the Nazi Party. In the autum n of 1936 Henlein 
becam e the  head  of an  association(VDVE) w hich un ited  all 
Germ an m inorities and whose policy was made to fall in  line with 
th a t of Nazi Germany[40].
V cr'bO vnd D w t s c h c r  Vol o f E u ro p e
Much of the  Nazi involvem ent in  the  SdP had  originally 
arisen  out of political necessity on the  p a r t  of Henlein, which 
H itler then  turned  to his advantage. In  May 1936, the SdP faced 
an  in te rn a l  c ris is  th ro u g h  a r i f t  be tw een  rad ic a ls  and  
trad itiona lists . F inding it  increasingly difficult to control his 
party , H enlein  tu rn ed  to the  Reich, which now had  a vested 
in te res t in  holding this party  together while keeping links w ith i t  
discreet. This reliance on Germ an support and m ediation was 
becoming a hab it w ith Henlein. W hen he m et Reich leaders in  
August 1936 a t the Olympic Games, he was told by N eurath  that, 
for the  m om ent the  SdP m ust rely  on them selves, although 
financial help would continue. R.M. Sm elser observes in  The 
Sudeten Problem 1933-38 that, through the increasing use of the 
Reich for mediation in his party, Henlein was falling into a fateful 
dependency on it[41].
Hadow had taken note of the struggles w ithin the SdP, and 
believed H enlein  was doing h is  b est to keep a  m oderating  
influence on its  direction, b u t lack of conciliatory action from 
Prague was helping to increase the strength  of the radicals in  the 
SdP. "Internal dissensions, ably fomented by extrem ist Czechs", 
he wrote, "will for a tim e pu t Henlein into a serious position and 
m ay resu lt in  his overthrow". If  th is occurred, Hadow warned, 
the  p arty  would be taken  over by extrem ists who would work 
underground and tu rn  w hat Hadow still believed to be merely a 
Sudeten-G erm an movem ent into a purely Pan-G erm an one[42].
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To a certain extent Hadow was correct; for example, Henlein felt it  
necessary to break  w ith the radical Rudolf K asper in  the  summer 
of 1936 and attem pted to remove sim ilar sources of dissension. He 
was, however, arguably more concerned w ith prom oting merely a 
semblance of m oderation in  order to keep his p a rty  alive. If  the 
SdP appeared too radical too soon, or close links w ith  the  Nazis 
were exposed, the  party  stood to lose outside in te res t or support 
and would be vulnerable to dissolution from the  Czechoslovak 
Government. Through the  still growing radical elem ent in  his 
p a rty  and  re liance  on th e  Reich, H enlein  did grow more 
aggressive in  his dem ands, calling for complete autonom y for the 
Sudeten Germ ans and w arning the Czechs th a t they  m ust make 
good all the wrong they had done this minority since 1918.
The Czechs, m eanw hile, had  no t failed  to read  the  
significance of the  reoccupation of the R hineland. H itle r had 
gambled th a t  F rance would not counter-act th is  move, and was 
now hoping to increase her reluctance to get involved in  Central 
Europe. Benes saw th is and increased a ttem pts a t  negotiation 
with Germany in  the w inter months of 1936-37. In  November 1936 
he and the Foreign M inister Kamil Krofla m et w ith two unofficial 
em issaries of the Reich, A. Haushofer and M. Trauttsm ansdorf. 
The idea of a Czech-German trea ty  had originated in  Germany 
with Haushofer, and T rauttsm ansdorff had helped m ediate in the 
SdP quarrels, and was concerned w ith the  Sudeten  G erm ans 
m ainly in  term s of peaceful expansion of G erm an infiuence[43].
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Both G erm ans were trad itionalists who did not fully rep resen t 
H itler, and i t  seems clear th a t H itler only allowed th is experiment 
to occur in  order to determ ine any possible advantages from an 
agreement. W hen i t  became clear tha t, w ithout the  commitment 
of a  non-aggression pact from Germany, no advantages could be 
made. H itler allowed the talks to fall through as he had  no wish to 
tie his hands.
Hadow h ad  no knowledge of th is  specific a ttem p t a t 
cooperation, b u t was aware th a t some sort of discussion had been 
going on between Prague and Berlin. He wrote in  February  that, 
from G erm an as well as Czech sources, he had  derived the  
im pression th a t  both  countries were seeking agreem ent along 
economic lines, b u t the  term s would include "a m easure  of 
political appeasem ent such as both, for the  m om ent, feel to be 
preferable to the a lternative of arm ed conflict"[44]. N ear the end 
of February he reported a statem ent Benes had m ade privately to 
him  in which the  Czech President told him  th a t  Czechoslovakia 
and Germany would "sooner or later" come to term s; th a t  after 
th e  R h ine land  episode he had  in form ed G erm any  th a t  
Czechoslovakia's p rerequisites to negotiations were Germ any's 
recognition of all C zechoslovak-G erm an T rea tie s  and  h is 
country's pacts w ith  France and Russia - which G erm any had 
accepted; th a t Germany did not wish and could not afford to attack 
Czechoslovakia; and  th a t  in  a w ar betw een G erm any and the 
W estern Powers Czechoslovakia would be involved, bu t not in  a
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war between Germany and the E astern  Powers[45].
By th is tim e, as has been shown. H itler had  no intention of 
concluding an  agreem ent w ith Czechoslovakia, and  w as more 
concerned w ith preparing  his forces for a  potential a ttack , given 
the  righ t circum stances. The Foreign Office w as no t aw are of 
th is, and Benes m ight have suspected i t  to be the  case, b u t was 
p u ttin g  on a  show of conciliation - a t  le a s t on th e  p a r t  of 
Czechoslovakia - in  order to dem onstrate  h is w illingness to 
cooperate, and  to downplay fears th a t Czech repression  of the 
Germ an m inority was an  active concern of the  Reich. Germany 
rem ained outw ardly vague as to w hether an  agreem ent w ith 
Czechoslovakia was possible, and in  M arch 1937 Hadow was told 
by the German M inister in Prague that, on a recent v isit to Berlin, 
he had been instructed to make clear to Benes th a t Germany was 
ready in  all German-Czech "rubs" to be conciliatory; b u t th a t fair 
treatm ent of the Sudeten Germans was a definite condition of any 
settlem ent between the two nations[46].
Hadow held  litt le  or no suspicions tow ards G erm an 
intentions, believing th a t  the danger lay only in  Czech repression 
streng then ing  radical elem ents among the  Sudeten  Germ ans, 
which would, in  tu rn , excite the sym pathy of Germ any and k ave 
th a t country w ith a highly legitim ate excuse for attack. Hacicw 
was justifiably  afraid of these circum stances, b u t confused over 
the question of priorities and the inherently  aggressive nature of 
the  Reich. The subjection of Czechoslovakia was the chief
objective of H itler, and the  grievances of the  Sudeten G erm ans 
were m erely a  m eans to achieve th is  end. Hadow, however, 
continued to believe in  1937 th a t Germ any’s aim s were peaceful, 
th a t she felt a sincere in terest in  the fate of the  Sudeten Germans, 
and th a t there was no connection between Henlein and the Nazis. 
In  regard  to the  la tte r , he wrote in  M arch 1937, "I can only 
answer th a t for two full years I have tried  by every m eans to obtain 
proof - however slight - of th is Henlein-Nazi connection; b u t in  
v a in " [47]. S h ie la  G ra n t Duff, who w as w ork ing  as a 
correspondent in  Prague a t th is time, asked the Activist leader W. 
Jaksch  if  Henlein was a Nazi. Jaksch replied th a t  i t  did not really 
m atter; w ith the  Nazis in  power in  Germany, i t  was inevitable 
th a t a right-w ing na tionalist movem ent would collaborate with 
them[48]. Given his attitude by th is time, Hadow was not inclined 
to foresee this.
In  M arch Hadow drew a tten tio n  to th e  B ritish  Charge 
D’Affaires S ir G. Ogilvie-Forbes' sta tem ent th a t  G erm any hoped 
to realise her aim s by peaceful m ethods and w ithout a  conflict. 
The danger, Hadow repeated, "lies chiefly in  the  deep-seated 
conviction in  G erm any th a t  a real wrong is being done to a 
k in d re d  a n d  n e ig h b o u r in g  G e rm a n ic  p eo p le ; th e  
Sudetendeutsche. I t  is upon th is belief th a t  th< [propaganda] 
campaign against Czechoslovakia is based; and the genuineness 
of the grievance m akes i t  impossible of eradication  except by 
negotiation"[49]. A t the  sam e tim e Hadow m ain ta ined  th a t
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Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy had, since its  creation, been based 
on fear of Germ an aggression, and tha t, since the reoccupation of 
the Rhineland she had  lost faith  in France’s ability to come to her 
rescue by attacking  Germany if  Germany attacked her. Through 
the Sudeten G erm an problem and through G erm an in te rest in  it, 
Hadow w rote, Czechoslovakia w as faced w ith  th re a ts  to her 
independence w hich had  increased  chauv in ism  am ong the  
Czechs. ’’The danger of a general European w ar developing from 
these causes cannot entirely be overlooked ”, he concluded[50].
L ater he ’’regretfully’’ sta ted  his opinion th a t, should the 
G reat Powers consent by their silence to the cancellation of the 
righ ts of m inorities by Czechoslovakia, th e  Sudeten  Germ ans 
would become an  ir re d e n tis t  G erm an m inority  looking to 
G erm any ’’for sa lv a tio n ’’. I f  th is  m inority 's  s itu a tio n  was 
worsened by continual ’’Czechisation" they could th en  create an 
incident which would play upon G erm an feelings "as to sweep 
aw ay such prudence and common sense as m ay yet rem ain  
among the ru lers of the Reich"[51].
In the late summer of 1937 Hadow wrote tha t, for reasons of 
self-in terest in  both the economic and political sphere, i t  was 
doubtful w hether Germany’s set policy was to a ttem pt an  armed 
incursion into Czechoslovakia: "she beheves th a t  the  la tte r  can 
now probably hold up an attack in  the frontier districts sufficiently 
long to embroil other powers and to lay waste the Sudeten-deutsch 
areas in  which the  firs t fighting would take place"[52]. Henlein,
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m eanw hile, w as again  tu rn in g  to H itler. The radicals in  h is 
p a rty  were once more coming to the  fore and increasing  the 
aggressive stance of the  SdP. The Czechs were prepared  for 
crackdowns if  the party  got out of hand, but, still uncertain  of the 
extent of support from the Reich, Henlein did not feel confident of 
the  outcome of a  confrontation. G erm any was carry ing  on a 
propaganda w ar w ith  Czechoslovakia, b u t no d irect action in  
support of the  SdP appeared forthcoming. U nder pressure from 
all sides, Henlein made the more radical proposal to H itler: th a t 
he annex the  whole Bohem ian-M oravian-Silesian a rea  to the  
R e i c h  [ 5 3 ] .
H itler, in  fact, had  already begun to m ake definite plans 
regard ing  Czechoslovakia, and  a lthough  he took his tim e in 
replying to Henlein, his policy was decided by the end of 1937. His 
m ilita ry  p lan n in g  specified C zechoslovakia a s  G erm any 's 
im m ediate  ta rg e t and  explo itation  of th e  S udeten  G erm an 
grievances was to be his m ethod of action. W here no grievances 
were apparen t, hardsh ips were to be invented  and incidents 
provoked in  th e  Sudeten  G erm an a reas in  order to create  
publicity[54]. H itle r 's  program  of in creased  iso la tion  of 
Czechoslovakia was a t  th is  po in t a lread y  well advanced: 
assistance from Poland was m Jikely, as th is country now looked 
forward to the prospects of territo ria l gains, no involvement in  a 
E uropean w ar, and  the possibility  of a common border w ith 
H ungary. Yugoslavia had  only a  m ild diplom atic in te res t in
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Czechoslovakia's fate, despite her ties through the L ittle Entente; 
H ungary, like Poland, saw the likelihood of te rrito ria l gains for 
herself, and Italy  had acquiesced on the  question of annexation. 
France had  a  formal commitment to Czechoslovakia in  the  event 
of aggression, b u t th e re  was no s ta ff  ag reem en t over how 
assis tance  would be provided and  th e  reoccupation  of the  
R hineland had  com plicated m a tte rs . H er com m itm ent was, 
therefore, by 1937 couched in  the vaguest of term s, m uch doubt 
having arisen  over the possibility of B ritish  support. Doubt also 
surrounded the possibility of assistance from the Soviet Union, 
whose m ilita ry  w as w eakened by recen t purges and  whose 
passage of troops to Czechoslovakia depended on the a ttitudes of 
Poland and Roumania.
In  the  evolution of h is p lans regard ing  Czechoslovakia, 
H itler had not failed to take note of growing in terest in the Sudeten 
Germans in  B ritain, and the consequential lessening of sympathy 
for the Czechs. He was gambling on a lack of B ritish intervention 
on behalf of th is country which would inhib it the actions of the 
French and leave the way clear for expansion. Hadow unw ittingly 
encouraged the  Nazi leader's course of action by encouraging 
B ritish  in te rest - particu larly  regarding H enlein and the SdP - 
and by urging pressure on Prague to redress Sudeten Germ an 
grievances. I t was a them e of his despatches which began w ith 
his in te rest in  the SdP and grew consistent in  1937. W ithout the 
support of Britain for, specifically the SdP, Hadow believed from
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the  outset th a t  th is party  would tu rn  to Germany as her only ally 
in  order to "avoid destruction"[55]. He warned th a t  the  outcome of 
the  struggle between Prague and  the SdP was definitely a  B ritish 
in terest[56],and th a t  only outside in te res t which would give the 
Czechoslovak Government an  excuse for "bowing to the  advice of 
its  friends" would offer any hope of arresting  the  p resen t trend  of 
events[57].
Through the efforts of Hadow and the  general slan t of the 
B ritish  Legation in  P rague combined w ith  v isits H enlein had  
m ade to B rita in , London's in te re s t in  th e  S udeten  G erm an 
question partially  encompassed the bias the diplom ats in  Prague 
had created. In  the  sum m er of 1936 the Czech M inister in  London 
Ja n  M asaryk sent the Foreign Office a series of press cuttings 
which, he wrote, corroborated his fear "that the  opinion is being 
circulated in  England and abroad th a t G reat B rita in  is ready to 
fight Mr. Henlein's battle  in  Geneva, th a t our efforts to m aintain  a 
decent dem ocratic governm ent find very little  favour in  th is 
country, th a t  Czechoslovakia is being pictured as an  outpost of 
Communism and Bolshevism in  Europe, and th a t  generally  we 
are ju s t a dam n nuisance"[68]. M asaryk had apparently  tried  to 
describe the situation in  Czechoslovakia as his government saw it, 
bu t Hadow wrote to the  Head of the Southern D epartm ent Owen 
O'Malley th a t the letter was "patently full of half-truths". Hadow 
pointed out as an example M asaryk's claim th a t fair trea tm en t of 
m inorities had  been the  ste rn  wish of Thom as M asaryk and
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would be of h is successors: "We know th a t  P residen t M asaryk 
WISHED for fair treatm ent", Hadow wrote, "but J a n  M asaryk is 
wise enough not to say more or to commit Benes. And have we not 
said th a t  the lot of the Sudeten-deutsch became noticeably worse 
as soon as M asaryk had resigned?"[59].
The Foreign Office was not as en thusiastic  over B ritish  
involvement in th is m atter as Hadow, b u t i t  was in terested in  the 
SdP question  because i t  rea lised  th is  w as a w eakness in  
Czechoslovakia which could invite G erm an aggression. Anxious 
th a t such a situation not arise as i t  would bring in  the question of 
B ritish  defence of Czechoslovakia, a certain  am ount of agreem ent 
th a t  th e  Czechoslovak G overnm ent be a t  le a s t inform ed of 
B rita in ’s concern th a t  its  in te rn a l difficulties be resolved was 
shared. Hadow was therefore confident in  suggesting, "in the 
in terests of m oderation if  not of peace", th a t rem inders of British 
in te re s t in  "im partial dem ocratic rule" in  Czechoslovakia in  
respect of minority rights be kept up especially through the British 
press[603. W hen the  February concessions of 1937 were agreed 
upon, Hadow a ttribu ted  th is action on the  p a r t  of Benes to the 
influence of the B ritish  press and he fu rth e r encouraged th is 
cam paign: "Im partial rem inders a t  in te rvals, in  the  press of 
G reat B rita in , th a t  deeds m ust follow words in  the m atte r of 
concessions to the Sudetendeutsche M inority as a whole would, I 
am convinced, be of assistance to President Benes and of m aterial 
help in  decreasing tension by rendering  i t  possible for him  to
negotiate with Germany"[61].
C zechoslovakia w as by th is  tim e beg inn ing  to gain  
prominence on the foreign policy agenda in  London and a t the end 
of F eb ruary  the  question of w hether the  B ritish  Governm ent 
should urge Benes to m ake term s w ith Germ any was discussed. 
I t  was mentioned th a t certain  diplomats in  Prague felt agreem ent 
would be possible; however, the B ritish  Am bassador to Berlin Sir 
Eric Phipps was strongly opposed to their "butting in". Phipps did 
not feel th a t Germany had a t th a t tim e any im m ediate designs on 
Czechoslovakia as "she was not ready". Oliver Harvey, who was 
Eden’s private secretary and who recorded the discussion, wrote 
th a t there was some evidence th a t Benes was h in ting  th a t he was 
refusing to come to term s w ith Germany out of loyalty to B ritain 
and France; "it was decided to let m atters alone, b u t th a t if Benes 
should take th is line with Newton, our new M inister [in Prague], 
he m ight indicate th a t we would like Czechoslovakia to be on good 
term s with all her neighbours’’[62].
Hadow, nevertheless, felt more decisive action on the p a rt of 
B ritain  was necessary. "Peace w ith honour", he wrote, could only 
be brought to fruition by application of B ritish pressure on both 
Czechoslovakia and Germany[63]; and because Germ any hoped to 
realise h e r aim s by peaceful methods, Hadow believed th is gave 
th e  B ritish  G overnm ent an  opportun ity  to "negotiate  and  
influence" H itler. He suggested privately to V an sitta rt th a t the 
B ritish  M inister in  Prague in tim ate  to Benes th a t  the  B ritish
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Government felt the  present tension in  the Sudeten German areas 
to be fraught w ith danger and threatened  the  peace of Europe. "I 
am confident in  asserting", Hadow wrote, " that Dr. Benes would 
accept and act upon th is advice. For France...has prom ised no 
concrete help; and he knows th a t  the  m oral influence of G reat 
B ritain  is his only real hope in  the long run"[64]. Hadow urged 
th is action more forthrightly in  May, and stated  th a t if  no action 
were taken  on th is m atter, "the peace of Europe will inevitably be 
jeopardised, sooner or later, by an  act which does violence to the 
very prom ises upon which Czechoslovakia was granted  control 
over the various Minorities"[65].
In the late  sum m er of 1937 Hadow was charging th a t the 
democracies of W estern Europe were being asked by P resident 
Benes "to condone th a t of which they  have b u t little  knowledge, 
under a  plea of resistance to G erm an encroachm ent upon a 
dem ocratic country"[66], and by December 1937 he was going 
beyond pressure and urging mediation: "the tim e has...now come 
for active intervention in the promotion of a  settlem ent between 
B erlin and Prague if  the peace of C entral Europe is not to be 
endangered. Both Dr. Benes and...Dr. N eurath  are agreed upon 
the necessity of avoiding war, bu t ne ither of them  is able without 
the intervention of an  uninterested and powerful interm ediary to 
tak e  adequate  or proper steps to p u t an  end to th is  tense 
situation...I venture to suggest th a t G reat B ritain  should assume 
the task  and encourage both sides to come to term s while yet there
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is time"[673.
Hadow's persistence on the m atter of B ritish involvement in 
the  Sudeten Germ an question was m et w ith mixed feelings from 
London. Not so convinced of H itler's peaceful intentions towards 
Czechoslovakia, the  Foreign Office nevertheless felt th a t  the  
S ude ten  G erm ans had  a rea l grievance and  th e  SdP w as 
organised and close enough to Germ any to create a th rea ten ing  
situation. The Foreign Office was not keen to m ediate and did not 
w an t to push  Czechoslovakia in to  the  arm s of Germ any, b u t 
neither did i t  w ant to discourage any possible agreem ent between 
th e  two countries. The position of th e  SdP was, thus, of 
considerable im portance, regard less of i ts  sincerity , and  the  
B ritish  Government took the line in  the sum m er of 1937 of urging 
Benes and the SdP to establish greater contact, and attem pting to 
convince a doubtful France th a t settlem ent between the two would 
strengthen Czechoslovakia and weaken the Germ an case.
H enlein, as the  leader of the  SdP, became the  focus of 
B ritish  attention, a  situation he had helped to create through his 
visits to London and the generally favourable im pression he had  
m ade there . R.W. Seton-W atson w rites th a t  on these visits, 
Henlein "cooed like any sucking dove" and found there a complete 
a failure to grasp the implications of the situation, a  circumstance 
which he tu rned  to his advantage[68]. To m any in  the Foreign 
Office and  the  Prague Legation, H enlein was legitim ate and 
sincere, and even those who were more sceptical tended to regard
97
him  as the voice of the German m inority in  Czechoslovakia. This 
point is illustrated  in  Hadow’s despatches and in  the general tacit 
acceptance of Henlein's pro testations. In  the  au tum n  of 1936 
Hadow wrote to O'Malley th a t  a  rum our was circu lating  in  
P rague to the  effect th a t Eden had  been found during recen t 
conversations w ith K rofta to be to ta lly  u n fam ilia r w ith  the  
existence of the Activist German parties in  Czechoslovakia, "that 
is those...who are not against the  Government!". Hadow was told 
th a t th is  sta te  of affairs reflected on the Foreign Office and th a t 
every effort was being made in  London to make political circles see 
th a t  the  A ctivist G erm ans w ere num erous and  im portan t. 
"Actually", Hadow added, "as you know, they polled, between the 
th ree  of them , roughly 32% of the  to tal Germ an vote as against 
Henlein’s 68%"[69].
Compared to the much-feted visits of Henlein to London, the 
a rriv a l of W enzel Jaksch , p rom inen t lead er of the  G erm an 
Activists, was a low-key affair. Hadow sen t a  m essage to the 
Foreign Office concerning th is v isit in  which he claimed th a t the 
Activists hoped to destroy H enlein and his p a rty  through the 
support of political allies, "especially am ong L iberals or the  
Labour P arty  in G reat Britain", for w hat am ounted to a  political 
cam paign against Germany. According to Hadow, th is plan was 
to be furthered privately by the Czechoslovak Legation in London. 
H aving given these warnings, Hadow wrote, "I have told Jaksch  
th a t when he comes to London he m ight ring you up and, if  you
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are out, ask  th a t  someone in  the  Southern D epartm ent should 
receive him. If  you do not like the  idea nothing is easier th an  an  
excuse".
The reaction from the  Foreign Office was unenthusiastic . 
The Head of the Central D epartm ent Orme Sargent m inuted, "I 
don't th in k  we need do anyth ing  about seeing M. Jaksch . M. 
M asaryk will no doubt tro t him  round as living evidence of the 
friendly  co-operation betw een the  Czechs and the  Germans". 
V ansitta rt commented, "If M. Jaksch  asks to be seen he need not 
be refused; b u t we should m ake no advance tow ard him, and i t  
would on the whole be better if  he did not ask to be seen, in  view of 
h is possible intentions here".
Jaksch  did m anage to see O’M alley who wrote th a t the 
Activist leader had expressed the hope th a t the Foreign Office took 
a detached view of the m erits of the  Activists on the one hand and 
Henlein's party  on the other. According to Jaksch , Henlein was 
"a rogue, a tool of the Nazi P arty  and if  he had his way the Sudetic 
d istricts would be annexed bag and baggage to the Third Reich". 
Jak sch  also inform ed O 'M alley th a t  the  A ctivist P a rty  was 
stronger th an  the las t elections m ade out: they  had  only polled 
30% of the German vote, bu t if  not for the trade slump they would 
have easily polled 50%. "Herr Jaksch  spent m ost of his tim e in  
le c tu rin g  me about th e  e sse n tia lly  dem ocratic  n a tu re  of 
Czechoslovakia and the  im possibility of any deep or enduring 
agreem ent betw een such a dem ocratic S ta te  and H err H itler's
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Government", O'Malley wrote. "All I said was directed tow ards 
rubbing into him  the necessity of m aking adm inistrative practice 
conform to democratic theory i f  he w anted for his country the  
undiv ided  sym pathy of B ritish  public opinion". V a n s itta r t 
m inuted under this: "I am  afraid H err Jaksch  does not am ount to 
m u c h [ 7 0 ] .
That no great attention was paid in  London or in the Prague 
L e g a tio n  to w a rd s  d e m o c ra tic  G e rm a n  e le m e n ts  in  
Czechoslovakia is further born out by Bruegel who observes th a t 
the  line taken  by Henlein of regarding these elements as "splinter 
parties" was followed instead. Bruegel also notes th a t  when the 
Foreign Office did receive inform ation implying the culpability of 
Henlein, officials dismissed its  importance[71]. In  Jan u ary  1936 
Hadow him self reported th a t  Benes had  draw n his a tten tion  to 
facts about the secret financing of H enlein from Germany, bu t 
N .J. Cheetham  of the Southern D epartm ent did not see anything 
objectionable in it: "The 'sin' even if  i t  had been proved, is not very 
deadly". Cheetham  carried  on, "One wonders why Dr. Benes 
m akes no a ttem pt to take advantage of the m oderation shown by 
H enlein him self before i t  is too la te  ". Another official added, "If 
the  facts [about trea tm en t of the  Sudeten Germans] were more 
fully known in England there  m ight almost be a  general feeling of 
hope th a t H itler would m arch in  to p u t the  m atte r stra igh t - I 
exaggera te  purposely to m ake my po in t clear"[72]. These 
comments support the claim  th a t  the  B ritish  Government was
100
fully aware th a t Henlein was being financed by the Nazis, b u t felt 
th is was merely an aside to the issue[73].
Henlein against Benes
A characteristic  which caught Hadow out in  th e  1930s, 
particu larly  w ith regard to the  Sudeten Germans, was th a t  his 
analysis of circumstances was often superficially correct, b u t not 
alw ays thorough, a characteristic  which m ay well have been a 
symptom of prejudice. He would m iss signals and  gloss over 
some facts while paying too close atten tion  to others. Hadow was 
w arned a t this time th a t i t  was thought in  the Foreign Office th a t 
he overemphasised the importance of rum ours which could not be 
checked, and  th a t he had  a little  too m uch conviction in  the  
righ tness of his recommendations[74], bu t he tended to dism iss 
such  critic ism  as stem m ing  from  d isag reem en t w ith  h is 
a rgum ents. Given the  economic and  ideological confusion in  
Europe i t  was probably difficult to assess the  underlying forces 
regarding German intentions; bu t Hadow's bias towards Henlein 
and against Benes while in  Prague reveals an innate sym pathy 
which ra n  counter to his claims of complete neu tra lity  on the  
subject. The Sudeten G erm ans did have legitim ate grievances 
which needed redressing and G erm an in te res t in th e ir situation 
was a problem, bu t these facts seemed to fuel an already existing
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conviction in  Hadow instead  of being used to counterbalance the  
youth of Czechoslovakia, Benes' struggle to m aintain  a  democracy 
betw een rad ical Czechs and  G erm ans, and the  Czechoslovak 
lead er 's  concern for ou tside  p ro tec tion  a g a in s t G erm any 's 
increasingly  aggressive n a tu re . In  H enlein Hadow saw the  
embodiment of one thing, and in  Benes the th rea t of another, and 
th is simplification of m atters furthered  his support for the policy 
of appeasement.
As early as 1935 Hadow was literally describing Henlein as 
the  saviour of the  Sudeten G erm ans. Henlein was leading his 
people on "a journey  th ro u g h  th e  w ilderness", w hile these  
"disciples" were being fed on the "barley loaves and small fishes" 
of concessions made to them  by the  Czechoslovak Government a t 
the  tim e. Visions of a "glorious G erm an resurrection", however, 
they were willing to b a rte r for "the safety of their hard-won daily 
bread"[75]. In the m idst of th is Biblical alliteration Hadow wrote of 
his impressions of Henlein: "To judge by his personality as well as 
by his speeches, he seems to be m oderate and a m an of h is word. 
Nor have I been able, from careful perusal of the  copious w ritten  
word of his party , to find any deviation from these  principles 
unless i t  be a  declaration th a t the State is above the party  and th a t 
th e  p a rty  system  leads to such abuse th a t  i t  should  be 
abolished"[76].
Hadow also wrote a t  th is  tim e th a t  H enlein, from the  
beginning, had  protested his loyalty to Czechoslovakia, h is belief
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in  democracy, and his desire to cooperate loyally in  building up 
the  Czechoslovak state[77]. L ater, on the p a rty  aim s of 1935, 
Henlein stated , "It would have been easier...to confess openly to 
National Socialism and go to prison, bu t i t  was doubtful w hether 
by th is m ethod we should achieve the political task  of sm ashing 
Czechoslovakia as the  spearhead of the  anti-R eich system  of 
alliances...we knew th a t  we could only win if  we succeeded in  
m aking three and a ha lf million Sudeten G erm ans into National 
Socialists, b u t if  we were to avoid Czech interference, we had to 
p re ten d  to deny our allegiance to N ational Socialism"[78]. 
Although Henlein's hidden motives in 1935 m ay not have been as 
clearly defined as he la te r claimed, he was obviously m uch less 
sincere than  Hadow believed and an opportunist when it  came to 
the possibility of Nazi assistance for his party.
Hadow's faith  in  th is m an, however, was unshakeable. 
He showed he was aw are of radical signs from H enlein which 
came from increased confidence of the la tte r in  Nazi support, bu t 
ascribed these to the fact th a t Henlein was too often a prisoner of 
the  more ex trem ist elem ents in  h is party . In  Ju n e  1936 the 
Observafior  ^ th a t Henlein had refused to give in  to these elements 
was, Hadow felt, proof of his own statem ents th a t the  SdP leader 
was "a m oderate and a 'Sudeten' not a ‘Gross' Deutsche "[79]. In 
Septem ber he wrote th a t although the situation in  Czechoslovakia 
tended to increase the trend  in the Germ an m inority  tow ards 
radicalism , H enlein was tenaciously clinging to moderation[80].
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Henlein's calls for autonomy in  1937 - which Hadow pointed out 
h ad  a  less radical m eaning in G erm an th an  in  English - were, 
Hadow felt, not to be taken  too seriously, "for like all Germans he 
asks for the moon in  the  hope of receiving a  sixpence of which he 
stands in  extreme need a t the  moment, as a  counter to those in  his 
ran k s who tell him  th a t the p a rty  is getting nowhere w ith his 
studied counsels of moderation"[81].
Hadow's view of H enlein was very much like his view of 
H itler. J u s t  as he saw H itle r a ttem pting  m oderation among 
certain  fanatics, so he saw H enlein m aintaining as m uch control 
as possible of extrem ists in  his party. That both desired a peaceful 
solution to either the European or Sudeten German problems, bu t 
would give in to extrem ism  i f  they  felt a lienated  Hadow felt 
assured, and these conclusions probably had as much to do w ith 
an  underlying perception of the  G erm an as an  underdog since 
W orld W ar I as w ith  a certain  am ount of unfam iliarity  w ith  
political opportunism, due to e ither naivete or m erely a lack of 
experience w ith th is type of phenomenon. This perception w ith 
regard  to Henlein was most likely enhanced by Hadow's previous 
posting in  Vienna, and the  fact th a t the Sudeten Germ ans had 
once been p a rt of A ustria, not Germany, which would account 
even moreso for his immediate affinity w ith th is minority. One of 
Hadow's relatives notes tha t, although Hadow had a repu tation  
for helping people, i t  was usually  those people to whom he felt 
a ttrac ted  or appealed to him[82]. I t  m ay also be noted th a t, if
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Hadow felt a sym pathy for underdogs, Opo/f 'fctXfed fo ix-
the more vociferous or seemingly capable ones: H itle r w ith his 
swift rise to power and organisational qualities, H enlein w ith his 
surprising success in  the 1935 elections. Given his background, 
he was therefore more inclined to sym pathise w ith the Sudeten 
Germ ans th a n  th e  Czechs, and, fu rther, more inclined to the  
cause of Henlein and the SdP than  the German Activists.
Hadow, of course, was not the only one deceived by Henlein. 
Through his visits to London in 1935 and 1937, the  SdP leader had 
managed to convince m ost of the Foreign Office of his sincerity, 
including V a n sitta rt. A fter H enlein’s firs t v isit, C hristopher 
Bramwell of the  Southern  D epartm ent wrote, "H err H enlein 
im pressed me in  a general way by his m oderation and freedom 
from the fanaticism  one generally associates w ith  the  leaders of 
big popular m ovem ents"[83]. Much was m ade of H enlein’s 
assurance of no connection w ith  the Nazis, and  the  P rivate  
Secretary to V an sitta rt Clifford Norton recommended th a t Benes 
be told "to give these fellows a straighter deal which, they  say, is 
all th a t they want"[84]. Henlein played up this in te res t as much as 
possible, exaggera ting  V a n s itta r t’s concern an d  keeping  in  
contact with London. In  1936 he (Henlein) wrote to an English 
correspondent, "The situation here is getting more critical and, so 
far as I am concerned, more hopeless. We are beginning to think 
th a t any understanding  with the Czechs is impossible"[85]. When 
he visited London in  October 1937 he specifically denied th a t his
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dem ands were to ta lita r ia n  or th a t  th e re  w as any  G erm an 
influence behind his movement. The Foreign Office expressed the 
belief th a t Germ an aggression against Czechoslovakia could be 
forestalled  if  H enlein  was given a seat in  th e  Czechoslovak 
Government[86].
The SdP leader was obviously skillful in  courting public 
opinion, and the  h istorian  R.W. Seton-W atson fu rther illu stra tes  
this. Seton-W atson was in  Czechoslovakia in  the  1930s and in  
contact with both Henlein and Benes. In  1936 he wrote, "I regret 
the criticism of Henlein on the  p a rt of some of my Czech friends. I 
consider it  unjust and political". In 1943, however, he wrote, "The 
Sudeten  G erm an ag ita tion , led by Konrad H enlein , was the  
Trojan Horse of the whole European tragedy. I t  was used w ith 
great skill to delude sentim ental public opinion in  the  West"[87].
Hadow's a ttitu d e  tow ards Benes, a lthough  he in itia lly  
a ttem p ted  to be fa ir, w as one of increasing  suspicion and 
eventually  dislike. At the  beginning he a ttr ib u ted  the  Czech 
president w ith a  "certain bread th  of vision" in  facing the  Sudeten 
Germ an problem and placed hope in  Benes' "farsightedness" and 
"inflexible résolution"[88]. At the  same time, however, he was 
a lready  approaching th e  Czech P residen t on the  subject of 
establishing contact w ith  Henlein. Benes had n-^  objection but, 
according to Hadow, w arned the  la tte r  to use proper discretion 
tow ards H enlein and  h is followers, "for they  arc very sly"[89]. 
H adow 's opinion of B enes, even w hen fav o u rab le , w as
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nevertheless unequal to the faith  he seemed to possess in  Henlein. 
Benes was "cunning" as opposed to Henlein being "sincere"[90], 
and Hadow was doubtfiil from the s ta rt of Benes’ capabilities. For 
all the  "clear-thinking and courageous leadership" of Benes, he 
was unable to see in  1936, " that the President's prom ises hold out 
m uch hope of appreciable relaxation of the political tension in  
N orthern  Bohemia"[91]. As the conviction grew in  Hadow th a t  
Benes was failing to address the crucial p a rt of Czechoslovakia's 
problem, the  grievances of the  Sudeten Germ ans, h is favourable 
view of Benes decreased. In  Septem ber 1936 he expressed the 
opinion th a t  th e  lo t of the  Sudeten  G erm ans h ad  become 
considerably worse since Benes was elected president[92]. and 
wrote th a t the Czech President was having to counteract doubt in 
other countries over the democratic nature of h is government[93].
By 1937 Hadow was perceiving Benes as a  hindrance to any 
lasting  solution regarding  the  Sudeten Germ ans. In  M arch he 
wrote th a t the  Czech P residen t's  a ttitude  was the  key to the 
situation: "W ithout h is secret opposition (of which I am  now 
convinced though long believed in  the genuineness of his public 
professions) Dr. Hodza and H err Henlein would gradually  edge 
tow ards an  unders tan d in g  such as would g rea tly  lessen  the  
presen t tension"[94]. In A ugust he spelled out h is feeling th a t 
Benes' policy in regard  to the  Sudeten Germans and Europe was 
risky and unwise. Com paring th is policy to a hand  in  poker, he 
wrote th a t the Czech President seemed to feel th a t he possessed a
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sufficient hand through French, British, and R ussian support for 
stand ing  up to th e  th re a t  of G erm an aggression. "The one 
weakness in  his hand  th a t the President seems perforce to cover 
up is th is  country 's tre a tm e n t of the  Sudeten-deutsch". The 
pressure B ritain  had  been pu tting  on Benes, according to Hadow, 
had  not gone unheeded, b u t the  President preferred to play his 
F rench  and o th er cards "in the  hope th a t  H is M ajesty 's 
Government can be persuaded - by its  closest ally as well as by 
pressure of socialist and  intellectual opinion in  G reat B ritain  - to 
change its  p resen t m ind and abandon the  Sudetendeutsche'*. 
Hadow wrote th a t there was no doubt of the u ltim ate unwisdom of 
these tactics[95]. He fu rther held Benes responsible for a  general 
"war neurosis" among the  Czechs, believing th a t  the  Government 
was finding it  necessary to convince its taxpayers of the  need of 
extravagant expenditure in  preparation for w ar[96].
W alter Koch, who was G erm an M inister in  Prague un til 
1935 believed Benes "was a cool rea lis t whose only serious 
consideration was w hat was good for his country"[97]. Hadow 
perhaps saw th is b u t subconsciously resented the fact th a t more 
recognition was no t being given to the SdP. He, therefore, 
increasing ly  judged  the  Czech P re sid en t in  th e  extrem e, 
interpreting Benes' actions as recalcitrant or unwise. H istorians, 
however, absolve the Czech l^esiden t of much of the blame for the 
s itua tion  in  Czechoslovakia and  Benes is seen m erely  as 
strugg ling  as shrew dly  as possible a g a in s t forces w hich
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th rea ten ed  h is country 's existence. Luza describes Benes as 
hard-w orking and  possessing an acute intellect: "With a rigid 
concept of public service, he had fought all his life for the principle 
th a t  the  public in te re s t comes first"[983. W illiam  V. W allace 
w rites in  Czechoslovakia th a t  the  Czech P re s id e n t "was a 
passiona te  believer in  th e  general a tm osphere  of security  
in te rnational agreem ents could bring and in  the  possibility of 
educating  m alcon ten ts to acceptable norm s of in te rn a tio n a l 
behaviour" [99].
C ritic s  of B enes, how ever, po in t to an  op tim ism  
conspicuous in  the Czech President as well as a certain  ignorance 
of hum an nature . Although th is criticism may exaggerated, i t  is 
fairly applicable to h is rela tions w ith S talin  - an  area  where 
Hadow was p articu la rly  censorious of Benes. As the  la tte r  
him self adm its, he erroneously believed th a t S talin  could be dealt 
w ith in  the same m anner as W estern Democracies: "My greatest 
m istake was th a t I refused to believe to the very la s t th a t even 
Stalin had lied to me, coldbloodedly and cynically, both in 1935 and 
later, and th a t  his assurances to me and to M asaryk were all 
in te rn a tio n a l dc ceit"[100]. Benes' lack of personal w arm th  
probably created  a fu r th e r  b ias in  Hadow, especially  in  
com parison to ILt charm  of Henlein. According to Ja rom ir 
Sm utny, chief of Benes' office during his exile in  London, the 
Czech P resident often failed to arouse confidence: "People leave 
him persuaded but not tru ly  converted[101].
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Benes' foreign policy objectives, however, were far-sighted 
and sincere, and hinged on the theory of balance of power and 
collective security: if, as Hadow believed, he was encouraging the 
fear of war, i t  was in  order to screw up tension (as la te r  in  the 
case of the  May C risis) and ex tract firm er assu rances from 
France, Russia, and B rita in  to support his country in  the  event of 
an  attack, and  to hold off Germ an aggression. Even as Hadow 
him self adm itted, i t  was not the  moral w eakness of the  Czechs' 
h and ling  of th e  S udeten  G erm an question  w hich caused a 
reluctance to assist th is country so much as the fear of Germ an 
strength and the risk  of being embroiled in  a  conflict. Benes knew 
th a t the Sudeten Germ an question was secondary to the  natu re  of 
the problem, and he was m uch more concerned w ith  building up 
h is  c o u n try 's  forces an d  convincing  o u ts id e rs  of th e  
aggressiveness of Germany. Hadow seemed determ ined not to be 
convinced. W hen Wenzel Jaksch  expressed his fear to Hadow 
th a t  w ar w as inev itab le  and  im m inent, and  th a t  G erm an 
preparations on the  border were "unending and for all to see", 
Hadow dism issed the  activ ist leader as "unnerved" and "on the 
run"[102]. A G erm an a ttack  would be checked, he m aintained, 
through cooperation w ith the dem ands of the  SdP, and  Benes 
m ust I t  pressured into accepting this.
Hadow's final sta tem ent on Czechoslovakia in  1937 was a 
reiteration of the contention th a t the Sudeten G erm ans were the 
key to the  continued existence of Czechoslovakia, and, w ithout
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proper trea tm en t of th is minority, th is country was destined to go 
under. "That she will do so only after lighting a bonfire which will 
a t least singe G reat B rita in ’s beard  is P residen t Benes' firm  
resolve and a point we should, I suggest, remember. For i t  makes 
i t  the  more im portan t th a t we should guide and  encourage the  
Government of th is country along lines which will not im peril the 
peace of Europe and our future"[103]. Hadow had  now accepted 
the  possibility th a t  Czechoslovakia m ight "go under" and seemed 
prim arily concerned tha t, given this possibility, B ritain  should not 
be involved in  defending her. His course for appeasem ent was 
therefore firm ly se t and  the  events of 1938 only served to 
strengthen th is a ttitude. "Guide and encourage" Czechoslovakia 
m eant, to Hadow, pressure th is country and, because from the 
o u tse t h is sym pathy  for Czechoslovakia w as nom inal, the  
considerations of its  territo ria l in tegrity  were to come second to 
the  "peace of Europe" and Britain 's future.
Influences Intensified
While Hadow was posted in Prague and as H itler began to 
challenge Europe there was a change in the mood and m eaning of 
appeasem ent which was represented in  Hadow's despatches. The 
growing fear of w ar among the B ritish  public was influencing 
foreign policy. The Spanish  Civil W ar, for exam ple, brought
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home the destructive effect of bombs which, in  the dread of such 
events occurring in  B rita in , m ade the desire for peace a little  
more desperate and a  little  less reasoned. While Hadow was in  
A ustria , th e  search  for peace had  been optim istic  and more 
strongly based on the  belief in  progress. In  th e  mid-1980s i t  
became pessimistic in  its  acceptance of the dictators, and  belief in  
the necessity of dealing w ith them  and extracting w hat good was 
perceived out of the situation.
Hadow's desire for peace m atched th is mood, and  as he 
subconsciously detected  events p rogressing  aw ay from  his 
expectations, he began to follow the frame of m ind which ignored 
or downplayed signs of aggression from H itler in order to preserve 
some form of cooperation. J u s t  a fte r the  reoccupation of the 
Rhineland he wrote th a t  the  fu tu re  of C entral Europe was a 
m atter of negotiation w ith Germany "by such of the  G reat Powers 
as concede th a t  surpassing even - in  im portance for the  future 
peace of Europe - the  question of reoccupation of the Rhineland, is 
the danger th a t the  next G erm an move m ay be in  a Southerly 
directi on...and th a t  the  p resen t opportunity for securing term s 
m ay not recur" [104]. More ap p aren t in  h is recom m endations 
after 1935 are  Hadow's references to the horrors of w ar and his 
own experience of it: "I would ask you to believe th a t  nothing 
m a tte rs  to  me m ore th a n  the  p revention  of w ar and  the  
m aintenance of true  democracy. The former I saw for four years: 
th a t is enough for a lifetime, and I have children"[105]. In  1937 he
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wrote th a t his most profound wish was to try  to "stop the drift th a t 
is leading C entral Europe tow ards the abyss of war: of which I 
tasted  the full horrors for nearly three y ea rs 'll 06].
I t  was in 1937 th a t Hadow’s pacifism became even more of a 
recurring  justification  concluding the  more strongly worded of 
his le tte rs  and despatches, and w ith it, the belief th a t  he was 
expressing the  views of his countrymen. In  M arch he wrote, "I 
have no axe to grind other th an  a desire to promote PEACE which 
is a  resu lt of my personal knowledge of war" and continued, "'We 
do not w ant war*" is the universal cry in our country...I w ant to 
go on fighting in  C entral Europe for 'Peace and Appeasem ent' 
such as I am  convinced we can a tta in  w ithout for a  m om ent 
sacrificing democracy of our own principles"[107]. In  urging the 
head  of the  P re ss  D ep artm en t R eginald  D eeper to curb 
anti-G erm an articles he wrote, "the 'will to appeasem ent' is far 
more general th an  seems to be believed as yet in  B rita in  and you 
can do an immense am ount towards promoting i t  - w ithout in the 
least sacrificing im portant principles"[108].
Hadow was m istaken, however, in  believing th a t  opinion 
was united  in  B rita in  on appeasem ent. The m ajority  were in  
favour of peace bu t, w ith the  streng thening  of the  Nazis, the 
nation became divided regarding the price of peace. Argum ents 
over foreign policy became b itte r and vociferous as m ost policy 
options appeared to involve negative consequences. Anthony Eden 
wrote a t the end of 1936, "There is a spirit of violence abroad in
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Europe today w hich bodes ill for the  fu tu re  un less all the  
restra in ing  and responsible influences in  hum anity  a re  brought 
to bear to check it"[109]. Hadow was not in  favour of a ttem pts to 
check aggression as he thought th is would only be detrim ental to 
European relations. Any semblance of a th rea ten ing  a ttitude  on 
the  p a rt of B rita in  was wrong: "at p resen t we are  confessedly 
PREPARING FOR WAR however m uch we m ay p ro tes t to the  
contrary; for people are ceasing to believe in  our FAIRNESS and 
tha t, and th a t alone, gives our STRENGTH in Europe today"[110].
Pacifism  had, in  fact, been a long trad itio n  in  B ritish  
politics, bu t played a  relatively m inor role before the F irst World 
W ar. The psychological scars of th a t w ar apparen t in  Hadow as 
well as the revulsion against conflict on a large scale had  become 
w idespread by the  1930s. Because Hadow encom passed th is  
aspect of appeasem ent to a large  degree, h is  be lief in  an  
enlightened Europe th a t could no longer contemplate dangerously 
aggressive policies involving w ar as a m eans to an  end became 
earnest enough in  the mid-1930s to consistently ignore or evade 
the  issues of aggressive signs from H itler. This a ttitu d e  is 
illu stra ted  in Hadow's increased irrita tion  w ith the  press during 
his time in Czechoslovakia. While i t  was the belief of m any la ter 
on th a t the B ritish press had failed to inform or prepare its public 
regard ing  the  Nazi danger, Hadow was m uch m ore concerned 
over the effect of any w arnings on Germany. He, therefore, made 
personal pleas to Deeper and others such as Dady Dayton, wife of
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the editor of The News Chronicle. To the la tte r, he wrote in  1936 
objecting to inferences th a t Henlein and his party  were known to 
be Nazi agents: "Such statem ents will have the inevitable resu lt of 
tak ing  away from us the  im m ense m oral power we have over 
C entra l Europe today by m aking both H enlein and  G erm any 
believe th a t  we are  not willing e ither to be fair-m inded or to 
prom ote a b e tte r  u n d e rs tan d in g  betw een peoples". Hadow 
continued, "Do not th in k  th a t  I am  pleading for tolerance or 
kindliness tow ards Germany. I only ask for FAIRNESS in  the 
removal of these little  irrita tions of daily headlines and cutting 
words, and if  you can help in  th is m anner, believe me, England 
will have good cause to be grateful to you 'll 11]. To Deeper he wrote 
th a t  m any recent articles were accomplishing little  ap a rt from 
"rubbing sa lt in to  wounds" w ithout doing m uch constructive 
good[110]. Such actions on the p a rt of Hadow were prompted, as 
he constantly stated himself, by his pacifist sentim ent.
I t  was m ainly Hadow's fear of w ar which spurred  the 
course of appeasem ent he had  adopted in  the mid-1930s, b u t his 
anti-com m unism  and m is tru s t of the Soviet U nion became a 
fu rther catalyst to his actions, a facet of Hadow, of which more 
exam ples emerge in  his despatches. A lready fairly  apparen t 
while in A ustria, Hadow’s posting to a  country allied w ith the 
Soviet Union evoked further expression of this sentim ent.
The concept of communism was new to Hadow - as to most 
W esterners - and a p articu la r th re a t to society circles where
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wealth and property were im portant and class distinctions strictly 
adhered to. Communism, from th is point of view, seemed much 
more destructive th an  Nazism, and the added confusion over how 
exactly such an  alien  system  operated encouraged these  fears. 
E lem ents in Hadow's despatches also suggest th a t  his suspicion 
of comm unism  w as linked to a lack of sym pathy for the  Slav 
m entality. Like his pacifism, it  was a reflection of B ritish  fears 
during the  1930s which, in  th is case, resulted in  the  wish to see 
ü.5.5^. kept in  diplomatic isolation. The term s in  which Hadow 
couched th is w ish was avoidance of a policy of encirclem ent of 
Germany through any agreem ent with the Soviet Union.
Like his pacifism , Hadow's anti-com m unism  rem ained  
beneath  the  surface of his recommendations while in  Prague, b u t 
w as often a p p a re n t in  w arnings of Bolshevik influence in  
Czechoslovakia and  analyses of Czech-Soviet relations. Hadow 
was evidently alarm ed over both these factors, and  his veiled 
criticism  was approached in  two ways: strateg ic  considerations 
concerning Czechoslovakia's reliance on the Soviet Union, and 
the  genera l sp read  of comm unism  in  E urope as allegedly 
condoned in Czechoslovakia. The former involved speculation on 
Russian assistance in  the event of an a ttack  on Czechoslovakia, 
w hile th e  la t te r  invoked w arn ings of encou ragem en t of 
bolshevism  by Benes' Government. The in te res t of the  Foreign 
Office in  Czechoslovakia in  1936 m ainly centred on th is la tte r  
approach; not, however, due to general fears of the  growth of
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com m unism  in  E urope (which w as H adow ’s concern), b u t 
because of G erm any’s po ten tia l in te re s t and involvem ent in  
Czechoslovakia to com bat com m unist influence. As events 
progressed, however, i t  seemed th a t Germany’s in te res t lay more 
w ith the Sudeten Germ ans, and th is m ay explain why Hadow's 
despatches contain more references to the  Soviet U nion and 
bolshevik influence in  1936 th a n  in  1937 w hen the  m inorities 
problem in Czechoslovakia became the focus of his attention.
In  Ja n u a ry  1936 Hadow w rote o f fric tion  betw een  
C zechoslovak ia  a n d  Y ugoslav ia  caused  a p p a re n tly  by 
organisation of com m unist propaganda in  Yugoslavia directed 
from Czechoslovakia which the  Czech M inister was unwilling to 
eradicate "for fear of offending Russia"[113]. In June  he described 
a debate in Prague on Czechoslovakia's foreign policy in  which 
the Czech Communist P arty  gave the  Governm ent its  "blessing" 
w hile th e  spokesm an of the  SdP em phasised th e  "ruin" to 
Czechoslovakia certa in  to be the  re su lt of th e  G overnm ent's 
friendliness to Russia[114]. In  the  sam e m onth he wrote th a t 
Benes was being accused by the Czech A grarians of allowing 
communism a  free hand in  Czechoslovakia in  the  hope of Soviet 
m ilitary and air assistance so th a t the Czech arm y could hold out 
against an attack[115].
In October 1936 Hadow emphasised again th a t  the  middle 
classes in Czechoslovakia were becoming alarm ed a t  the degree to 
which Communist activities and propaganda were being tolerated
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by th e  C zech G o v ern m en t. "In com m on w ith  th e  
Sudetendeutsche ParteV\ Hadow wrote, "the A grarian, C hristian  
Social and Slovak N ationalist parties now openly declare th a t they 
are fighting communism in  Czechoslovakia; b u t the  Government 
professes to see no danger from th is  propaganda"[116]. In  a 
m em orandum  on Czech foreign policy Hadow wrote th a t  Benes 
had tried to reinforce his position in  Europe by "introducing Soviet 
R u ss ia  in  place of or in  addition to Prance, as the  patron  and 
m ilitary protector of Czechoslovakia". This led, Hadow believed, 
to "persistent rum ours of secret agreem ents, preparations for the 
establishm ent of Soviet air-bases in and the  despatch of Soviet 
troops to Czechoslovakia in case of hostilities"[117].
The stories of R ussia  se tting  up advanced air-bases in  
Czechoslovakia from 1936-38 were, in  fact, basically  w ithout 
foundation, although an airfield a t Uzhorod was being enlarged to 
receive Soviet aircraft. Development of a new air-base a t V innitsa 
had also begun as well as the process of fitting out a  Slovak base 
w ith fuel dum ps and  g rea ter technical facilities, b u t these were 
in te rru p te d  by G erm an p ress denunciations[118]. R ussian  
defence of Czechoslovakia in  the event of a G erm an attack was a 
difficult question as passage to Czechoslovakia was dependent on 
Roum anie and  Poland. Polish rela tions w ith  R ussia were 
beginning to deteriorate  in  1936 and she eventually  definitely 
refused Soviet passage through h er territo ry . Roum anie was 
consistent in refusing land passage bu t appeared to be willing to
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close her eyes to the Soviets using her air-space. Hadow came to 
recognise these facts la te r on, and pointed to them  w ith a certain  
m easure  of re lief as fu rth e r reason  for Czechoslovakia being 
technically  as well as m orally  indefensible ag a in st G erm an 
aggression. In  1936, however, he  w as still w orried over th is  
aspect of Bolshevik infiltration of Europe.
In  November Hadow wrote of concern he felt over rem arks 
a ttribu ted  to M ajor-General Wavell of the B ritish  G eneral S taff 
a f te r  a tten d in g  Red Arm y M anoeuvres w ith  th e  B ritish  
Delegation. The International Press Correspondence - a Soviet 
paper circulated in  B rita in  and  C entral Europe - had  reported 
W avell rem ark ing  th a t  he hoped in the  n ea r fu tu re  to g ree t 
delegates of the Red Army in  England. Hadow did not suppose 
th a t  these were W avell's exact words or assum ed th a t, i f  they  
were, they had been taken  out of context: "But my a tten tion  was 
draw n to them  by a Czech friend who asked me w hether they  
m ean t th a t  the  B ritish  as well as the  French Army was now 
having to bow to the dictates of 'Red Politicians'. You can well 
imagine my answer!"[119].
At the beginning of 1937 Hadow dem onstrated his fear of 
Pan-slavism  by criticising a recent book on E astern  Europe by a 
Czech "Diplomat-publicisist" M. Seba. The book, Hadow felt, g*ve 
a  clear p icture of Seba’s views: "Friendly to R ussia, frankly  
anti-Polish; desirous of w arning Yugoslavia against the danger of 
f l ir tin g  w ith  G erm any; n ervous of any  A u stro -G erm an
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Anschluss and above all seeing in  Germany the traditional enemy 
of his race, M. Seba seems to be little  more th an  a Slav politician 
w ith  a  lean ing  tow ards P an -S lav ism  as the  opponen t of 
Pan-G erm anism  and th e  cham pion of Slav Czechoslovakia". 
Hadow wrote th a t  Seba m ade no secret of h is conviction th a t  
R ussia should be kep t in  Europe "to oppose a G erm any which 
seeks steadily  to exclude h er from participation  in  E uropean  
affairs". Hadow added th a t Seba had President Benes' backing, so 
h is  caree r w as u n lik e ly  to be cu t sh o rt by h is  "b lu n t 
indiscretions"[120]. From  th is  tim e on, as Germ any's a tten tion  
sh ifted  from com m unism  in  Czechoslovakia to th e  S udeten  
Germ ans, Hadow also shifted his a tten tion  more solely on th is 
la t te r  question  and  th e  sp read  of com m unism  becam e an  
underlying factor in  his a ttitude  towards the Czech Government.
From  1936 to the  beginning of 1937 Hadow was fu rth er 
perceiving an  in te rn a l s trugg le  in  Czechoslovakia betw een  
N ational Socialism and Communism, and through the  em phasis 
in  his despatches, appeared increasingly more concerned over the 
possible victory of the latter. In  Septem ber 1936 he wrote of th is 
struggle and rem arked th a t  the  middle classes in Czechoslovakia 
were "uncomfortably aware" th a t  there  was little  room for an  
in d e p e n d e n t b o u rg eo is  C zech o slo v ak ia  t b v u l d  e i th e r  
national-socialism or communism prevail[121]. By 1937 he viewed 
the  struggle in different term s; as one of a m ajority against the  
ru lin g  Czech m inority  w hich w as complicated now only by
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com m unism  (and  n o t n a tio n a l-so c ia lism ) a g a in s t  w hich  
influential supporters of the  Governm ent were having  to fight. 
According to Hadow the Conservative classes were claim ing th a t  
Benes was having to pay Moscow’s price for protection against 
G erm an aggression by to le ra tin g  the preaching of Moscow's 
doctrines in  the  towns and  villages of Czechoslovakia. Hadow 
offered proof of th is  claim  through "ocular" evidence of police 
p ro tec tion  of com m unist m ee tings in  N o rth e rn  B ohem ia 
furnished by "a reliable B ritish Subject"; and compulsory visits by 
school children to Soviet propaganda films which were being 
shown in  Prague. "The open sympathy", Hadow wrote, "for the 
'Red' elem ent in such films shown by local audiences and th e ir 
vociferous hostility to any 'White' elements is often cited by Czech 
opponents of communism as proof of the ir contention th a t  its  
virus is taking effect in Czechoslovakia"[122].
H adow 's a n ta g o n ism  to w ard s  S ov ie t R u ss ia  an d  
communism in  general was seemingly brought out during  his 
posting in  Czechoslovakia. A lthough m entioning fears of a 
"leftist" tendency in  N azi G erm any in the  early  1930s, h is 
prejudice against the  Soviet Union found more expression in  a 
country friendly to R ussia  and  possessing the  added Slavic 
elem ents w ith which Hadow was u n ^ rn ilia r  and re lu c tan t to 
tru s t. The Nazi regime was admittedly brutal, b u t i t  projected a  
comparative sense of order more likely to appeal to Hadow, and 
th is  is one reason why Pan-G erm an tendencies were m et w ith
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g rea te r understand ing  from him  th a n  Pan-Slavic ones. H is 
anti-com m unism  was, thus, perpetuated  in  Czechoslovakia and 
became an added incentive to his heightened sense of the  need for 
appeasem ent in  the late 1930s.
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4 The ForeîgQ Office: Appeasem ent Pursued
The Early Signs
I t seems clear th a t Hadow gradually grew a ttuned  to those 
in support of appeasem ent and th a t  he drifted tow ards these 
figures in  the mid to la te  1930s as the policy gained m om entum  
under Cham berlain. This m eant an autom atic sh ift away from 
m any of his colleagues in  the Foreign Office who continued to 
support a policy of containm ent of Germany and Italy. The shift 
was clear from the tim e of his posting in  London b u t had begun 
developing as early as his tim e in  Vienna. Officials in  the  Foreign 
Office grew aw are of Hadow's divergence from th e ir own views 
and expressed th e ir  differences largely  in  m in u tes  on h is 
despatches; his earliest and gradually most trenchan t critic being 
S ir Orme Sargen t. Sargen t, who was head  of th e  C entral 
D epartm ent and became A ssistan t U nder-Secretary of S ta te , is 
described by M artin  G ilbert and Richard Gott as the  strongest 
opponent of appeasem ent in  the Foreign Office: "He refused any 
com prom ise, how ever a ttra c tiv e  superfic ia lly"[l]. S a rg en t 
advocated a "classical" policy for B ritain  in th a t she could not 
allow any one power to dominate Europe. Germany was therefore 
to be contained by alliances; preferably Franco-B ritish, b u t the 
Soviet Union should be included if necessary.
O thers in th e  lânii(jr\C?p[<cc who opposed concilia tion  of
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right-w ing sta tes as the prim e object of foreign policy included 
laurcAce. Collier, Phipps, S ir Reginald Deeper, D uncan Sandys, S ir 
Ralph W igram, and  V an sitta rt, the  la tte r  being well-known for 
h is  s tringen tly -vo iced  c ritic ism  of any  p ro -G erm an  line . 
V a n s itta r t grew to deplore the  tendency in  B rita in  to divorce 
G erm an dom estic b ru ta lity  from possible aggression abroad, 
because he rea lised  th a t  N azism  w as incapable  of such a 
division[2]. T hat these officials supported containm ent is not to 
say, however, th a t they  did not, a t  different tim es, recommend 
lim ited concessions to both Germany and Italy, bu t the  basis of the 
m ajority of their recommendations rested on a strong defence and 
a curbing of these countries' aim s. In  th is  crucial sense they  
differed from Hadow.
T hat Hadow could deviate from the Foreign Office line is 
due to changes in  its  role and the workings w ithin th is institution, 
and a lack of agreem ent betw een certain  factions which m ade a 
clear-cut policy difficult to define. K eith M iddlem as w rites in  
Diplomacy of Illusion th a t in the  days when Eyre Crowe headed 
the Foreign Office i t  would have been inconceivable for Heads of 
D epartm ents or Am bassadors to by-pass the  norm al channels of 
com m unication or directly com m unicate w ith m em bers of the 
Cabinet[3]. B ut a quick succession of Foreign Secretaries after 
1929 weakened th is system  and heads of departm ents acquired 
g rea ter freedom. A rthur H enderson, the  M arquess of Reading,
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S ir Sam uel H oare, an d  S ir Jo h n  Simon w ere a ll Foreign 
S ec re ta ries  d u rin g  th e  y ears  Hadow w orked in  V ienna. 
H enderson had  been caught up in  Geneva w ith  th e  post-w ar 
settlem ents and the League of Nations, Reading was only Foreign 
Secretary for four m onths, Hoare had  been forced to resign, and 
Simon served three years b u t showed a lack of in itiative and was 
d isliked  and  m is tru s te d  in  th e  Foreign  Office. T hese 
c ircum stances com bined w ith  th e  general e rosion  of th e  
dominance of the  Foreign Office due partly  to the  form ation of 
special m inisterial committees probably helped to cloak any major 
differences of opinion betw een Hadow and his superiors during 
the early 1930s.
In the  years he worked under Phipps in  A ustria  Hadow 
grew to have little  respect for the  la tter. Sharing th e  n a tu ra l 
cynicism of m any anti-appeasers, Phipps possessed m any of the 
qualities of a  good diplomat. This probably gave rise to im patience 
from Hadow who increasingly in terpreted  his job m ore loosely. 
The im pression Hadow's sister-in-law  received when she visited 
him  in  Vienna was th a t  he "bullied " Phipps, and th is im pression 
is supported by a le tte r  S argen t wrote a t one point to Phipps: 
"Your le tte r of A ugust 12, enclosing Hadow's b ru ta l suggestion 
th a t you should break your leave to come up to London and join in 
the A ustrian financial struggle. Hadow m ust be a hard  hearted  
fellow and I shall be no party  to his proposal"[4]. From  Vienna
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Phipps w ent on to become A m bassador to B erlin  and, like the  
form er Am bassador S ir Horace Rumbold, grew alarm ed a t  the  
excesses of the  Nazi regime, describing H itler as "a fanatic  who 
would be satisfied  w ith no th ing  less th a n  the  dom inance of 
Europe"[5]. Rumbold and Phipps were not heeded, however; S ir 
Ne vile Henderson, (who bficafvxc, Aft\basSGdorio2firl»V\mR3ri 
Ihc latter too pro-French to understand Germany objectively[63.
Sir Walford Selby who replaced Phipps in  V ienna in  1933 
got on ra th e r  b e tte r  w ith  Hadow despite  d isag reem en t over 
G erm an intentions, and he sen t praise of Hadow's efforts on the  
financial aspects of his work. Selby la te r wrote of Hadow w hen 
describing the 1934 V ienna rebellion, "If I succeeded in  any way 
in  extricating myself from a well-nigh impossible situation  I owe 
an  im m ense debt to...Mr. Hadow...[who] was anxious to p reven t 
the  overthrow of Chancellor Dollfuss. He th rew  h im self w ith  
ardour into the task  of securing the  distribution of funds collected 
by our Trade Unions in  England"[7]. Selby la ter sharply  criticised 
the Foreign Office of the 1930s, largely attribu ting  "the d isaster of 
1939" to faulty organisation in  W hitehall[8].
The line taken  by the  Foreign Office from 1931 to 1934 . 
regard ing  G erm any and  E uropean  concerns w as vague and  
erra tic , being ham pered by in te rn a l differences and a lack of 
guidance from Simon. The central principle appeared to be to 
avoid any disruption of the existing order, and the Foreign Office
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aim  was, a t  th a t  tim e, to prevent shifts in  balance among the 
g rea t powers and to reconcile local difficulties and  tensions. 
M iddlemas w rites, "from the earliest years following the  w ar, i t  
was our policy to elim inate those parts  of the Peace Settlem ent 
which, as p rac tica l people, we knew to be u n ten ab le  and 
indefensible"[9]. Hadow apparently took this policy to heart.
In  Novem ber 1931, w hen the  B ritish  G overnm ent was 
p reparing  for the  D isarm am ent Conference, S argen t began to 
argue w ithin the Foreign Office th a t the C abinet needed a new 
approach to foreign affairs. He contended in  an  analysis of 
European and world problem s produced by w ar and depression 
th a t finances and economy, security and disarm am ent, territories 
and Treaty revision, were all linked, Sargent believed th a t French 
security  a g a in st G erm an im perialism  was th e  com m anding 
issue, implying th a t France had reason to fear the fu ture and th a t 
the  Locarno agreem ents were inadequate protection. I f  "real 
stability" was to be restored to Europe, the B ritish  Governm ent 
should unequivocally  g u a ran tee  te rrito ria l order[10]. Such 
recommendations were too strong for the Cabinet and did not fit in 
with Simon's view of the  situation or his cautious approach. He 
was being criticised a t th is tim e for failure to take a  stronger line 
over Japanese aggression in  M anchuria, and his view th a t  "we 
m ust keep out of trouble in  Central Europe a t  all costs" was not 
calculated to deflect H itler and Mussolini from th e ir designsfll].
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Even Neville C ham berla in , who was then  C hancellor of the 
Exchequer, said of Simon, "the fact is th a t his m anner inspires no 
confidence and th a t he seems tem peram entally unable to m ake up 
his mind to action when a difficult situation arises"[12].
By the late sum m er of 1933 the Foreign Office did begin to 
make stronger attem pts to promote effective protection of A ustria - 
a  policy which Hadow adhered  to in  his defence of A ustrian  
independence, and  one which was m ainly th e  re su lt  of the  
in itia tiv e  of V a n s itta r t. U nlike Hadow, how ever. H itle r’s 
aggressive  A u s tr ia n  policy confirm ed V a n s i t ta r t  in  h is  
anti-G erm an a ttitude . The Perm anent U nder-Secretary of S tate  
w arned the B ritish Government th a t A ustria confronted i t  w ith a 
"European crisis of the  first m agnitude", with H itle r’s "first tria l 
of strength". He fu rth e r wrote, "The fu ture  of Europe tu rn s  
largely on the  fashion of our facing the G erm an challenge over 
A ustria , in  w hich we a re  a t  p re sen t likely  to lose. The 
seriousness of the challenge can only be realised if  i t  is not seen as 
an  isolated case...but as the first in  a series of challenges, each 
one of which will carry w ith i t  a  nearer th rea t to th is country’l l  3].
Before 1933, Hadow's reports were fairly  consistent w ith I
general views in  the  Foreign Office and even, a t  tim es, received 
praise. N ear the end of 1931 Sargent wrote Hadow to thank  him 
for his le tte rs on the  In ternational Socialist Conference, "which 
V ansittart and I have read  w ith much interest"[14]. By the end of
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1933, however, criticism  of m any of Hadow's observations and 
recom m endations became apparen t in  the Foreign Office, m ost 
notably from Sargent. In  com m enting on a m em orandum  by 
Hadow on A ustro-G erm an rela tions in  A ugust 1933, S argen t 
m inuted th a t  Hadow's suggestion th a t Ita lian  policy a t  th is tim e 
was not averse to accepting Anschluss w ithin the  fram ework of a 
Central European Union lead by Germany and Italy  was "worth 
reading bu t hard ly  credible". V ansitta rt added his agreem ent to 
th is observation[15]. W hen, in  Septem ber of th a t  year, Hadow 
suggested  B ritish  m ed ia tion  in  A ustro -G erm an  re la tio n s , 
V an sitta rt wrote, "I do not th ink  i t  our business to m ediate - 
especially on such slender grounds as these...If the  G erm ans do 
really  desire to sober down while saving th e ir faces - I doubt 
w hether H itler does w ant to sober down over A ustria - somebody 
like H err V. N eurath  will make an approach to the S[ecretary] of 
S[tate] a t Geneva"[16]. V an sitta rt was voicing an  objection to 
Hadow's recom m endations which was soon to become the major 
one of an ti-appeasers in  the  Foreign Office in  response to his 
despatches: th a t B ritain  should not involve herself in  any attem pts 
a t  m ediation  in  E urope; especially  th a t  w hich concerned 
Germany.
In 1934, ju s t before the attem pted Nazi putsch in Vienna, 
Hadow sent Sargent a despatch on the effect of the  SA revolt in 
Germ any on A ustrian  public opinion. "If a G erm an collapse
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would deliver A ustria  from the  political m enace of Nazidom", 
Hadow wrote, "it is  also expected by A u strian s to produce 
economic suffering, and  possibly a form of com m unism  hard ly  
less dangerous to the  life of th is country, th a n  a N azi victory". 
R.A. Gallop of the  Southern D epartm ent commented, "I cannot 
resist the feeling th a t V ienna is getting on Mr. Hadow's nerves 
and th a t  h is  view of the  s itua tion  is unnecessarily  gloomy. 
Perhaps th is is no t u n n a tu ra l while he rem ains the  'cook and 
captain bold' (this despatch is self-typed) w ith Mr. Pollard as the 
'crew of th e  N ancy brig'"[17]. S argen t appeared  to be in  
agreem ent w ith  th is  view. In  his comments on a le tte r  from 
Hadow containing notes which expressed despair over A ustria 's 
economic situation  leading to a loss of all th a t  G erm an visitors 
m eant to the  country, concern over the lack of discipline and 
corruption in A ustria , and the  suggestion th a t  A ustro-G erm an 
relations had  practically  ceased to exist, S argent w rote, "I am  
getting a little  tired  of Mr. Hadow's oft-repeated conclusion to the 
effect th a t A ustria is bound to collapse unless succour reaches her 
speedily from G reat B ritain . W hat does Hadow really  wish to 
imply when he says this? I ra th e r suspect th a t he has repeated 
th is phrase so often th a t i t  has ceased to have any real m eaning 
for him"[18].
By 1934 Hadow was irrita ting  Sargent to the extent th a t the 
la tte r  sen t a com plaint to V ienna over th e  s ta te  of Hadow's
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typew riter which he wished had a larger scrip t and  a blacker 
ribbon. "Even if  the  first of these deficiencies is beyond remedy 
surely the second m ight be rectified by the  purchase of a new 
ribbon"[19]. V an sitta r t, however, was not so critical and  in  
A ugust w rote to th e  M in iste r in  V ienna W alford  Selby 
co n g ra tu la tin g  H adow  on th e  "detailed  an d  illum ina ting" 
m em orandum  recently sent, "It is full of inform ation and shows 
how much of the  A ustrian  background he has acquired during 
his service in  Vienna. He deserves the greatest credit for it"[20].
Hadow also received criticism  from D uncan Sandys of the 
C entral D epartm ent, who, a t  one stage, m inuted th a t he doubted 
the  accuracy of Hadow 's reports of an approaching  G erm an 
compromise w ith A ustria. Sandys had joined the  Foreign Office 
in  1930, and worked as Third Secretary in Berlin under Sir Horace 
Rumbold who was Am bassador there  from 1928 to 1933. Both 
Sandys and Rumbold had become aware of the  implications of the 
Nazi regime and Rumbold sen t London warnings of its  b ru ta lity  
and po ten tia l aggression abroad, while Sandys re tu rn e d  to 
London convinced of the need for a  positive B ritish policy. Sandys 
was too junior, however, for his opinions to carry  weight, and 
when in 1933 he expressed his fears and views on B ritish  policy in  
the event of Germ an occupation of the Rhineland, Simon merely 
com m ented, "we canno t consider hypo thetica l issues"[21]. 
Sandys resigned from the Foreign Office in  1933 in  protest against
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th e  G overnm ent’s G erm an policy and became a Conservative 
M.P. in  1935, la te r joining the anti-appeasem ent groups of Eden 
and Churchill. G ilbert and Gott w rite th a t Sandys was "a realist, 
not a  visionary"t22]. His understanding of the situation  was not 
likely to coincide w ith Hadow's inspired conclusions.
While in  A ustria, Hadow had expressed h is own opinions 
often, b u t his early adoption of appeasem ent had yet to m eet with 
any grea t disagreem ent in London. Knowledge of the  implications 
of N azi G erm any w as s till unc lear desp ite  w arn ings from 
Rumbold, and avoidance of confrontation in  E urope was an  
implicit concern. Hadow's drift towards appeasem ent was a t  this 
tim e slow and vague enough th a t he could correspond privately 
and am icably w ith ano ther an ti-appeaser S ir R alph  W igram. 
Wigram, was head of the C entral D epartm ent, close to Churchill 
and V ansitta rt, and "a g rea t friend of France". W hen Sandys 
resigned from the Foreign Office W igram believed he was righ t to 
go: "I wish I'd done i t  long ago. I left i t  too long". J u s t  after the 
Germ an occupation of the  Rhineland, W igram m ade the  famous 
sta tem ent, "War is now inevitable...I have failed to m ake the 
people here realise w hat is a t stake"[23]. Hadow often addressed 
W igram as "Wigs" and had no qualm s over m aking observations 
to him  on the  despatches from V ienna w hich he saw as a 
"reflection of my departing chief’ (Phipps)[24].
The divergence in  th e  Foreign Office, how ever, was
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growing and was represented by the still fairly strong Eyre Crowe 
tradition kept up by V ansitta rt and the beginnings of appeasem ent 
in  Sim on's cau tious approach. The Foreign  Office sh ared  
H adow 's pessim istic  view of A ustria  and  w as sym pathetic  
regard ing  N azi a ttack s  on h e r G overnm ent, b u t a p a r t  from 
initiatives taken  by V ansitta rt in  the late  sum m er of 1933 (while 
Simon was aw ay on holiday), in  which effective protection of 
A ustria was promoted more energetically, th is m oral support did 
not actually  express itse lf  in  stronger political action. Hadow, 
a lready , w as a rgu ing  for approaches to G erm any, w hereas 
V a n sitta r t and Sargen t saw strong alliances w ith  France and 
Italy as the key to the  prevention of Anschluss.
At th is  tim e Hadow received a personal le tte r  from the 
Liberal M.P. Bernays which gave a fairly clear indication of the 
difference in  views between Hadow and a large p a rt of the Foreign 
Office. Bernays had  had a  ta lk  w ith Anthony Eden, who became 
Foreign Secretary in  1935, and p u t forward Hadow's case for a 
"real attem pt" a t  getting a settlem ent with Germ any on the basis 
of unequivocal acceptance by H itle r of A ustria 's independence. 
Bernays wrote, "I do no t th ink  I made m uch im pression. The 
Foreign Office is wedded to 'the Ring of Steel' conception of policy. 
W hen I ta lked  of the  in d u stria l p light of A ustria  I was m et 
im m ediately with Phipps' report, which appears to take a very 
roseate  view of A ustria 's  economic fu tu re . B ernays spoke
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"strongly and  sincerely" about Hadow and his "non-government" 
sources, and  E den  repo rted ly  said , "I don 't know Hadow 
personally bu t he is doing very well. Everybody tells me that"[25].
Growing Divergence
W hen Hadow was transferred  to Czechoslovakia a t  the  end 
of 1935, the Foreign Office and B ritish  governm ent were in  the 
m idst of struggling  for a definable foreign policy to m eet the 
expansion ist policies of G erm any and Ita ly . The dilem m a 
confronting B rita in  was th a t  her in terests were world-wide, bu t 
she lacked the arm ed strength  to protect them . Faced w ith the 
Ita lian  invasion of Abyssinia in  1935, Foreign Office officials such 
as V ansitta rt shared the concern of France over the  possibility of 
alienating Italy  through sanctions in  answer to th is  action, while 
th e  m ore form idable  th re a t  of G erm any hovered  in  th e  
background. O thers, like Hadow, were more in ten t on coming to 
term s w ith  G erm any in  the  hope of curbing h e r belligerence. 
B ritain 's insecurity in  m ilitary strength  and her uncertain ty  over 
Germ an in ten tions created  an  environm ent ripe for those who 
advocated conciliation of H itler, and Ian Colvin in his biography of 
V ansitta rt notes th a t while 1934 was the year of endeavouring for 
European alliances, 1935 was the year in  which appeasem ent of
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G erm any gained ground[26]. A ppeasem ent, a t  th is  tim e, took 
more th an  one form as there were those who felt i t  preferable to 
get a general settlem ent in  company w ith France, being mindful 
of Central and E astern  Europe, while others w anted to em bark on 
a  two-power policy w ith Germ any to the  exclusion of France; a 
suggestion which brought with it  the idea of le tting  Germ any "go 
east".
As borne ou t in  contradictory m inutes, a t  a  tim e when 
Hadow 's involvem ent in  B ritish  policy prio r to th e  w ar was 
probably a t its  m ost significant through the recom mendations in  
his despatches from Prague, the  Foreign Office was divided in  
opinion, unsure  in  its  direction, and w eakening in  its  influence 
over Governm ent decisions. The overall picture of the  Foreign 
Office from 1936-1937 is one of increasing confusion, conflict, and 
a certa in  am ount of fru stra tio n , and  can be read  from the  
despatches from Prague and subsequent reactions, and in  general 
assessm ents in  the Foreign Office of the European situation. At 
the  end of 1935, for example, W igram and Sargent wrote a joint 
m em orandum  following the  first form of appeasem ent, declaring 
i t  to be the  continuance of B ritain 's foreign policy, and rejecting 
the  policies of d rift and encirclem ent of G erm any. The only 
constructive policy open to Europe, they felt, was to come to term s 
w ith  G erm any in  order to m oderate he r aim s in  C entral and 
E astern  Europe. The way to go about this, i t  was concluded, was
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th rough  a colonial or a ir  agreem ent[27]. The m em orandum  
aroused debate in  the  Foreign Office and L aurence  Collier who 
was head of the N orthern  D epartm ent and a R ussian  specialist 
opposed it, sta ting  th a t i t  was not a continuance b u t a reversal of 
B rita in ’s previous policy. In  Collier's view th e  only way to 
m oderate  G erm any's aim s would be to m ake h e r  drop them  
altogether. General discussion with Germany, he felt, would only 
damage relations w ith th a t country and render B rita in  subject to 
suspicion from o ther countries[28]. V a n s itta r t  agreed  w ith  
Collier th a t G erm an expansion could not be modified, b u t did not 
dism iss discussions over te rr ito ry  in  Africa as he believed 
Germany was bound to expand somewhere[29].
The P rag u e  L egation , m eanw hile , d e sp ite  H adow 's 
insistence on the neu tra lity  or reliability  of his sources, became 
noticeably biased towards the Sudeten Germ ans and against the 
Czechs. Through the  influence of the M inister from 1931-1936 Sir 
Joseph Addison, i t  distanced itse lf to a certain  degree from the 
Czechs, generally accepting the claims of the Sudeten  G erm an 
P arty  a t face-value, and regarded the statem ents of Benes and the 
Czech M inister in  London J a n  M asaryk w ith  m ore scepticism. 
This, in  tu rn , influenced opinion in London.
While Hadow fell in  readily  w ith the bias in  the  Prague 
Legation which Addison helped create, the la tte r  tended towards a 
cynicism th a t  separa ted  him  from his colleagues and brought
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condem nation from the  Foreign Office. Addison apparently  had 
l i t t le  tim e  for th e  Czechs, "exploding" th e  c laim  th a t  
Czechoslovakia was the only new sta te  trea ting  its  m inorities in  a 
liberal fashion. Shiela G ran t Duff, who m et Addison several 
tim es while in  Czechoslovakia, noted, "The Czechs did not like 
him  very m uch, knowing how much he disliked them". W hen 
she asked him  w hat B ritish  policy was in  E as te rn  Europe he 
answ ered, "B ritish policy! You fla tte r them". H is associates in 
Prague tended to be mostly Bohemian noblemen who, according to 
G rant Duff, viewed the Czechs with the same snobbishness as the 
British Minister[30].
Addison also, however, had  little  tim e for th e  Sudeten 
G erm ans, the  g rea t m ajority of whom he believed to be Nazis 
desiring union w ith Germany. To Addison, i t  was only a  m atter 
of tim e before Czechoslovakia was swallowed up by Germany and 
i t  was useless for B ritain  to take any action w ith regard to th is 
eventuality . By 1936 he was recom m ending little  more th an  
general observance of Czechoslovakia on the p a rt of Britain, and it 
w as th is  la issez-fa ire  a ttitu d e  which b rough t censure  and 
eventual replacem ent of Addison from the Foreign Office. Hadow 
defended Addison throughout, w riting as early  as December 1935, 
"I am  confident we can prove th a t  there  is no underlying bias, 
prejudice or preference; but only a sad necessity to show you...the 
p resen t stage of a historical 'Bruder-Zwist' which is once more
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not w ithout danger to the future of Central Europe"[31]. Despite 
Hadow's defence, the Foreign Office began in  December 1935 to 
review Addison's despatches as they  were held to be one-sided. 
Eden commented th a t Addison was en terta in ing , "But offers no 
constructive advice even on the imm ediate issue of the petitions a t 
Geneva. Nor do I recollect th a t Sir J . had given us such frequent 
w arnings about the  Sudetendeutsche, H is continual them e has 
been the disintegration of Czechoslovakia as a  whole, and had he 
concentrated on th is problem a t an  earlie r da te  we m ight have 
been helped in  a very difficult task". He added, "Nor do I believe 
th a t S ir J . Addison properly appreciates the  European dangers of 
th is  problem"[32]. Addison re tired  a t  the end of 1936 and was 
replaced by Sir Basil Newton in 1937. O'Malley wrote to Hadow 
th a t he had  m et Addison shortly after his resignation and found 
him  in  a  "sulphurous" fram e of mind, beyond consolation. "His 
whole career is a tragedy for which p a rtly  we and partly  he 
him self are  to blame"[33].
The Prague Legation thus w ith the influence of Addison 
and  th e  opinions of Hadow p a in ted  a b leak  p ic tu re  of 
Czechoslovakia which was basically accepted in  London as was, to 
begin w ith , the  Prague Legation's assessm en t of the  conflict 
between Benes and the SdP. W hen Shiela G rant Duff approached 
these diplom ats on the subject of Czechoslovakia she was told, 
"The Czechs know they are doomed..and will be fools if  they resist.
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The French will not help them  and neither will we". G ran t Duff 
wrote, "I found m yself terrib ly  depressed by th e  cynical and 
uncaring a ttitu d e  of my fellow countrym en and  felt lonelier in  
the ir company th an  I did when alone. The implications th a t 
we were the  English and they were the Czechs was so apparent in 
every word and gesture th a t one felt totally isolated"[34].
A part from the  fact tha t, a t  the  beginning of 1936, those 
such as W igram, Sargent, and V ansitta rt were still exploring the 
possibilities of some agreem ent w ith Germany, the  Foreign Office 
was also taken  in  by the sincerity of Konrad Henlein; two factors 
which have possible bearing  on the  views and suggestions in  
H adow 's despatches. W hen C h ris to p h er B ram w ell of the  
Southern D epartm ent was sent by the Foreign Office to report on a 
speech H enlein gave a t C hatham  in  December 1935 he found 
nothing suspicious about Henlein, and was, in  fact, im pressed by 
the SdP leader[35].
H enlein  w as also taken  to m eet S a rg en t and  Clifford 
Norton, V ansitta rt's  Private Secretary. In N orton’s notes on the 
v isit, p rom inence w as given to H en le in ’s assu rance  of no 
connection w ith the Nazis, and the visit led to th is Foreign Office 
official recommending to the  Secretary of S ta te  (then Sir Samuel 
Hoare) th a t Benes should be told "to give these fellows a straighter 
deal which, they say, is all th a t they w ant"[36]. Sargent, before 
the ir meeting, had w ritten  th a t Henlein was not a Nazi, and after
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the  m eeting believed th a t  the SdP leader was definitely on an 
anti-N azi platform . Owen St. C laire O'M alley, H ead of the  
Southern D epartm ent wrote th a t the Foreign Office was convinced 
th a t  H en lein  w as m oderate, and  two officials (C hristopher 
Lam bert and  R.A. Gallop) went so far as to suggest seeing if  a 
nonaggression pact offer to Czechoslovakia from Germ any was 
still open and recom m ended a "standstill" ag reem ent on the  
Polish model. . As well as Hadow, the  B ritish  Legation itse lf in  
Prague was keen on th is idea, although the Foreign Office did not 
pursue it[37].
Despite V ansitta rt's  caution in regard to Germ any and his 
belief in  the  policy of strength, the Perm anent U nder-Secretary of 
S ta te  was also deceived by H enlein. I t  is one elem ent in  
V a n s itta r t 's  o therw ise  fairly  shrew d read in g  of E uropean  
concerns w here he was completely m isled, A record of an  
arranged interview  between V ansitta rt and H enlein was sent to 
Hadow in  Ju ly  1936 and V a n s itta r t’s com m ents m ust have 
gratified the F irs t Secretary to a certain extent. V ansitta rt wrote 
th a t  H enlein m ade a m ost favourable im pression and seemed 
m odera te , honest, and  c lear-sighted . "He speaks w ith  a 
frankness and decision th a t inspire confidence". Throughout the 
in te rv ie w , V a n s i t ta r t  fe lt, H en le in  spoke "w ith  g re a t 
earnestness". V a n sitta rt believed the SdP leader was, if  not 
actually speaking the tru th , speaking w hat he believed to be the
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truth[38]. While Henlein exaggerated V ansitta rt's  in te rest in  the 
Sudeten Germ ans, i t  is true  th a t  th is in te res t existed, and J.W. 
Bruegel w rites th a t  there is enough evidence the Foreign Office 
files to show th a t  V a n s itta r t helped  H en le in  "behind th e  
scenes"[39].
Hadow also described H enlein as "moderate" as well as 
being  a  "m an of h is word"[40]. W hat Hadow term ed  as 
V a n s itta r t’s "statesm anlike in terest" in  the  Sudeten  G erm ans 
increased  th roughout 1936 and encouraged Hadow to send to 
V an sitta rt's  secretary  C.J. Norton in  1937 a m em orandum  for 
V an sitta rt to read in  the hope th a t i t  would be useful to him  as a 
sum m ary of the  problem. "If I have endeavoured to indicate a 
way out of the  p resen t impasse", Hadow wrote, "it is because of 
the hopefulness th a t has been instilled into us by th is constructive 
recognition of G reat B rita in 's essen tia l p a r t  in  bring ing  the  
opponents [Czechoslovakia and Germany] together which comes 
from S ir R obert's 'drive'"[41]. Hadow received a m essage of 
th an k s  for the  m em orandum  from V a n s itta r t who apparen tly  
read  i t  "with g rea t interest" and found the  inform ation "of much 
use"[42].
The enthusiasm  Hadow expressed for B ritish  involvement 
in  the  Sudeten G erm an question represen ts a crucial point of 
contention in  the Foreign Office which developed by 1937. British 
policy in  early  1936, however, was m ainly  dealing  w ith the
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question of how to pursue an orthodox League of N ations policy of 
sanctions against the  aggressor Italy w ithout m aking i t  easy for 
Germany to unbalance the sta tu s quo in  Europe, plus how to seek 
renew ed friendship  w ith  I ta ly  w ithout seem ing to condone 
aggression. The Foreign Office, under the guidance of V ansittart, 
followed the belief in concessions to Italy, although Anthony Eden, 
who had replaced Hoare as Secretary of State, was doubtful of this 
course. V ansitta rt wrote a t th is time, "We cannot m ake a stand 
for Abyssinia and connive a t the  spoilation of L ith uan ia , or 
Czechoslovakia, or Austria". He also wrote, "We should do all we 
can to secure better trea tm en t of German minorities"[43]. Hadow 
was undoubtedly aw are of th is mood in his im m ediate a ttem pt to 
establish contact w ith the SdP, and officials such as Sargent were 
initially enthusiastic about the idea: "This activity on the p a rt of 
the Prague Legation is both unusual and refreshing"[44].
The German reoccupation of the Rhineland in  1936 was m et 
w ith  confusion and  exasperation  in  the Foreign Office w ith  
V ansitta rt noting th a t H itler had deprived them  of the  possibility 
of m aking concessions to him. Many sectors of the B ritish  public, 
however, had convinced them selves th a t Germ any's action was 
not such an unjustified crime. The Cabinet, also, was guarded in  
its  response. ( n p o l i c y  speech th a t
i t  was not hard  to understand Germany's claim to full sovereignty 
over G erm an soil. 'W e w ant no encirclem ent of Germany", he
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stated . "We w ant no exclusive alliances. We w ant to build a 
p a rtne rsh ip  in  E uropean society in  which G erm any can freely 
jo in  w ith  u s ...[45]. Thus, the  Foreign Office and  the  B ritish  
Governm ent were confused betw een them selves over w hat the ir 
E uropean policy should be, and  the  question of Czechoslovakia 
was one grey area  which dem onstrates th is  uncertain ty . The 
c ritic ism  m ingled w ith  p raise  w hich accom panied Hadow 's 
despatches during th is  tim e are an  illu stra tion  of d iversity  of 
opinion w ithin the Foreign Office.
The situation in  the Foreign Office was partly  due to the 
in trusion  of the Cabinet in Foreign Office m atters,a  circumstance 
which became even more apparen t once C ham berlain took over 
from Stanley Baldwin as Prime M inister in the following year. In 
the  opinion of John  Connell who was working in  the Foreign 
Office a t th a t  time, the position of th a t establishm ent was, from 
1936, "ironic and hum iliating". Connell w rites th a t  "the high 
s ta tu s  and g rea t authority  which it  had  achieved in  the previous 
th irty  years were taken away from it, not openly and abruptly, bu t 
by a gradual process of unacknowledged transference of power". 
According to Connell, the  control Baldwin exerted over foreign 
policy tended to be occasional and capricious and subject to the 
influence of unofficial advisors and a sm all clique of M inisters 
and officials unconnected w ith foreign policy[46]. In  May 1936 
Eden had a ta lk  w ith Baldwin on foreign policy, bu t recorded in
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his diary th a t he got little out of i t  except th a t the Prim e M inister 
w anted be tte r relations w ith H itler th an  Mussolini. W hen Eden 
asked how th is  should be achieved, Baldwin replied, "I have no 
idea, th a t is your job"[47].
Although an  explicit B ritish  policy towards the  dictators in 
Europe did not exist in  1936, Baldwin's rem arks dem onstrate the 
emergence from certain conservative circles of a  definable policy 
goal which argued th a t, ra th e r  th a n  face ano ther A byssinian 
fiasco, the B ritish governm ent should settle for an  official line of 
appeasem ent of the demands of dictators. After the  reoccupation 
of the  Rhineland, however, those such as V ansitta rt and Sargent 
were fast becoming disillusioned w ith the idea of coming to term s 
w ith H itler. By the beginning of 1937, the policy the Foreign Office 
was attem pting to pursue was th a t of bringing Italy  and Germany 
into a general European settlem ent; its m ain preoccupation being 
the Spanish Civil War.
In  the  pu rsu it of th is policy. Foreign Office officials carried 
on a search for agreem ent w ith Germany on the basis of a revised 
"Locarno" trea ty , and  Hadow took th is  line to h e a r t  in  his 
continued prom otion of a Czech-Germ an se ttlem en t over the  
S u d e ten  G erm an  grievances. The a rg u m en t for B ritish  
rapprochem ent w ith  G erm any from  a position of s tren g th , 
however, was becoming i^tronger in  the  Foreign Office and in 
Parliam ent, while V ansittart had begun to arouse doubts over his
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effectiveness in  his adam ant and somewhat vociferous support of 
such a policy.
The reaction to Hadow's despatches in  the  C entra l and  
Southern  D epartm ents during  th is  tim e was again  mixed and  
often as vague as B ritish  policy. Officials such as Bramwell and 
O 'M alley were ready  to accept Hadow's assessm en ts of the  
s itu a tio n , w hile those such as S argen t and  V a n s itta r t  had  
in c reas in g  reservations; for exam ple, w hen Hadow se n t a 
sum m ary of a report on the  Sudeten G erm ans in  Ju n e  1936, 
Bramwell m inuted, "I th ink  Mr. Hadow is quite righ t in  urging, 
as he does almost weekly, th a t we should keep up the  pressure on 
the  Czech Governm ent ". He added, "it is held  now in  some 
q u a rte rs  th a t  G erm an policy will concentrate increasingly  on 
Czechoslovakia in  the  im m ediate fu ture and less upon A ustria 
and th a t is another reason why the Czech Government should be 
stirred  out of the ir complacency w ithout delay". S argen t was 
m ore cau tious in  h is agreem ent. He w rote th a t  th e  News 
D epartm ent could work up pressure in  the Press, "But i t  m ust be 
done very carefully so as not to fu rn ish  am m unition  to Dr. 
Goebbels, who m ight easily try  to tw ist w hat appears in  the B ritish 
p re ss  in to  evidence to show th a t  th e  p o sitio n  of th e  
Sudetendeutsche is a  quite impossible one, and one th a t clearly 
cannot be remedied by League enquiries or B ritish  lecturings bu t 
only by the  th rea t of Germ an intervention". V ansitta rt was also
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cautious, merely suggesting th a t a little  pressure which dwelt on 
th e  "im prudence" of th e  Czechs w ithou t em phasising  the  
sufferings of the Sudeten Germans m ight have some effect[48].
In  th a t same m onth Bramwell also wrote, "These are very 
useful bulletins th a t Mr. Hadow sends us. I do not suspect him  of 
bias"[49]; and la ter, in  1937, when doubts were growing in  the 
Foreign Office over the sources of Hadow's inform ation and the 
streng th  of his argum ents, Bramwell was still inclined to tru s t  
h is despatches: "Mr. Hadow prefers the  more pessim istic view of 
anything. There is anyhow no reason for complacency, and to th a t 
extent he is perhaps justified"[50]. Lewis Collier, however, made 
no bones about his doubts, w riting in  January  1937, "The Prague 
Legation ["Mr. Hadow" was w ritten  here and crossed out] seems 
to be very m uch in  the G erm an pocket! (Some of Mr. Hadow's 
reports quite alarm  me on th a t score)"[51]. Charles B rakencourt 
of the C entral D epartm ent wrote in the following m onth th a t he 
wished th a t Hadow was more readable and objected to the le tter 's  
use of inverted  commas and parentheses which were "irritating" 
and som etim es m isleading. "If I m ight venture ano ther small 
criticism ", continued B rakencourt, "it is the  tendency of Mr. 
Hadow to e rr  on the  side of subjectivity, especially when he is 
w riting  on p e t them es of h is, such as the  Sudetendeutsche 
q u e s t i o n  " [ 5 2 ] .
Hadow's closest ally in  the Foreign Office a t th is tim e was
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O'Malley and the two kept up a private correspondence during 
Hadow's tim e in  Prague. O'Malley was a more cautious appeaser 
th an  Hadow but defended the  m ajority of Hadow's despatches as 
well as Addison's, and supported conciliation of Germany. In  
February 1936 he subm itted a memorandum he had w ritten  a t the 
end of 1935 bu t withheld because he believed a t th a t time it  was too 
unorthodox. He rem arked on submission, "Since then  the idea of 
general negotiation w ith Germ any has become fashionable". The 
m em orandum  defended the  practicality of m aking concessions to 
Germ any and expressed the belief in  the eventual m oderation of 
the  Nazi party. V ansitta rt's  comments on the  m em orandum  in  
May 1936 dem onstrate h is disillusionm ent after the  R hineland 
occupation. "While ne ither of us would wish to tre a t  Germ any 
narrowly, I th ink  the era of grievances is p retty  nearly played out 
now since March 7,1936. If  more is to be done, i t  should be done 
a t our own expense in Africa, B ut you would like to do i t  a t other 
people’s expense in  E urope...I'm  afraid  I look upon yours as 
immoral, even if events prove it  to be inevitable, which I do not yet 
admit[53].
W hen Addison came under question in the Foreign Office, 
O'Malley had collected extracts from th is m inister's despatches 
going back to 1931. Regarding the criticism of a lack of sufficient 
w arning from him  over problems in Czechoslovakia, he argued 
th a t these extracts showed th a t the "two interconnected themes"
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of the  possible break-up of Czechoslovakia and quarrels betw een 
th e  Sudeten  G erm ans and the  Czechs had  been fairly  and 
consisten tly  m en tioned  in  P rag u e  despatches w hich w ere 
supplem ented by conversations w ith  Addison and Hadow which 
left the  Southern  D epartm ent "under no illusions". O 'M alley 
continued, "When Mr. Hadow was in London in  the middle of the  
sum m er he said th a t  he and  S ir Joseph were m uch disturbed 
because th ev  felt th a t  i t  was the  Foreign Office which did not 
sufficiently appreciate the  gravity  of the position. Mr. Hadow 
wrote a  mem orandum  here in  my room on the subject and begged 
urgently on Sir Joseph's behalf as well as his own th a t we would 
do everything in our power to press a m oderate policy on the  
Czechoslovak Governm ent". D espite th is defence, V a n s itta r t  
m erely m inuted, "Sir Joseph Addison has certainly been a keen 
and prescient critic, b u t not much of a  constructive one"[54].
While O'Malley was in agreem ent with Hadow on foreign 
policy, he did feel compelled to w arn  the la tte r  of the  negative 
effects of some of h is behaviour. In  M arch 1936 Hadow had 
apparently  received an  official le tte r of approval of his work from 
E.H. C arr of the Southern D epartm ent. O'Malley assured Hadow 
th a t the letter was an expression of the general feeling there, bu t 
w ent on to sound "a very  sm all note of w arning" th a t  h is 
telegram s were sometimes criticised for a lack of clarity, and th a t 
i t  had been suggested th a t  he sometimes lent too ready an ear to
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rum ours. O’M alley wrote th a t  Hadow should not m ake heavy 
w eather of these criticisms, bu t to bear them  in  mind[55]. Hadow 
thanked O'Malley warmly for the  w arning and, in  response to the 
second criticism , sta ted  th a t  h is facts were carefully controlled 
and time would prove him  right. He felt th is to be particu larly  
tru e  about h is despatches on the  Sudeten Germans[563.
The doubts Hadow's despatches began to raise from Sargent 
during the form er's tim e in  A ustria increased to such an  exten t 
in  1936-37, th a t th is official became Hadow's strongest critic, a  fact 
which Hadow soon recognised and came to resent. Sargent, like 
other anti-appeasers in  the Foreign Office, was cautious in  his 
outlook regard ing  G erm any and  E aste rn  Europe, and  in  his 
m inutes on despatches, tended to tone down or question Hadow's 
recom m endations as well as the acceptance or en thusiasm  with, 
which they  were m et in  the Foreign Office. To S argent i t  was 
alw ays im portan t to th in k  th rough  the consequences of any 
initiative taken  by Britain; for example, the idea of pu tting  public 
pressure on the Czech Government regarding th e ir trea tm en t of 
m inorities and agreem ent w ith Germany. His objections in  th is 
respect usually took the form of the question, "How do we know we 
are right?"; a question which Hadow, by nature, was not inclined 
to consider. Like m any of his colleagues, S argen t appeared  
in c reas in g ly  aw are  of a possib le  G erm an o n s la u g h t on 
Czechoslovakia, bu t he wanted to better anticipate H itler instead of
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rushing blindly into concessions.
Like most of the Foreign Office, Sargent, to begin w ith, was 
tak en  in  by H enlein and  less im pressed w ith  Benes. W hile 
Hadow, however, w as anxious to estab lish  contact w ith  the  
S ude ten  G erm ans as soon as possible, S a rg en t (a lthough  
approving th is action) was w ary of too in tim ate  a  relationship  
w ith Henlein. The SdP leader had  tried, in December 1935, to 
begin a direct correspondence w ith Sargent, but the la tte r tactfully 
declined th is  opening, w riting to Addison th a t such an  exchange 
would be em barrassing. To Henlein he wrote, "All of us in  the  
Foreign Office have to be exceedingly careful to give no grounds 
w hatever for letting i t  be supposed...that we had ever gone behind 
the backs of the foreign governments with whom we are  on special 
relations"[57]. Sargent, also, while often believing th e  policy 
followed by Benes was short-sighted, was, unlike Hadow, less 
critical of the motives behind Benes’ actions, whom he grew to feel 
was understandably  afraid. This was why he deprecated the  
constant calls for B ritish  advice to the Czech G overnm ent from 
both Hadow and Sir Charles Bentinck who was also working in  
Prague. In  the spring of 1937, for example, Sargent wrote th a t he 
suspected th a t when Benes had, in  the past, told Hadow he was 
not concerned over Germ an intentions, he had really  m eant th a t 
he did not w an t to be urged to come to an agreem ent With 
Germany a t all costs as he still hoped to put up a fight. "In this I
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th ink  Dr. Benes was right", wrote Sargent, "and as i t  tu rned  out 
we never did give him , and did not intend to give him , any such 
advice (although you will recollect th a t it  was recommended th a t  
we should do so by S ir Charles Bentinck and Mr. Hadow)"[58].
In M arch 1936 when Hadow wrote th a t  the  Slav-Germ an 
struggle in  Czechoslovakia was entering a new and  dangerous 
phase and recommended th a t firm and private pressure should be 
p u t on this country in  the  form of joint counsel from B rita in  and 
F rance, he received support from Bram w ell and  O 'M alley. 
Sargent, however, m inuted  th a t an  approach to France on th is 
m atter would most likely be m et w ith a  snub, as the  French would 
hold th a t B rita in  was playing the German game: " th a t we were 
the dupes of an agitation which has been worked up by Germ an 
propaganda and th a t the  Czech Government are fully justified in  
tak in g  m easures to coun terac t it". V a n s itta r t agreed  w ith 
Sargent, bu t wrote th a t the Czechs were asking for trouble[59].
In  Ju ly  1936 Hadow p u t forward the  suggestion of an  
investigation of the  Sudeten Germ an petition to the  League of 
Nations and the adoption of a  definite attitude by B ritain  in  regard 
to th is petition. O’Malley, again, expressed his agreem ent th a t 
B ritain  "should take the bull by the horns" and get the  Sudeten 
G erm an grievances thoroughly gone into, w arn ing  the  Czech 
Government, a t  th e  sam e tim e, th a t th a t was th e ir  in tention. 
Sargent, however, m ade clear his complete d isagreem ent w ith
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such m easures. Such a public s ta tem en t by th e  B ritish  
G overnm ent w ould, he fe lt, "severely shake" th e  Czech 
Government and  arouse "unw arranted  hopes and  assum ptions" 
among the Sudeten Germans. Sargent continued, "worst of all, it  
would give the  G erm an G overnm ent and N azi propaganda a 
heaven-sen t a rg u m en t to show how ju stified  th ey  w ere in  
intervening on behalf of their oppressed German b re th ren  across 
th e  fron tier" . S a rg e n t fu r th e r  objected th a t  th e  Czech 
G overnm ent had , "rightly  or wrongly", m ade its  decision in  
regard to the  SdP, and could accuse B ritain  of speaking w ithout 
full knowledge of the situation. If  the  Czech Government followed 
B rita in ’s advice th is  could m erely lead to the  estab lishm ent in  
Czechoslovakia of a fully organised Nazi party, underm ining the 
state. If  th is occurred, asked Sargent, could Czechoslovakia count 
on British support? "I am  afraid there is a good deal to be said for 
the dictum th a t if  we assum e no commitments we m ust equally 
give no advice ”[60].
Sargen t's  criticism  of Hadow grew stronger and  more 
direct in  1937. At the  end of January , Hadow sen t a telegram  to 
the Foreign Office which sta ted  "Controversy has been given a 
fresh fillip by a  m ost un fo rtunate  article headed 'Czechs and 
G erm ans’ from The Times of Jan u ary  29. The artic le  claimed 
th a t, despite G erm an propaganda, there  w ere few signs of 
"Bolshevisation" in  Czechoslovakia and th a t a democratic system
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was being m ain tained  "against all odds" in  th is  country. Few 
people in  Czechoslovakia looked confidently tow ard  peace, b u t 
most were confident th a t  a Germ an attack would bring help from 
her allies. Given peace, the article stated, th is country would sort 
ou t h e r dom estic problem s; and, re fe rring  to th e  G erm an 
m inorities i t  claimed concerning the SdP: "The best observers are 
convinced th a t  i t  s ta n d s  u n d er Nazi m oral an d  m ate ria l 
influence". D istress in  the  Sudetenland, the  article  continued, 
however, was diminishing[61].
Sargent wrote th a t he was a t a loss to understand  Hadow's 
objection to the  artic le . "Why is The Times a rtic le  m ost 
unfortunate? I t  seem s to me to be a very clear and  objective 
sta tem en t of the  position which the B ritish  public were fully 
entitled to be given". He added, "I have the im pression th a t Mr. 
Hadow...does not understand  the line we are following in  regard 
to Czechoslovakia"; and thought th a t the F irst Secretary should be 
enlightened. He therefore, sent Hadow a le tte r which sta ted  th a t 
the reason B ritain  was calling attention to the unwisdom of their 
a ttitude to its  G erm an m inority was because H itle r m ight exploit 
these grievances to his own ends, "but th a t is an entirely  different 
m a tte r  from  th e  p ropaganda  which the  G erm ans a re  now 
running  about the  Bolshevisation of Czechoslovakia". Sargen t 
wrote th a t  the  Foreign Office did not wish to encourage press 
polemics between the Czechs and Germans, "but we also do not
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wish our own public to be deceived, as they can be very easily, by 
the  German propaganda against Czechoslovakia"[62].
Hadow took the  liberty  of replying to S a rg en t’s le tter, 
apologising for th is  breach bu t appealing to h is repu ta tion  for 
"great fairness in  giving full consideration to the  other side of any 
case". Hadow defended his objection to The Times article and 
sta ted  th a t  he had  tried  in  his reports to give "objective and 
incon trovertib le"  p roof of th e  a c tu a l s ta te  of a ffa irs  in  
Czechoslovakia. He "laid bare" his motives for prom oting B ritish 
arb itration  between Czechoslovakia and Germany, these being his 
characteristic  horro r of w ar and the possession of a  son; "my 
ever-present recollection of th is fact makes me strive never to send 
you a word th a t is not carefully sifted and...a constructive effort in 
the  cause of peace, ra th e r than  a contribution tow ards w ar in the 
shape of destructive criticism only" [63].
Sargent’s criticism of Hadow is indicative of a  general trend 
of th e ir growing differences over the  Czechoslovakian question 
and  B ritish  policy tow ards G erm any; a tre n d  w hich was 
becoming apparen t in  1936, and was obvious in  1937. In  February 
Hadow sent the  Foreign Office a telegram  which sum m arised a 
statem ent Benes had made to him for the confidential information 
of the B ritish Government. Hadow wrote th a t he had  derived the 
im pression th a t  G erm any and Czechoslovakia were nearing  a 
point of negotiation bu t a  private statem ent from B rita in  would
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lead to fa ir compromise betw een the  Czechs and  Germans. He 
fe lt th e  s ta te m e n t from B enes w as a re s u lt  of th e  Czech 
P re s id e n t’s nervousness over a recen t a rtic le  in  th e  D aily  
Telegraph [64].
Sargent m inuted th a t he personally deplored the newspaper 
article; ’’I t  is one th ing  for us to lecture M. Benes privately on the 
necessity of getting rid  of his Sudetendeutsche problem, bu t it  is 
quite another m atte r to criticise him  in  the public press: th a t has 
m erely  th e  effect of s tren g th en in g  th e  h an d s  of G erm an 
propagandists’’. Sargent continued th a t i t  was no use following 
Hadow’s suggestion of a B ritish  s ta tem en t unless B rita in  was 
prepared to advise Czechoslovakia to abandon h e r trea ties w ith 
France, the  L ittle  E ntente, and Russia, or was ready to advise 
G erm any to give up he r an ti-C om m unist cam paign aga in st 
Czechoslovakia[65].
This criticism of Sargent’s was the m ain objection he had to 
Hadow's view: like Phipps, he felt th a t B rita in  should not get 
involved in  th e  problem  of Czech trea tm e n t of the  Sudeten 
G erm ans or Czech-Germ an rela tions. S a rg en t’s m is tru s t of 
G erm any's in ten tions was g rea te r th a n  H adow 's as was his 
cau tion  reg a rd in g  A nglo-G erm an rap p ro ch em en t, and  his 
respect for Hadow's judgm ent on these m atters  was decreasing. 
By February  1937, his concern over i t  was such th a t  he wrote a 
le tte r  to Phipps regarding Hadow’s suggestions. Sargen t noted
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th a t Hadow was very keen th a t B ritain  should take a leading p a rt 
in  reconciling Germ any and Czechoslovakia, "and he goes so far 
as to suggest th a t  bo th  th e  G erm an  an d  C zechoslovak 
Governm ents are  anxious for us to assum e th is  difficult and 
ungrateful role". The position "as we see it", Sargent wrote, was 
th a t Germany had suddenly picked a quarrel w ith Czechoslovakia 
on the  grounds th a t  the  la tte r  was becoming bolshevized. The 
Foreign Office considered such a quarre l unjustified  and  the 
grievances of th e  S ude ten  G erm ans w as an  u n c lea r b u t 
subsid iary  factor. On the  subject of th e  desirab ility  of an  
agreem ent between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Sargent felt i t  
would m ean one of two things: e ither th a t Czechoslovakia would 
recognise th a t Germ any was justified in  picking th is quarrel and 
m ake concessions to regain  G erm any’s goodwill, or G erm any 
would call off th e  quarrel. The form er would be a definite 
German success and m ight have dem oralising effects throughout 
Central Europe; the la tte r would be a welcome settlem ent even if  it  
were nothing more than  a tem porary truce.
Sargent also wrote in th is le tte r th a t the Foreign Office had 
been inform ed th a t  some sort of negotiations were proceeding 
between Prague and Berlin, bu t they were unsure  of the ir basis. 
He added, "But if these negotiations are proceeding - and even if 
they are not - our instinct is th a t we should be well advised not to 
b u tt in  w ith advice or assistance". To advise Czechoslovakia to
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m ake a se ttlem ent would encourage the  G erm ans to raise  the ir 
price to more dangerous concessions; to advise G erm any would 
label B rita in  as meddlesome and, to show h e r independence, 
G erm any m ight decide to in tensify  the  quarrel. S argen t also 
questioned the sincerity of the Germ an Governm ent's in te res t in  
the Sudeten Germ an question and w hether a  settlem ent on these 
lines would really  imply a durable detente betw een these two 
countries. He ended by requesting  Phipps' diagnosis of the  
situation[66].
Phipps began his reply by redefining the  "quarrel Germany 
suddenly  p icked w ith  Czechoslovakia" as "the p e rm an en t 
squabble betw een G erm any and Czechoslovakia" which had  
flickered up m om entarily only to die down again as i t  is in  the 
hab it of doing". Phipps did not feel th a t the grievances of the  
Sudeten Germ ans entered th is quarrel. He believed th a t  H itler 
was anxious to detach Czechoslovakia from France and th a t  
Goering w anted to sever the connection betw een R ussia and the 
Czechs for reasons involving G erm an a ir  defence. The Nazi 
party, Phipps felt, was deeply in terested in  the  Sudeten question, 
"because i t  is dam aging  to H itle r 's  p restige  w henever the  
Sudetendeutsche  raise  a howl". He, nevertheless, agreed th a t 
B ritain should not interfere w ith assistance or advice because she 
lacked a motive for doing so and her prospects for success were 
small: "H itler is the  slave of his own logical m ind, and if  th a t
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m ind grinds out the  essential tru th  th a t i t  is not in  Paris, or in  
Moscow, th a t the obstacle to Germ an policy is to be found, he will 
not hesitate to draw the logical conclusion"[67].
S argen t, m eanw hile, had  w ritten  a personal le tte r  to 
Hadow concerning the ir difference of opinion, pointing out th a t i t  
was merely on the question of tactics th a t they disagreed; th a t they 
both would welcome a Czechoslovak-German detente in  the cause 
of peace. "At the  same time I am  sure we would both agree th a t a 
detente m ust be honourable and durable if  i t  is  to serve the cause 
of peace - otherwise i t  will only be a snare and a delusion and fail 
to produce any real sense of security and confidence in  Europe 
generally". Sargent pointed out th a t they disagreed on B ritain 's 
role in  th is problem. "The task  of honest broker is a t best a very 
thankless one and may well do more harm  th an  good if  conditions 
are not altogether ripe and favourable". He told Hadow th a t he 
w as correct in  m aking Benes rea lise  th e  im portance  of a 
se ttlem ent of the  Sudeten Germ an problem, b u t th a t  the  m ain 
grievance - communist influence in  Czechoslovakia (here Hadow 
had p u t an  x and w ritten  in  the m argin, "no, m ain grievance is 
S-D) - p resen ted  a more ticklish  problem. "We feel th a t the  
G erm an cam paign is insincere and unscrupulous, and we ought 
not to play up to it. If  therefore a t any time we can do anything to 
p reven t th is  pernicious propaganda from spread ing  to th is  
country i t  is all to the good". Sargent then  repeated  his view on
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the  press problem regarding Czechoslovakia. He concluded, "I 
hope th is  le tte r will help to clear up any divergencies of view 
which there may have been between us"[68].
Hadow sen t S argen t a cordial le tte r  of th an k s  for his 
"fair-m indedness" in  dealing  w ith  a ju n io r . A note of 
resen tm ent, however, can be detected in  th e  F irs t Secretary’s 
defence of himself. He felt sure Sargent would believe th a t, in  
reporting in  the m anner th a t  he had, he had  m erely tried to pu t 
the  point of view of "man-on-the-spot" before the Directors. "I 
th in k  I can therefore claim th a t  you have not had  m any false 
rum ours served up from this post?"[69].
The clash between Hadow and Sargent was one illustration 
of general differences in the Foreign Office over policy regarding 
Czechoslovakia, and  p a rticu la rly  p ress polem ics involving 
Germany. Not long after Hadow's objection to the article in  The 
Times , an editorial w ritten  by Lord Rotherm ere came out in The 
Daily Mail which attacked  Czech policy as well as criticising 
Czechoslovakia as a whole, re fe rrin g  to i t  as a "spurious 
country"[70]. W hen Phipps wrote th a t  th e  a rtic le  was being 
reprin ted  prom inently in  Germ any, Bramwell m inuted th a t no 
great harm  m ay have been done by it, although Rothermere might 
be dropped a h in t from the Foreign Office. O'Malley wrote th a t he 
had  no doubt th a t i t  was prom pted by The Times article which 
Hadow had objected to, "and I cannot help feeling th a t appearance
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of Lord Rotherm ere’s article and the  fillip which i t  has given to 
polem ics on th e  C ontinen t goes a good w ay to ju s tify  the  
apprehensions expressed by Mr. Hadow in  h is telegram  No.9 
Saving, for which he was ra th e r  heavily  rebuked". S argen t 
m inuted, however, "my view is th a t  i t  is not the  article in  The 
Times bu t the Germ an propaganda against Czechoslovakia which 
has m ade Lord Rotherm ere hoist the  w hite flag and advocate 
surrender. He always reacts to th rea ts  in  th is way" (V ansittart 
wrote in  the m argin, "Yes, I am  afraid he is rem arkably yellow"). 
Sargent continued, "I still consider the 'Times' article to be useful 
and tim ely as a counterpoise to Germ an propaganda, and in  view 
of Lord Rotherm ere’s article, I am not a t all sure th a t the  process 
ought not be repeated"[71],
V an sitta rt, during th is tim e, was usually  in  agreem ent 
w ith Sargent, but, like Hadow, more inclined to get involved in  the 
question of the Sudeten Germans. Although he was not impressed 
w ith Addison, he felt i t  was im portant to continually im press on 
Benes and the  Czech M inister in  London Ja n  M asaryk the danger 
of their policy, and, as shown earlier, he respected the in tegrity  of 
Henlein. W hen Hadow suggested an approach to France to pu t 
jo in t p ressu re  on the  Czech G overnm ent in  1936, V a n s itta r t 
agreed w ith  S argen t th a t  the  F rench  would re sen t such a 
proposal, bu t he wrote th a t the Czechs were "asking for trouble". 
While he felt i t  best to leave the French out of the  m atter, he did
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w rite, "Let us go a t  i t  ourselves and, as Mr. O’M alley suggests, 
stick to it"[72]. B ut V ansittart, despite his concern for the Sudeten 
G erm ans, w as averse to any a rran g em en t w ith  G erm any. 
Towards the  end of 1937 he even grew a little  disillusioned with 
Henlein whom he basically still believed was sincere, bu t felt the 
SdP Leader’s argum ents were growing out of focus.
V ansitta rt's  disillusionm ent reflected a  general feeling in  
the Foreign Office of wariness regarding the  form of appeasem ent 
the  B ritish  Governm ent had  begun to pursue, accompanied by 
doubt regard ing  previous assessm ents of the  Sudeten  G erm an 
case in  Czechoslovakia. Bramwell expressed growing doubts over 
H enlein in  October 1937 m entioning proof of funds for his party  
coming from Germany. "Henlein, moreover," he wrote, "on the 
former occasion had, so he claimed, never se t eyes on Hitler; they 
have since appeared side by side on the  sam e platform" [73]. 
Hadow, m eanw hile, began to sense the  increasing ly  critical 
m anner in  which his despatches were read. In  February  1937 he 
had  sen t the  Foreign Office a telegram  which sta ted  th a t the 
Duchess of Athol^ having made a tour of the Balkans and Central 
European countries, had "revealed an  overwhelming consensus 
of opinion" th a t  Germany did not w ant to a ttack  Czechoslovakia. 
Hadow wrote th a t Benes had  em phasised to him  recently  th a t 
Czechoslovakia’s friends were doing th a t country a disservice by 
"constantly crying w o lf. Bram w ell m inuted, "How except by
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crying wolf does Benes expect to keep his friends together?" 
V a n sitta rt commented th a t  i t  was not Czechoslovakia's friends 
bu t Goering who was crying wolf and th a t Benes ought to be told of 
Foreign Office inform ation  th a t  th e  G erm ans w ere going to 
mobilise a t Munich the following week[74].
Eden had  taken note of criticism of Hadow and wrote to him  
th a t  his telegram  suffered from overemphasis, subm itting points 
for him  to use as guidance in  h is despatches which had been 
drafted by V ansittart, The first point was tha t, while the Foreign 
Office was prepared to believe th a t Germany did not wish to attack 
Czechoslovakia i f  th is  m eant s ta rtin g  a war, th e ir inform ation 
showed th a t  the  G erm an G overnm ent’s policy w as directed 
tow ards disintegration and domination of Czechoslovaikia as the 
first step into penetration of the Danube Basin and th is would be 
achieved, if  not by peaceful m eans, th an  by force. The second 
point was th a t Benes’ own lack of confidence in  the situation was 
dem onstrated  by th a t  leader's recen t a ttem pts to organise an  
alliance w ith France and the other members of the L ittle Entente. 
Hadow should thus not be surprised if  the foreign press studied 
and  discussed w ith  anxiety  th e  s tra in ed  re la tio n s betw een 
Czechoslovakia and G erm any so long as the  p resen t G erm an 
campaign of abuse continued[75].
As if  to soften the blow of th is official censure, Hadow also 
received a  note from V ansitta rt's  secretary  thank ing  him  for a
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m em orandum  on the  Sudeten G erm ans which V a n s itta r t had  
read  w ith in terest. Hadow described th is note to O’Malley as "a 
small crumb of comfort ” after the  criticism  he had  received and 
com plained of the  difficulty of serving abroad ’’w ithout m uch 
guidance from the  top and very little  idea of ’policy’ other than  
H eads of D epartm ent can send out’’ - again, a  reflection of the  
confusion in  the Foreign Office. Hadow expressed the fear th a t all 
he had  w ritten  had  been ignored because of his association w ith 
Addison and he requested th a t O'Malley send him  a note on the 
extent which his argum ents had been listened to or rejected[76].
O'Malley replied th a t Hadow’s le tte r was difficult to answer 
w ithin the lim its of discipline of the Office bu t he would try. The 
official view of Hadow, according to th is counsellor, was th a t he 
had  m uch ability  and energy b u t perhaps a little  too m uch 
conviction in  th e  r ig h tn ess  of h is recom m endations and a 
tendency  to  overestim ate  th e  im portance  of rum ours and 
im pressions. "The word which I th ink  would be used to describe 
th is is 'too highly strung’ or excitable, perhaps even in moments 
of irrita tion , neurotic". O’Malley continued by saying th a t there 
was a feeling th a t  Hadow moved about the  china shop, "not 
perhaps like a bull, bu t a t any ra te  like a sheep-dog". He advised 
Hadow to follow the lead of the new M inister in  Prague Sir Basil 
Newton who had "the cat touch well-developed". Of the official 
view regarding Czechoslovakia, he wrote Hadow th a t, although
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he h im self felt th e ir  resources for exercising a conciliatory 
influence w ere not exhausted , th e re  was no prospect of the  
Foreign Office a ttitu d e  being changed in  any m ateria l respect 
unless an  unexpected local event occurred or Newton indicated 
otherwise. Meanwhile, O'Malley advised Hadow, "be pa tien t and 
keep the soft pedal down"[77].
By the autum n of 1937 when Hadow was transferred  to the 
Foreign Office, the  feeling in  London, as has been shown, was 
th a t  he was beginning to exceed him self in  his despatches. This 
critic ism , however, did not ap p ea r to dam p h is  a rdou r in  
pursu ing  b e tte r relations betw een B rita in  and Germany. This 
m ay be due to his detection of a conflict in  the Foreign Office over 
policy heightened by the direction adopted by the new Government 
in  B ritain . A few changes had, also, occurred in  the Foreign 
Office. W illiam Strang had replaced Sir Ralph W igram as head of 
the  C entral D epartm ent when the  la tte r  died in  December 1936, 
while S ir Alexander Cadogan became a Deputy Under-Secretary 
of S ta te  and would eventually replace V an sitta rt as Perm anent 
U nder-Secretary in  1938. If  Hadow was raising  doubts over his 
recom m endations, V a n s itta r t w as m aking h im self even more 
unpopu lar w ith his increasingly  voiced strong  opinions; and 
V a n sitta rt had the  disadvantage of being in  disagreem ent w ith 
the line taken  by the Government. He was also losing allies in the 
Foreign Office. A lthough unclear over w hat policy should be,
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m any found the argum ents of V an sitta rt too forceful and direct 
and, perhaps, "undiplomatic". S trang  la te r  adm itted  his own 
confusion a t the  time: "Too m any people were talk ing  too glibly 
about standing up to H itler even a t  the  risk of w ar,...and when the 
U nited Kingdom w ent to war, she, unlike some other countries, 
p u t h e r whole fortune to the  touch. In  w ha t causes was a  
governm ent justified in running  th a t hazard?"[78].
H adow  cam e up a g a in s t  c ritic ism  from  S a rg en t, 
V ansitta rt, and even Eden; b u t V ansitta rt was soon to be muffled 
by the creation of a new less influential post, Eden would resign in 
1938, and Sargent's opinions lessened in effect w ith the growth of 
appeasem en t. J u s t  a fte r H adow 's tra n s fe r  to London in  
Septem ber 1937 an article appeared in  the new spaper The Week 
which reported "Even more troublesome to the  Czechs have been 
the activities of a certain B ritish diplomatic official who they knew 
to be an  enthusiastic advocate of H err Henlein. Their relief a t his 
recen t rem oval from Prague has been scarcely disguised. I t  
rem ains to be seen however, w he ther the  rem oval of th is  
undiplom atic diplomat will make any difference in the a ttitude of 
th e  Legation"[79]. H adow 's rem oval, in  fact, m ade sm all 
difference. Despite a g rea te r sym pathy tow ards Benes, the  
"cat-like" Newton already had a reputation as a former counsellor 
in  B erlin  for "explaining" G erm an behaviour as opposed to 
condemning it[80], and in  November 1937 was asking Sargent if  it
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would not be in  the Czechs' b e tte r in te rest to get on be tter term s 
w ith  G erm any "even a t  some cost to th e ir independence"[81]. 
Hadow, on h is re tu rn  to London, found encouragem ent in  the  
a ttitude  of the Government, and, despite the conflicting opinion of 
h is  new boss Collier in  th e  N o rth ern  D epartm en t, pu rsued  
appeasem ent with even greater fervour and less discretion.
Advantageous Confusion
By the tim e Hadow was transferred  to London, the system  
w ithin the Foreign Office had become complicated. Lord Gladwyn, 
who was then  private secretary to the  Perm anent Under-Secretary 
of S tate  in  1938, describes the system  in his memoirs, noting th a t 
all papers of importance were m eant to come up to the Secretary of 
S ta te  th rough  the  P e rm an en t U nder-S ecre tary  and  P riv a te  
Secretaries. The two P arliam en tary  U nder-Secretaries of S ta te  
had  the righ t of direct access to the  Secretary of S tate, and  the 
la tte r  could send for heads of departm ents and discuss m atters  
w ith them , bu t the resu lt would norm ally come down through the 
P e rm an e n t U nder-S ecre ta ry  of S ta te . "This system  no t 
unnaturally  resulted in  a  terrible bottle-neck, Gladwyn writes. As 
the  w ar approached in  1938 and the work became more feverish, 
the  congestion grave". I t  requires little  im agination to see how 
Hadow, w ith his strong views on the European situation and belief 
in  the danger towards which B rita in  was heading, failed to resist
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the tem ptation to avoid official channels in  his efforts to promote 
qu icker and  m ore decisive action. G ladwyn describes the  
"m ountains' of red-labelled red  boxes piled up on th e  P.U .S.'s 
desk as frequently depressing to h is boss (from the  beginning of 
1938) Sir Alexander Cadogan, and adm its th a t he often, in  helping 
out, used a special stam p m arked "seen by Sir A. Cadogan" which 
Gladwyn initialled him self and la te r explained to Cadogan[82].
The promotion of Cadogan to Perm anent U nder-Secretary 
of S tate in  1938 came as the resu lt of the creation of a new post for 
V ansitta rt. In 1937 C ham berlain offered him  the  post of Chief 
Diplomatic Adviser and m any believe it  was an a ttem pt to silence 
V ansitta rt. Oliver Harvey wrote a t the time, "No one so m uch as 
h in ts a t the tru th , which is th a t he has been sidetracked. In  fact, 
th e  suggestion is so m uch th e  o ther way - th a t  he is now 
perm anently and exclusively to advise the Secretary of S tate th a t I 
th in k  som ething m ust be done th rough  Press to resto re  the  
balance and show th a t Alec [Cadogan] will be w hat the P.U.S. has 
always been, and Van a supernum erary  adviser en m ange of the 
m achine who will advise and function only i f  and when asked" 
[83].
1938 also brought the resignation of Eden due to a growing 
rift between the Foreign Secretary  and Cham berlain on foreign 
policy and Italy. Ede n had not approved of the sending of Halifax 
to m ee t H itle r  in  N ovem ber 1937 and  w as p a rtic u la rly
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disappointed a t  Cham berlain 's rebuff of an  offer from Presiden t 
Roosevelt in  Ja n u a ry  1938 for an  a rrangem ent of a collective 
discussion on the underly ing  causes of d iscontent in  Europe. 
These differences were contributing irr itan ts  to Eden's profound 
disapproval of C ham berlain 's in ten tion  to conciliate M ussolini, 
Cham berlain was of the opinion th a t a renewal of the S tresa F ront 
through increased Anglo-Italian cooperation was desirable in  the  
face of possible German expansion, while Eden disliked the idea of 
m aking any approaches to M ussolini, feeling in stead  th a t  the  
dictators should be faced up  to. As early  as Novem ber 1937 
C ham berlain had expressed his dissatisfaction to Eden th a t  the 
Foreign Office never made a genuine effort to get together w ith the 
dictators[84] and Eden often complained th a t his colleagues were 
"dictator-minded "[85]. The rift between Eden and Cham berlain 
on th is  subject was so deep by F ebruary  1938 th a t, w ith  the  
recom m endation of the  Prim e M inister, E den handed  in  his 
resignation  on F ebruary  20. Eden had, in  fact, increasingly 
m inu ted  agreem ent w ith  S a rg en t's  opinions on th e  P rague 
despatches from 1936 to 1937 and  h is resignation  speech 
i l lu s tra te s  a grow ing d is illu s io n m en t w ith  th e  policy of 
appeasem ent: "Of late  the conviction has steadily grown upon me 
th a t  there  has been too keen a  desire on our p a rt to m ake term s 
w ith  others, ra th e r  th a n  th a t  o thers should m ake term s w ith  
us...I do not believe th a t  we can m ake progress in  E uropean
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appeasem ent...if we allow the im pression to gain currency abroad 
th a t  we yield to constan t pressure"[86]. Eden was replaced by 
Halifax.
During the first h a lf of 1938 Hadow appeared to be towing 
the  line in  the Foreign Office and pu tting  his views through the 
official channels. This is not to say th a t he had abandoned outside 
contacts - these, in  fact, increased  during th is  year - b u t he 
ca rried  on w ith  ro u tin e  expression  of h is id eas to those 
im m ediately in charge. In  April he again received criticism from 
S argen t when he wrote a m em orandum  which a ttem p ted  to 
answ er questions p u t to him  by S trang  about Czechoslovakia. 
Hadow wrote th a t he was convinced th a t Germany's m ain  object 
was still accurately sum m arised in  a statem ent a ttribu ted  to the 
G erm an Am bassador in  Angora: "No territo ria l questions exist 
for Germ any in  respect of Czechoslovakia, bu t G erm any cannot 
view w ith  indifference a  s ta te  of affairs in  which a G erm an 
M inority is held in subjection by Czechs", and w ent on to explain 
the  need for a negotiated se ttlem ent on th is  m a tte r  w ith  the  
prom ptings or actual involvem ent of B rita in  and  to analyse 
possible foreign assistance to Czechoslovakia if  th a t country were 
attacked. Sargent m inuted th a t the m em orandum  was a very 
useful sta tem ent of the  problem, "although I am not personally 
p repared  to agree en tire ly  w ith  Mr. H adow 's ana ly sis  or 
conclusions".
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Sargent, in  fact, m ade several m arginal comments on the 
m em orandum . On th e  question  of defence of Czechoslovakia 
Hadow reitera ted  his view th a t there  was no possibility of direct 
help from France, "whose arm y will m oreover no t face the  
appalling  casualties th a t  would resu lt from an  a ttack  on the  
'G erm an Maginot Line', in  support of a d istan t Slav people", and 
Sargent commented, "But the  Germ an 'Maginot' line is not ready 
yet". He then  went on to query Hadow's assertion th a t  the  Czech 
Government had  kept local representatives of the m inorities out of 
office, and, where Hadow h ad  listed  the  concessions he felt the 
Czech G overnm ent should m ake out of necessity , S a rg en t 
questioned the resu lts Hadow foresaw from them  as well as their 
desirability . One was th a t , as the  outcome of g ran tin g  full 
democratic rights, Czech dom ination in  Czechoslovakia would be 
a t an  end, and "M. Benes and his Czech National-Socialist Party  
would go down before the ir b itte r enemies the A grarians who, for 
some tim e past have dem anded a truce with Germ any and  been 
fought tooth and nail by the President, who hates Germ any with 
'historical' Slav hatred". Sargent wrote next to th is, "Isn 't th is a 
b it  overstated?", and  fu r th e r  on, when Hadow w rote th a t  
Czechoslovakia would be left a  "rump" sate, powerless to defy 
Germ an arrogance and "compelled a t all tim es to do as Germany 
bids in destroying more especially Communist Propaganda such 
as we know em anates from Prague today", Sargent commented,
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"Do we wish to see such a rum p state?". Finally, w hen Hadow 
concluded th a t he had tried  to show how tem pted Benes was "to 
pursue the  policy th a t  would be as fatal to his country, and to 
Europe as a whole, as was the 30 Years W ar which started  in  1618 
in  Prague", S argen t rem arked , "If I have no t forgotten  my 
history, the  30 Y ears W ar was fata l to G erm any and highly 
beneficial to France"[87].
A lthough S a rg en t rem ained  m ore in flu e n tia l in  the  
Foreign Office th an  V ansitta rt in  1938, his criticism  by th is time 
h a d  l i t t le  effect in  d iscourag ing  H adow 's p rom otion  of 
appeasem ent. This is partly  due to Sargent's n a tu re  which was 
philosophical as opposed to V an sitta rt's  c rusad ing  a ttitu d e . 
A lthough he fervently  upheld his theory of foreign policy, he 
tended to shrug  his shoulders if  it  did not penetrate  the  higher 
echelons of th e  decision-m aking  process. A ccording to 
V ansitta rt, Sargent was "a philosopher strayed into W hitehall. 
He knew all the answers; when politicians did not w an t them  he 
w ent out to lunch"[88]. Although th is cleared the p a th  somewhat 
for Hadow, i t  was an  approach th a t he would have found totally 
a lien  to h is own character. R ather like V a n s itta r t, Hadow 
railroaded his opinions onto all he felt would or should listen, 
p re tty  much regardless of who they were or w hat th e ir  views 
m ight be.
If  strong anti-appeasers w ithin the Foreign Office such as
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Sargent and V an sitta rt felt isolated in  1938, Hadow was no less 
alone in  th is  in s t i tu t io n  in  h is v igorous p rom otion  of 
appeasem ent. O'Malley had  been transferred  to Mexico, and if 
some in the Foreign Office were in  agreem ent w ith  Hadow, i t  was 
likely to be only p artia l agreem ent and too deliberative for his 
impulsive natu re . Appeals to figures outside the  Foreign Office, 
therefore, increased  during  th is  year and th a t  Hadow relied  
heavily on the  tac t and discretion of his unofficial associates is 
apparent. Such were the  problems in  the  Foreign Office th a t 
Hadow was not caught out and reprim anded until October of th a t 
year w hen Cadogan wrote a personal note of rebuke to him . "I 
m uch reg re t to note your lack of confidence in  me", began the  
Perm anent Under-Secretary of State, going on to sta te  th a t he had 
several tim es asked Hadow to pu t any ideas or suggestions to him, 
preferably th rough  the  relevan t D epartm ent, "I suppose you 
th ink  th a t th is is sheer bureaucracy and th a t I should sit on your 
communications", wrote Cadogan, "But I am  sorry  to say th a t  I 
m ust insist. I t  will really be quite impossible to conduct th is Office 
if  everyone who has ideas - possible very good ones - fires them  off 
a t [R.A.]Butler or [LordJHutchison without reference to the  proper 
quarters. Believe me th a t won’t  lead to efficiency in  the  end". 
C adogan added, "Anyhow, I w on't have it: so don’t  do i t  
again"[89]. T hat sam e day the  P erm anen t U nder-Secretary  
recorded in his diary, "Got through some work and cursed J[ohn]
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Balfour and  Hadow for a iring  th e ir  views prom iscuously on 
conduct of foreign policy"[90].
C adogan h ad  obviously discovered th a t  H adow  was 
corresponding w ith  Lord HutchisorT and th e  P a rlia m e n ta ry  
Under-Secretary of S tate  R.A. Butler. After Cadogan's reprim and 
B u tle r re tu rn ed  a n  enclosure th a t  Hadow had  se n t him  and 
wrote, "Thank you for your le tte r and enclosure which I re tu rn . I 
am sure th a t i f  you have any suggestions to p u t forward they will 
receive every considera tion  if  they  go th ro u g h  th e  proper 
channels, since the work of the Office m ust be conducted in  th is 
way". As B utler had  been receiving inform ation from Hadow 
since a t least May of th a t year he m ust have been aw are of the 
hypocritical tone of th is  typed note and  added in  w riting  
underneath , "I re tu rn  Alec's le tte r  and th an k  you very m uch 
personally for all your help and care"[91].
T hat Hadow m anaged to escape censure during  m ost of 
1938 is a reflection on the  workings of the Foreign Office by this 
tim e and the  in h e re n t difficulties i t  was facing which were 
complicated by the advent of Chamberlain. The Foreign Office's 
loss of power during the  1930s was partly  due to an  increasing 
m is tru s t  of "secret diplomacy" which caused  th e  B ritish  
Government to try  and adapt itse lf more fully to the dem ands of 
public opinion, and less to the personal analyses of perm anent 
officials. W hen Cham berlain assumed power, the official lines of 
R>.MNv!xvte.r Ge.oe.fDi.1
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com m unication w ere increasingly  by-passed. "Uncooperative" 
people such as E den and  V a n s itta r t w ere c ircum vented  or 
excluded from p rivate  consultation, while unofficial channels 
were created in  order th a t Cham berlain m ight successfully carry 
out his policies w ith little  or no obstruction. John  Connell writes 
in  The 'Office' th a t, although the  Foreign Office continued to 
carry out its num erous duties, "from the beginning of 1938 until 
C ham berla in 's  fall, i t  had  no say in  th e  h an d lin g  of the  
all-im portant issue of Anglo-German relations"[92].
Hadow w as a t  le a s t  subconsciously  aw are  of th is  
development and took full advantage of it, basing his motives on 
patrio tism . He also adopted the im patience, characteristic  of 
politicians during th is  tim e, of opposing forces in  the  Foreign 
Office; th e  p ro -G erm an ism  v e rsu s  a n ti-G e rm a n ism  and  
pro-French versus anti-French . Such a dichotomy of opinion 
hindered any action taken  by the Foreign Office, and  Hadow had 
grown single-minded in  calling for definite moves by Britain. His 
behaviour in London, as a result, had become more fanatical and 
less discreet.
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5 London: Mood of Desperation
W ith the  increasing tension regarding G erm an am bitions 
and the uncertain  sta te  of Europe in the late 1930s, the th rea t of 
w ar loomed large over the policy m akers in  B ritain , and the ir 
actions became more frantic and less reasoned. Hadow's reports 
and correspondence after he was transferred to London in  October 
1937 reflected th is  characteristic  to a large degree, and  his 
stric tu res  became more adam ant, a lm ost as i f  he needed to 
convince him self as much as his colleagues. There was, perhaps, 
a  subconscious aw areness in  Hadow th a t his recom m endations 
for B rita in  were undergoing a subtle b u t definite change; the 
actions taken  by B rita in  had become increasingly dependent on 
reaction from G erm any and policy steadily began to hinge on 
g u esses  as to t h a t  c o u n try 's  n e x t m ove. H adow 's 
recommendations, although active in  the sense th a t  th is country 
should in itia te  cooperation in  various ways, were, on the other 
hand, passive in  the ir reliance on Germany's acquiescence. If  he 
w as aw are of th is  change, Hadow gave no indication  in  his 
reports; however, the  fact th a t  he had  become so vociferous 
indicates th a t  he was a ttem pting  to drown out the  increased 
misgivings over dealing w ith H itler so subserviently. H is outward 
reason  for th is  would have been th a t  such critic ism  was 
dangerous in  its  pessimism and more likely to bring on war. Any
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m isgivings over the  policy of appeasem ent which he h im self 
m ight have felt a re  never apparen t in  his papers during  th is 
crucial time, and it  seems th a t he rem ained absolutely unshaken 
in  support of it righ t up to and even after the outbreak of w ar in  
September 1939,
Anschluss to May Crisis
By the tim e he was transferred  to London in  October 1937, 
Hadow was convinced th a t Germ any desired cooperation and the 
preservation of peace. Evidence to the  contrary  was ignored or 
dismissed, while any indication of peaceful intentions on the p a rt 
of Germany were highlighted. Hadow, thus, drew attention to the 
sta tem ent by Ogilvie-Forbes, in  Berlin, th a t Germ any hoped to 
realise h er aim s by peaceful m eans and w ithout conflict. Hadow 
noted, "This surely  denotes a very considerable change in her 
a ttitude  and  gives H.M.G. [the] opportunity to negotiate and to 
influence H itle r"[l]. A m eeting recorded by H itle r's  m ilita ry  
A dju tan t F riedrich  H ossbach on November 5, 1937, however, 
indicated otherwise. In  th is m eeting between H itler, his M inister 
of W ar, Foreign M inister, and Chiefs of th ree  branches of the 
arm ed forces, there  was, in  fact, no more ta lk  of w anting  to 
cooperate w ith  B rita in  or pressure h er into an  alliance. I t  was 
decided in stead  th a t  B rita in  and  France would alw ays oppose 
Germ any and would yield no colonies until faced with the th rea t
176
of superior force. Both, however, were m om entarily weak; thus, 
force alone could solve the problem. B ritain  was still not regarded 
as an  enemy bu t th is possibility had increased, and she was to be 
pushed into rem aining in  a position of neutrality[2].
Hadow, m eanw hile, rem ained oblivious and in  February  
1938 reitera ted  his opinion th a t Germany was seeking friendship 
w ith B ritain . He wrote th a t  he had  received a clear indication 
from a high G erm an official of exasperation on the  p a rt of H itler 
a t the unwillingness of B ritish  policy-makers to see nothing good 
in  anything th a t Germ any did. This official, according to Hadow, 
was "bitterly  vehem ent" and asked, "more in  despair th an  in  
anger" w hen B rita in  would deal w ith G erm any '"as a willing 
partner in  the concert of Europe, b u t one no longer willing to be 
trea ted  as a fraudu len t bankrup t, a pariah , or an  office-boy ". 
Hadow had received the im pression from th is conversation tha t, 
unless advances tow ards cooperation were begun w ithout delay, 
w ar was imminent[3].
Efforts towards th is end had, in  fact, already been begun by 
C ham berlain  in  Novem ber 1937 (ironically ju s t  a fte r H itler's 
Conference of November 5) in  the arrangem ents of talks between 
Edward Halifax, Lord Privy Seal, and Hitler. Halifax stressed the 
cooperation of B rita in  and Germ any as a  common front against 
Bolshevism and gave his assurance th a t B ritain  would not object 
to Germ an claims in  C entral and E aste rn  Europe if  these were
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realised peacefully. B ut H itler was not to be won round to the idea 
of peaceful, political, and economic suprem acy over C entral and 
E as te rn  Europe as he hoped to subjugate these areas in  the 
shadow of B ritish  neutrality . The B ritish  call for G erm any to 
cooperate in  c rea tin g  w orld peace, th u s , m et w ith  litt le  
en th u siasm  from  th e  F ü h re r  as i t  contrad icted  th e  le tte r 's  
programme and policy towards Britain[4]. He had  now turned  his 
attention to Czechoslovakia and Austria.
A part from C ham berlain 's belief in  the prim e im portance 
of B ritish  cooperation w ith Germany, other considerations were 
having the ir influence on B ritish  policy and encouraging Hadow 
to continue his consistently  less diplom atic p u rsu it of such a 
course. In December 1937 the B ritish Cabinet reviewed its foreign 
and defence policies, having studied a  m em orandum  prepared by 
the  M in ister for Coordination of Defence. The m em orandum  
sta ted  th a t B ritish  Naval, M ilitary and Air Forces were still far 
from sufficient to m eet defensive commitments and the Chiefs of 
S taff could not foresee the time when B ritish defence forces would 
be s tro n g  enough to fig h t G erm any, I ta ly , an d  J a p a n  
simultaneously. A strong appeal was made for foreign policy to be 
governed by the  consideration of B rita in ’s weakness in  defence. 
A lthough a ttem p ts  h ad  been m ade or w ere being  m ade to 
conciliate Ja p an  and Italy, i t  was generally felt th a t Germ any was 
the real key to the question[5].
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Hadow had  e ither reached these same conclusions on his 
own or been aware of them  as a reinforcement of his views on the 
European situation. He, a t  any rate, felt confident enough to pu t 
forward a p lan  for the  form ation of an  Anglo-Franco-Germ an 
Triangle of which B ritain  would be the base. On term s of absolute 
equality  betw een the  th ree  w ith B rita in  tak ing  the  role of fair 
mediator, Germany, Hadow felt, was ready " - while pandering as 
hitherto  to Signor Mussolini's vanity - to put the Rome-Berlin axis 
back in to  its  proper place (th a t of an  im portan t b u t subsidiary 
ideological agreem ent between two Fascist states)"[6]. At the end 
of 1937, however, Italy  had  joined Jap an  and G erm any in  the  
A nti-C om intern  P ac t and  Italo-G erm an cooperation w as of 
g rea te r s tre n g th  and  significance th an  Hadow realised . As 
shown before. H itler had  now decided to face away from London 
and the im plications of th is policy were not lost on Italy. After 
M ussolini jo ined  the  A nti-Com intern Pact, C ount Ciano, the  
I ta l ia n  F ore ign  M in is te r  proclaim ed, "Three n a tio n s  are  
em barking together on a pa th  which may perhaps lead them  to 
war. A w ar necessary in order to break through the  crust which 
is stifling  th e  energy  and  the  a sp ira tio n s of the  younger 
nations"[7]. The cooperation of Italy  w ith G erm any also gave 
H itler a freer hand w ith A ustria and Czechoslovakia.
Hadow’s e rro r of judgm ent on the Italo-G erm an alliance 
m ay be seen as a  reflection of his (and the B ritish  Government's)
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basic error in  regard  to Germany. H itler had se t h is course of 
expansion tak ing  into account the strong possibility of war, and 
the more B rita in  and France attem pted to conciliate th is leader 
the more encouraged he felt to take risks in  the  face of such 
obvious desires for peace. Hadow’s belief in the Germ an desire for 
peace being equal to th a t of B rita in  and France was becoming 
increasingly  contradictory  to the  evidence of H itle r’s actions 
which were governed more by the intention of in tim idating  these 
countries into noninterference.
T here w ere still, however, a few outw ards signs th a t  
Germany could be mollified. Hadow may well have a ttached too 
much importance to the fact th a t the head of the  G erm an Foreign 
Office von W eizsacker was still, a t the end of 1937 and beginning of 
1938, defining G erm an wishes in  traditional G reat Power term s. 
Acquiescence to G erm an dem ands on the  colonies and  h e r 
E astern  policy, for example, were to be extorted from B rita in  in  
re tu rn  for a  compromise on arm s agreem ent - a  compromise to 
which Cham berlain was inclined. Goering had  announced these 
dem ands in  a  ta lk  w ith  the U.S. Am bassador to B erlin W illiam 
B ullitt, and i t  was only after Ribbentrop failed to get the  sort of 
alliance with B ritain  H itler was hoping for in  Jan u ary  1938 th a t a 
sign of h is rea l policy appeared in  his replacem ent of the  more 
m oderate N eu ra th  w ith  the  anti-B ritish  Ribbentrop as Foreign 
Minister.
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The A ustrian  A nsch luss  of M arch 1938 was the firs t 
clear-cut indication of H itler's  progressive p lan  of aggression 
which confronted Hadow in th a t year. Schuschnigg had  in  1936 
concluded an  agreem ent w ith H itler in  which the la tte r  publicly 
recognised the independence and integrity of A ustria in  re tu rn  for 
which the  A ustrian  Chancellor conceded th a t  A ustria  was a 
Germ an sta te  and would guide its  future foreign policy on th is 
basis. The takeover of Austria, however, had become a factor high 
on H itler's agenda by the  end of 1937.
In  Ja n u a ry  1938 the  A ustrian  police uncovered p lans to 
provoke governm ent repression on a scale th a t would bring in the 
Germ an arm y, including the  convenient m urder of the  G erm an 
am bassador von Papen. Finding him self in  a difficult position, 
Schuschnigg tried  to seek fu rther compromises w ith  Germ any 
and agreed to m eet H itler in  Berchtesgaden. The A ustrian leader 
was m et w ith a  barrage of th rea ts and an ultim atum  involving the 
signing of a prepared agreem ent on Austro-German relations. On 
M arch 9 Schuschnigg, in  a gesture of desperation and defiance, 
arranged a plebiscite for M arch 13, calling on his countrym en to 
vote for "a free and G erm an independent and social, C hristian  
and united Austria", and arranged the conditions of the plebiscite 
in  a way likely to give him  an  overwhelming vote of confidence[8]. 
On M arch 11 G erm any closed the  frontier and m assed troops. 
Schuschnigg resigned  and was replaced by the  N azi agen t
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Seyss-Inquart. Schuschnigg announced th a t  h is country  was 
yielding to force. The following day H itler invaded and on M arch 
13 A ustria was declared to be a province of the Germ an Reich.
D uring th is  crisis Schuschnigg had  asked  th e  B ritish  
Governm ent for advice. He received the answ er, "His M ajesty's 
Government cannot take responsibility of advising the Chancellor 
to take any course of action which m ight expose h is country to 
d an g ers  a g a in s t w hich  [they] a re  u n ab le  to  g u a ra n te e  
pro tection"[9]. M any in  th e  B ritish  F o re ign  Office and  
Government, in  fact, felt an  Austro-German union was inevitable 
and the w ish of the  m ajority  of A ustria. C ham berla in  had  
rem arked to a guest a t a luncheon held in Ribbentrop's honour on 
M arch 11, "Once we have all got past this unpleasant affair and a 
reasonable solution has been found, i t  is to be hoped th a t we can 
beg in  w o rk in g  in  e a rn e s t  to w ard s a  G e rm a n -B ritish  
understanding" [10].
The takeover of A ustria  confirmed C ham berla in  in  h is 
belief th a t he m ust try  h ard er to get on good term s w ith Italy. 
G erm an  action , he  to ld  th e  C abinet, m ade in te rn a tio n a l 
appeasem ent harder; "In spite of i t  all, however, he felt th a t th is 
th ing  had  to come. N othing short of an overwhelming display of 
force would have stopped i t  "[11]. Hadow, m eanw hile, m ade his 
opinion clear even before the  Anschluss : "As an  essentially  
Germanic country, w ith  a  traditional contempt for Italy ...A ustria
182
was bound, ever since 1934, gradually  to come to term s w ith 
Germany" [12].
Hadow's a ttitude  was echoed fairly substantially  in  B ritain  
as illustrated  in a le tte r from Thomas Moore to The Times which 
stated th a t H itler was only doing w hat the people affected wanted; 
"If the A ustrian  people had  not welcomed th is union, physical 
opposition and bloodshed m u st have occurred...[this] proves, I 
subm it, th e  in h eren t desire of the two nations to secure the 
Anschluss  of which they  have been so long deprived...Let us 
therefore consider and assess the benefits with which A ustria and 
Europe are confronted before allotting blame for a development 
which in  the end m ay prove a decisive factor in  E uropean  
appeasem ent'll 3].
Hadow wrote a sim ilar le tte r  to The Times addressing  
those "who p e rs is te n tly  a tta c k  G erm any for h e r  rape ' of 
Austria". He pointed out the  example of the m anifesto issued by 
th e  Rom an C atholic  B ishops in  A ustria  w hich "joyfully" 
recognised th a t the  N ational Socialist movement was doing great 
things for all classes of the  Germ an people. The Bishops, Hadow 
w rote, could no t have signed th is  docum ent u n less  th e ir  
consciences were clear: "Surely th en  they are  b e tte r  fitted  to 
rep resen t to th e  W orld th e  feelings of the  m ajority  of th e ir  
fellow-countrymen th a n  the  foreigners who continue to m ain tain  
th a t  freedom , se lf-determ ination  and  independence w ere all
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ru th lessly  tram pled under foot by Germany...?". Hadow felt th a t 
these "foreigners" would do be tter to wait "until deeds have shown 
w hether or no the union of the  two lands is for the greater good of 
the g rea ter num ber, in  A ustria  as well as in  Germany? I leave 
the  answer to fair-minded Britons in  the hope that, by their needs 
and by propagating th e ir  views they  will strike a  blow for the  
cause of peace 'll 4].
Not all in  B ritain , however, took Hadow's view. V ansittart, 
had  w arned during  the  crisis, "we are incurring an  enorm ous 
responsibility in  not speaking to H itler a great deal more firmly 
and explicitly th an  we have yet done in this m atter.;.If he is not 
checked by being brought up against hard reality, he m ay carry 
him self and everyone else into disaster. I urge th a t  we should 
take the proper step to obviate th is before it is too late"[15]. The 
Spectator was of the opinion th a t the Anschluss was "a violation 
of repeated  pledges and  i t  m akes every fu ture  undertak ing  by 
G erm any w orthless and irrelevent"[16], while the  F irs t Lord of 
the Adm iralty Alfred Duff Cooper urged Cham berlain to respond 
by increasing  B rita in 's  nava l construction  program m e and  
m aking a statem ent to the  effect th a t if France fought Germ any 
over Czechoslovakia, B ritain  would fight also[17].
If  Hadow had  been aw are of the dictators' view of B rita in  
and the  Anschluss his complacency over this m atter m ight have 
been a little disrupted. On M arch 12 Ciano had noted in his diary,
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"I am  convinced th a t  G rea t B rita in  will accept w ha t has 
happened w ith ind ignan t resignation’l l  8]. After the  invasion 
w hen H itle r was asked how Europe would reac t he replied, 
"England has sen t me a pro test. I would have understood a 
declaration of war; to a protest I shall not even re p ly 'l l9].
The argum ent th a t  the  B ritish  appeasers saw only w hat 
they  wished to see is not least applicable in Hadow's case. The 
F irs t  Secretary  had  convinced h im self by 1938 first, th a t  the  
claim s of H enlein  and th e  SdP were genuine; second, th a t  
im m ediate concessions to th is  m inority  were vital; th ird , th a t  
H itle r 's  in ten tions were p rim arily  peaceful b u t he could not 
ignore the  p ligh t of the  S udeten  Germ ans; fourth , th a t  any 
association w ith the Soviet Union was dangerous; and fifth, the  
peace of Europe could only be m aintained  th rough  the  v irtua l 
sacrifice of Czechoslovakia.
Not unpredictably, Hadow wrote th a t he regarded Prague 
as the  principal danger spot of Europe and one on which every 
am ount of p ressure  should be exerted "in order to p reven t a 
s till-p o ss ib le  in te rn a l  s e t t le m e n t b e tw een  C zechs a n d  
G erm ans....from  being superseded  by a G erm an u ltim atu m  
which m ight plunge Europe into a  w ar of direct concern to G reat 
B rita in " . In  H adow 's opinion, in  th e  event o f a conflict, 
Czechoslovakia was w ithout allies to afford her m ilitary  help, "for 
the Little E ntente and G reat B ritain  definitely cannot come to her
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help and  rem ilita risa tio n  of the  R hineland m eans G erm an 
fortifications a t least equal to the Maginot Line with the result th a t 
the  French peasan t is recognised in  France...to be unw illing to 
sacrifice h im se lf by an  a tta c k  on G erm any on b e h a lf  of 
Czechoslovakia'"[20]. Hadow still believed th a t the  SdP and 
G erm any  w ere keen  on a  se ttlem e n t and  i t  w as Czech 
recalcitrance th a t was hindering th is opportunity.
The G erm an p lan  for Czechoslovakia, however, was far 
m ore prem editated  th an  Hadow realised. H itler's antagonism  
tow ards the  Czechs was profound and longstanding and the lack 
of defensive streng th  from the L ittle  E ntente was partly  due to 
N azi diplom atic m achinations. H itle r had  a lready  begun a 
lengthy and persistent effort to persuade the H ungarians to reach 
an  accommodation w ith  Y ugoslavia in  the  hope of focussing 
H ungary 's revisionist asp ira tions against Czechoslovakia and 
d isrup ting  the L ittle E ntente. M eanwhile, he hoped to improve 
re la tions w ith  Yugoslavia and tak e  advantage of Czech-Polish 
antagonism . As shown earlier, w hen the Czechs had  a ttem pted  
negotiations with H itler, the  la tte r  had no in te rest in  tying his 
own hands and allowed the discussions to peter out.
The building up of Germ any's m ilitary forces was the  m ain 
elem ent in H itler's policy tow ard Czechoslovakia in  1937 and 
G erm an  m ilita ry  p lann ing  specified Czechoslovakia as its  
im m ediate target. By the beginning of 1938 H itler was explicit in
186
sta tin g  th a t the  m ajor issue in  G erm an foreign policy was the 
destruction of Czechoslovakia and, contrary to Hadow's belief in  
th e  sincere  concern of G erm any for h e r cousins in  th e  
Sudetenland, the Sudeten Germans were to serve as the tool for 
broader goals. Hadow echoed the belief of the British Government 
th a t all steps to conciliate the Sudeten Germans were necessary in  
order to remove the  German pretext to Czechoslovakia and to gain 
time.
J u s t  a fter the Anschluss in  M arch 1938, Oliver Harvey, 
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, recorded in  his diary, 
"Moley [Sargent] has p u t up a paper urging th a t  we should 
announce th a t if  France is attacked by Germany as a  resu lt of her 
going to the  support of Czechoslovakia ag a in st unprovoked 
G erm an aggression. G reat B rita in  would support F rance...I do 
not believe a direct guarantee of Czechoslovakia is possible - b u t 
th is  is also the least we should do if  we are to stop the rot"[21]. A 
policy of firm ness in th is respect, however, was not the desire of 
the B ritish  Government despite the Anschluss; any alienation of 
G erm any was still considered a  bad idea. N evertheless, the 
events of M arch 1938 made the question of Czechoslovakia more 
acute and B rita in  was confronted w ith a crude dilem ma in her 
foreign policy: if  Germ any was not deterred  by a w arning from 
B rita in  could she be challenged? C ham berlain  and Halifax, 
unw illing to accept the  inev itab ility  of war, regarded  such a
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possibility as too dangerous as they were reluctan t to give up hope 
of agreem ent w ith Germ any and failed to perceive th a t Germany 
m ight expand into non-Germ anic territory. C ham berlain wrote 
to h is s is te r on th e  im practica lity  of firm  assu ran ce  given 
collectively to Czechoslovakia: "You have only to look a t the map to 
see th a t nothing th a t  France or we could do could possibly save 
Czechoslovakia from being overrun by the  G erm ans, i f  they  
wanted to do it" [22].
As yet unaw are of the  Prim e M inister's decision not to 
make any promises in  defence of Czechoslovakia, Hadow, during 
the  rum ours of a possible B ritish  guarantee  to Czechoslovakia, 
frantically and constantly w arned against such a step. On M arch 
18 he wrote tha t, w ithout B ritish  promises, France was helpless 
in  defence of Czechoslovakia because her air force was far inferior 
to th a t of Germ any and therefore could not fly across Germ an 
territory  to assist in defending Czechoslovakia, nor could she get 
her troops to Czech territo ry  through Yugoslavia or Roum ania as 
neither were willing to risk w ar w ith Italy or Germ any "in order 
to help an  ally of Moscow whom, above all other countries, their 
Governments hate  and fear"[23]. On M arch 22 Hadow wrote to -fhe
as the  Cabinet appeared to be considering a 
gu aran tee  to Czechoslovakia, he felt ju stified  in  enclosing 
telegram s which showed th a t  "Yugoslavia would do nothing to 
antagonise Germany, th a t H ungary is watching her opportunity,
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as we also know th a t  B ulgaria  is doing; while Roum ania is 
apathetic so far as Czechoslovakia is concerned"[24].
On the question of Little E ntente assistance as well as help 
from H ungary  and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia was isolated to a 
certain  degree. As regards Russia and Germany, Yugoslavia, for 
exam ple, preferred  the la tte r  connection and from 1936 secret 
negotiations had  begun betw een the  two, while and agreem ent 
was reached between Italy  and Yugoslavia in  M arch 1936. The 
Yugoslavian Foreign M inister had  decided th a t the Rome-Berlin 
axis would guard  Yugoslavia ag a in st comm unism , while h e r 
tre a ty  w ith  Ita ly  would guard  h e r against Germ any, and  he 
seemed to have already w ritten  off Czechoslovakia. From 1935 
B ulgaria  had  established good relations w ith  Germ any and in  
Ja n u a ry  1937 signed a trea ty  w ith  Yugoslavia prom ising th a t 
"inviolable peace and sincere and perpetual friendship" would 
reign between these two countries[25].
H ungary  felt h erse lf to have claim s over Slovakia and  
R uthen ia  in  Czechoslovakia and H itle r had  told H ungary th a t 
G erm any recognised these claims, as i t  was in  his in te rest to get 
th is country to come in  a t the appropriate m oment and complete 
the  e lim ination  of the  Czech s ta te  while dem onstra ting  its  
artificial and  un n a tu ra l character. At the sam e time H ungary 
was engaged in  1938 in  private exchanges with the Poles over the 
division of Czechoslovakia, a lthough  these  were not alw ays
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cordial. Roum ania was probably the safest of Czechoslovakia's 
a llies b u t even th is  country was adm itted ly  u n certa in  in  its  
re la tio n s  w ith  h e r  neighbour. G erm any  h ad  ru n  across 
difficulties in  try ing  to persuade Roumania to join her camp, bu t 
defence by th is country of Czechoslovakia did not seem  anywhere 
n e a r a certa in ty  and  Roum ania's reluctance in  th is  respect is 
underlined  by h er refusal to allow R ussian troops to cross her 
land. By May 1938 the Roumanians had promised not to intervene 
in  a  localised Germ an-Czech encounter b u t also declined to 
commit them selves any further.
Any R ussian assistance, in  the m eantim e, was dependent 
on F rance honouring he r obligations tow ards Czechoslovakia 
first, and the la tte r  occurrence had become increasingly doubtful 
after M arch 1938. There was also the fu rther possibility tha t, after 
S ta lin 's  purges, which greatly  reduced his m ilita ry  staff, the 
Soviet Union would rem ain reluctan t to become embroiled in  any 
conflict, regard less of F rance’s actions. Hadow was, thus, 
partia lly  correct in  his assessm ent of Czechoslovakia's situation 
in  the  event of aggression, bu t arguably wrong in  the conclusions 
he, in  tu rn , drew.
On M arch 24 an article appeared in  The Daily Telegraph 
which s ta ted  the Prim e M inister would declare th a t  day in  the 
House of Commons th a t, though B rita in 's  com m itm ent to help 
Czechoslovakia would not be automatic, she would help France in
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case of G erm an action if  Berlin did not come to term s w ith  
Prague, Hadow, upon reading this, im m ediately sen t a note to 
Lord Hutchison urging him to point out to Cham berlain that, as of 
th a t  day, "v irtua lly  the  ENTIRE GERMAN M INORITY of 
Czechoslovakia is dem anding its  rights as Czechoslovak citizens" 
to which the Czech reply was apparently to form a purely Czech 
Cabinet. "The resu lt is a  foregone conclusion: un less B rita in  
forces P rague by its  sage advice to g ran t these righ ts Germ any 
w ill sooner or la te r  dem and  th em  on b e h a lf  of h e r  
fellow-Germans, the Czechs will appeal to France for help or s ta r t 
hostilities to engage France, and G reat B ritain  will be draw n into 
an European w ar on the side of a Government which is denying 
their rights to a large percentage of its citizens"[26].
C ham berlain’s statem ent, in  fact, tu rned  out to include not 
as firm  a com m itm ent as Hadow feared. The Prim e M inister 
enum erated the B ritish  obligations which m ight lead to the use of 
force and  included the  case of Czechoslovakia, b u t B ritish  
obligations in  th is question were not autom atic. The Government 
had  actually  decided against i t  on th e  grounds th a t  i t  would 
deprive them  of control over the im portan t question of foreign 
policy in  re la tion  to the  a rea  where v ita l in te re s ts  were not 
concerned to th e  sam e degree as F ran ce  a n d  B elgium . 
C ham berlain did add, however, th a t  the "inexorable pressure of 
fac ts  m ig h t w ell p rove m ore pow erfu l th a n  fo rm al
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pronouncements", and adm itted th a t other countries not party  to 
the dispute could become involved[27].
Hadow described C ham berlain 's speech as "adm irable" 
and felt th a t  the  "mass of m oderate opinion" in  B rita in  had, no 
doubt, in terp reted  it as a "statesm anlike w arning to Europe th a t 
B rita in  would not partic ipate  in any European w ar unless th is 
country were satisfied of the justice of the cause which i t  was 
being asked to champion and of its  vital in te rest to G reat B ritain  
and  its  a lly  F rance  alike". He w arned , how ever, of the  
"unw arrantable" in te rp re ta tio n  of th is  speech which had  been 
ta k e n  by  " c e r ta in  sec tio n s of F re n c h , B e lg ian  an d  
Government-controlled Czech Press, whose articles seek to read 
in to  Mr. C h am b erla in 's  words an  im p lied  p ledge 'm ore 
efficacious and binding' th an  even the unwise guaran tee  which 
in terven tion ists had  sought to w ring from G reat B ritain". To 
Hadow, the  implications of th is contention had been brought out 
by "inform ation from well informed political circles in  Paris" to 
th e  effect th a t  th e  F ren ch  F ore ign  M in is te r  M onsieur 
Paul-Boncour had  recently  assured some of h is deputies of his 
in ten tion  "not only to go to the  assistance of Czechoslovakia 
w hether or not France were herself the  victim of aggression, bu t 
also to use G reat B rita in 's Locarno and League obligations as a 
m eans of ensuring th a t France would be certain, in  such [a] case, 
of autom atic B ritish  support". To Hadow, th is was tan tam ount to
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giving a blank cheque to Benes signed by France and endorsed by 
Britain[28].
Early in  April Cham berlain, as if  sharing Hadow's fears of 
m isinterpretation of B ritain 's policy, made clearer his in tentions 
in  regard to Czechoslovakia in  a speech he made in  Birmingham. 
Cham berlain sta ted  th a t  a w arning to Germany was a gamble, 
not w ith money, b u t with lives, and he would not give the world to 
face "the s te rn  necessity  for war" unless he was "absolutely 
convinced th a t in no other way could we preserve our liberty"[29]. 
To Chamberlain, i t  was of prim ary  importance "tO urge more 
concessions to the Sudeten Germ ans on Prague. He had already 
w ritten  to his sister th a t he was prepared to approach H itler and 
say "The best th ing you can do is tell us exactly w hat you w ant for 
your Sudeten G erm ans. I f  i t  is reasonable we will urge the  
Czechs to accept and if  they do, you m ust give assurances th a t you 
will let them  alone in  the  future"[30]. The Foreign Office was, 
m eanw hile, d iscussing  w h a t concessions P rague  should be 
encouraged to make. Harvey wrote a t th is time, "geographically 
they  [the Sudeten  G erm ans] a re  hard ly  su itab ly  placed for 
autonom y un less p e rh ap s th ro u g h  a can tonal system  like 
Sw itzerland, though here again any cohesive elem ent such as 
common patriotism  or common fear is lacking"[31].
To Hadow, im m ediate concessions to the SdP, however 
damaging to the Czech sta te , w^ere vital, and he communicated
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th is  to S ir Robert Kingsley Wood, M inister of Air, ju s t  as the 
B ritish  Government was on the verge of discussions w ith France 
on foreign policy. Hadow wrote th a t British advice to France and 
Czechoslovakia should be; "In your own in te rests  we can do no 
more, and nor should Paris, th an  advise M. Benes to negotiate 
w ith  the  M inorities w ithout fu rth er delay and  on a  basis of 
co m p le te  n e u tr a l i s a t io n  of C zech o slo v ak ia"  [32]. T he 
Anglo-French discussions took place on April 28 and 29, and the 
B ritish  goal in  these had been decided as securing the  support of 
the  F rench in  urging Prague in accommodation of the  Sudeten 
Germ ans while a t  the same time informing Berlin of th is in  order 
to make Germany more patien t over the question. This, of course, 
fit right in  w ith H itler's plan of gradual pressure and propaganda 
leading to a crisis of which he could take full advantage.
It m ay be th a t Hadow’s convictions made him  particularly  
b lind  to signals the  Foreign Office had  been receiving from 
Germany, for example, the Germ an w riter E rn st Jackh  had been 
bringing reports to the Foreign Office from G erm any since the 
mid-1930s. Jackh  was a m ember of the Nazi P arty  b u t apparently 
not a  complete follower of H itler. E rn st W oermann, the  Germ an 
C harge d'A ffairs in  London had  told Jack h  in  confidence in  
January  1937: "in a  few years tim e Germany would have to attack 
Czechoslovakia in  order to penetrate  into the Danube basin. She 
would not, however, do th is  un til she had  assu red  herse lf of
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B ritain 's friendship. She would be prepared to risk  French and 
R ussian in tervention  as long as we [Britain] stood a loo f. Jackh  
had  passed th is inform ation on to the  Foreign Office bu t i t  was 
e ither ignored or accepted with equanimity. In  M arch 1938 the 
word came again  from W oerm ann th a t slices of Czechoslovakia 
would go to Germany, Poland, and Hungary, while the res t would 
be partitioned; "Such a policy m ight lead to a  world war, b u t th a t 
depended on G reat B ritain . H itle r’s task  was to prepare  the 
situation and choose his time so th a t G reat B rita in  could be kept 
out"[33].
A fu r th e r  exam ple is inform ation  the  Foreign  Office 
received early in  M ay 1938 regarding a conversation betw een a 
B r i t is h  o ffic ia l a n d  th e  fo rm er G e rm a n  m o n a rc h is t  
Kleist-SchMen zin. The G erm an had  s ta te d  ju s t  a fte r  the  
A n sch lu ss  : "H itler has h is p lans ag a in st F rance, H olland, 
Belgium, D enm ark, Russia, against England and  the new world. 
He w ants to annex C anada and Siberia". Czechoslovakia was the 
next step: "One th ing  I know for certain. I f  England says no, if  
only through diplomatic channels, the adventure m ust be p u t off. 
H itler has adm itted this, and w hat he fears like the  plague is th a t 
E ngland will caution him...The arm y has few reserv ists and  no 
reserves of m ateria l...T he people are against w ar...The Nazis 
bluff...The B ritish  Government alone can throw it[a  sheet anchor] 
to them  [the General Staff] by a firmly spoken word". The sense of
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th is conversation was forwarded to London b u t nowhere is it  
produced in  public documents[34]. Hadow m u st have been 
exposed to a t least some of th is information; however, his own 
opinions seemed to rem ain unshaken: th a t G erm an in ten tions 
were m ainly based upon fear of Soviet expansion, and in  the case 
of C zechoslovakia, G erm any w ished to leave th e  S ude ten  
Germans as Czechoslovak citizens for "economic reasons"[35].
After the Anglo-French m eeting on April 28-29, the opinion 
had  been gaining ground th a t Henlein could be used  to get a 
settlem ent with the Czechs on the basis of autonomy. Henlein had 
come to London as a  resu lt of an "indirect feeler" v ia Hadow 
indicating th a t he (Henlein) wanted to see V ansitta rt, and Hadow 
been convinced th a t the SdP leader could be used in  th is way[36]. 
H enlein rea ssu red  V a n s itta r t of h is sincerity  and  m oderate 
intentions and the report w ent back to the C abinet th a t  Henlein 
had  no in s tru c tio n s  from  B erlin  and  B enes could get an  
agreem ent of a useful character if he would only act quickly[37]. 
(Henlein, in  fact, stopped off in  Berlin on his way back from this 
t r ip  to  f u r th e r  so lid ify  H i t le r ’s p la n s  r e g a rd in g  
Czechoslovakia)[38],
After th is visit, Hadow began to express the  opinion th a t the 
best solution to the problem was neutralisation of Czechoslovakia 
on the basis of Belgium or Switzerland; federation of th a t country 
a long  Sw iss lin es; equal tre a tm e n t of a ll c itizen s  of
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Czechoslovakia; and  the right of appeal for all Czechoslovakia’s 
m inorities to the  Hague Court[39]. O thers, however, were more 
doubtful over such a solution. According to Sargent, the  examples 
of Belgium  and  Sw itzerland were m isleading because in  both 
cases the  neu tra l s ta te  acted as an  indispensable buffer to three 
jealous G reat Powers who were its  neighbours. ’Czechoslovakia 
can never be in  th is happy position because she is absolutely alone 
w ith one single G reat Power. In  fact, she is not a  buffer S tate, she 
is m erely a  b a rr ie r  betw een G erm any and  h e r  am bitions ”. 
B rita in  should, therefore, not persuade France and R ussia to 
renounce their trea ties w ith Czechoslovakia as th is would m ean a 
hum iliation  to both  which would m erely p rop itia te  Germany. 
V ansitta rt agreed w ith Sargent and added, "I disagree w ith Mr. 
Newton th a t we can afford to lose any more prestige. We have 
practically none left anywhere as it  is"[40].
On May 19, 1938 the  B ritish  Acting Consul in  D resden 
reported there  was reason to believe th a t G erm an troops were 
concentrating in  Southern  Silesia and N orthern  A ustria . The 
B ritish  Consul-General in  Vienna reported a convoy of G erm an 
lorries moving tow ards the Czech border. On M ay 20 the Czech 
M inistry for Foreign Affairs reported concentrations of G erm an 
troops in  Saxony. The Czechs responded with partia l mobilisation 
on th e ir borders, and  tension  was heightened in  the  fron tier 
regions when two Sudeten Germans on motorcycles were shot by
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Czech policemen after refusing to stop. Henlein had, a t the same 
time, broken off negotiations w ith the Czech Governm ent which 
made the situation look ominous. The French panicked as they 
had  no wish to in terfere, and Bonnet urged the  Czechs not to 
m obilise. He fu r th e r  told the B ritish  A m bassador th a t  "if 
Czechoslovakia were really unreasonable the French Government 
m ight well declare th a t  France considered herself released from 
her bond"[41].
The B ritish  Government, however, acted w ith  surprising  
firmness and on May 21 decided to w arn Germany. The French 
were to honour th e ir obligation under the alliance trea ty  w ith 
Czechoslovakia and under these circum stances B rita in  would 
probably become involved. Ribbentrop was w arned personally by 
H alifax th a t if, "from any precip itate  action" general conflict 
arose, B ritain  would not stand  aside[42]. The G erm an Secretary 
of S ta te  received th e  w arnings angrily  and  refused  to urge 
Henlein to resum e negotiations, professing his indifference to the 
possibility of war[43]. The danger of fu tu re  G erm an action 
seemed im m inent b u t the Germ ans were not ready a t th is point 
and  did not move, and by May 23 the  heat had  gone out of the 
crisis.
The reactions to th is  crisis in  the  Foreign Office were 
mixed. On May 20 Hadow received a copy of a telegram  from 
Newton in Prague th a t sta ted  th a t the Czech press was urging its
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Governm ent to take  s te rn er m easures regarding  the  SdP, and 
noted the G erm ans could use the  argum ent th a t they  were only 
in tervening to m ain tain  order in  Czechoslovakia: "In fact if  the 
Germans are out for trouble they can have it  easily in  either way. 
If  Czechs m ain tain  order and bloodshed resu lts H itle r will 'act 
like lightning'. If  they do not, they are not fit to govern and m ust 
give play to those who can. Before these gloomy alternatives I feel 
the Czechs are right in  the ir decision..."[44].
On May 24 H arvey wrote, "Our sources tend  to show th a t 
H itler had really intended to go for Czechoslovakia b u t th a t  he has 
shied off in  face of our warnings"[45], bu t on the sam e day Nevile 
Henderson sent a telegram  to the Foreign Office on G erm an press 
reactions to the crisis which protested against the  assum ption 
th a t  peace h ad  been saved by a determ ined  fro n t ag a in st 
Germany. "The G erm an Government has never en te rta ined  the 
idea of invading Czechoslovakia and no troops have been moved. 
Such danger to peace as exists is due to the  behaviour of the  
Czechs and in a lesser degree to the blind support given to Prague 
by London and Paris". (Hadow had underlined "Czechs" in  th is 
te legram  and  "blind support given to Prague by London and  
Paris")[46]. Harvey took note of this reaction on May 26: "German 
press is now violently a ttack ing  us for in te rfering  in  C entral 
E urope and  for claim ing the  credit for stopping a G erm an 
offensive which had never existed"[47].
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Hadow's reaction to the crisis was, not surprisingly, on the 
side of the Germans; he felt the incident was largely, if  not wholly, 
th e  fau lt of the  Czech G overnm ent. "No b e tte r  m eans of 
torpedoing the  H odza-H enlein negotiations could...have been 
devised  th a n  th is  m obilisation ...". Hadow w rote th a t  he 
"reluctantly" endorsed the  suspicion th a t Benes was behind the 
m ilita ry  moves, in tend ing  to wreck Hodza's negotiations for a 
compromise, and  was ce rta in  th a t  the  Czech p res id en t had  
in s tig a ted  the  Czech P ress 's  dem and for s te rn e r  m easures. 
According to Hadow, a Secretary of the Czechoslovak Legation in 
London had  told "a sym pathizer w ith the Czech cause whom I 
happen to know" a few weeks before th a t "once he was assured of 
B ritish backing M. Benes would know how to torpedo Dr. Hodza's 
negotiations with Henlein in  such a m anner as to pu t the  la tte r  in  
the wrong before public opinion in  other countries".
Because of B ritish  and F rench reactions to the  G erm an 
troops movements, Hadow thought Benes would "fritte r away" 
concessions; "in th is  case I m ost earnestly  endorse S ir N. 
H enderson 's estim ate  of G erm any's absolute determ ination  to 
secure justice for the Sudetendeutsche; by peaceful persuasion if  
possible, bu t, if  not, by early  use of force...Germany is sullenly 
resentfiil a t w hat is now being dressed up by certain  sections of 
the Press as a  diplomatic defeat for Germany". If  given time, and 
the  chance to achieve justice for the Sudeten Germans, Germany,
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Hadow felt, would hold back because her Governm ent "knows 
well enough th a t incorporation of the Sudetendeutsche in  the 
Reich m eans assum ing an  economic liability  w ithout hope of 
corresponding assets"[48]. Hadow, meanwhile, m inuted to R.A. 
B utler th a t he was struck by the unjustified note of optimism in 
the B ritish  Press and in  French statem ents in  Official telegram s 
a t the  "success" attending Anglo-French intervention in  Berlin on 
May 22-24. He wrote th a t the  tru th  of the m atte r was "(a) L ast 
week G erm an pressure  was only m eant as a rejoinder to Czech 
m ilita ry  pressure  upon th e  Sud.-D. d istricts, (b) I t  served its  
purpose in  showing the Sud-D. th a t Germ any was behind them  
unwilling...to look on indefinitely a t the 'incidents' which are one 
of the m ost dangerous features of the present situation". I t was 
Hadow's belief th a t the rum ours of G erm an troops movem ents 
were used as a pretext by the  Czech Government for mobilising 
and adopting more suppressive m easures in the Sudeten Germ an 
areas. He la te r in  th is lengthy m inute described the rum ours of 
G erm an troop m ovem ents as baseless (although they  m ainly 
came from B ritish observers[49]) and stated, "at the present tim e 
i t  cannot be denied th a t sections of the  B ritish Press and of the 
Opposition - if  not also such In tellectuals as the  Czechoslovak 
Committee and the Archbishop of C anterbury - are encouraging 
Benes to beHeve he can resist...fundam ental concessions"[50].
Opinion differs as to how the May crisis actually originated.
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Ian  Colvin, who was in the Foreign Office a t the time, noted w hat 
Hadow was quick to pounce on, "there was an  em barrassing  
s tra in  of jubilation in the B ritish  and French press comments, it  
being asserted  th a t 'H itler had  climbed down'"[51]. B ut i t  is 
believed th a t H itler's in ten tions were not definite enough for a 
move such as was im agined against Czechoslovakia a t th is time 
and W einberg states, "at a  tim e of great in ternational tension, 
rep o rts  of rea lly  rou tine  G erm an  troops m ovem ents were 
m istaken  as presaging an  im m ediate a ttack  on Czechoslovakia. 
W hen the tim es are appropriate for them , m any omens or flying 
saucers will be seen"[52]. Hadow's suspicion th a t Czechoslovakia 
had deliberately heightened the tension by mobilising is also felt to 
be w ith o u t foundation. According W.V. W allace, i t  w as 
"clear...that before the May crisis nothing had  been fu rther from 
th e  C zechoslovak G o v ern m en t's  m ind  th a n  a m ili ta ry  
dem onstration. In so far as i t  considered m ilitary m atters a t all, 
i t  h ad  been in  term s of H itle r’s possible in tentions...The May 
Crisis was of H itler's m aking "[53].
H enderson Braddick, on the  other hand, exposes evidence 
in  an  essay on the Crisis th a t strongly supports Hadow's notion 
th a t  the  reports of Germ an troop movements were in itially  false. 
B ut Braddick points out, tha t, although i t  seems unlikely th a t they 
originated in  Prague, they were, nonetheless passed on w ith the 
knowledge th a t th a t they were in  inaccurate. W hether or not the
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G erm ans could be held culpable, the  central fact of the crisis is 
th a t  Benes, by mobilising against G erm an troops, did in itia te  a 
provocative move against G erm any which required a reaction 
from B rita in  and France[54]. W hat Benes had  dem onstrated, and 
w hat Hadow failed to realise, was th a t the th rea t of im m inent war 
could be diminished if the W estern Powers stood confident in  such 
a crisis and p u t pressure on Germany. H itler would then  be less 
certain  of the  success of any fait accompli in itiated  such as the 
A ustrian  Anschluss. P rague, in  fact, had  sufficient reason to 
precipitate the event.
In  any case, the crisis left its  m ark  on both B rita in  and 
G erm any. In  G erm any i t  spu rred  on the  process leading  to 
"Operation Green" - the take-over of Czechoslovakia. H itler m et 
H enlein  again  and  told the  la t te r  to hold to h is program  of 
dem ands b u t not to let developments in  Czechoslovakia to get out 
of hand; Germany first had to fill the gaps in  her fortifications on 
the  W estern border. By the end of the sum m er or in  the au tum n 
France would not be able to help Czechoslovakia and H itler could 
proceed as he wished. The G erm an leader's m ilitary  tim etable 
was now se t for the  operation s ta r tin g  on October 1 w ith  a 
complete breakthrough to be completed by October 4[55].
The B ritish  Foreign Office and  Government, m eanwhile, 
m erely  becam e a little  more fran tic  in  th e ir  approaches to 
Germany. Cadogan wrote on May 29: "We m ust clear the air; we
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can 't let Germany go on keeping the  initiative, and we m ust call 
her into the open, as I urged upon A. [Eden] on May 13,1936!"[56]. 
To C ham berlain  the episode was proof of how un trustw orthy  
H itler was, b u t a t the sam e time, i t  m ade him  more anxious to 
achieve a  speedy accom m odation betw een th e  Czechs and  
G erm ans. Hadow him self wrote w ith disapproval of the  "facile 
assum ption" in  Press and o ther circles in  B ritain , France, and 
Czechoslovakia th a t the "comer was turned" in  the crisis by firm 
A ng lo -F rench  su p p o rt o f a re so lu te  dem ocratic  Czech 
G overnm ent. G erm any 's v ex a tio n  over supposed  B ritish  
"partiality  tow ards Prague", in  Hadow 's opinion, m ade the 
situation  more dangerous[57]. Christopher Thorne w rites of th is 
period, "It is difficult...to avoid the word servility when describing 
B ritish  dealings with Berlin"[58].
Prelude to Munich
In  th e  sum m er m on ths lead ing  up to th e  M unich 
A greem ent, th e  question  of B ritish  invo lvem ent in  the  
Czech-Germ an problem  became Hadow's p rim ary  concern, as 
indeed i t  became the concern of the B ritish  Government. The May 
Crisis, instead  of illu stra ting  to Cham berlain the advantages of 
m aking a  firm  stand  in  Europe, had  the  reverse effect on the 
Prim e M inister. As H itle r and H enlein increasingly edged the
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Czech G overnm ent in to  a corner, the  B ritish  quickened the 
process by applying pressure on Benes and continually offering 
solutions advantageous to Germ any. Hadow, in  his enthusiasm  
for Cham berlain and growing zeal in  the general avoidance of 
w ar, adapted him self to each p lan  even when his instincts were 
in itia lly  against them , and he lay  increasing stress on B rita in  
tak in g  the  in itia tive, p a rticu la rly  in  push ing  the Czechs in to  
agreem ent to w hatever solution w as am enable to H itler.
N eutra lisation  was now high on the agenda of suggested 
solutions for Czechoslovakia and in  Ju ly  Hadow wrote to R.A. 
B utler th a t he felt d isaster would be impossible to avoid unless the 
"Four G reat Powers" (he excluded Russia) agreed to this: "Only if  
WE are prepared to FORCE Benes to do so by telling him  plainly 
th a t  otherwise we shall w ithdraw  all support can we hope th a t he 
will...come to term s with the Sudeten-Germans"[59]. At the same 
tim e Hadow wrote to Sir Kingsley Wood, now Secretary of S tate  for 
Air, asking the la tte r  to use his influence to fu rther the p lan  for 
agreem ent on neu tra lisa tion  of Czechoslovakia. "You will see 
how closely S ir N. H enderson and the French Am bassador M. 
F rancois Poncet agree upon th e  despera te ly  u rg en t need of 
im m ediate and firm  action on the  p a r t  of G reat B rita in  if  the 
Peace of Europe is to be saved"[60].
Hadow fu rth er outlined th is  p lan  to S ir Arnold Wilson, 
Conservative M.P. for H utchin , H ertfordshire , who supported
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appeasem ent[61]. A four-power g u aran tee  of a n eu tra lised  
Czechoslovakia by B ritain  was, according to Hadow, of prim ary 
im portance and would sim ultaneously be a  diplomatic victory for 
B rita in  "since the countries which now believe th a t Germany can, 
by biding her tim e, take w hat she w ants, would one and all be 
shown th a t peace and the guarantee of the sovereignty of a  small 
s ta te  can still be achieved by NEGOTIATION and th a t  i t  is 
therefore to their advantage to resist unjustified German pressure 
in stead  of surrendering to it." Hadow's suggestion to Sir Arnold 
was to "warn" Benes by raising two questions in Parliam ent. The 
first was w hether the B ritish  Governm ent was aw are th a t  the 
proposed nationalities s ta tu te  of the  Czechoslovak Governm ent 
had  not been shown to the Sudeten-G erm an delegates, and th a t 
consequently the la tte r  were persuaded th a t the Czechs did not 
in tend  to g ran t them  their rights. The second was w hether the 
B ritish  Government would take action to ensure th a t  i t  was not 
draw n in  support of denial of the righ t to self-determination of the 
Sudeten Germans. "I would beg you", Hadow wrote, "to th ink  the 
m a tte r  over and, if  you possibly can, to help in  th e  m anner 
indicated to arouse Parliam ent and the  country to the im m ediate 
na tu re  of the danger th a t threatens them"[62].
Wilson did, in fact, raise both questions in  Parliam ent ju s t 
a  few days after receiving Hadow's le tter. He first asked the 
Prim e M inister whether, in  view of the  fact th a t B ritain  supported
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the 1918 claim for self-determination of Czechs and Slovaks would 
she now give the assurance th a t  she would not lend m oral or 
other support to the denial of the claim for self-determ ination by 
p leb isc ite  be tw een  th e  S u d e ten  re p re se n ta tiv e s  and  the  
C zechoslovak  G o v ern m en t. C h a m b e r la in  re p lie d  t h a t  
conversations between the  two parties were proceeding. Wilson 
then  pu t the questions to the Prim e M inister of w hether he had  yet 
received a  copy of the tex t of the  proposed Czech N ationalities 
S ta tu te , w h e th er he w as aw are  th a t  i ts  non-pub lication  
s tre n g th e n e d  th e  S u d e ten  desire  for a p leb isc ite  u n d e r 
in te rna tiona l supervision, and  w hat steps he proposed to take 
before the  m atter was brought before the League of Nations under 
the  M inorities clauses. Cham berlain answ ered no to the  first 
question, sta ting  th a t the  tex ts of the  s ta tu te  were still in  the 
process of elaboration, bu t added th a t His M ajesty's Government 
was closely watching the situation[63].
In  these a ttem pts to increase pressure on Benes to m ake 
g rea ter concessions to the  Sudeten Germ ans Hadow and Wilson 
were sim plifying the  m atter, p a rticu larly  on the point of the 
N a tio n a litie s  S ta tu te , in  order to achieve th e ir  end. The 
N ationalities S ta tu te  was a code which, under p ressure  from 
B rita in  in  the  Spring of 1938, the  Czechoslovak G overnm ent 
announced i t  would adopt w ith the  aim  of improving regulations 
regarding the National Minorities. The term  Nationalities S tatu te
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im plied the  end of the conception of a  national sta te , and  the 
conception instead  of a m ultinational State[64], In  the  eyes of 
Hadow and Wilson, Benes had  announced the form ation of this 
code in  order to keep control of the situation and not lose face, but 
was now stalling in  its actual fulfilment. In  Prague, however, as 
Newton him self wap beginning to realise, the situation was not a 
clear cut one of uncooperativeness on the p a rt of the Czechoslovak 
Government. The B ritish M inister wrote to Halifax in  June, "My 
im pression is th a t  one of [Czech Prem ier] Dr. Hodza's chief 
objects in  re fra in in g  from  show ing th e  te x t of th e  d ra ft 
N ationalities S ta tu te  to the  Sudeten  G erm an p a rty  has been 
precisely to avoid the  danger...of m aking an in itia l offer which, 
however far-reaching i t  m ight have seemed to the Czechs, would 
alm ost inevitably have been characterised as inadequate by the 
Sudeten  G erm an party"[65]. Hadow's idea of a Four Power 
a rran g em en t was, fu rtherm ore, unwelcom e in  B erlin: "an 
official of the  Chancery recently volunteered to a m em ber of my 
staff', Henderson wrote in  June, " that H err H itler would not even 
agree to a  conference of Four Powers summoned to devise and 
impose an  agreed solution on Czechoslovakia"[66].
In  m id-A ugust Hadow w rote th a t  he could see no 
appreciable bridging of the gap between the Czechs and Germans, 
and  blam ed the Czech Government; Benes in  particu lar. Hadow 
even suggested th a t the Czech President was toying w ith the idea
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of a  m ilitary  dictatorship[67]. I t  was about th is time, however, 
th a t Benes agreed to meet with SdP representatives and presented 
them  w ith  a  d raft for ag reem ent which included im m ediate 
accep tance of th e  G erm an language  as equal s ta tu s  to 
Czechoslovak, and  increased  in ta k e  of G erm ans in to  the  
adm inistration of the  state. His only request in  re tu rn  was a two 
m o n th  a rm is tice . The p roposa ls  w ere declared  to be 
inadequate[68].
D espite  h is  lack of confidence in  B enes' s incerity  in  
a ttem pting  to come to term s w ith the Sudeten Germ ans, Hadow 
believed agreem ent was not impossible - if  only Benes would 
cooperate. He wrote a t the end of July, 'T  believe th a t there is a 
hope of achieving, by exercise of moderation and fair play in  th is 
land , the  beginning of a  se ttlem en t no t only of the  Sudeten  
question bu t...an  independent b u t neu tra l Czechoslovakia strong 
for self-defence as is Sw itzerland..."[69]. Hadow fu rther wrote 
th a t it was of the utm ost im portance th a t an  approach be made 
"without fu rther delay" to Berlin, with the object of laying before 
m id -S ep tem ber "the foundation -stone  of an  In te rn a tio n a l 
G u a ra n te e  of th e  te r r i to r ia l  in te g r ity  of a  N e u tra lis e d  
C zechoslovakia in  r e tu rn  for p rio r g ra n t  of concessions 
satisfactory  to the  Sudeten and, subsequently, renunciation by 
Czechoslovakia of h e r Soviet Pact". To Hadow, the  p rim ary  
re su lts  of such action would be reestab lish m en t of w aning
209
Anglo-French prestige and  a ha lt called to Germ an absorption by 
ultim atum . Hadow concluded, "further delay - even for a m onth - 
or failu re  to deal sim ultaneously  w ith  both  aspects of the 
Czechoslovak problem m ay well m ean failure of the Cham berlain 
policy of 'Peace by negotiation "[70].
Septem ber 5 m arked Benes' form ulation of the Fourth  Plan 
which included equality for all languages, the creation of a "state 
w ithin a state", and the righ t of the Sudeten Germans to a ir  all 
their grievances. Hadow was not impressed w ith the Fourth  Plan 
and wrote to Kingsley Wood and Halifax th a t the offer was neither 
genuine nor did i t  give to the Sudeten G erm ans any hope of 
equality as Czechoslovak citizens[71]. To S trang he wrote th a t the 
offer could no t be regarded as the "fair and indeed handsom e 
basis for a negotiated solution" as sta ted  by The Daily Telegraph 
on Septem ber 13. Hadow expressed h is concern th a t  the  
im pression given was th a t  th is was the  accepted view of the 
British Cabinet. "As it  stands I venture, m ost respectfully, to say 
th a t  the  Protocol represents no real abandonm ent of the Czech 
hegemony which - as Professor Toynbee rightly  pointed out - has 
m ade of Czechoslovakia a  S partan  Democracy'; and  therefore no 
lasting contribution to the peace of Europe "[72].
Belief in  the further necessity of British involvement in  the 
Czech-German dispute, ap art from pressure, was not lim ited to 
Hadow and  was strong enough to resu lt in  the Runcim an Mission
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carried  out from A ugust to Septem ber. Hadow him self had  in  
Ju ly  urged Lord Noel-Buxton to im press on the  Prim e M inister 
the im portance of sending an  em issary to Prague[73]. From  the 
beginning of Ju n e  the idea of going even fu rther and sending an  
independent m ediator to Czechoslovakia had  been brought into 
consideration by the B ritish Foreign Office. Hadow was doubtful 
over th is idea to begin with. Expressing his opinion on the subject 
to S trang, Hadow wrote th a t the Czechoslovak Government would 
be like ly  to  ex ert rep ress ive  m easu res on anyone giving 
information to a  foreign observer, and believed th a t only a m an on 
the  spot could unob trusively  provide accu ra te  inform ation  
"without endangering the liberty of those w ith whom he came into 
contact"[74]. He had  apparently  come round to the  idea by July, 
and on Ju ly  18 i t  was decided th a t the past P resident of the Board 
of Trade Lord Runcim an would be sent to Prague as "investigator 
and mediator"[75], while Prague was forced to accept the un true  
statem ent th a t i t  had asked for Runciman.
On Ju ly  25 Hadow wrote a m em orandum  entitled  "Lord 
Runciman" in  which he stressed the  im portance of m aking sure 
of th is  observer's im partia lity  in  order for h is reports to "carry 
weight w ith the  Sudeten". From this standpoint Hadow felt th a t i t  
was unfortunate th a t Benes had  sta ted  th a t Runcim an was to be 
standing  adviser to the Czech Government. "This will not only 
cause suspicious or recalcitrant m inority elem ents to throw doubt
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on his im partiality , bu t will make it  awkward for Lord Runciman 
to estab lish  and  m ain ta in  free contact w ith  the  Sudeten, the 
S lovak, th e  R u th en e , H u n g a ria n , an d  P o lish  M inority  
leaders""[76]. The mission was ostensibly m ean t to arrive a t a 
ju s t  solution of the  Czech-German problem satisfactory to both 
sides, b u t Hadow seemed to take  the view th a t  some sort of 
solution should have been arrived  a t  already; Runcim an was 
m erely a  m eans of conveying it. He, therefore, expressed his fear 
in  A ugust th a t  G erm any’s dem ands th a t  the  Sudeten Germ ans 
obtain equality of sta tus and Czechoslovakia be neutralised did not 
appear to G erm any as likely to be fulfilled by any aw ard from 
Runciman. He was already suggesting other m eans of arriving 
a t a settlem ent, in  particular, self-determination along the lines of 
confederation of Czechoslovakia.
Runcim an, i t  tu rn ed  out, had  very little  knowledge of 
Central Europe and had been pressed by London for quick results. 
He accepted th e  SdP on the  sam e footing as th e  Czech 
Government, and  was trea ted  by the former to weekend trips to 
the e sta tes  of G erm an aristocrats. A lthough accompanied by 
A shton-G w atkin, head  of the W estern and League of N ations 
D epartm en t in  the  Foreign Office and  an  expert on trade  
negotiations, he received no advice on procedure from London, 
and by Septem ber i t  seemed th a t the Mission was accomplishing 
little. On Septem ber 14 i t  had tracked down an  elusive Henlein
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who sta ted  th a t the SdP's previous demands were out of date; the 
q uestion  w as no longer one of se lf-a d m in is tra tio n , b u t 
self-determ ination and a  plebiscite. The SdP leader issued  a 
communique sta ting  th is was the only basis for negotiation[77].
The question of a  plebiscite now began to be earnestly  
discussed in  the  B ritish  C abinet, w here R uncim an's growing 
pessim ism  was m aking its  influence felt. Taking its  cue from the 
Cabinet, the  C entral D epartm ent requested a m em orandum  from 
Hadow on th e  subject. In  th is  m em orandum  he answ ered  
questions on possible population figures, voting procedure, and 
te rr ito ria l boundaries w hich he felt could be achieved by a 
compromise on exchange of populations[78]. The problem  for 
B rita in  was getting  the  Czechs to agree to a p lan  which could 
am ount to political suicide for Benes and which the  Foreign Office 
itself - including Hadow - had been against to begin with.
Hadow personally had little confidence in  the la test idea: "a 
plebiscite is, from knowledge as I have both of the populations and 
of the leading personalities on both sides, a  virtual impossibility in  
practice. Feelings have been so exacerbated by tw enty  years of 
ha tred  and anim osity th a t one side or other - perhaps even both - 
would begin serious bloodshed and so civil w ar or in ternational 
w ar". H adow  p re se n te d  as an  a lte rn a tiv e  th e  idea  of 
reconstitu ting Czechoslovakia as a confederation of nationalities, 
each nationality  possessing autonomous S tate  righ ts - sim ilar to
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those in  the  U nited S tates. In  re tu rn  for Germ any recognising 
th is new Czechoslovakia w ithout dem anding su rren d er of the 
S udeten  te rrito ry , P rag u e  would in troduce p roscrip tion  of 
Communism throughout Czechoslovakia and denounce her pact 
with the Soviet Union[79].
Cham berlain, however, had  already decided th a t  the  only 
solution was some form of self-determ ination. Thus, two days 
after h is suggestion for a confederation Hadow had  reconciled 
him self to the idea of a plebiscite and spelled out his own methods 
for achieving th is  plan, which were contrary  to the  generally 
accepted p a tte rn  of holding plebiscites. In  regard to supervision 
he recom m ended exclusion of F rench  and  L ittle  E n te n te  
contingents for fea r of bloodshed, and p referred  a  specially 
recruited B ritish  force. To Hadow it  was a  m atte r of course th a t 
Germ an term s be accepted which, in  addition to those mentioned 
previously, included transfer of the Sudeten areas to Germ any "by 
plebiscite or otherwise - in  a very short time", a  sim ilar transfer of 
P o lish  and  H u n g a ria n  te rr ito r ie s , and  fed e ra tio n  of th e  
rem aining Czechoslovak Republic. In  Hadow's opinion, the m ain 
obstacle to peace was the transfer of Sudeten or other territo ry  to 
Germany, Hungary, or Poland[80].
On Septem ber 17 Runcim an had  reported  to the  B ritish  
Cabinet th a t he was unable to suggest any p lan  or policy. Four 
days la te r  he produced a repo rt recom m ending the  solution
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C h am b erla in  (as well as  H adow ) h a d  in  m ind , th a t  
Czechoslovakia "be required to abolish political liberties, suppress 
free speech...relinquish h e r tie w ith France and Soviet Russia, 
give up h e r responsib ilities as a ‘grown up* m em ber of the 
League...accept a  guaran tee  by 'the principal Powers', and en ter 
the G erm an economic system"[81]. Hadow was m ost likely quite 
pleased w ith the report, although i t  seems th a t  i t  was actually 
tailored to fit the policy already decided upon by Chamberlain[82].
Hadow's bias over the Czech-German question can be seen 
to have increased considerably in  1938. I t was fairly clear by this 
tim e th a t  he had  little  regard  for the Czechs and held Benes 
largely i f  not wholly responsible for the continuing deadlock in  
negotiations. In  June  1938 he wrote th a t Benes was deliberately 
provoking Germ any by m aking out th a t B ritain  was joining "what 
G erm any h a te s  m ost": th e  F ranco-Soviet tre a tie s  ag a in s t 
Germany. Hadow continued, "I th ink  i t  is very necessary th a t  
public opinion and the  House should wake up to w hat th is  little  
schemer is doing; for he has every in tention of getting us into a 
position from which we cannot w ithdraw..."[83].
In  J u ly  H adow  w rote in  a  m em orandum  on the  
Czechoslovak crisis th a t  in  B rita in , and  still m ore in  France, 
there was too m uch inclination to accept the  claim of Benes th a t 
the Sudeten Germ ans had no case and th a t Czechoslovakia would 
be ru ined  by g ran tin g  autonom y[84]. Hadow, as u sual, was
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suspicious of a ll c la im s or efforts m ade by  B enes b u t 
sim ultaneously accepted all stories which em anated  from SdP 
sources. In  the sam e m onth he warned th a t Sudeten inform ation 
was to the effect th a t a  m ilitary putsch was to be staged by Benes' 
M ilitary Machine. "With such advice it is hardly  surprising th a t 
Dr. Benes is sure of him self and will no longer negotiate w ith the 
S udeten  Germ ans"[85]. By A ugust Hadow w as po in ting  out 
evidence th a t  Benes was appealing to Cham berlain 's opponents 
and th a t the  Czech president had  virtually accused Cham berlain 
of being Berlin 's agent[86]. He wrote to W.I. M allet, A ssistant 
P rivate Secretary to the  Secretary of State, th a t  Benes was the 
m ain  obstacle to a  compromise betw een Czechoslovakia and 
Germany on the Sudeten issue[87].
To Hadow, Cham berlain, and others in  the  Foreign Office 
and C abinet, agreem ent betw een the Czechs and  G erm ans was 
th e  only m ethod  of avoiding w ar, and  th e  b reakdow n of 
negotiations a  b a rr ie r  to peace. W ith th is  d irec t view of the 
situation in  C entral Europe, their fervour for agreem ent blinded 
them  to the  enorm ity  of some of th e ir proposals. T hat the  
in ternational neu tra lity  of Czechoslovakia was not comparable to 
Sw itzerland had  a lready been pointed out by Sargent, and  the 
danger of such a  situation  to B ritain  herself in  term s of Germ an 
expansion were not taken  into account or ignored. The transfer of 
th e  S u d e ten  te r r i to ry  w ould m ean  a G erm an  econom ic
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stranglehold over Czechoslovakia and the la tte r  would become 
politically dependent on the former. A partition  also would not 
unravel the  danger of a general w ar as believed by Hadow - not 
w ith G erm any in  possession of an  A ustrian  fron tie r and  the 
proximity of Poland and H ungary looking for the re tu rn  of their 
minority territo ry  (which Hadow was all too willing to hand  over). 
By the  beginning of Septem ber Harvey was expressing his concern 
over the lim ited view of the  Cabinet: "I cannot help feeling myself 
th a t in  the ir anxiety for non-provocation and peace they  overlook 
the  real issues now a t stake - not Czechoslovakia b u t the  position 
of the democracies as a  whole and all they represent"[88].
Czechoslovakia was only a concern to B ritain  because of the 
B ritish  fear of war, and as the crisis increased the im portance of 
preparing for an  Anglo-German agreem ent outweighed all other 
considerations. Shiela G ran t Duff writes th a t when she returned 
to B rita in  a t  th is  tim e she was appalled by h e r  countrym en's 
ignorance on the subject of C entral E astern  Europe. "In so far as 
I m et anyone remotely in  touch with official life, I was amazed a t 
how m isinform ed they  were. I t  was Czechoslovakia and  not 
Germany who was regarded as a th rea t to peace, not only because 
she was an  artificial S tate  who should never have been allowed to 
exist in  the first place, bu t because now, it  was being said, she was 
deliberately provoking H itler by her abominable trea tm en t of the 
G erm ans who should never have been subjected to her"[89].
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Hadow even an tic ip a ted  in  Ju ly  1938 the  la te r  words of 
Cham berlain by describing the lack of a clear case for defending a 
state  such as Czechoslovakia which was "far-away"[90].
Hadow*s Plan
I t  was in  Septem ber 1938 th a t Cham berlain launched the 
f lu r r ie d  n e g o tia tio n s  over th e  m in o ritie s  p ro b lem  in  
Czechoslovakia which led to the Munich conference a t  the  end of 
the  m onth. H itler, by th is  tim e, had  increased  p ressu re  on 
Czechoslovakia regarding  the  Sudeten area and h ad  generally 
heightened tension in  Europe over his possible next move. The 
fear among m any was th a t Czechoslovakia m ight feel compelled 
to mobilise in  answ er to H itler's th reats; a  move inviting Germ an 
invasion  and  a  E u ropean  war. "In those c ircum stances", 
Cham berlain la te r told Parliam ent, "I decided th a t  the  tim e had 
come to pu t into operation a plan which I had had  in  my m ind for 
a considerable period as a la s t resort...I resolved to go to Germany 
m yself to in te rv iew  H e rr  H itle r  and find out in  personal 
conversation w hether th e re  was yet any hope of saving the  
peace "[91].
On S ep tem ber 15 C ham berla in  m et w ith  H itle r  in  
Berchtesgaden where H itler declared th a t he w anted the Sudeten 
areas delivered to him  by the end of the m onth or he would go to
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w ar to get them ; however, if  Cham berlain could assure  him  th a t 
B rita in  recognised th e  principle of self-determ ination for the  
Sudeten G erm ans, he would be prepared to discuss m ethods of 
carrying it  out. Cham berlain re tu rned  to London to confer w ith 
Runcim an and the  C abinet and, a t th is point, i t  was advocated 
th a t an  international commission be invited to handle the transfer 
of the Sudeten territory  and an international force be set up to keep 
order in  th is operation. The Czechoslovak, Government was urged 
to agree to direct tran sfe r of all territory  consisting of over 50% 
Sudeten  G erm ans, in  w hich case B rita in  would prom ise to 
g u a ra n te e  the  new  boundaries of C zechoslovakia a g a in s t 
aggression. The Czechoslovak Governm ent a t f irs t objected, 
asking th a t  the  dispute be subm itted to a rb itra tion  under the  
term s of the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration T reaty of 1926; but, 
u n d e r p ressu re  from  B rita in  and  France, i t  accepted the  
proposals[92].
As tran sfe r of th e  Sudeten territo ry  to G erm any gained 
ground as an acceptable m eans of deflecting H itler and avoiding 
w ar the m ethod of tran sfe r came under discussion in  the B ritish  
Cabinet and Foreign Office. On Septem ber 19 Halifax conducted 
an  academic discussion w ith Sargent, Cadogan, V an sitta rt, and 
A shton Gw atkin in  the  supervision of the  tran sfe r of territo ry . 
Oliver Harvey wrote of th is meeting, "He [Halifax] is very anxious 
to have a  few B ritish  troops sent to show the flag. He believes
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naively th a t a few B ritish  regim ental bands m arching up and 
down the  Sudeten areas would suffice to keep order"[93]. Basil 
Newton wrote to Halifax on Septem ber 23: "the only practicable as 
well as equ itab le  a lte rn a tiv e  to m ain tenance  of o rder by 
Czechoslovak Government would be an  in ternational force...If i t  
were undertaken  by G reat B rita in  alone or by an  Anglo-French 
force, Czechs m ight be very glad of such a guaran tee  of fa ir 
treatment"[94].
On Septem ber 25 Hadow p u t forward his own p lan  of 
supervision of transfer by the B ritish Legion. He wrote to Halifax 
th a t the  Legion had now offered to supply about 10,000 men and 
suggested tha t, w ith C abinet approval, the G erm an Governm ent 
be asked to provide th e  facilities for th e ir ra il journey  across 
Germany. The question of a plebiscite for the Sudeten areas had  
been generally  accepted a t  th is  tim e and Hadow w ent on to 
suggest th a t, on the en try  of the Germ an forces, a q uarte r of the 
volunteer force would rem ain in  the districts until the  holding of 
the  plebiscite "if th is be thought necessary in  order to reassure  
B ritish  public opinion th a t th is protection was being afforded to 
the  dissident-m inority against acts of revenge on the  p a rt of the 
SUDETEN during the first days of the letters' return". The m ain 
object of the  w ithdraw al, according to Hadow, was to provide a 
m eans of Czech w ithdraw al and  G erm an advance "w ithout 
collision and acceptable to both Governments".
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Hadow w ent on to state  th a t  the idea of accomplishing an 
Anglo-German understanding  through the ex-servicemen of both 
countries was one of H itler’s m ain them es, and fu rth er proposed 
th a t the heads of the British Legion be sent a t once to p u t forward 
the plan to H itler personally with only the authority  of the B ritish  
Government m aking th is possible. If  the plan were then  rejected, 
the B ritish Government would not be involved. Such an  "unarm ed 
peace army" as Hadow was suggesting would, he believed, make 
an  in s tan t appeal to the im agination of the B ritish  public and 
"satisfy  PA CIFIST OPINION IN  GREAT BRITAIN of th e  
’r i g h t n e s s '  o f  t h i s  m o v e " [9 5 ] .
According to H adow 's own notes, a fte r  w ritin g  th is  
proposal he gave i t  to H alifax who prom ised to a sce rta in  
Cham berlain 's views on the m atte r and let Hadow know as soon 
as possible w hether the  B ritish Legion m ight go ahead w ith the 
Prim e M inister's approval. A few hours la te r  Hadow received 
th is  message from Halifax: "The Prim e M inister is quite willing 
th a t Mr. Hadow should tell the head of the B ritish Legion th a t the 
approach of w hich Mr. Hadow spoke to Lord H alifax  th is  
morning, m ight be made a t once to H itler and the  Prim e M inister 
would welcome it  i f  H itle r was also willing to accept it"[96]. 
Hadow th en  visited S ir F. M aurice the P residen t of the  B ritish  
Legion who arranged  to fly to B erlin th a t  evening along w ith 
Hadow and a Colonel M urray. Hadow had also contacted Theo
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K ordt, C harge  d 'A ffaires of th e  G erm an E m b assy  who 
telegraphed Berlin to request the interview.
All th is occurred ju s t after Cham berlain's second m eeting 
with H itler on Septem ber 22 a t Godesberg. Cham berlain had told 
H itler th a t P rague had  been persuaded to accept cession of the 
Sudeten territo ry , b u t H itle r answered th a t  th is  p lan  was no 
longer acceptable. The G erm an leader now p u t forw ard the  
claims of H ungary and Poland for rectification of th e ir frontiers 
w ith  Czechoslovakia and  he fu rth er dem anded unconditional 
G erm an occupation of the Sudeten Germ an areas by October 1 
w ith any plebiscites being held afterwards. A w ritten  form ulation 
of H itler's demands was then  given to Cham berlain who returned  
to London and reported th is change to the Cabinet on Septem ber 
24. Cham berlain's acceptance of Hadow's plan was possibly p a rt 
of his now desperate search to find a means of p lacating H itler 
and avoiding a confrontation over Czechoslovakia.
When Maurice arrived in  Berlin he told Ribbentrop th a t he 
had  not come to suggest any a lteration to H itler's m em orandum  
b u t w ith a  proposal from the B ritish  Legion which he had  the 
authority  to present to H itler, and would not p resen t i t  to anyone 
else. Maurice then  m et w ith H itler and handed him  the proposal. 
"The Führer replied th a t he welcomed the proposals in  principle, 
bu t was determ ined th a t the whole of the organs of governm ent in  
the Sudeten area  up to the  line of dem arcation m ust be in  his
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hands by October 1st and said th a t there would not be tim e to give 
effect to the  Legion plan  in  the  area up to th is line by th a t  date". 
According to M aurice, H itle r sta ted  th a t  he welcomed the  
proposal th a t the B ritish  Legion should provide an adequate body 
of neu tra l observers in the areas proposed for a  plebiscite; "he did 
not propose to occupy the Plebiscite areas with m ilitary force until 
the  end of the  Plebiscite. He hoped th a t the  la t te r  would be 
satisfactorily concluded by the middle of November, so th a t we 
m ight all enjoy a peaceful Christmas!"[97].
H itler was, thus, undeterred by the B ritish  Legion plan  in 
his object of occupying the Sudeten areas by October. Hadow noted 
th is in  a le tte r to Halifax, b u t focussed on H itler's sta ting  th a t it 
was physically im possible for the  B ritish  Legion to get to the 
Sudeten a rea  up to the  by October 1st, noting th a t  th is  was, 
"unfortunately" the case. Hadow pointed out, however. H itler's 
"valuable assurance" th a t i f  the German troops reached the  line 
of dem arcation s tip u la ted  they  would not go beyond i t  b u t 
"welcomed w ith enthusiasm " the despatch and occupation of the 
plebiscite areas un til these were held. "He would, I believe, keep 
th is promise as he was enthusiastic, so Sir F. Maurice said, about 
the ex-service-men idea despite some very obvious attem pts on the 
p a rt of von Ribbentrop to stampede the whole idea beforehand "[98].
After M aurice's v isit to H itler a communication was sent 
from the G erm an Em bassy to the  Prim e M inister w hich was
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passed on to the Foreign Office. The message basically re itera ted  
w hat M aurice had already  sta ted ; th a t  H itler appreciated  the  
notion of the  B ritish  Legion b u t felt th e  proposal w as no t 
practicable in its p resent form. I t  was stated tha t, "in view of the 
situation  in  the  Sudetendeutsche  district" i t  was im possible to 
renounce the  occupation set out in  the Germ an m em orandum . 
The "evermore chaotic conditions" would not perm it any fu rther 
delay. "In order to show w hat these conditions are  it  suffices to 
m ention the  fact th a t  a t  the  p resen t tim e a lready  190,000 
Sudetendeutsch refugees have crossed over into the territory  of the 
Reich"[99].
These rem arks were in  line w ith a v iru lent speech H itler 
made on September 26 a t the Berlin Sports Palace. After attacking 
Benes personally H itler w ent on to claim th a t 214,000 G erm ans 
Kod{fed during the  p ast few days while up to 600,000
G erm ans had had  to leave th is  country during  the  previous 
years[100]. Bruegel comments, "No one dared ask  how i t  was 
possible th a t such a m ass em igration had rem ained completely 
unknown to the outside world until 26 September 1938"[101].
If H itler was undeterred in  his course, Hadow was also in  
his and on Septem ber 27 wrote up a fresh proposal incorporating 
his former one, th is tim e involving the King. Hadow's idea was 
th a t, as H itler had not rejected the B ritish  Legion p lan  for 
occupation bu t only sta ted  th a t  it  was physically impossible, the
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King should send a public m essage to H itle r ask ing  him, "in 
order to save Europe from the horrors of war", to transport 10,000 
m en from th e  B ritish  Legion across G erm an te r r i to ry  on 
Septem ber 29 as far as the  Czech frontiers and consent to the ir 
policing the en tire  a rea  envisaged by H itler. The force would 
occupy th is area until the term s for transfer of the  territories had 
been arranged and un til the plebiscite was held in  the  rem aining 
areas. Hadow felt th is m essage could only come from the King 
and, if  publicly sent, would so line up public opinion in  Germany - 
"which is now NOT for w ar since Mr. C ham berlain 's v isit and 
offers" - th a t  the  G erm an G overnm ent would accept. "The 
a lternative  is definitely WAR, as was clearly evident in  B erlin 
yesterday; [Hadow was referring to H itler's speech a t  the  Berlin 
Sports Palace] yet the Germ an nation has nothing b u t regret and 
a passionate desire for cooperation w ith B rita in  "[102]. Hadow 
sen t th is  m essage to Buckingham  Palace where i t  was left w ith  
S ir A, H ardinge, S ecretary  to the  King, who sen t back the  
unencouraging reply  th a t  such a suggestion m ust come from 
"experts" or approved by them . H ardinge telephoned Cadogan 
about the m atter who sent for Hadow as he "saw objections"(it is 
not clear from Hadow's papers w hat these were). The m atte r was 
then dropped[103].
The idea of the B ritish  Legion policing the Sudeten areas 
u n til th e  plebiscite w as held still was regarded  as feasible,
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however, and on the 28 Septem ber Sir Nevile Henderson sent the 
m essage from Berlin th a t i t  would be "clearly desirable" if  the 
B ritish  Legionaries could be ready for in s tan t departu re  should 
they be required for the Sudeten areas. F.K. Roberts of the Central 
D epartm ent m inuted, "Arrangem ents are  being m ade as rapidly 
as possible and an advance party  of th is kind would presum ably be 
available"[104].
Up u n til th is  da te  H itle r seem ed ben t on a policy of 
aggression, bu t on Septem ber 28 he received a m essage from 
Mussolini appealing to him  to postpone the Germ an mobilisation. 
News then  arrived in  Berlin of m obilisation of the B ritish  fleet. 
These two factors along w ith the disappointing response from the 
G erm an people to H itler's decision to occupy the Sudetenland  
worked enough influence on H itle r for him  to agree to a final 
m eeting in  Munich w ith C ham berlain, Daladier, and Mussolini. 
Russia and Czechoslovakia were excluded from this meeting.
A t M unich i t  w as ag reed  th a t  th e  occupation  of 
Czechoslovakia would be sp read  over a period of ten  days 
beginning on October 1, an  in ternational commission was to be 
formed to arrange the carrying out of the transfer, all plebiscite 
projects and  special a reas were dropped, a tim e lim it for the 
se ttlem ent of Polish and H ungarian  claims was set, and B ritain  
an d  F re n ch  g u a ra n te e s  a g a in s t  agg ression  w ere m ade 
im m ediately. The la tte r  were to be followed by G erm an and
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Ita lian  guarantees once the  Polish and H ungarian questions were 
settled. The Czechoslovak Government was then  informed of the 
agreem ent and was given little choice bu t to capitulate[105].
W hen C ham berlain re tu rned  to London on Septem ber 30, 
Oliver H arvey reported "vast crowds in  the  streets - hysterical 
cheers and enthusiasm . P.M. on balcony a t Buckingham  Palace. 
B u t m any feel i t  to be a  g rea t h u m ilia tio n 'll06]. Hadow was 
probably among those hysterically cheering, bu t many, in  fact, did 
have growing doubts about the whole business during th is time. 
On Septem ber 24 Cadogan had  recorded in  his diary his reaction 
to Cham berlain's report to the Foreign Office after m eeting w ith 
the  Cabinet: "I was completely horrified - he was quite calmly for 
to ta l surrender. More horrified  still to find th a t  H itle r has 
evidently hypnotised him  up to a point"[107]. Sargent, while 
w atching the re tu rn  of C ham berlain  from the  Foreign Office 
commented, "For all the fun and cheers you m ight th ink th a t they 
were celebrating a major victory over an  enemy instead  of merely 
a  betrayal of a minor ally"[108].
A few voices were also being raised as well in  Parliam ent. 
On September 28 ju s t after Cham berlain spoke of his negotiations 
vdth H itler so far and received the m essage th a t  H itler would 
m eet with him in Munich the next morning, the GimmuOj&l M.P, Mr. 
G allacher spoke: "No one desires peace more th an  I and my 
party, bu t i t  m ust be a peace based upon freedom and democracy
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and not upon the cutting up and destruction of a  sm all state. I 
w ant to say th a t the policy of the National Government hassled to 
th is crisis [HON. MEMBERS: "No!"] Yes, and if  there is peace a t 
the m oment i t  is the  determ ined a ttitude  of the people th a t has 
saved it. W hat ever the outcome the National Government will 
have to answ er for its policy. I would not be a  party  to w hat has 
been going on here...I p ro tes t again st the  dism em berm ent of 
Czechoslovakia"[l 09].
One of the  m ost tre n c h a n t critics in  th e  C ab inet of 
C ham berlain 's conciliatory policy a t  th is tim e was Alfred D uff 
Cooper, F irs t Lord of the Admiralty. Duff Cooper sta ted  th a t no 
fa ith  could be placed in  any of H itler's promises and continually 
urged for general mobilisation. After M unich he resigned. Duff 
Cooper was also critical of Hadow's p lan for the  transfer of the 
Sudeten  areas. On Septem ber 29 he wrote to Halifax th a t he 
personally felt i t  would be unwise to use the  B ritish Legion for 
tem porary occupation of the ceded territories, pointing out th a t the 
analogous body in  Germany was probably drilled, disciplined, and 
well organised. "As you know however our B ritish  Legion is 
simply a collection of middle aged and elderly men who have been 
a t  some tim e in  one of the  Services and  who m eet together 
occasionally w ith the  laudable purpose of w earing th e ir m edals 
and  drink ing  beer. They differ in  hard ly  any respect from a 
collection of Conservative working m en's clubs". Duff Cooper felt
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the resu lt of sending a collection of these m en to the Sudetenland 
would be ludicrous and possibly disastrous[110], Halifax replied 
th a t  he was him self fully conscious of these difficulties and the 
Foreign Office was in  the process of sending a telegram  to the 
M unich delegation suggesting i t  would be b e tte r  to use the 
B elgians and  D utch "who, m arvellous to re la te , seem  quite 
gmxious for the job"[lll].
W hile the  idea of th e  B ritish  Legion was still un d e r 
consideration, Hadow, apparently, was, a t one point, suggested 
(possibly by himself) as tak ing  a  direct role in  the policing of the 
tran sfe r. Halifax again, however, a lready  had  his doubts as 
indicated by a le tter w ritten to him  a t the time by the Chairm an of 
the B ritish  Legion Major Fetherston Godley. "I quite understand  
about Mr. Hadow*, wrote the Chairm an, "and in  view of w hat you 
say would not th ink  of pressing the request for his services, and I 
am  sure th a t  w ith the very fine class of Liaison Officer which we 
are  obtaining, we shall have adequate personnel to deal w ith any 
m atters arising" [112].
The B ritish  Legion was, of course, never used and the  
plebiscite never carried out. An in te rnational commission was 
form ed b u t was so h a rassed  by H itle r  th a t  the  new line of 
dem arcation agreed upon a t M unich w as practically the  same as 
th a t  dem anded a t Godesberg. W hile a t  M unich, C ham berlain 
had  acquired H itler's signature to a  declaration th a t B ritain  and
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Germ any would never go to w ar with each other - an  agreem ent 
which turned  out to be meaningless.
At the  beginning of October Henderson sen t a message to 
the Foreign Office on the establishm ent of the  Sudeten Germ an 
areas, and  V ansitta rt voiced his disgust over the  whole business. 
"In my opinion", he wrote, "the proceedings of the  In ternational 
Commission have been scandalous. S ir N. Henderson's principle 
is alw ays to give the  G erm ans every th ing ...he  has sim ply 
reproduced Godesberg, after we had flattered  ourselves publicly 
on hav ing  got aw ay from i t  - a source of g rea t po ten tia l 
em barrassm ent to us though not to him. And over three quarter 
of a m illion Czechs are now apparently  to be under Germ an rule. 
I t  is a  shame"[113]. W einberg w rites th a t in the  im m ediate 
period  a f te r  M unich th e  h u m ilia tin g  c ircu m stan ces for 
Czechoslovakia and  the sham e and reg re t among the W estern 
Powers led the la tte r  to "resent and tu rn  away from those they had 
trea ted  ra th e r  shabbily - a not uncommon reaction - and to refuse 
to m ake any real effort to assist Czechoslovakia in  its  desperate 
a ttem pt under new leaders and new policies to work out a new life 
for its  people w ithin  the new boundaries"[114]. The subject of 
C z e c h o s lo v a k ia  c e r ta in ly  d is a p p e a r s  from  H ad o w ’s 
correspondence after September 1938 as if  already forgotten, while 
he began to tu rn  his attention to other methods of appeasem ent.
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After Munich
The a fte rm ath  of M unich represen ted  a tim e of divided 
opinion in  Britain. While a sense of relief was felt by some, m any 
began to feel uncomfortable with the direction of events in  relation 
to the direction of B ritish  foreign policy. This mood of uneasiness 
m ade itse lf  felt in  the  Foreign Office and C abinet w ith, for 
exam ple, the  resignation  of D uff Cooper, and  th e  m isgivings 
expressed by Oliver Harvey: "The P.M. is in fatuated  w ith H itler 
and believes he can tru s t him"[115]. Voices raised in  opposition to 
the  policy of appeasem ent were becom ing louder and more 
num erous.
To Hadow, however, Munich was a  sign th a t H itler could be 
reasoned  w ith  and  peaceful ag reem ent w ith  G erm any was 
p o ss ib le . H e w as p a r t ic u la r ly  im p re s s e d  w ith  th e  
H itler-C ham berlain declaration made a t Munich, and in  October 
1938 w rote th a t  th rough  th e  M unich A greem ent and  th e  
declaration, "personal contact" and  "m utual respect" had  been 
established between Cham berlain and  H itler. The declaration, to 
H adow , w as "none o th er th a n  public  recogn ition  of th e  
will-to-peace and hatred  of w ar between these two g reat nations". 
Encirclem ent of Germany was, he continued, "a th ing of the past" 
and  th is  change would re su lt in  a g rad u a l lessen ing  of
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claustrophobia on the p art of Germany[116]. Cham berlain's policy 
of appeasem ent, however, was now being increasingly subject to 
criticism  as the events of 1938 to 1939 and the  a ttitudes of the 
dictators made i t  appear inadequate and eventually m istaken. To 
H itle r, M unich was a flaw ed tr iu m p h  and  h is subsequen t 
expressions of dissatisfaction and  reg re t over abandoning his 
original in ten tions reveal an  a ttitude  which helped to shape his 
policies after September 1938.
The more objections to th is policy were raised, nonetheless, 
the more i t  seemed to become an  obsession to those such as Hadow 
who still advocated it. To the policy-makers in  Britain, despite any 
misgivings over the  m orality of Munich, the view generally held 
ju s t a fter th is event was tha t, w ar having been avoided when it  
appeared  inevitable, i t  m ust be possible to arrive a t peaceful 
solutions to o ther problems. Thus, overtures to B erlin  were 
redoubled, th e  Anglo-Germ an dec lara tion  a t  M unich being  
regarded as an encouraging sign. Hadow him self now tu rned  his 
a tten tio n  to B ritish  influence in  the  M editerranean , having 
dism issed G erm an expansion to th e  E a s t as inevitab le  and 
incontrovertible. In  October he wrote th a t  the  front line of 
defences against the Germ an advance into the Danube Basin was 
pierced when Germany took over Austria, and B ritain  and France 
m ade a  serious m istake in  "bolstering an  outflanked bastion, 
Czechoslovakia" long after i t  was apparen t th a t Germ any could
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advance as far as the Black Sea whenever she saw fit. To a ttem pt 
to h a lt  th is advance was, to Hadow, impossible and would only 
serve to "irritate" Germany; nor, Hadow believed, was this type of 
resistance necessary to British vital interests[117].
Hadow was reflecting the  line taken  in  B ritish  policy after 
M unich, and  C adogan w rote s im ila rly  in  a review  of the  
European situation, believing th a t B ritain  should cut her losses in 
C e n tra l an d  E a s te rn  E urope a n d  le t  G erm any  find h e r 
lebensraum  and establish herself as a  powerful economic unit. 
"We should do everything we can", Cadogan wrote,"to m ain tain  
the best relations with, and give assistance as m ay be possible to, 
Turkey and Greece. I t follows, of course th a t we should spare no 
reasonable effort to resum e our form er friendly rela tions w ith 
Italy". H ungary, Yugoslavia, and Roumania, Cadogan felt, were 
bound to fall in  w ith  an  economic plan w ith Germany, b u t he did 
not see an  economically strong Germany as such a  bad thing[118].
Hadow's views corresponded w ith those of Cadogan, bu t 
Hadow also felt th a t  Yugoslavia as well as Turkey and Greece
V
could be b rough t in to  w hat he  term ed  th e  B ritish  "zone of 
influence". This "zone of influence" policy was one which he felt 
would have to replace the League ideal: "the tim e has come when 
self-protection requ ires abandonm ent of ideals in  favour of 
self-protection; and the M editerranean  is our life-line". Hadow 
wrote th a t  once G erm any was on the  M editerranean  "we m ay
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well despair of our future"; however, asserting  B ritish  influence 
in  th is area  could be done "in a sp irit of friendly rivalry...and by 
use of the weapons we have, of finance and c red its 'll 19].
Yugoslavia was, a t th is tim e leaning very m uch towards 
the  influence of Italy , and John  Balfour, who was head of the 
A m erican D epartm ent and for whom Hadow had  w ritten  his 
m em orandum , noted th a t Yugoslavia "will not play if  she is likely 
to be faced w ith  a  hostile Italy  as well as Germany". On the 
general idea of the M editerranean coming into the  B ritish  zone of 
influence, Balfour pointed out th a t  Ita ly  could also claim  th is 
area, and thought it unlikely or even impossible for th a t country to 
abandon the  Axis[120]. Hadow's and  Cadogan's analysis, thus, 
hinged on the a ttitude  of Italy  which Hadow personally believed 
was favourable. Balfour's objections, he felt could be countered by 
"the very obvious desire of Italy" to m ake friends w ith B rita in  
"before Germany swallows up Ita lian  trade in  the Danube basin". 
To Hadow, an  early settlem ent of an  Anglo-Italian agreem ent was 
of immense importance[121].
Hadow's focus on Italy  was a  fairly standard  reaction in  the 
B ritish  Government and Foreign Office after Munich. The more 
in transigen t Berlin appeared a t th is tim e, the  more eagerly the 
appeasers tu rned  to Rome. At the end of October Phipps wrote to 
Halifax, "Francois-Poncet feels th a t Mussolini is now, so to speak, 
the  key to H itler, who is very subject to th e  influence of the
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Duce"[122], In November B rita in  surrendered to Ita lian  dem ands 
"iW kyecwiit of April 1938 be ratified and on November 16
the agreem ent was signed. To Mussolini, however, the  Axis was 
still fundam ental; for example, he not soon after decided to accept 
the  Germ an proposals for tu rn ing  the Anti-Comintem  Pact into a 
m ilitary alliance[123].
Later, in January  1939, Cham berlain and Halifax m et w ith 
M ussolini in  Italy. The purpose of the m eeting was to come to 
some sort of understanding  regarding a dem onstration m ade in  
the  Ita lian  P arliam ent in  November 1938 raising  a call for the 
F ren ch  possessions of T u n is ia , Corsica, Nice and  Savoy. 
Mussolini hoped by the m eeting to persuade Cham berlain to pu t 
pressure on France to relinquish her hold on these territories, b u t 
the tactic failed.
Hadow, characteristically , had  p u t forward a  p lan  which 
he a ttem pted  to get to C ham berlain  before the m eeting in the  
hopes th a t it could be presented to Mussolini. The plan was for a 
Four-Power consortium  in  the  F a r E ast (the four powers being 
B rita in , F rance, G erm any, and  Italy) and Hadow sen t i t  to 
Hutchison requesting i t  be passed on to the Prime M inister. "This 
I do because I was lucky enough to get endorsem ent from a 
highly-placed Italian as to M ussolini's attitude and both his hopes 
and  h is fears about th e  Rome c o n v e rsa tio n s 'l l24]. The 
Consortium  proposed was to ru n  on economic lines in  which
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Germ any and Italy  would be given the righ t to take paym ent for 
th e ir  exports both  in  Chinese exports and in  Colonial raw  
m aterials. Hadow's plan was still based on the idea th a t once the 
d ictators were sa tia ted  they  would se ttle  down - despite the 
growing evidence th a t they were not likely to ever be satiated . 
"Recent events", he w rote, "have g rea tly  s tren g th en ed  the  
chances of successful promotion of th is  p lan  and have also - by 
showing clearly how great is the danger facing B ritain  in  the F ar 
E ast - m ade its  early consideration advisable".
Hadow believed th a t Mussolini would be amenable to the 
idea because he was in dire need of a "trium ph". The Ita lian  
economic situation  was not happy and "from an  unim peachable 
source i t  has been lea rn t in  the  p ast week th a t, failing a quick 
success in  SPAIN..., he [Mussolini] m ust have successes in  some 
o ther sphere to allay  I ta lian  fears and no sm all m easure of 
grum bling". I f  M ussolini failed to come to some so rt of 
advantageous agreem ent w ith B rita in  Hadow wrote th a t th is  
leader could be tem pted to listen  to Ribbentrop and Goebbels 
"when and if  the  la tte r  can persuade HITLER to risk  all in  a war 
for WORLD POWER; to which both Mussolini and H itler are still, 
on the above excellent authority, in  principle averse"[125]. (There 
a p p ea rs  to be no evidence th a t  H adow 's p lan  reached  
Cham berlain or th a t i t  was presented to Mussolini).
The meeting, as i t  turned out, was a charade sim ilar to the
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d ec la ra tio n  m ade a t  M unich. W hile C ham berla in  w rote 
afterw ards th a t  he was satisfied th a t the chances of peace had  
definitely been streng thened[l 26], Ciano wrote, "Nothing was 
accomplished. I have telephoned von Ribbentrop th a t the visit was 
a fiasco 'll 27].
The focus on Italy  followed by the B ritish Government and 
tak e n  up by Hadow w as p a rtly  th e  outcome of a growing 
uneasiness over th e  behaviour of G erm any a fte r  M unich; a 
feeling  w hich, am ong th e  B ritish  public, began  to grow 
censorious. The con tinu ing  B ritish  advances to G erm any 
suffered a  severe setback, for example, in November 1938 when a 
G erm an Jew  Herschel G rynszpan shot and m ortally wounded a 
T hird  Secretary  in  the  G erm any Em bassy in  P a ris  E rn s t von 
R ath . The G erm an press im m ediately  laid  responsibility  on 
underg round  ac tiv ities  of Jew ish  propaganda, and  accused 
B ritish  politicians as the instigators of the crime. On November 
10 Goebbels organised a general h a ra ssm en t of Jew s which 
included looting and arson of synagogues, homes, and businesses 
in  the  Reich, and new m easures were declared to elim inate Jews 
from the economic life of Germ any and Austria. The worldwide 
press reaction  was one of shock and  horror, p a rticu la rly  in  
B rita in  and  the  U nited S tates. H itler’s speeches had  meanwhile 
become increasing ly  m ore bellicose since M unich, especially 
regarding Britain. This trend  was intentional as H itler needed to
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get the  G erm an public behind his regime in  any future war, and 
on October 8 he delivered a  vehem ently an ti-B ritish  speech a t 
Saarbrucken which set the them e for the  continuing anti-B ritish 
tone in  the Germ an press and other speeches.
The effect of Germany's behaviour generally on B ritain  was 
a  definite rise in  scepticism about the possibility of peace. Hadow, 
however, wrote a lengthy m em orandum  a t  the end of November 
which gave an  explanation of Germ any’s actions which bordered 
on justification . He wrote th a t  the  decision to im plem ent the 
A nglo-Italian agreem ent, the  v isits betw een London and Paris 
"without promise of corresponding 'gestures' between B ritain  and 
Germany", the recent Anglo-American Trade Agreem ent "which 
an  unwisely jub ilan t American Press has characterised not only 
as a blow to Germ an exports b u t also as Democracy's answ er to 
G erm any's tre a tm e n t of the  Jew s", had  all contributed to a 
re tu rn in g  sense of isolation among the  G erm an people and a  
belief am ong them  th a t Munich was only a  mirage. "With their 
ingrained  inferiority-com plex and  exaggerated fear of loss of 
prestige, the  leaders of Germany have characteristically  tu rned  
for comfort to increased ru th lessness and  abuse; and even the  
more m oderate may, if  the m eans cannot soon be found of turning 
the ir m inds back to cooperation and appeasem ent, be tem pted to 
listen  to the extrem ists who are prom ising W orld-domination if  
they will bu t risk  unsheath ing  the sword before the Democracies
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are ready"[128].
Although Hadow still defended Germany, h is ideas on the 
M editerranean m ay well have been a  response to the  increasing 
calls for a  firm  stance against the Nazis. To Hadow, overtures to 
Ita ly  would be a m eans of "trum ping the G erm an ace"[129], his 
a ttitu d e  being th a t  G erm any should only be challenged in  an  
economic sense and  through the appeasem ent of Italy  as both 
countries could still be reasoned with. Consequently, in  February 
he denounced recent tales "of im agination and mystery" used as 
an  a ttem pt to work up a "war scare" in  B rita in  and the  U nited 
S tates - tales which he stated were based on slender evidence. The 
BBC, Hadow claim ed, was being used to "sting G erm any and 
reaw aken  suspicion of our designs for the  overthrow  of the  
G erm an G overnm ent by sowing d issa tisfac tion  among th e ir  
people". This view was apparently shared by Nevile Henderson as 
well as "other repu tab le  persons". Hadow urged  th a t  these 
"m ischief m akers" be stopped, and  th a t  B rita in  tak e  heed of 
H itler's recent broad h in t for a possible economic solution to the 
world's problems[130].
The "economic solution" was m eanwhile being explored in  
the  Foreign Office and  Government. Ashton-^Gwatkin h ad  had  
exploratory ta lk s  w ith  the G erm ans in  B erlin  in  February  and 
w ritte n  th a t  G oering w anted  economic cooperation to begin 
im m ediately, and  th is would lead to "political agreem ents"[131].
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A rrangem ent were made for trade negotiations a t  Düsseldorf. At 
the beginning of M arch Hadow again urged th a t  efforts towards 
an economic settlem ent through Goering be increased[132].
H adow 's recom m endation of approaches to G oering is 
another example of h is increasingly irra tional view of Germ any 
during the climax of appeasem ent. From November 1938 he had  
begun urging inform al approaches to Goering w ith plans such as 
his own for a  four-power consortium, which he felt would act as a 
co u n te r-a ttrac tio n  to  R ibbentrop 's "wild schem ing". Such 
approaches would, Hadow believed, have the psychological effect 
of "bringing G erm any out of the cold", and, by tak ing  th is step, 
Cham berlain "would once more have set Europe on the  road to 
appeasem ent, whose beginning was M unich and  whose early  
continuation is v ital to the  peace of Europe"[133].
Hadow 's tu n n e l vision seems to have become worse in  
F eb ruary  1939 w hen he passed  on to th e  Foreign Office a 
summary of a report on a  visit to Germany by Major Joubert of the 
South African S taff Corps. Ironically, th is repo rt gave a clear 
indication of the  character of the Reich and the  practical method 
of dealing w ith H itler, sta ting  th a t German foreign policy was one 
of "prim itive leaders w ith  prim itive ideas and  using  prim itive 
m ethods", and  relied  on force which they  were in  danger of 
m isapplying: "W ar could be averted  if  G reat B rita in  s ta ted  
definitely th a t  she was strong enough and would not hesita te  to
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figh t‘’[134].
Hadow, however, wrote th a t  the  principal in te res t of the  
report lay in  the views on the a ttitude  of the arm y towards the ir 
leader. He adm itted th a t all signs pointed tow ard H itler being 
able to count on the loyalty of the  m ilitary  a t  the  outset of w ar 
despite th e ir own private doubts, b u t felt th is was all the  more 
reason to conciliate Germany economically to de tract H itler from 
"the w hisperings of gam blers such as R ibbentrop or Goebbels" 
who would have th e ir leader risk  all in  a sw ift decisive war. 
Hadow did not refer a t all to the  report's recom m endation th a t 
B ritain  take a firm stance against Germany[135].
Hadow 's assessm en t of G erm any's leadersh ip  was one 
shared  by the  ever-decreasing num ber of those still clinging to 
appeasem ent. V a n s itta r t  h ad  already  w arned  ag a in st such 
illusions in  December 1938 when he circulated a  memorandum in  
the  Foreign Office communicated to him  by a G erm an expert Mr. 
Rennie Smith. Sm ith stated  th a t the "conservative" opponents of 
H itle r actually  desired an  im perialism  of a  slower and more 
prudent sort, bu t their opposition could only have been serious had 
H itle r no t scored his successive trium phs over the  W estern 
Powers: "as a ru le  people do n o t revo lt a g a in s t victorious 
G overnm ents. U nless H itle r suffers a resounding m ilitary  or 
diplomatic defeat there  can hardly  be any effective opposition to 
him  in  Germany...The German people m ust be taken  as i t  is - as a
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whole people subject to a  purposeful m ilitary  Government, and 
compelled by th is Government to en ter upon the greatest political 
experim ent i t  has ever undertaken  in  the  thousand years of its  
history"[136]. This m em orandum  was circulated to Hadow, bu t 
he was oblivious to its  warnings, and  m erely p u t a pencil m ark  
next to a sentence which sta ted  th a t neither Germany, Italy, nor 
Ja p a n  desired a world w ar or even a w ar w ith  the  W estern  
Powers or the United States.
In  th e  w inter m onths betw een M unich and the  G erm an 
occupation of Prague, Hadow clung to the  illusion which, for 
m any, would be broken in  M arch 1939. Germ an recalcitrance was 
a defensive reaction against isolation from the W estern Powers, 
su rrendering  of E aste rn  Europe and economic arrangem ents in 
th e  M ed ite rranean  w ere called for, while I ta ly  was to be 
approached as a counter-balance to and restra in ing  influence on 
Germany. While a t first tak ing  a  confident a ttitude  in  in itiating  
plans which were apparently  advantageous to all parties, in  the 
late  1930s Hadow had become seemingly insecure in his adaption 
or acquiescence to each plan or event advantageous only to the 
dictators.
War's Shadow
An exam ination of Hadow's despatches from 1938-1939
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leaves the  d istinct im pression of a  m an increasingly panicking 
w ith  the  build-up of enormous tension in  Europe. While his fear 
of w ar in  1938 m ade him  urge compliance w ith  or accept as 
legitim ate every German move, he m aintained th is course even in 
the late  sum m er months of 1939. Hadow's error of judgm ent had 
been compounded by the tense atm osphere of the late 1930s which 
clouded his vision and heightened h is emotions. There is less 
evidence, during Hadow's posting in  London, of his lengthy and 
vigorous exam ination of background to each situation previously 
characteristic  of his reports and argum ents. Much more evident 
is a  tendency to jum p to conclusions or grasp a t  straw s while 
directing the m ajority of his energy to influencing the decisions of 
C ham berlain . As suggested earlie r, h is behaviour depended 
in c r e a s in g ly  on th e  a c t io n s  of H i t le r .
As illu stra ted  in  his despatches in  V ienna and  Prague, 
Hadow 's increased  prejudice regard ing  com m unism  and the  
Soviet Union constituted a m ajor blind spot to his vision of events 
in  C entra l Europe in  the 1930s. This factor, in  respect of the 
appeasers in general, became more crucial to the  policy carried 
out by B rita in  in  1938 and 1939. In  the face of the  growing 
G erm an th rea t, a collective stance involving R ussia would have 
checked H itler and possibly weakened his position in ternally  as 
well as externally. Churchill recognised this, as did the Soviet 
Foreign M in ister Maxim Litvinov, both  m aking appeals for
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A nglo-R ussian cooperation. C ham berla in , how ever, w as as 
averse to such action as Hadow and the res t of the appeasers, and 
m ade th is clear from the s ta r t in  purposely om itting Russia from 
a  sta tem ent he made in  February 1938: "the peace of Europe m ust 
depend on the  a ttitu d e  of the  Four Major Powers of Europe: 
G e rm a n y , I ta ly , F ra n c e , a n d  o u rse lv es" [1 3 7 ].
Hadow’s ostensible reasons for dismissing the  Soviet Union 
as an  ally  hinged on doubts regarding  the effectiveness of the  
Soviet arm y, particularly  after the recent purges. W hen Litvinov 
m ade his appeal to the  W est in  M arch 1938 (which B rita in  
rejected), Hadow commented th a t Soviet Russia was "quite unfit to 
su sta in  an  offensive against any first-class power", and doubted 
w hether she would even dare mobilise her arm y "for fear of an  
in te rn a l revolution led by the  la tte r  against the  S talin  factor, 
which has tried to destroy the officer-caste"[138].
In  a report on possible opposition to Germany in  case of an 
a ttack  on Czechoslovakia, he wrote th a t, in  regard  to Soviet 
a ircraft, Russia's bombers had been reported to be obsolete and, 
th u s , he r possible help to Czechoslovakia was au tom atically  
discounted. Hadow also wrote th a t  the  R ussian arm y was now 
unfit, for lack of leadership , to wage an  offensive w ar and, 
furtherm ore, "the optimism of the  French M ilitary A ttache as 
regards Russian help for Czechoslovakia should France decide to 
go to th e  le t te r 's  a id  w as sh a red  by no o th e r m ilita ry
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observer... "[139].
Hadow was consistently seeing half, if  not a quarter, of the 
picture, and his g rea test m istakes were usually  exposed in  his 
recom mendations on B ritish  action - w hat th a t  country should or 
should no t do and w hat was w orth  preserving or defending. 
According to Hadow, friendly relations with Germany were worth 
preserving; Czechoslovakia was not w orth defending. Hadow was 
quick to ignore or by-pass the  rea l significance of events such as 
th e  A ustrian  A nsch luss, th e  G erm an reaction  to B rita in 's  
response to the May Crisis, and the behaviour of Germany during 
and after Munich.
The Germ an occupation of Prague in  M arch should have 
given Hadow the clearest sign of G erm an in tentions. On the  
p re tex t of establishing order betw een the  Czechs and Slovaks, 
H itler had  marched into Prague on M arch 11, meanwhile forcing 
th e  new  P re sid en t H acha to sign  an  ag reem en t p u ttin g  
Czechoslovakia under G erm an protection. The occupation took 
London by surprise, b u t the  B ritish  Governm ent, even a t  th is  
point, took its  familiar line of tac it acceptance. The B ritish public, 
however, was not so complacent, and pressure began to increase 
on th e  G overnm ent to com m it itse lf  openly. On M arch 28 
Churchill, Eden, and 32 others tabled a motion in the  House of 
Commons calling for the  fo rm ation  of a genuine N ational 
G overnm ent w ith full em ergency powers. The w idespread
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d isqu ie t which th is  m otion rep resen ted  was no t calm ed by 
C ham berlain 's assurance th a t  he was p lanning  moves which 
w ent further than  negotiation^ 40].
The moves th a t  C ham berlain m entioned were guaran tees 
to Poland, Roum ania, and  Greece. A lthough the  display of 
G erm an in ten tions m ade C hurchill's idea for a G rand Alliance 
w ith Russia all the more desirable, Poland was still considered by 
the  B ritish  Government as the  key to European policy; there  was 
no point in  seeking Soviet assistance if  Poland and Roum ania 
were alienated by it. The motive of the  appeasers, as reflected in  
Hadow, still appeared, even a t th is stage, to be peace a t all costs, 
and the aim of a peace front involving Poland and Roum ania was 
not to prepare for m ilitary  action b u t to lu re  G erm any to the 
conference table.
Hadow h im self had  no t been happy over th e  B ritish  
guaran tee  to Poland and wrote a lengthy critique of i t  in  April. 
The ground and method chosen for w hat he described as B ritain 's 
new "momentous stand" after P rague suffered from two inheren t 
w eaknesses. The first was, as th e  Foreign Office had already 
convinced itself, th a t Poland was unlikely to accept any alliance or 
guarantee  based on R ussian participation: "The ru lers of Poland 
know full well that, in  the p resen t s ta te  of the Polish masses, the 
a rriv a l in  Poland of Soviet troops would be th e  signal for 
C om m unist ou tb reaks w hich would destroy  th e ir  personal
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properties if  not their own lives". The second weakness was tha t, 
ap a rt from Russia, no m ilitary  help of any decisive value could 
reach Poland in  case of Germ an attack.
Hadow was equally critical of the guarantee to Roum ania to 
which he wrote his argum ents could be applied w ith even g rea ter 
force: "why should Roum ania's oligarchical ru lers be expected to 
choose self-im molation, by inv iting  R ussian arm ies in to  th e ir  
territories, ra th e r th an  vassalage, however uncomfortable, under 
the  protecting-shield of Germany? ". Hadow continued, "Nor has 
B rita in  seemingly been able to extract from [the Polish Foreign 
M inister] M. Beck even a conditional promise to go to the  aid of 
Roum ania to whom even a  B ritish  or Franco-B ritish guaran tee  
would be inconvenient if, by tu rn ing  the German attack  down the 
D anube, he could win a resp ite  for Poland To Hadow, any 
Anglo-French attem pt to guarantee Roumania was likely to fail in  
the  objective of encouraging other E astern  European countries to 
res is t Germ an aggression, and was more likely to precipitate  a 
Germ an descent on Roumania caused by the desire to forestall the 
W estern powers in  "their Soviet-aided 'encirclement'"[141].
Chamberlain's view of the situation was, in  fact, not all th a t 
different from Hadow's b u t he probably promoted the guarantee to 
Poland because he felt i t  would act more as an  incentive to 
improved German-Polish relations th an  as a guaran tee  for war. 
W hen the guarantee was announced and Beck visited London in
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April 1939, the full extent of the deadlock between G erm any and 
Poland over Danzig was not revealed; thus, those such as Hadow 
perceived Poland as leaning more tow ards G erm any th a n  the 
Soviet Union.
The B ritish Government had meanwhile been halfheartedly 
p u rsu in g  n eg o tia tio n s w ith  th e  Soviet U nion, b u t  w h a t 
C ham berlain failed to realise was th a t, in  guaran teeing  Poland 
and Roumania, association w ith the Soviet Union - who was now 
growing disillusioned by British rebuffs and vacillation - would be 
difficult except on th a t country’s term s. The new situation  made 
a Soviet understanding more attractive to Germany as Stalin  was 
now protected by a  belt of guaran teed  territory . W hen B rita in  
tu rn e d  down a  conference w ith  R ussia  an d  u n ila te ra lly  
guaranteed  Poland and Roum ania, Fitzroy M aclean, a  Secretary 
in  the  B ritish  Em bassy in  Moscow, confided h is "despair" to 
Charles Bohlen of the  American Embassy: "He felt, and it  seemed 
obvious, th a t  th e  B ritish  governm ent had  given aw ay all its  
bargaining chips"[142].
Hadow, i t  appears, was not in  favour of any commitment in 
the East, particularly one involving Russia. At the same time th a t 
he was denouncing the guarantees to Poland and Roum ania, he 
w arned of a "sinister" side to Soviet activity in  the  Baltic, and 
w rote th a t  "entirely  neu tra l"  friends of h is "are regretfu lly  
unanim ous in  believing th a t w ar's shadow is ominously n ear if
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we sign w hatever Moscow asks of us"[143]. Hadow had  earlie r 
warned of Soviet activity in  the Baltic, stating  th a t Russia clearly 
sought to establish a  "virtual protectorate" over the  Baltic S tates, 
and  th a t Anglo-Soviet negotiations had  pushed these sta tes into 
"re-insurance" agreem ents w ith Germany. To Hadow the m oral 
issue was clear: "Is th is  country, under the guise of protecting 
sm all countries from G erm an encroachm ent, to be p a rty  to a  
bare-faced R ussian veto upon the  liberty-of-action of the  Baltic 
States?". I f  th is were the case, he wrote, B ritain  m ust be prepared 
to see all Baltic sta tes prefer Germ an protection in  case of w ar to 
Soviet invasion[144].
T hroughout th e  sum m er of 1939 Hadow ca rried  on 
expressing h is disapproval. "A form ula is in sis ted  upon", he 
wrote, "which would give Russia to interfere unasham edly in  the  
in te rn a l affairs of the  B altic countries and, by m aking some 
p re tex t for declaring w ar out of th is  r ig h t to check ’ind irect 
aggression' to involve us in  an  European war"[145]. Hadow was 
refe rrin g  to difficulty betw een B rita in  and R ussia  over the  
guaran teeing  of certain  sta tes including those such as F in land 
who did not wish to be included, and the use of the words "indirect 
aggression" in the agreem ent for the  justification of intervention. 
By th is  tim e the  Soviet Foreign M inister Litvinov had  been 
replaced by Molotov, and the  change has been suggested as 
rep re sen tin g  a change in  S ta lin 's  in ten tio n s reg a rd in g  the
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possible agreem ent w ith Britain. Litvinov, i t  is believed, sincerely 
desired a  firm  alliance w ith  B ritain ; Molotov, however, m ade 
more difficult dem ands during negotiations when he took over in  
May 1939, and it  is possible th a t S talin  was so doubtful of B ritain  
as an  ally a t this point th a t he was merely testing her to see if  she 
could offer him  anyth ing  more secure th an  he could achieve 
through an  agreem ent w ith Hitler.
The spreading rum ours of a  possible Nazi-Soviet pact were 
not taken  seriously by the  B ritish  Government or in  the  Foreign 
Office, one reason being th a t  those such as Hadow could not 
appreciate the Soviet nightm are of having to fight Germ any alone 
on her own soil instead of m eeting the attack  in  e ither Poland or 
the the Baltic states. This accounts for the insistence of inclusion 
of these sta tes in  the Anglo-Soviet agreem ent which Hadow saw 
as merely an  excuse for Soviet aggression. Both sides did, in  fact, 
w ant an  agreem ent b u t not the  same agreem ent and, in  the end, 
Hadow and others' determ ination to keep the Soviet Union out of 
Poland and the Baltic S ta tes outweighed the securing of R ussian 
aid against Germany.
In  his adam ant objection to any cooperation w ith the Soviet 
Union, Hadow dem onstrated the basic aversion to th a t  system of 
G overnm ent which caused him  to accuse the  Soviet Union 
ironically of intentions more applicable to Germany. In Ju ly  1939 
he wrote, "Every concession to the Soviet point of view has been
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followed by a  fresh and more serious demand "[146]; and in  urging 
his plans for the  M editerranean, he wrote th a t no expense should 
be spared in  preventing the Soviet Union establishing communist 
suprem acy over capitalism[147]. Even in 1939, the Soviet Union 
posed a greater th rea t to Europe, in  Hadow eyes, th an  Germany.
The announcem ent of the Nazi-Soviet P act on A ugust 21, 
1939 m ust have come as a severe shock to Hadow b u t no m ention 
of i t  is made in  his despatches. W hile B ritain , reeling from th is 
blow, quickly signed th e  A nglo-Polish T rea ty  of M u tua l 
Assistance, Hadow was still pushing for conciliation. On August 
31, 1939 he wrote in  a m em orandum  titled  "Germany and G reat 
B ritain: settlem ent": "There is now every sign th a t  Germ any will 
not fight, because he knows th a t  his people no longer believe he 
can win"[148]. At 4.45am  th e  nex t day the  G erm an attack  on 
Poland began. A m onth  la te r , Hadow w as tra n s fe rre d  to 
Argentina.
While Hadow's assum ptions about the B ritish  and Germ an 
public were sim plistic and usually  assum ed to be in  agreem ent 
w ith his own views, his real naivete in London is perhaps best 
dem onstrated  in  his perception of H itler: th a t  the  la tte r  was 
always looking to B ritain  for guidance, would be wholly amenable 
to friendly suggestions or ideas such as Hadow's own for the  
transference of the Sudetenland, and, even after concluding the 
Nazi-Soviet Pact, would still prefer the choice of peace through a
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settlem ent w ith B ritain . Hadow in terp reted  the im portance of 
economics to H itler wrongly especially as regards the ir overriding 
quicker methods of expansionism, and clung to the idea of H itler 
as more m oderate th an  his colleagues and ultim ately desirous of 
peace. In  the  sum m er of 1938, for example, he showed a lack of 
knowledge of Mein Kampf which m akes his study of th is  book 
suspect. Arguing th a t a fight w ith Germany was not inevitable 
even if  G erm an n a tio n a l u n ity  was allowed, H adow  w rote, 
'A ggressive aim s m ay be deduced from H itler's w ritings, b u t 
'Mein K am pf can equally be quoted as showing th a t  the G erm an 
aim  is national unity, and the  government of other races is to be 
avoided"[149].
All of these characteristics of Hadow in the  late  1930s were 
signs th a t his m ind was proceeding along a single track  w ithout 
deviation. Appeasem ent, to those who still supported i t  a t  th is 
tim e, had become a mission. U nder such circum stances, a  lack 
of unim paired judgm ent seem s inevitable. W hile rea l experts 
w ith  th e ir  u n p lea san t w arn ings were shun ted  aside, lesse r 
figures such as Hadow seemed be tte r able to m ake them selves 
heard. Hadow's adapting him self to each idea of Cham berlain 's 
as well as each move by Germ any in 1938-39 show the  extent to 
which events were running  away from him as they were from the 
B ritish  Government. Hadow represents a lack of control during 
th is period: as the tide of Germ an aggression came sweeping in,
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he found h im self floundering on the  rock of appeasem ent - a 
strategy w ithout a basis and increasingly w ithout substance. By 
the  tim e w ar broke out in  Septem ber 1939, Hadow's confusion over 
m atters seemed complete as he wrote of the "mad unanim ity  " of 





The character of appeasem ent is complex; but, although i t  
is more easily a ttached to particu lar views than  particu lar men, 
there  were certain  people who epitomised th is poHcy. Because 
Hadow represen ts m any, i f  not most, of the tra its  a ttached  to 
appeasem ent, a  tigh t comparison can be made betw een him  and 
two m en who fall into th is  category: Neville C ham berlain  and  
Ne vile Henderson. The comparison requires a closer study of all 
th e  facets of appeasem ent as i t  expressed itse lf  in  the  varying 
p erso n alitie s  of those responsib le  for its  fo rm ula tion  and 
execution, and fu rther illu s tra te s  the m otivating forces behind 
Hadow's support for appeasem ent.
The advent of C ham berlain to power and the  posting of 
Nevile H enderson to B erlin  had  issued in  a new dim ension to 
appeasem ent: i t  became an  "active pursuit", as opposed to the  
Baldwin e ra  of passive acceptance of Germ an actions. I f  Neville 
Cham berlain is thought to be the personification of appeasem ent, 
the  B ritish  Ambassador to Berlin Nevile Henderson runs a  close 
second. Both were largely instrum ental in  the vigorous formation 
and carrying out of th is  policy through the  sim ilarity  of th e ir  
view s an d  th e  im portance  of th e ir  positions. A lthough 
C ham berla in  had  n o t de libera te ly  a rran g ed  the  posting  of
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Henderson to G erm any to assure coordination of his policy, the 
B ritish  Prim e M inister did not fail to take advantage of the new 
am bassador’s en thusiasm  over coming to term s w ith  the  Nazis, 
and  H enderson 's efforts to by-pass the  m ore sceptical and  
slow-moving Foreign Office were tacitly  encouraged. Hadow's 
a rd o u r in  prom otion  of appeasem en t w as obviously less 
influential, especially after his transfer from Prague to London, 
b u t the sim ilarity  of his character and Outlook to C ham berlain 
and Henderson makes him  highly comparable to the two.
From  the  evidence of Hadow's actions he no t only felt 
justified  b u t also encouraged to a certain  degree to voice his 
opinions to H enderson and  a ttem pt contact w ith  Cham berlain. 
Hadow m ust have felt an  affinity with both men. All three, for 
example, felt the  influence of the effects of the  F irs t World War. 
Hadow had  experienced the horrors of i t  first hand  as he never 
failed to rem ind his superiors. Henderson had  been posted in  
P a ris  du ring  the  W ar and  received personal accounts from  
soldiers on leave, and  he la te r wrote, "The long casualty lists, the 
wet w inters, the  ghastly  w aste of hum an life in  long draw n-out 
battles w ith little  progress to show a t the end of them , was ju s t a 
tragedy which left an  enduring impression on one's mind"[l].
Cham berlain, during the  war, was made director general 
of national service and consequently found him self working in  an
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im possible s itu a tio n  u n d e r d ifficu lt conditions w ith  little  
adm inistrative help. He resigned his post after seven m onths. 
The period following C ham berlain 's resignation was, according 
to L arry  Fuchser in  Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement, the 
worst in  his life[2]. L ater th a t  year (1917) his cousin N orm an was 
killed in  battle  in France. Cham berlain was very close to Norm an 
and Iain Macleod writes th a t th is death  affected him  more deeply 
th an  his father's, and  "sowed in  him  the seeds of h is life-long 
hatred  of war"[3]. The personal tragedy Cham berlain felt over the 
w ar (he also lost his cousin Johnny), coupled with the hum iliation 
of failure in office made i t  easy for him  to share in  the national 
disillusionm ent w ith w ar afterwards.
The origin of the  appeasers' ra th e r pious convictions, apart 
from pacifist sentim ents, can be traced to a strong attachm ent to a 
now old fashioned order. Socialism and in ternationalism  was on 
the  rise  and  the  values a ttached  to the Em pire were waning. 
Those in  trad itiona lly  h igher social positions felt th rea tened . 
W hat Felix G ilbert w rites of H enderson can be applied to both 
Hadow and Cham berlain: "Unintellectual and trad itional in  his 
thinking, clinging to the values of the past - like m any m en of a 
conform ist character in  tim es of changing values - he grasped 
after a faith, an  absolute"[4]. This link with an  older - and to their 
minds, be tter - era, caused a  blinkering of the appeasers' outlook
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on the in ternational situation  and a slightly paternal a ttitude  in  
the expression of the ir policy. The outlook was too simple and left 
too m any gaps in its  analysis of the dictators' policies bu t was pu t 
forward in such term s as to m ake i t  appear the only clear and 
reasonable approach. Cham berlain stated a t the end of 1937, "We 
are not drifting; we have a  definite objective in  front of us. T hat 
objective is a  general se ttlem ent of the grievances of the world 
without war. We believe th a t the right way to go about th a t is not 
to issue th rea ts , bu t to try  to establish those personal contacts to 
which I have already alluded, and th a t only by friendly, fi'ank 
discussion betw een the  na tions can we hope to arrive  a t  a 
situation when once more we shall be able to remove anxiety firom 
our minds "[5].
C ham berlain 's belief in  "friendly" and  "frank" discussion 
w ith  G erm any illu s tra te s  a  fea tu re  of the Em pire legacy th a t  
appeasers such as him self, Hadow, and H enderson were still 
influenced by; namely, the  im portance of B ritain. Because she 
w as so in fluen tia l, B rita in  could afford to be m agnanim ous.
Cham berlain stated in  the House of Commons in  1938 th a t B ritain  
was a  "great" country, "a country to which countless of millions of 
people look up for leadership, because they respect her. I t is for a 
g rea t country to do w hat a small or weak country cannot always 
afford to do - to show m agnanim ity, and whoever inspires to lead
j
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her m ust be ready to ignore abuse"[6]. Hadow felt th is so ardently 
th a t he constantly called for g reater B ritish involvement not only 
in  the  Sudeten G erm an question, b u t earlie r in  the  economic 
difficulties of Austria. In  1937 he urged Lady Layton in  a le tte r 
concerning press statem ents about Germany to "be fair" so th a t 
G erm any would have to recognise B rita in 's  im p artia lity  and  
B rita in  could te ll th a t  country  to m ake friends w ith  h e r  
neighbours while she watched and counselled. "On these lines 
you will see th a t Germany will not only give heed to ALL England 
says, bu t you will be surprised how quick will be the progress of 
peace-m aking in  Europe"[7]. He even believed th a t  a  sta tem ent 
from the King during the  Munich crisis would carry weight w ith 
H itler. T hat H itler m ight view B rita in  as a country dim inishing 
in  importance and ru n  by old vacillating men did not occur to any 
of them . One of Henderson's worst m istakes was overestim ating 
h is im portance to the  N azis as a  rep resen ta tive  of B rita in . 
H itler's  in te res t in  th is  diplom at had  little  to do w ith  B ritish  
opinion and much to do w ith sounding out the lim it to which he 
could push th is country.
The simplicity of the appeasers' outlook is most apparent in  
th e ir  diagnosis of G erm an intentions. Cham berlain believed a t 
the end of 1937 th a t H itler wanted control of E astern  Europe and a  
close relationship w ith A ustria - b u t not annexation. He believed
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in  potential disarm am ent and the  possible re tu rn  of Germ any to 
the  League of N ations, and saw no reason why he could not 
simply tell H itler th a t  B rita in  would recognise his conquests in  
E aste rn  Europe if  these were achieved peacefully[8]. Hadow and 
Henderson shared th is belief and it  was m aintained in  the face of 
m ounting evidence to the  contrary. Hadow's assum ptions as to 
G erm an plans were so consistently idealistic th a t they could only 
have been a  projection of h is own wishes. In  1936 he claimed 
H itle r’s m otto w as "Before N orth  Bohemia, A ustria; and  both 
m ust of them selves come to us "[9]. In  May 1938 he wrote of the 
Sudeten  G erm an problem , "Germany does not w ish to create 
m inority problems for herse lf’[10]. In July  of th a t year he stated, 
"It is...assum ed th a t Germ any is incorrigibly aggressive and th a t 
no satisfaction of real grievances will make any difference to her 
policy of aggression...If G erm an aggressiveness should some day 
be proved by an  a ttack  on non-Germans, it  would be a  case for 
resistance; bu t such proof has not been fum ished"[ll]. Henderson 
echoed these sentim ents to Halifax in  August 1938, "For w hat my 
opinion is w orth the  la s t th in g  which the  G erm ans w an t is 
serious trouble or to be involved in  a general w ar "[12].
Hadow, Henderson, and Cham berlain all shared an irrita tion  
w ith  the  press - a  characteristic  which could help to explain a 
certain  am ount of sym pathy w ith fascist regimes. Fuchser writes
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th a t Cham berlain became increasingly im patient w ith the B ritish  
democratic process which so easily allowed all forms of dissent. 
He felt there  was a flaw in  the  system  "which demanded th a t the 
Government reveal its every intention while the fascist states were 
under no such restrictions"[13]. Henderson wrote th a t, while he 
respected the  B ritish  press, he felt i t  had handicapped his efforts 
to im prove Anglo-German relations, and  th a t  the  reports were 
often biased and unfair: "It did not help me in  my diplomatic task  
if  H itler's back was being constantly rubbed up the wrong way by 
P ress criticisms"[14]. This was exactly the line Hadow took in his 
aspersions on the Press. In  1937 Hadow sent a private plea to 
Leeper, Head of the News D epartm ent in  the Foreign Office, to 
u se  h is  influence in  dam ping ce rta in  p ress a rtic le s  w hich 
"rubbed sa lt into wounds w ithout doing much constructive good" 
(he w as referring  to a rtic les critical of the  N azi regime)[15]. 
Leeper replied th a t  such action was not w ithin his power, and  
went so far as to say, "Believe me, i t  is not the Foreign Office who 
encourage polemics, b u t i f  the  pro-Germ ans here  s ta r t  it, the 
o ther side will reply quite rightly"[16]. By "pro-German ", Leeper 
m eant J.L . Garvin, editor of The Observer, and Lord Rotherm ere, 
who he believed were "scared stiff" of G erm any and "quite 
uncontrollable" in  the ir abuse of the Czechs. While the  appeasers 
were responsible in the ir views on the increasingly violent tone of
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th e  G erm an press, they were, perhaps, secretly envious of the 
tigh t control m en such as Goebbels had  over th is institution.
Like Hadow, both H enderson and  C ham berlain  worked 
hard  a t carrying through appeasem ent, bu t they were older th an  
Hadow and  suffered a c e rta in  am ount of physical s tra in . 
Cham berlain only m anaged to survive the first year of the Second 
W orld W ar, and  H enderson suffered from a com plaint which 
tu rned  out to be th roat cancer. The stress of the ir roles during the 
la te  1930s com plicated by illness could have clouded th e ir  
judgm ent. Hadow him self apparen tly  w ent into the hospital in  
1939 - a fact he kept secret from all bu t his closest friends, and the 
reason for which he told nobody[17].
In  addition to the  exhausting  dem ands of th e ir  roles, a 
certain  am ount of social loneliness can account for the obsessive 
pursu it of appeasem ent by Henderson and Cham berlain, if  not so 
m uch in  H adow 's case. C ham berla in  was qu ite  reserved, 
form ing few friendsh ip s and  ra re ly  confiding in  anyone. 
Henderson, having spent more tim e away from his native country 
th a n  in  it, re trea ted  in to  a caricature of "Englishness", always 
dressing the  p a rt and playing the  role as he saw it[18]. This 
practice coupled w ith his servile a ttitude  towards the G erm ans 
m ay have done little  to endear him self to his contem poraries in  
the  Foreign Office. Hadow was m uch more of a social person and
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loved to en terta in  but, due to his nature , made as m any enemies 
as he formed loyal friendships. Because of the streng th  of their 
convictions and either na tu ra l - or, in Hadow's case, self-induced 
- iso la tion , a ll th ree  m en in u red  them selves to criticism . 
H enderson developed a complete blindness to it, C ham berlain  
ignored or by-passed it, and Hadow fluctuated between dismissing 
i t  or bombarding opponents w ith his own opinions.
W hile Hadow and  H enderson  were bo th  diplom ats of 
sim ilar background and character, Hadow and C ham berlain are 
comparable in  more isolated term s. C ham berlain was a  political 
an im al and , a lthough th e ir  outlook was basically  the  same, 
C ham berla in 's  background and position were not. The m ost 
obvious difference between Hadow and C ham berlain is th a t the 
la tte r  directed the policy of appeasem ent while the former merely 
cham pioned it. Cham berlain was, thus, autom atically concerned 
w ith  the politics of his policy, b u t he also w ent beyond Hadow's 
idealistic pursu it of appeasem ent through m oral argum ent. T hat 
Hadow was a diplomat and Cham berlain a politician accounts for 
a  large  p a rt of th is  difference; b u t Hadow did behave quite 
undiplom atically a t  tim es, and C ham berlain often assum ed the  
role of diplom at in  his efforts to directly control B ritain 's foreign 
policy. Cham berlain was calculating and, according to Fuchser, 
inclined to view political power as the  basis of hum an relations:
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"His personality  was such th a t  he could no t conceive of any 
h u m an  in te rac tio n  except on the  basis of power, an d  his 
leadership rested ultim ately on his ability to coerce"[18].
C om pared to Hadow, C h am b erla in 's  m otives beh ind  
appeasem ent policy were complicated. He shared Hadow's moral 
conviction in  regard  to the  righ tness of h is policy, b u t was 
m anipulative in  m aking sure i t  was carried out. The shifting of 
V ansitta rt to the  less influential post of Chief Diplomatic Adviser 
is one illustra tion  of th is side to Cham berlain as is the resignation 
of Eden. There can be no doubt th a t  the  absence of Eden was a 
relief to Chamberlain, bu t the Prim e M inister sta ted  in  the  House 
of Commons, "in our view, there was no necessity for my righ t 
honourable Friend to leave the  Government". He added, "It is for 
each m an to decide for him self w hat his duty  and  his conscience 
enjoin upon him  to do "[19].
C ham berlain  had a sincere belief in  h is duty, b u t was 
arguably  unscrupulous and more cynical in  h is m ethods th a n  
Hadow. In 1937 when Mussolini w anted de jure recognition of his 
conquest of Abyssinia, C ham berlain wrote a  friendly personal 
le tte r  to the  Italian  leader w ithout consulting Eden. Eden writes, 
"I m ade no difficulty about the incident a t the  tim e, thinking th a t 
there was no deliberate in ten t to by-pass me as Foreign Secretary, 
b u t th a t  i t  w as m erely a slip a  P rim e M in iste r new to
263
in te rn a t io n a l  a ffa irs" . E den  w as w rong, how ever, as 
Cham berlain wrote of the episode, "I did not show my le tter to the 
Foreign Secretary, for I had the feeling he would object to it"[20].
Hadow w as more direct and not so m anipulative - not m erely 
because he was not in  a position to m anipulate, b u t because his 
style was more of a m an trying to force his opinions on all those 
w ith  which he was acquainted. He did, however, a ttem p t to 
by-pass the official channels in  the Foreign Office in  order to push 
his ideas through to those he felt would be more sympathetic.
In  h is  w hole-hearted support for appeasem en t Hadow 
developed a  strong loyalty to C ham berlain which, had  Hadow's 
position in  the  Foreign Office been higher, the  Prim e M inister 
m ight have m ade more use of, as he m ade use of H enderson's.
From  the  tim e th a t  Cham berlain assum ed power and  Hadow 
wrote to Henderson of his approval of the  new Prim e M inister, (aeepogeais") 
+Ke. F irs t  S ecre tary  consistently defended his leader as B rita in 's  
p rim ary  hope for m ain tain ing  peace. Hadow w as constan tly  
aw are of those he perceived to be doing a ll they  could "to 
underm ine and weaken the position in  th is country of the  Prim e 
M inister"[21], and  of "continuous a ttem p ts  to pull down and 
sca tter all th a t  the  Prim e M inister had  so wisely bu ilt up"[22].
T his w as one of th e  reasons Hadow kep t try in g  to reach  
C ham berlain w ith  his ideas and m em oranda. Hadow obviously
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felt th a t it  was im portan t th a t C ham berlain was fully informed 
and presented with the most choices in  carrying out his policy, but 
he probably also believed i t  was im portan t to le t C ham berlain 
know he had a t least one ally in the Foreign Office and could count 
on th a t m inority of support.
In  a ttem pting contact with Cham berlain Hadow was not as 
direct as w ith Henderson and approached the Prim e M inister by 
sending m em oranda and recom m endations to people such as 
H utch ison  and  B u tler, requesting  th a t  these  be show n to 
Chamberlain. Hadow was encouraged to a certain  degree by both. 
In  A ugust 1938 he wrote to Hutchison asking him  to read  some 
enclosed m em oranda, and, i f  he agreed w ith them , to p u t them  
before the  Prim e M inister for whom they  had  apparen tly  been 
w ritten . Hadow requested  th e ir  au th o rsh ip  be kep t secret, 
however[23]. Less th an  a week la te r Hutchison replied, "I have 
read your le tte r and bu rn t it. I take your view so strongly th a t I 
am  leaving shooting and going to London tomorrow T hursday 
night to try  and catch the P.M. on Friday in London[24].
Hutchison did catch up w ith Cham berlain. On August 19 
Cham berlain wrote to Halifax th a t Hutchison had telephoned th a t 
m orning w ith  an  u rgen t request th a t  he see him  as he had  
im portan t inform ation to comm unicate. H utchison apparen tly  
told Cham berlain th a t he had  learned through various contacts
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th a t H itler ’’m eant business th is time" and it was essential tha t, if 
the  G erm an leader was to be stopped, B rita in  should approach 
him  and  come to some understand ing  w ith  him  as soon as 
possible, "There was really nothing new in  w hat H utch had  to 
say", w rote C ham berla in , "but pe rh ap s i t  m ay usefu lly  be 
com pared  w ith  von K leist"*. According to C ham berla in , 
Hutchison had  left a  long memorandum of his views[26],
Hadow la te r  wrote to H utchison thank ing  him  for letting  
him  know of h is "interview" w ith  th e  P rim e M inister. He 
enclosed more inform ation for Hutchison, adding, "Butler would 
probably object to my approaching the  P.M. direct so th a t  there 
can be no question of my, or your, sending on the  copy enclosed". 
If, however, Hutchison could "recast" the inform ation so as not to 
be tray  its  origin for Cham berlain's "personal use", Hadow wrote 
he would gladly take the risk[27].
*Later part of the unsuccessful coup attempt of July 1944, Edwald von 
Kleist-Schemzin had come to Britain to warn the Government of Hitler's 
intentions. Von Kleist stated that Britain was no longer in danger of war but in 
the presence of the certainty of it and there was no prospect of a reasonable policy 
being pursued by Germany so long as Hitler was in power. He believed, 
however, that if war could avoided, this might act as a catalyst to the end of the 
present regime in Germany[25].
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Cham berlain was also guilty of the tendency to avoid the 
advice of all save those in  agreem ent w ith him. He, in  particular, 
preferred  the  advice of "am ateurs" such as S ir Horace Wilson 
who was C hief Industria l Adviser to the  G overnm ent and had 
little  experience in  foreign affairs. This tendency was all the more 
dangerous w hen applied to the claims of H itler and  fellow-Nazis 
as opposed to those of clear-sighted diplom ats such as Rumbold 
and Phipps . I t  was moreover a tendency which was likely to 
encourage Hadow to try  to reach the Prim e M inister w ith his 
m em oranda. In  Septem ber 1938 Cham berlain wrote to his sister 
ju s t  before H itle r's  belligerent speech a t N urem berg th a t  he 
believed H itler would not present an ultim atum  a t Nurem berg but 
his fu ture p lans were uncertain. Fuchser w rites, "On th is and 
other occasions, Cham berlain's analysis as he presented  i t  to his 
sister was a  restatem ent of Henderson's despatches. I t therefore 
seem s th a t  H enderson 's  view s, p e rh ap s  because  they  so 
approxim ated h is own, alm ost always received C ham berlain 's 
closest attention"[28]. This could also be true of those 
recom m endations and m em oranda of Hadow's which m anaged to 
filter through to Chamberlain.
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Hadow’s respect for Cham berlain stemm ed partly  from an  
approach to foreign relations which both expressed as an  appeal 
to reason. This was p a rt of the  pre-World W ar I legacy of the 
belief in the victory of rationality  over passion. The suppression of 
emotion, i t  was felt, and the  reliance on logic and goodwill, would 
bring  about the solution to any conflict. C ham berlain 's fam ily 
trad ition  caused him  to adopt th is  approach more rigidly th an  
Hadow who applied i t  to communication and cooperation between 
sta tes and the suppression of personal suffering and pain; b u t 
Hadow was younger and more volatile th an  C ham berlain, and 
prone to passionate appeals on behalf of appeasem ent. Like 
Cham berlain, he would sta te  his argum ent as the only practical 
one, b u t would punctuate i t  w ith  impassioned pleas for "fairness" 
which were underscored, p u t in  upper case letters, or ended with 
an exclamation ivdrk, Cham berlain purposely rejected th is style 
in  his speeches because he w anted the public to believe th a t peace 
was possible and to avoid the m ass hysteria of war[29].
The su pp ress ion  of em otion w as m ore ev id en t in  
Cham berlain, but both he and Hadow often adopted overbearing 
a ttitudes in  promotion of th e ir policy. William Rock w rites of 
C h a m b e rla in , "He cou ld  be s te rn , o b s t in a te ,  a n d  
uncomprom ising, quite in to le ran t and som etim es rude tow ard 




Souls and Appeasement^ th a t i f  one had not got a  duodenal ulcer 
to begin w ith  "he [Chamberlain] was enough to s ta r t  one ofF'[31]. 
Those who knew or worked w ith Hadow are all in  agreem ent th a t 
he could be quite overpowering. One friend wrote to Hadow while 
the la tte r  was in  Kitzbuhl, "if you ski as violently as you growl, I 
should no t th in k  there  is a person in  K[itzbuhl] w ith  whom you 
have not yet collided"[32].
In  outlook, Hadow and Cham berlain varied to some degree 
again  due to the  political m achinations of C ham berlain; for 
exam ple, bo th  w an ted  to exclude R ussia  from  any  form of 
E uropean agreem ent, b u t Cham berlain felt less th rea tened  by 
communism th an  Hadow. He was suspicious of the bolsheviks 
b u t was not so concerned about the ideology of communism, and 
felt th a t  agreem ent w ith  th e  dictators was a  crucial enough 
p u rsu it th a t  the  additional argum ent of fascism  acting  as a 
bulw ark again st communism was unnecessary[33]. Hadow, as 
a lre ad y  show n, encom passed  a ll th e  s ta n d a rd  fea rs  of 
communism, which were, in  fact, linked to his fears of a second 
world war. By 1939 he was writing of Soviet in tentions to "stand 
on the  sidelines until the ebb and flow of war shall have provided 
them  w ith opportunity for a  successful appeal to the  war-weary 
m asses of all nations by which they may justifiably calculate upon 
w inn ing  th e  u ltim a te  victory  for th e  P ro le ta r ia t  a g a in s t
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C apitalism  and  true  Democracy "[34]. Hadow and  Cham berlain 
also differed over the guarantee to Poland in 1939. Hadow felt th a t 
i t  made no sense, b u t Cham berlain saw the political necessity of it 
in  the public reaction to the German invasion of P rague and the 
importance of displaying some form of deterrent to H itler.
Hadow and C ham berlain did bear a resem blance to each 
other on the questions of d isarm am ent and rearm am ent, and in  
th e  im portance bo th  a ttach ed  to economics. The difference 
between the two m en in these issues again lies in  the importance 
of politics to Cham berlain. In the early 1930s Hadow supported 
disarm am ent and pu t forward his own suggestions as to how it  
should be carried out, m ainly through a four-power pact between 
B ritain , Germany, France, and Italy, and through pressure on a 
h e s ita n t  F rance[35]. A t th is  tim e, C h am berla in  held  a 
commitment to rearm am ent, but, as Chancellor of the  Exchequer, 
he felt the need to cut defence in  order to balance the  budget. He 
gained influence in  the  rearm am ent program  b u t modified the 
Defence Requirem ents Committee Report, his prim ary motivation 
being fiscal res tra in t. A fu rth er m otivation was opposition to a 
continental arm y like th a t prior to the F irst World War[36]. After 
1935 Hadow and Cham berlain began adopting the same views on 
rea rm am en t. B oth  used  the  argum en t th a t  B rita in  w as not 
m ilitarily  prepared to combat the growing streng th  of Germany.
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H adow  used  th is  a rg u m en t r a th e r  hypocritica lly , hav ing  
supported d isarm am ent to begin w ith, although he added the 
rid e r th a t  there  w as a  shortage of m en w illing to "m an the  
guns"[37]. I t could be argued tha t, like Chamberlain, Hadow was 
using th is la tte r  defence to support a conclusion on foreign policy 
he had already reached.
Both Hadow and  Cham berlain believed th a t  a  country’s 
streng th  and political health  depended on its  economic vitality. 
C ham berlain was influenced in  th is respect from his background 
in trade and fiscal responsibility in the early 1930s. Hadow had 
been appointed commercial secretary while in  Persia  and Turkey 
along  w ith  h is  o th e r  d u tie s  an d  h a d  th ro w n  h im se lf  
w holeheartedly in to  the  work involved in  th is  position. While 
C ham berla in  w as orig inally  concentra ting  on th e  economic 
health  of B ritain , Hadow took a special in te rest in  the economic 
situation of those countries to which he was posted, particularly  
A ustria . Hadow constantly  urged economic cooperation w ith 
E urope, ou tlin ing  p lans w hich m ade a po in t of includ ing  
Germany. Hadow's argum ent was th a t  an  economically strong 
Germ any would become more responsible and less likely to force 
Europe into war[38]. Cham berlain la ter came to express the same 
view in  objecting to a  Foreign Office idea of countering Germ an 
economic expansion in  the  B alkans w ith a  revived D anubian
271
Federation. He was doubtful th a t the strengthening of Germany's 
economic situation  was necessarily bad, and  suggested th a t  its 
im provem ent m igh t qu ie ten  G erm any and  m ake h e r  less 
interested in political adventures[39].
The sim ilarity  between Hadow and Cham berlain thus lies 
in  their adoption of the policy of appeasem ent and  the ir conclusion 
th a t i t  was the most sensible course of action. The difference is in 
the  m ethod of adoption. C ham berlain was in strum en ta l in  the 
form ulation of th is  policy and his p u rsu it of i t  was, a t  tim es, 
ruthless. He not only ignored the advice of those not in  agreem ent 
w ith him, b u t sidetracked or disposed of them  whenever possible. 
Hadow was more inclined to try  and convince those who disagreed 
w ith him  th a t he was right, although he often failed to address 
certain argum ents which were presented to him  and pu t stress on 
those statem ents which supported his reasoning.
The s im ila rity  betw een Hadow and H enderson  in  the  
appeasem ent years was more acute and a t tim es they appeared to 
be speaking w ith one voice. Both adopted the self-righteous tone of 
appeasem ent and  used th e ir "moral rectitude" to overstep the 
boundaries of th e ir  positions. W hile Hadow defended his 
un d ip lo m atic  ac tio n s  th ro u g h  h is  deep convictions and  
patriotism , H enderson wrote in  the same m anner to Halifax, "the 
stakes for which we are  playing are too high to allow me to
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Xrem ain  silen t on a  m a tte r  on which I feel so strongly"[40]. 
H enderson  and  Hadow , like C ham berlain , cam e to believe 
ardently  in  the  m oral duty  of their actions - an  error th a t came 
about p a rtly  th rough  th e ir  disillusionm ent w ith  war. In  the 
Foreign Office Hadow saw him self as p a rt of a  m inority  in  his 
desire for peace a t  all costs, and his growing indiscretion and bias 
in  his reports probably partly  originated from th is feeling. While 
in Czechoslovakia, Hadow wrote to O'Malley, "I would ask you to 
believe th a t nothing m atte rs  to me more th an  the  prevention of 
w ar and the  m aintenance of true  democracy"[41]. In  London 
Hadow wrote to H utchison th a t he preferred to take  the risk  of 
incurring official displeasure to "sitting and watching events with 
th a t fatal official complacency", and added, "I fear you will th ink  
I am a very bad official; bu t tru s t you will believe in  my patriotism, 
which transcends the  narrow  bonds of officialdom"[42]. To 
H enderson he wrote, "I hope you will succeed and w ish I could 
help; b u t in  the  N orthern  D epartm ent one is side-tracked and 
anyhow a 1st Secretary is easily sm othered though, as you will 
see, no t silenced!"[43]. I t  was th is  sense of m oral iso lation 
expressed by Hadow which made his (as well as Henderson’s and 
Cham berlain's) form of appeasem ent not too far removed from a 
dangerous fanaticism .
H enderson, even a fte r his debacle in  B erlin  expressed a
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belief th a t he had  a "mission" beyond the duties of a B ritish  
diplom at in  Germany: "When I left the A rgentine Republic in  
M arch 1937, it had  been my suprem e am bition and m y earnest 
p rayer to play a p a rt, however hum ble, in  contributing to the  
preservation of world peace. I believed th a t th is could only be 
ensured through Anglo-German co-operation, and  for two years I 
fought w ith  a ll m y h e a r t  and  s tre n g th  for th a t  end"[44]. 
H enderson, i t  seem s, p ictu red  him self in  the  role of a "great 
am bassador", m aking his m ark  in  history. (U nfortunately, the  
m ark  he m ade w as not the  one he pictured). Like Hadow, he 
sensed a lack of sym pathy from the Foreign Office and by-passed 
his im m ediate superio rs th rough  direct correspondence w ith  
Halifax.
J u s t  a fter H enderson replaced Sir Eric Phipps in  B erlin  
April 1937, he made a speech to the German-English Society about 
which he h im self w rites, [it]aroused considerable criticism  in  
certain  circles in  E ngland and earned for me in  some B ritish  
journals the  appella tion  of 'O ur Nazi B ritish  A m bassador in  
Berlin'. I have never felt the  least remorse for th a t  speech" [45]. 
The speech and others H enderson made in Berlin did not escape 
Hadow's a tten tion  and he sen t the  new Am bassador to Berlin a 
le tter concerning the recent changes in  the Cabinet and  the effects 
these would have on B ritish  policy. Hadow had apparently  heard
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through Sir Kingsley Wood th a t Henderson was felt to have struck 
"the righ t note" in  h is firs t speeches in  G erm any by both  the 
Cabinet and C ham berlain, and th a t Henderson could reckon on 
the la tte r’s support along these lines. Hadow had also received 
the message th a t Cham berlain m eant to direct the foreign policy 
of B rita in  h im self in s te a d  of le ttin g  i t  be governed from  
departm ents in W hitehall. "I apologise for repeating w hat is no 
doubt stale news to you; b u t I was so cheered m yself by th is 
information - w hatever m ay be Sir Kingsley Wood's influence or 
lack of influence in  the Cabinet - th a t I felt I m ust pass it  on!" 
Hadow added in a  postscript th a t if  Henderson had  any comments 
to m ake on certain  of his despatches they would be useful in  
reinforcing w hat he (Hadow) had tried  to pu t forward "as to the 
righ t way to promote b e tte r relations between th is country and 
G erm any and so prom oting peace in  our tim e in stead  of the 
reverse"[46].
Hadow had no doubts as to the wisdom of C ham berlain 's 
course of action and he obviously felt he had an  ally in  Henderson. 
In  May 1938 he sent the la tte r  a  memorandum he had  w ritten  for 
Strang, noting th a t i t  had  "fortunately" come to the notice of the 
Secretary of State, "who - against the opinion of the Ptm dits of the 
Office who were aghast and unhappy a t its bluntness - pleased to 
endorse it". Hadow continued, "All th a t you have said  will of
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course come true; bu t here the clique who would not allow of any 
righ t on the Germ an side are still doing w hat they can to bring on 
th e  day of reckoning". Hadow reassu red  H enderson th a t  his 
telegram s and those of Newton were receiving anxious a tten tion  
in  political circles. Hadow also sen t H enderson a  copy of a 
m em orandum  he w rote on R ussia  which w as endorsed  by 
Halifax, bu t Hadow felt i t  had  little  effect in  the Office. He added 
th a t he had no au thority  to send on these documents and hinted  
th a t  he had  "certain contacts" w ithin  the  C abinet, "but th is  I 
should not say and I cannot claim th a t they are really effective in 
action". Hadow concluded, "May I wish you all success in  your 
fight"[47].
Like the m ajority of appeasers Hadow and H enderson were 
determ ined to view Nazism  w ith an "open mind", they felt more a t 
home with Germanic people, they  were convinced th a t  the peace 
of Europe hinged on an  understand ing  betw een B rita in  and  
Germ any, and they  sincerely believed th a t  G erm any w as not 
in tend ing  to s ta r t  a  war. Both felt strongly th a t  the  biggest 
m istake in  B ritish and  French foreign policy would be to exclude 
G erm any politically  and  economically. H enderson  w rote in  
Failure o f a Mission th a t  Europe would never be stab le  un til 
Germ any achieved prosperity. "The theory th a t, if  H itle r were 
trea ted  as a pariah, the Germ an nation would itse lf overturn  him
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and his regime had no foundation in  fact, and was m erely the 
outcome of wishful thinking. The reverse was actually the case, 
and  the  denial of help  and th e  refusal of all sym pathetic  
understanding  m erely drove the  nation to despair and  to cling 
closer to him as the sole defender of German interests"[48].
While both Hadow and Henderson did their best to excuse 
the  excesses of G erm any and  the  Nazi regime, ne ither felt any 
qualm s in tak ing  a belligerent a ttitude  towards Benes and the 
Czechs. Hadow attem pted to be fair to the Czechoslovak President 
from the beginning of h is appointm ent to Prague, b u t ended up 
re fe rrin g  to Benes as a schem er who m ade dem ocracy a 
misnomer for the sta te  of Czechoslovakia. Henderson called the 
Czechs "a pig-headed race" and believed Benes was "not the least 
pig-headed among them"[49]. D uring the May C risis of 1938 
H enderson accused the  Czechs of spreading rum ours of Germ an 
troop concentrations "for the  express purpose of serving as a  
pretext for planned partia l Czech mobilisation"[50]. Hadow wrote 
th a t  he "reluctantly" endorsed the  suspicion th a t  Benes was 
beh ind  th e  m ilita ry  m oves, in ten d in g  to w reck H odza's 
negotiations for a compromise. He continued, "in th is case I most 
earnestly  endorse S ir N. H enderson’s estim ate  of G erm any’s 
absolute determ ination to secure justice for the Sudetendeutsche\ 
by peaceful persuasion  if  possible, but, if  not, by early  use of
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force "[51]. If  H enderson was more frank than  Hadow about his 
affinity w ith the G erm ans, he was also more outspoken in  his 
an tipathy  towards the Czechs. While Hadow a t least tried  to keep 
up a th in  sem blance of fa irness to the  Czechs as a whole, 
Henderson confided a t the  N urem berg Party  Conference of 1938 
th a t  he had  no personal sym pathy a t all with the Czechs, and 
considered th e  p lacing  of S ude ten  G erm ans u n d e r Czech 
dom ination to be a  grave m istake. He apparently  expressed his 
aversion to the Czechs in  very strong terms[52].
B o th  H adow  a n d  H e n d e rso n  m is in te rp re te d  th e  
decision-m aking process in  Germ any; seeing it  as a  struggle 
betw een m oderates and extrem ists. At the height of the Czech 
crisis, Henderson wrote about "Hitler's own love for peace, dislike 
of dead G erm ans, and  hesita tion  of risking his regim e on a  
gambler's throw"[53]. He became involved in a complicated game 
designed to support "moderates" in  Nazi Germ any and, a t  one 
point wrote to Halifax, "My im pression is th a t H itler is being not 
only egged on b u t deliberately m isled by the extrem ist faction 
here"[54]. In  1938 Hadow wrote th a t Germany's leadership was 
in  a  struggle between two opposing groups for the "soul" of Hitler. 
On the one hand  were Ribbentrop, Goebbels, and  Him m ler "who 
are on the  side of a violent solution of Germany's problem s by 
m eans of an  a ttack  upon the  Democracies". Opposed to them .
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according to Hadow, were Goering, the  arm y leaders, and  "the 
vast m ass o f'm odera tes"’ of all classes "who are convinced...that 
B rita in  is desirous of peaceful se ttlem ent w ith G erm any and 
afraid of the issues of Ribbentrop's adventures"[55].
Hadow and  H enderson 's  sh a rin g  of outlook can be 
a ttr ib u ted  to some degree to a  sim ilarity  in  background and 
character. Both came from a privileged class and attended public 
school. N either had  spent much time in  B ritain  apart from their 
schooling, bu t they shared a strong identification w ith the  B ritish  
Em pire and perceived a crumbling of th is edifice. Henderson and 
Hadow combated the insecurity they felt with regard to tw entieth  
cen tu ry  changes in  th e ir  own ways: H enderson identify ing  
him self w ith all he believed to be typically British, and Hadow 
averring a  strong and unw avering patriotism . Their response to 
w hat they  perceived as growing weakness within the B ritish  and 
E uropean  system  caused them  to view the repressiveness of 
d ictatorial regimes (apart from the Soviet Union) w ith a  certain  
am ount of sympathy. H enderson believed th a t dictators were not 
always reprehensible and were often necessary[56]. He had  been 
posted to Turkey ju s t before Hadow in  the early 1920s and wrote 
th a t M ustapha Kemal had  bu ilt up a  new Turkey on the  ru ins of 
the  old and th a t "his expulsion of the  Greeks, which perhaps 
suggested to H itler th a t he should do the same in Germany w ith
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th e  Jew s, has already  been forgotten and forgiven"[57].
Hadow was not so enam oured of Kemal or the T urks as 
H enderson  b u t shared  h is im patience w ith liberal regim es. 
C arefully  saving all h is despatches from the  1930s, Hadow 
in tended  to w rite an  "inside history" of why democracy fails 
"because it  looks a t local instead of world events and too late' is its 
motto"[58]. A good m any of Hadow's and Henderson's postings 
before the Second W orld W ar were w ith right-w ing repressive 
regimes. Both had  been posted to Turkey, and H enderson was 
la te r  posted to Belgrade where he was labelled pro-Yugoslav and 
pro-dictator[59]. Both were sen t to Argentina; H enderson ju s t 
before he went to Berlin, and  Hadow ju s t a fter his posting in  
London.
Felix Gilbert writes in  The Diplomats th a t i t  is a  danger in  
the  diplomatic profession th a t those sent abroad often associate 
them selves with the government to which they have been assigned 
and defend its policies; "this tendency grows in direct proportion 
to resistance of the home office to such persuasion"[60]. While 
th is  is applicable to Henderson, i t  is less so to Hadow who tended 
to feel more affinity to a  particu lar people than  to a  regime in  the 
coun tries he was posted. H adow 's selective sym pathy  for 
"underdogs" coloured his view. He despised the Turks for th e ir 
trea tm en t of the Kurdish tribes and the  Greeks, and despised the
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Czechs for th e ir trea tm en t of the  Sudeten Germans. His g rea t 
liking for the A ustrians was influenced by his regret over th e ir 
declining economic sta te . B u t the  Nazi trea tm en t of the  Jew s 
failed to strike an  equally sym pathetic note in Hadow. This may 
be due to a  certain am ount of anti-sem itism  which he shared with 
Henderson, Cham berlain, and other appeasers[61]; or i t  m ay be 
th a t  had  Hadow been posted  to G erm any as he requested , 
sym pathy  for the  Jew s m ay have been aroused. T his was 
apparently  not the case w ith Henderson.
The sim ilarity  in  Hadow and Henderson's analysis of the 
European situation probably arose a t least partially  from Hadow's 
access to H enderson’s telegram s and despatches. The basis of 
these  officials' outlook was a lready  the  same; in  which case 
Hadow was likely to pay a large am ount of a tten tion  to all th a t 
H enderson reported. T hat Hadow, unlike his colleagues in  the 
Foreign Office, was inclined to accept Henderson's sta tem ents a t 
face-value in  the same m anner th a t Henderson fell victim  to the 
deceit of the  Nazis dem onstrates a lack of scepticism in  both m en 
w hen i t  came to read ing  s ta tem en ts  which reinforced th e ir  
wishes. Felix G ilbert w rites th a t  Henderson was "probably by 
na tu re  the least sceptical m an alive"[62]. Hadow was perhaps a 
little  less guilty, but th is did not stop him  from accepting reports 
from the Sudeten Germans without question.
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H enderson was also probably a worse cu lprit as regards 
listening to w hat he wanted to hear and interpreting events to suit 
his outlook. As Rock points out Henderson did not fail to notice 
the dangers in  Nazi policies or even to be irrita ted  by them[63]. But 
th is official had determ ined his course even before he arrived in  
Berlin as he him self admits[64]. So, like Hadow, he concentrated 
on w ha t appealed to him  or helped to prove his point and  
d iscarded  th a t  w hich con trad ic ted  it. W hile th e ir  form  of 
optim ism  was welcomed by C ham berlain and  his cabinet, the 
simplicity of it  was irrita ting  to officials in  the Foreign Office such 
as S argen t. Ian  Colvin w rites in  Vansittart in Office of 
H enderson 's "irascible exchanges" w ith  S argen t, "who p u t 
penetrating  questions to him about German protestations th a t the 
Reich had no control over the Sudeten Germans" [65].
T hat Hadow and Henderson were quick to see where the ir 
views were m ost welcome dem onstrates a lack of diplomacy on 
both th e ir  pa rts  which was a fu rther source of irrita tion  to the 
Foreign Office. Cadogan eventually  reprim anded  Hadow in  
October 1938 for his circumvention of his im m ediate superiors, 
and , of H enderson, to whom he was in itia lly  sym pathetic , 
Cadogan came to write, "N.H. really does w ant a gentle jab  in  the 
m outh occasionally"[66].
I f  H adow 's and  H enderson 's behaviour f ru s tra te d  the
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Foreign Office, i t  suited the  needs of Cham berlain in  carrying out 
h is policy and the relative weakness of the  Foreign Office added 
encouragem ent to the  two officials. Both w ere vigorous and  
unshakeable in their pursu it of appeasem ent from 1937 to 1939, 
even a fte r com m itting d ras tic  e rro rs. On M arch 11, 1938 
H enderson claimed he did no t believe H itle r was th ink ing  in  
term s of Anschluss or annexation[67]. The next day G erm an 
troops m arched into Vienna. Hadow made the  same m istake ju s t 
before the attack on Poland. Both officials, in  their enthusiasm  for 
the  Cham berlain 's policy, unvdttingly b u t determ inedly adopted 
the narrow  vision associated w ith appeasem ent.
Outside Support
The appeasem ent of Hadow, Cham berlain, and Henderson 
was not merely a product of th e ir character and background, bu t 
also a reflection of a mood p reva len t am ong scmt poli-Hc*oo& and 
officials in  B rita in . This mood found expression in  Mosley's 
F asc ist movement, in the Anglo-German Group set up in 1933 
under Lord Allen of Hurtwood, in  public speeches and le tters to 
new spapers on Anglo-German cooperation, and in books such as 
Ourselves and Germany by Lord Londonderry. As in  the case of 
Cham berlain and Henderson, Hadow was not slow in observing
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those who had  influence and  who shared  his opinions, and  he 
m ain ta in ed  unofficial contact w ith  as m any  as possible - 
especially after he was posted to London - despite the undiplomatic 
behaviour his actions entailed. These contacts usually  involved 
Members of Parliam ent or public figures, although he also had a t 
least one contact in  the Cabinet.
Hadow's chances of success in  influence in  the Cabinet lay, 
as he rea lised , w ith  those favoured by C ham berla in  who 
in terpreted  th e ir jobs w ith official realism  as opposed to political 
idealism. In  order to be tter guarantee a  free hand in  the direction 
of Foreign policy, Cham berlain had surrounded him self w ith civil 
servants whose opinions did not necessarily m atch his, bu t whose 
loyalty and general agreem ent m ade his course easier. Neville 
Thom pson w rites "Cham berlain preferred  C abinet M inisters 
w hose detached , unem otional and  em pirical approach  to 
problem s m ade them  resem ble good civil servan ts ra th e r  th an  
politicians in  touch w ith the mood of the electorate. S ir Sam uel 
Hoare, S ir John Simon, Lord Halifax, and Sir Kingsley Wood were 
his idea of w hat a  cabinet m inister should be, not the emotional 
and tem peram ental Anthony Eden and Duff Cooper"[68]. It was 
in  such people - whose ch arac te rs  in  m any ways were the  
an tipathy  of his, bu t whose outlook was sim ilar - th a t Hadow saw 
a  chance for fulfilm ent of the policy he endorsed. They placed
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hopes in  a E uropean  solution to G erm an aggression  which 
by-passed rearm am ent and collective security, and Hadow hoped 
to assist in  providing the solution. He, thus, made overtures to Sir 
K ingsley  Wood who w as fe lt to be closer th a n  m ost to 
Chamberlain.
Kingsley Wood had been M inister of H ealth until May 1938 
w hen he replaced Lord Sw inton as Air M inister. D espite the 
financial restrictions on the Air M inistry, Swinton had m anaged 
to provide shadow factories for production of a irc raft, begun 
designs to improve a ir  staff requirem ents, and developed a rad ar 
system . Wood's in s tin c ts , how ever, leaned  m ore tow ard  
accommodation of Germany, and  on assum ing office, he shelved 
the  p lan  for a Vickers shadow factory a t Castle Bromwich which 
Sw inton claimed would have grea tly  increased the  num ber of 
Spitfires a t the B attle of Britain[69]. Maurice Cowling w rites of 
Wood, "If his critics spoke of him  as a 'cynical professional’, th a t 
m ean t m erely th a t  he reg istered  the civic m ind and w as the 
successful propagator of a reactionary reassurance foreign to the 
elevating half-truths of aristocratic idealism"[70].
The firs t record of Hadow's com m unicating w ith  Wood 
comes ju s t  after his arrival in  London in  A ugust 1937. Hadow 
sen t some of his despatches from Prague to Wood, sta ting  th a t 
there  could be no objection to th e ir being m ade use of. Hadow
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expressed the hope th a t Wood would presen t his "case" to the 
Cabinet and "stop the drift th a t is leading Central Europe towards 
the abyss of war"[71]. In  th is le tte r Hadow m entioned th a t Wood 
had visited Prague and talked to Benes. I t  is probably then  th a t 
Wood m et up w ith Hadow and a sim ilarity in  views encouraged 
the F irs t Secretary to m aintain  th is contact when he was posted to 
London. Duff Cooper wrote of Wood, "He clings to the  idea of 
friendship  w ith  G erm any and ha tes the  thought of getting too 
closely tied  up w ith the  French"[72]. In  April 1938 Wood and 
Sim on a rgued  strong ly  in  th e  C ab inet a g a in s t any  new 
com m itm ent to France[73]. Hadow sen t m em oranda to Wood 
throughout 1938, usually ju s t before Cabinet m eetings on foreign 
policy, and these were accompanied by letters asking Wood to use 
w hat influence he could on the  course of B ritish  foreign policy. 
Hadow w as obviously aw are of Wood's closeness to the Prim e 
M inister, and he m ust have been encouraged to a certain  degree 
by th is M inister, although there is no evidence of any replies from 
Wood.
O f those in  C ham berla in 's "inner circle" th e  Foreign 
Secretary  Lord Halifax fits less easily th an  the  others into the 
category of appeaser. Hadow did not try  to influence Halifax in  
the  way th a t  he approached Wood and had little  d irect contact 
w ith the former, probably because he was more answerable to the
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Foreign Secretary  for his actions as an official in  the Foreign 
Office. B ut Halifax did fulfil Chamberlain's policy to the best of his 
ability as a loyal civil servant, and Hadow made attem pts to sway 
him  indirectly through public figures such as Lord Noel-Buxton.
Halifax had  taken  over as Foreign Secretary a fte r Eden's 
resignation in  February 1938, much to the relief of Chamberlain, 
who had  found Eden to be increasingly uncooperative in  his 
foreign policy, particularly  in  regard to Italy. To Halifax, foreign 
affairs were not a  m atter of absorbing in te rest and his approach 
tow ards C ham berla in 's course, a lthough  no t convinced, was 
pragm atic . Lord B irkenhead wrote of Halifax, "it som etim es 
seemed to others th a t he was doing his work a t the Foreign Office 
as an  unpleasant duty, th a t he had no strong convictions about it, 
and  few preconceived views about E uropean  problem s "[74]. 
Halifax understood Cham berlain's policy to be to show H itler he 
could get m ost of w hat he wanted as long as he did not s ta rt a  war, 
and he carried  out th is policy until, even to him , i t  appeared 
unfeasible. To begin w ith he was sufficiently in  agreem ent w ith 
such a policy th a t  he m aintained a personal correspondence w ith 
Nevile H enderson on Germany. Keith Middlemas writes, "Halifax 
was am enable to any advice pu t forthrightly enough. Aloof bu t 
tolerant, he could always be jolted by reference to his duty or to the 
moral implications of diplomatic decisions"[75].
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I t  could be th a t Hadow was aware, to a  certain  extent, of 
these aspects of Halifax. Some of his m em oranda were sent to the 
Foreign Secretary  through Noel-Buxton, th e ir au thorsh ip  being 
kept secret. In  September 1938 Halifax was becoming doubtful of 
C ham berlain 's policy w ith regard  to Czechoslovakia and began 
d riftin g  tow ards the  hard -liners in  the  Foreign  Office and  
su p p o rtin g  th e  enforcem ent of a w a rn in g  to  G erm any. 
Cham berlain eventually m anaged to swing him  back to his line of 
thought, b u t no t w ithout some convincing. D uring th is  tim e 
Hadow sent directly to Halifax - on the suggestion of Birkenhead - 
an  analysis of Czechoslovakian answ ers to the  dem ands of the 
Sudeten Germans, which had  been requested by Halifax. Hadow 
wrote th a t he was sending i t  for the Foreign Secretary 's private 
inform ation only "in case you should need i t  a t th is  m orning's 
Cabinet and  not yet have tim e to receive it  officially"[76]. I t  is 
possible th a t Hadow had got wind of Halifax's crisis of conscience 
and  w as doing w hat he could to help  red irec t the  Foreign 
Secretary's support towards Cham berlain's policy.
The resignation of Eden brought w ith i t  the resignation of 
Lord C ra n b o  m e, who had  been U nder-Parliam entary  Secretary 
of S tate  and he was replaced by another civil servant more loyal to 
C ham berlain , R.A. B utler. A contem porary w rote of B u tle r 
d u rin g  th is  tim e, "Butler is no t hand icapped  by genius,
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orig inality  or emotion. He is an  ideally  efficient M inister, 
industrious, full of accurate inform ation which he is too cautious 
to divulge"[77]. T hat Hadow felt he had  an  ally in  B u tler is 
understandab le  given the  sta tem en ts the  new P arliam en tary  
U n d e r-S ec re ta ry  m ade abou t A nglo-G erm an re la tio n s  on 
assum ing office. Butler stated repeatedly th a t he hoped for a close 
and  tru s tin g  relationship  w ith G erm any and  would do all he 
could to prom ote th is goal. The G erm an Em bassy in  London 
received the  im pression th a t B utler "is quite sym pathetic toward 
Germ any and has no prejudices against us, and th a t his attitude 
toward the French orientation is understanding bu t critical"[78].
Hadow's correspondence with B utler was lim ited to official 
m inutes and m em oranda until June  1938 when he began w riting 
personal le tte rs  to this m inister. The first one began, "I realise - 
none b e tte r  - the  im propriety of addressing m yself 'out of tu rn ' 
and behind the backs of my superiors to you; only sheer fear of the 
results of the present drift driving me so to do". Hadow went on to 
ask , "Are we so afra id  to take  th e  in itia tiv e  and  assum e 
responsibilities in  order to save peace...? "[79]. T hat Hadow felt 
inclined (if not compelled) to tell his superiors w hat action they 
should take  seems obvious, but, if  his communications sounded 
im patien t a t times, they were never disrespectful. His letters to 
B utler often began "without w ishing to bother you", or "Though
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lo th  to spoil your weekend" before commencing w ith  a usually  
long explanation of the  dire situation in  Europe. Like Kingsley 
Wood, i t  is  u n c e rta in  w h e th er or n o t H adow  received  
encouragem ent from B utler, b u t he ap p aren tly  received no 
d iscou ragem en t an d  continued  to w rite  to th is  m in is te r  
throughout the  sum m er. I t is likely th a t  both Wood and B utler 
found Hadow's inform ation useful, especially as i t  w ent along 
w ith the ir line of thinking. If his actions were thus not strictly in  
line w ith his duties, they were willing to tu rn  a  blind eye as 
m erely receiving his letters and m em oranda would not h u rt them  
to any great extent.
Of his contacts outside the Government and Foreign Office, 
Lord Noel Buxton was one w ith whom Hadow corresponded a 
g rea t deal in  the la te  1930s. The once Labour M.P. and author of 
several pub lications on h istory  and  politics w as in  general 
agreem ent w ith Hadow on foreign policy, especially on the  subject 
of G erm any and  Czechoslovakia, According to R ichard Griffiths 
in Fellow Travellers o f the Right N oel-B uxton deplored  the  
anti-G erm an policy found in  debates in  the House of Commons; 
and, a lthough  he was aw are of the  violence and  repressive 
m easures characteristic of the new Germany, he m anaged to find 
excuses for them . In  an  article entitled "England and Germany" 
Noel-Buxton wrote "there is a solid base of reason  which gives
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s tren g th  to G erm an demands; th is  is p a rticu la rly  tru e  w ith  
regard to the  form er German colonies, and  also to the sufferings 
of the 'Sudeten Deutsch’ minority in  Czechoslovakia. I t  m ust be 
the aim  of B ritish statesm en, not only for the sake of peace, bu t in  
the  in te rests  of...world justice..., to come to term s w ith Germ any 
over the whole field of foreign policy"[80].
After corresponding w ith Hadow throughout the  first h a lf 
of 1938, Noel-Buxton sent him a copy of a le tter he had  w ritten  to 
Halifax. In the le tte r he thanked the Foreign Secretary for letting 
h im  see a  m em orandum  on a  possib le  p leb isc ite  for 
Czechoslovakia, and w ent on to m ake recom m endations sim ilar 
to Hadow'8: "We should tell Benes tha t, if  he does not in  a short 
tim e reach an  agreed settlem ent with the Sudeten Germans, and 
if  the Sudeten Germans (having failed to obtain autonomy) appeal 
for a  plebiscite, on the question of tran sfer to Germ any, G reat 
B rita in  would have publicly to m ake i t  clear th a t  she could not 
support resistance  to self-determ ination "[81 ]. Hadow though t 
Noel-Buxton's le tte r  was "excellent", b u t rem ained dubious on 
w hether such recom m endations would be followed by action on 
the p a rt of the government. He wrote to Noel-Buxton, "I beg you if 
you possible can not to be pu t off from SEEING HALIFAX and 
trying to convince him  of the u tte r urgency of the situation and the 
param ount need of sending an em issary - w ith Cabinet sanction -
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to Prague"[82]. Noel-Buxton’s reply, despite his sym pathy w ith 
Hadow's cause, was not so encouraging; he wrote th a t  he could 
not see w hat more to do and added, "I saw Halifax so lately th a t I 
m ust take  care not to p u t him  against me by boring him"[83J. 
Noel-Buxton had  also approached Cadogan on the  subject who 
recorded in  his diary in  Ju ly  1938: "Noel-Buxton a t 5: w ants us to 
th re a te n  Czechs w ith  plebiscite. Told h im  w hy we d idn 't 
approve"[84j.
Like Hadow, Noel-Buxton felt an  affinity w ith  the Germ an 
people which coloured his views on foreign policy. The origin of 
th is feeling in  Hadow could probably be found during his posting 
in  A ustria, b u t Noel-Buxton's dates as far back as 1912 when he 
sta ted  in  an  interview  to the Daily Chronicle^ "I w ant to insist on 
the fact th a t there  is no essential conflict of in te res t betw een the 
G erm ans and ourselves...There is  ample room in  the  world for 
the commercial ambitions of both people"[85]. W hen H itler gained 
power in  1933, Noel-Buxton wrote to The Times: "However much 
we, w ith  our E nglish  trad ition  see to deplore in  the  G erm an 
situation, we m ust adm it th a t the Allied policy since the w ar is 
m ainly responsible for the abnormal psychology of today. Would it  
not pe rh ap s be produced in  sim ila r circum stances in  o ther 
countries w ith a  degree of violence a t least as great?"[86].
A part from Noel-Buxton, Hadow was also in  touch w ith
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Captain Archibald Ram say and Sir Arnold Wilson. Conservative 
M.P. for Peebles, Ramsay was prom inent in  the Right Club which 
was p a rt of the anti-w ar movement. His background was sim ilar 
to Hadow’s: he had  come from a long line of Scottish m ilitary  
men, was educated a t E ton and Sandhurst, and took p a rt in  World 
W ar I when he was wounded invalided out of the  army. In 1937 
Ram say suddenly became aware of the "Communist menace" and 
was chairm an  of the  U nited C hristian  F ron t, one of h is chief 
concerns being the  m aintenance of C hristian  society against the 
"godless". Ram say's sym pathy w ith Germ any combined w ith his 
anti-com m unist feelings caused him  to jo in  the  C oordinating 
Committee in  1938, a  gathering of righ t wing groups formed to 
present a united  front against Communism[87]. Hadow appeared 
aw are of R am say 's an ti-com m unist sen tim en t as he often 
mentioned Russia in  his correspondence with th is M.P.
W ilson  w as a  C o n se rv a tiv e  M .P. fo r H i tc h in ,  
H e rtfo rd sh ire , w hom  G ilb e rt an d  G o tt d esc rib e  as a 
P a rliam en ta ry  Appeaser[88]. G riffiths w rites th a t  he was a 
complicated appeaser. A fter v isiting  Nazi G erm any in  1934, 
Wilson developed a  strange m ixture of adm iration and repulsion 
for the regime. He was im pressed by H itler who left on his mind 
"an indelib le  im pression  of single-m indedness, w ith  g re a t 
reserves of strength"; b u t he defended the Jew s and criticised
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Nazi regim entation. The Manchester Guardian described Wilson 
as "the most consistent panagyric of the new regime th a t we have 
yet heard"[89]. The European situation after 1936 drove Wilson 
tow ards a desire for an alliance with Germ any and th is is when 
he fell in line w ith Hadow. In  the summer of 1938 Hadow wrote to 
both Ram say and Wilson asking them  to raise certain  questions in 
Parliam ent. Wilson did, in  fact, raise the questions suggested by 
Hadow on Czechoslovakia, bu t Ramsay appeared  too concerned 
w ith the spread of Russian influence in China and  the legitimacy 
of the incorporation of the U kraine and Georgia into the  Soviet 
Union.
H adow  a lso  h a d  som e c o rre sp o n d e n c e  w ith  
Barrington-W ard, the Deputy Editor and Chief Leader-W riter of 
The Times from 1934. According to G ilbert and  G ott W ard 
"supported and  encouraged [Geoffrey] Dawson [editor of The 
Times ] in  devoting The Times to a  more thorough and  consistent 
appeasem ent policy th an  any other newspaper"[90J. In  Septem ber 
1938 Hadow sen t W ard an  analysis of Czech proposals for the 
Sudeten G erm ans. "I need hardly add", Hadow wrote, "that I 
show my faith  in  th is respect in  the scrupulous im partiality  of the 
’Tim es’ by laying before you documents which will I tru s t  show 
you how far the proposals are from being w hat they  purport to 
be"[91]. (No doubt, Hadow in te rp re ted  The Times leanings
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tow ards appeasem ent as im partial). W ard thanked  Hadow for 
allow ing him  to see the "valuable studies" of the  proposals, 
rem arking th a t they were a  striking exposure of lim itations. "In 
any case peace will not now be secured w ithout a m uch more 
drasti ' solution, and we m ust all hope th a t the P.M.'s courageous 
tactics will, even now, open a way to it"[92].
The public figures w ith whom Hadow corresponded show 
the extent to which the concern for European peace and justice for 
G erm any could lead  to a be lief in  H itle r 's  good in ten tions. 
Noel-Buxton and  another friend of Hadow's, Corder Catchpool, 
were both mem bers of the Anglo-German Group whose m ain aim 
was to m ain tain  good relations between countries and which had 
a  strong pacifist element. According to Griffiths the  group was 
innocent in  n a tu re  and fired by a concern for good relations 
betw een B rita in  and  Germ any. Hadow probably watched fhe. 
activities of th is group with great interest. I t carried on from 1933 
although m any of its  original mem bers soon became aware of its  
im possib ility  w ith  H itle r in  power. R am say  and  W ilson 
represen ted  the  concern of m any in  P arliam en t for coming to 
term s w ith Germany, while Barrington-W ard showed a slan t in  
the press towards th is aim. The goal was m aintenance of peace 
and Hadow probably felt he was not only in touch w ith the B ritish 
public through his associations with these men, b u t th a t he could
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help to enlighten i t  even fu rther through his efforts, and thus pu t 
pressure on the Government to act, Hadow in terpreted  the public 
feeling as possessing "a will to appeasement".
M in is te rs  such  as K ingsley Wood an d  B u tle r  a re  
identifiable as appeasers and the  fact th a t  Hadow grav ita ted  
tow ards such m en is understandable. B ut appeasem ent, even as 
late as 1938, was not excluded to the fanatics. Ju s t after Munich, 
the  le tte rs  of support sen t to C ham berlain included one from 
Roosevelt and  one from Baldwin, and even Eden wished luck to 
the  Prim e M inister before his la s t m eeting w ith  H itler. L arry  
Fuchser points out th a t i t  was not ju s t naive and foolish old m en 
who believed the Munich agreem ent had some chance of success, 
and th a t i t  was difficult to foresee the future course of events. He 
also notes, however, th a t m any of the letters w ritten  after Munich 
represent an  im m ediate outpouring of emotion[93].
This la tte r  poin t grows in  significance w ith  the  drop in  
support for C ham berlain 's policy in  1939. Hadow's "contacts" 
decreased  d u rin g  th is  tim e no t m erely  because  C adogan 
discovered his indiscretion in  October 1938. His engagem ents 
diary for 1939 records m eetings w ith Noel-Buxton and Ramsay, 
b u t no m ore a ttem p ts to reach  Kingsley Wood or B u tle r are 
apparen t and, particu larly  after the  invasion of Prague, Hadow 
probably began to find him self more isolated in  his opinions. I t
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was the pragm atism  of the M inisters th a t appealed to Hadow to 
begin w ith because i t  coincided w ith his belief in  a "reasonable 
approach" to foreign policy. This is ra th e r  ironic as Hadow 
him self was em otional and  volatile, a lthough constan t in  his 
opinions. B u t the  pragm atic  approach which he saw in  these 
m en arose out of a lack of conviction which caused them  to drift 
towards appeasem ent in  1938 in  the avoidance of any unpleasant 
confrontation. I t  was equally th is lack of conviction which caused 
them  to d rift aw ay from C ham berlain 's policy w hen i t  grew 
clearly untenable, and when public opinion began to tu rn  against 
it.
Because these m en were civil servants a t heart, they could 
not be relied upon to m aintain  a policy - even in  loyalty to their 
Prim e M inister - in  the  face of strong opposition and weighty 
evidence. Kingsley Wood's cautiousness, for example, kept him  
in  the Government where he eventually became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, while it  was he who had to advise Cham berlain to 
resign in  1940. (Cadogan once scathingly referred to Wood as "a 
chicken-hearted little  m utton-head "[94]). Hadow was sent off to 
A rgentina on the eve of the w ar and from then  on his career was 
m ildly successful b u t never fulfilled its  prom ising s ta rt; while 
Henderson re tired  after Berlin having been refused the posting 
back to B elgrade. H alifax , however, w ent on to become
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Am bassador in  the  U nited S tates, and B utler rose through the 
ranks to become Deputy Prim e M inister in  1962. Because these 
m en never em braced a  policy fervently  in  th e  m anner th a t  
C ham berlain, H enderson, and Hadow did, they  survived the 
afterm ath  and recrim inations of the Cham berlain years, and the 
ta in t of appeasem ent did not damage their careers. Hadow was 
probably correct in  assum ing th a t his approaches to them  in  1938 
m ight m eet w ith success, b u t he would have been optim istic to 
assum e th a t he could hold them  to a steady conviction w hatever 
the course of events th a t followed.
The Middle Ground: Cazalet
The line between appeasers and anti-appeasers in  the 1930s 
was not always definite, although the two cam ps became more 
discernible from 1938 to 1939. Opinions regarding  G erm any's 
intentions, the th re a t implied by Russia, and the involvement of 
B rita in  in  E u ro p ean  a ffa irs  w ere m ixed and  som etim es 
contradictory in  respect of th e  motives behind  the  p u rsu it of 
appeasem ent. One of Hadow's associates and  close friends 
Captain Victor Cazalet can be seen as a bridge betw een the two 
factions of appeasem ent and anti-appeasem ent, which m ade his 
agreem ent w ith Hadow on certain  points understandable, and, in 
the end, his u ltim ate rejection of the philosophy of appeasem ent a t
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th e  sam e tim e possible. C aza le t can also be used  as a 
representative of a m ajority of B ritish  opinion during th is time.
CjoASftrvfllive,M.P. for Chippenham  from 1924, in  the 1930s Cazalet travelled 
a round  C en tra l E urope study ing  the  concerns of d ifferen t 
countries. In  the late  1930s he developed links w ith mem bers of 
the  B ritish  G overnm ent close to C ham berlain , as well as a 
friendship  w ith  the  Prim e M inister him self. By supporting  
certain aspects of appeasem ent, Cazalet helped to encourage more 
fervent characters such as th a t of Hadow to pursue th is policy in  
the belief th a t i t  was in  the in terest of the majority of Britain. But 
C azalet’s more ponderous approach caused him  to fall in  less 
w ith the line of appeasem ent as evidence of G erm an aggression 
increased.
Like Hadow, Cazalet had suffered first-hand experience of 
World W ar I a t  an  im pressionable age, and entries in  his diary 
often resemble those of Hadow. While fighting in  the trenches in  
France he described three successive days as "Hell" and wrote of a 
friend dying in  his arm s. In  his biography of Cazalet R.R. Jam es 
writes th a t the experience of war was not as traum atic  for Cazalet 
as for m any of his contem poraries, b u t "His dislike of w ar and 
patriotic clap-trap had been confirmed"[95]. Dislike of the former 
would have made Cazalet akin to Hadow, while the  la tte r  would 
have probably separated the two.
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Cazalet twice visited A ustria while Hadow was posted there 
b u t m issed him  on the  second occasion. "I w as absolutely  
miserable a t not seeing you", he wrote. "However I had  some good 
talks w ith a  lot of people. I have made some notes on my trip  for 
Anthony Eden and am  sending you a copy"[96]. L ike Hadow, 
Cazalet took a  pessim istic view of A ustria. "Vienna", he wrote, 
"is a  terrib ly  sad town w ith m asses of beggars, who really  look 
and are h a lf  or wholly starved. How can i t  work - th is  top-heavy 
sta te  and town?"[97]. After visiting H ungary and Czechoslovakia, 
he presented a p lan to Eden th a t the B ritish Government should 
encourage the formation of a League of Nations of Central Europe. 
Hadow wrote to Cazalet after his second visit, "Would th a t more 
people a t home could see the urgency of the situation  as you do! 
And the need for a British lead...", and went on to state  as if  he felt 
Cazalet would be in  agreem ent th a t there would be no peace for 
Europe "until and unless Germany is included"[98],
Cazalet, however, like m any others in B rita in  a t th is time, 
was shocked by th e  Nazi regim e. "The conduct of G erm any 
tow ard h e r neighbour [Austria]", he wrote in  a le tte r  to The 
Times y "has been inexcusable, m onstrous, and  barbaric. One 
m ight ask  of w hat use is the League of N ations or of w hat 
influence is C hristian  civilisation if  a  nation of 60 million is to be 
allowed to bully, browbeat, and blackm ail a  neighbour of six
300
million into obeying her wishes?"[99]. In  1935 he recommended a 
close understand ing  w ith France and Italy  backed by the  L ittle 
E n ten te  which he believed G erm any would not dare  oppose. 
"Germany's one object", Cazalet wrote, "is to separa te  England 
and France" [100].
In  1936 C aza le t sh a red  public confusion over the  
reoccupation of the  Rhineland and the proper m ethod of dealing 
w ith Germany. "People really getting frightened of Germans", he 
wrote in  June . "It is ha rd  to know how to proceed. I doubt i f  you 
can hope to res tra in  Germany if  she w ants to take over Germ an 
speaking d istric ts. Anyhow we can bu t reason and p ray  th a t 
some in tervention  of Providence will decide the re s t "[101]. To 
Cazalet, the  Nazi regime was a shocking occurrence, b u t one he 
felt other countries would have to resign themselves to and hope a 
solution would come about. Such an a ttitu d e  was useful in  
fuelling appeasem ent: although settlem ent w ith  G erm any was 
not necessarily welcomed, i t  began to be seen i t  as a necessity. 
After H enderson's conciliatory speech tow ards the  G erm ans on 
arrival in  Berlin, Cazalet asked w hether i t  was not "the duty of 
H is M ajesty’s represen ta tives in  all countries to estab lish  and 
m aintain the m ost friendly relations possible w ith the  countries to 
which they are accredited "[102].
Such sentim ents kept Cazalet in  agreem ent w ith Hadow as
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well as his views on the  Spanish Civil War: "I...tru st and pray  
th a t G eneral F ranco will w in a  victory for civ ilisation over
I
Bolshevism"[103], and  he was also fooled by Henlein, seeing the 
la t te r  as "an essen tia lly  honest and  ra th e r  sim ple-m inded 
man"[104]. Hadow was sending Cazalet his ideas a t th is tim e and 
Cazalet wrote to Hadow a t one point during m eetings w ith Butler, 
Simon, and Hoare, "I th ink  your notes admirable. I shall hardly 
change a le tte r - and still claim them  as my own"[105]. In articles 
and  speeches h e  p roposed  a fed e ra l c o n s titu tio n  for 
C zechoslovakia, th e  r ig h t of appeal by m in o ritie s  to the  
In te rn a tio n a l C ou rt of Ju s tic e , and  the  g u a ra n te e in g  of 
Czechoslovakia’s neutra lity  by the Great Powers.
One thing, however, which separated C azalet from Hadow 
and other appeasers was his increasing concern w ith  the issue of 
Jew ish refugees. In  May 1938 he expressed abhorrence of the fate 
of A ustrian  Jew s and  concern for their future[106], and  in  Ju ly  
s ta ted  in  the  House of Commons: "It is quite  im possible to 
exaggerate the situation in  which many hundreds of thousands of 
Jew s and others find them selves in  Central Europe today"[107]. 
This concern coloured C azalet’s a ttitu d e  tow ard G erm any and 
Jam es m akes th e  in te res tin g  sta tem en t th a t  C azalet's public 
proposals du rin g  th is  tim e were delibera te ly  based  on the  
assum ption th a t G erm any genuinely required a peaceful solution
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to m inorities problems in  Europe, bu t i t  was an assum ption which 
Cazalet, in  private, did not believe[108]. Like m any bordering on 
appeasem ent, C azalet came to accept Munich as a "regrettable 
necessity" and his first reaction was one of relief: "Poor Czechs - I 
am sorry for them , bu t it is partly  Benes' fault. He always pushed 
the policy of keeping G erm any down". Colleagues of Cazalet, 
however, claim th a t Cazalet hated  Munich, seeing its  only m erit 
as buying time for rearmament[109].
To claim  th a t  C azalet became increasingly disillusioned 
w ith Germany would be wrong because he had  always found the 
Nazi regim e d is tas te fu l and, for a while, m erely  supported  
agreem ent w ith  th is  country  as B rita in 's  only a lte rn a tiv e . 
Because he did not share  Hadow's enthusiasm  for conciliation of 
Germany a t the  expense of other nations, he gradually  distanced 
him self firom his friend’s proposals, m any of which relied on a 
claim to patriotism  which Cazalet probably would not have agreed 
with. W hen Hadow asked him  to pass a m em orandum  he had 
w ritten  onto C ham berlain , C azalet became re lu c tan t. "All I 
would ask  you to do", Hadow had w ritten, "would be to ask  the 
Prim e M inister to give th e  document his personal a tten tion  as 
coming from one who knows his subject and has taken  pains to 
investigate his facts"[110]. Cazalet replied im m ediately, "I am 
terrib ly  sorry  b u t I sim ply cannot take the  responsib ility  of
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sending your th ing on to the Prim e Minister", b u t he did offer to 
enclose a note if  Hadow w anted to send the  docum ent on to 
B u tle iflll] .
In  1939 C azalet grew increasingly critical of the  B ritish  
Governm ent and although there  are a  few records in  Hadow's 
engagem ent d iary  of th e ir  m eeting du ring  th is  year, th e ir  
correspondence in  general appeared  to drop off. C azalet had  
become much more involved in  the Jew ish refugee question and 
was growing dism ayed a t  H itler's progress in  Europe. W hen 
G erm any occupied P rague in  M arch, C azalet w rote, "just so 
appalling as to be unspeakable. I t has roused the ordinary 'm an 
in  the street* as nothing else has. We seem very n ea r war. I t 
looks as though H itler is determ ined to dominate Europe. I th ink  
we ought to promise action if  a single Germ an soldier crosses the 
border of Roumania, Poland, Yugoslavia or Holland"[112].
Cazalet joined the R.A.F. in  1939 and when w ar broke out, 
he developed a friendship w ith the Prim e M inister of the Polish 
Government in  exile General Sikorski which led to his becoming 
liaison officer between the Free Poles and the B ritish Government. 
In  Ju ly  1943 he was killed in  a plane crash along w ith  Sikorski. 
Like Hadow, C azalet held  an  abhorrence of w ar th rough  his 
experience of it, bu t in  the late  1930s he recognised th a t Germany 
was going too fa r and  th a t  he should resign  h im self to the
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possibility of ano ther war. Hadow was a  "fighter" for his cause 
and would not accept this. His desperation in  the search for peace 
blinded him  to circum stances which, by this tim e, C azalet felt it 
was necessary to face. In  th is recognition of G erm an intentions, 
Cazalet, despite h is loyalty to Chamberlain, fell out of line w ith 
appeasem ent along w ith a  large m ajority of B rita in , and left 
Hadow in  the  m inority of those still supporting it.
Voices of Doubt
Cazalet, in his dislike and m istrust of the Nazi regime, and 
eventual d isillusionm ent w ith  the idea of conciliating H itler, 
reflected sen tim en ts w hich were taken  even fu r th e r  by the 
an ti-appeasers . A part from the  G erm an G overnm ent being 
b ru ta l in  a  domestic sense, critics of appeasem ent argued more 
and more th a t its  aggressive foreign policy was unlikely to change 
if  i t  was presented  w ith anything less than  effective opposition. 
The sim plicity of continuing to assum e anything else was w hat 
the  anti-appeasers objected to and it  represents a  way of thinking 
w hich seem s common to the  appeasers. V a n s itta r t,  w hen 
reflecting on the  causes and  origins of the Second W orld W ar, 
wrote tha t, to the appeasers, men were supposed to be continually 
rising "on stepping stones of their dead selves to higher things" as 
th is was M an's destiny; "an abstraction", he argued, " tha t never
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e x i s t e d " [ 1 1 3 3 .
The dichotom y of opinion betw een H adow  and  Orm e 
Sargent is one clear illustra tion  of the difference in  psychology as 
well as philosophy betw een the appeasers and an ti-appeasers. 
Hadow constantly appealed to logic and reason, b u t his outlook, 
like  m any  ap p ease rs , w as idea lis tic  and  ten d e d  tow ard  
generalisa tion . S argen t, according to Lord G ladwyn, had  a 
sharp , cu tting  edge to h is m ind. "He was rea lis tic  and  thus 
inclined to be pessimistic in  his general outlook, and nobody could 
'debunk' some high-falutin* theory be tter th an  he"[114]. While 
Hadow's view took in  m oral and historical concerns and was often 
em otional in  its  appeal, S argen t's  cynicism m ade h im  more 
capable of weighing both sides of an  argum ent w ithout jum ping to 
conclusions. H is la te r  criticism  of appeasem ent was typically 
pragm atic. He felt th a t  the  policy stood condemned not so m uch 
because i t  was im m oral or dangerous, bu t because i t  proved 
ineffective and "Cham berlain ought to have known i t  would be 
ineffective". S argen t dism issed the  excuse th a t  M unich bought 
tim e for B ritain  to rearm  as he doubted w hether the  year’s grace 
was of greater benefit to B rita in  th an  Germany and pointed out 
th a t th is argfument was dishonest as the Munich agreem ent was, 
a t  the  tim e, felt to have guaran teed  long-lasting peace[115]. 
Hadow, however, still clung to the "buying time" theory even after
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th e  w ar.
Because Sargent's approach tended to be reasoned, cynical 
or even pessim istic, i t  is sm all wonder th a t Hadow's despatches 
irrita ted  him  not m erely because he felt their conclusions were 
wrong but also because they were so adam ant. I t  was often along 
these lines th a t the appeasers clashed with anti-appeasers. To the 
la tte r  it seemed th a t those who pursued agreem ent w ith Germany 
were not facing facts so m uch as jum ping to conclusions which 
made them  arden t and inclined to emotional appeal. S tatem ents 
by Hadow such as "Germany responds to us as no other nation" 
were not likely to sit comfortably with Sargent's queries as to the 
sincerity of the  G erm an Governm ent's in te rest in  the  Sudeten 
G erm an question  and  Phipps ' belief th a t  H itle r w as more 
concerned about de tach ing  Czechoslovakia from F rance  and 
Russia th an  w hether any of h is actions m et w ith approval from 
Britain. In their ardency the appeasers were often inclined to give 
the impression th a t they had  a monopoly on the desire for peace, 
w hereas those in  the  Foreign Office or P arliam en t who made 
objections or pu t up barriers were seen as "war-mongerers ".
W hile S a rg e n t w as as m uch an  a n ti-a p p e a se r  as 
V an sitta rt, by m ain ta in ing  a quiet cynicism he continued to 
operate a little  more influence w ithin the Foreign Office th an  the 
la tte r  who was eventually  reduced to w riting long m em oranda
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which often went unread  and try ing to influence events through 
the  sending of covert inform ation  to outside allies such as 
C hurchill. I t  m ay be p a rtly  because V a n s it ta r t  g rad u a lly  
exercised less influence in the Foreign Office, th a t his relations 
w ith Hadow were less acerbic. This could also be due to a  certain  
s im ila rity  in  c h a rac te r betw een the  two and  an  a p p a ren t 
friendship which survived the division. Fourteen years older th an  
Hadow, V ansittart could have been an example of the fulfilm ent of 
the  potential promise of h is junior. Like Hadow, he felt a  keen 
sym pathy for underdogs and had  been rem em bered a t E ton as 
suppressing bullying through fim m ess of personality. Ian  Colvin 
w rites: "He had  unend ing  patience and k indness in  forlorn 
causes"[116], and describes how V an sitta rt once potted w ith  a 
pistol a t a  butcher b ird who was tearing sm aller birds to bits[117].
Also like Hadow, V a n s itta r t  w rote poetry and  spoke m any 
languages fluen tly . B oth  w ere h ighly  sociable an d  very  
industrious.
A fu rth e r resem blance betw een the  two was th a t, like 
Hadow, V an sitta rt could be his own worst enemy, despite the  
brilliance or correctness of his views. Eden writes th a t V ansitta rt 
held decided views on in ternational affairs and his in stinc t was Î
usually right, "but his sense of the political methods th a t could be 
used was som etim es a t  fault...Even about Germ any, w here he
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was abundantly  right, he expressed him self w ith such repetitive 
fervour th a t  all those except who agreed with him  were liable to 
discount h is views as too extreme. As a resu lt he som etim es 
injured the very causes he w anted to promote"[118], Hadow was 
no less fervent, the  g laring  difference being th a t  bo th  m en's 
perceptions of Nazism  and w hat B ritish foreign policy should be 
were poles apart.
V a n s itta r t 's  ap p aren tly  unshakeab le  fa ith  in  H enlein  
provided fu rth er common ground for him self and Hadow. W hen 
H enlein  came to London again  in  May 1938 V a n s itta r t still 
seemed to tru s t him:"I found H err Henlein far more reasonable 
and am enable than  I had  dared hope, and I am sure th a t he will 
desire to rem ain so"[119]. After the Second World W ar, V ansitta rt 
defended his actions in  regard to Henlein and wrote of the 1938 
visit, "The tru th  is th a t I and a  friend of mine - in  a  desperate 
endeavour to avert the final calam ity - got Henlein over here with 
the  deliberate  purpose of frigh ten ing  him"[120]. The "friend" 
V ansitta rt refers to could conceivably have been Hadow as Colvin 
writes th a t th is visit came about by an indirect feeler from Henlein 
sen t through Hadow who was convinced th a t H enlein could be 
used to find a solution to the Czechoslovak dilemma. If  th is were 
the case V ansittart's  defence of his actions is ra th e r questionable, 
and  i t  seem s clear th a t Hadow, a t  least, had  no in ten tion  of
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1frightening Henlein and was probably more concerned to frighten 
Benes.
Much of appeasem ent sprang out of reaction to historical 
an ti-G erm anism  in  the  Foreign Office. V a n s itta r t has been 
described as a "professional" anti-G erm an who explained th a t  i t  
was not merely Nazism which he disliked. He apparently  did not 
ha te  all Germans, only "the bloody-minded bulk"[121]. Hadow, in  
contrast, was inclined to ignore the excesses of the  N azi regime 
because he saw Anglo-German friendship as v ita l to European 
peace. His criticism of prejudice towards Germ any followed the 
lines of Thom as Jones who believed "diplom ats should have 
no th in g  to do w ith  h a tre d  of anybody. I t  is  silly  and  
dangerous"[l 22]. These two different views affected both Hadow's 
and  V a n s itta r t 's  assessm ent of foreign policy. W hile Hadow 
believed th a t the F irst World W ar should not recur and th a t the 
Versailles T reaty had been unduly harsh  to Germany, V ansitta rt 
believed th a t in  1911 the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey had  
failed  to stre ss  to the  Prim e M in isters the
im m inent danger in  Europe. "These lessons", w rites Colvin, 
"V an sitta rt had  la id  up in  h is heart" [123]. Hadow h ad  the  
experience of w ar laid  up in  h is heart, which caused him  to 
p u rsu e  h is course w ith  as m uch vehem ence as V a n s itta r t  
pursued his.
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Like resistance to appeasem ent within the Foreign Office, 
those outside this establishm ent who were against the policy were 
in itia lly  lim ited  by th e ir  lack of direction, agreem ent, and  
clearness in  regard  to an  a lternative  policy. Nevilfe Thompson 
w rites th a t opposition to appeasem ent is like a  mirage; "the more 
i t  is studied, the less substan tia l i t  appears". He adds, however, 
th a t i t  never vanishes completely. "What rem ains is a picture of 
sporadic and  discontinuous d issent, of ind iv idual critics and  
sm all cliques b u t no cohesive g ro u p 'll 24]. This is one reason 
why, in  the Foreign Office, Hadow could feel he had  an  affinity 
w ith  V a n s itta r t  and  an  enem y in  S argen t, and  w hy h is 
disagreem ent w ith critics of appeasem ent could be profound bu t 
not b itte r. Hadow, for example, kept up a correspondence w ith  
Lord B irkenhead  th roughou t th e  la te  1930s, even though  
B irkenhead la te r voiced the opinion th a t Churchill was "the only 
voice of sanity" du ring  th is  tim e[125]. Hadow 's reg a rd  for 
V a n sitta rt also survived as the form er's son-in-law notes th a t 
Lady Hadow gave him  the im pression th a t they had  always liked 
V a n s itta r t . (He does rem em ber, however, H adow  m aking  
derogatory passing rem arks about Churchill)[126].
Political an ti-appeasers were obviously less confined by 
ru les of behaviour th a n  those in  the  Foreign Office. Eden, for 
example, could be considerably more outspoken on foreign policy
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once he resigned as Foreign Secretary. W hen he resigned Eden 
moved to the  forefront of Conservative criticism  of appeasem ent 
and  formed the  "Eden Group" or "Glamour Boys" as they  were 
labelled  - an  inform al discussion group w ith  no b a rrie rs  on 
m em bership. Churchill had  his own group which was separa te  
from Eden’s although informal liaisons were kept up between the 
two by H arold M acM illan and  D uncan Sandy s. W hile E den 's 
group  m erely  followed the  line  of sup p o rtin g  tra d itio n a l 
diplom acy, C hurchill w as less reserved  in  h is  critic ism  of 
governm ent policy and more specific in offering alternatives such 
as the Grand Alliance system.
C hurchill and  his followers, a lthough  no t necessarily  
anti-G erm an, held very little  of the  appeasers’ sym pathy for th is 
country, Churchill did, in  fact, like m any of th e  appeasers, 
recognise and appreciate the leadership qualities of H itler, noting 
in  1937, "One m ay dislike H itler's system  and yet adm ire his 
patrio tic  achievement. If  our country were defeated I hope we 
should find a  champion as indomitable to restore our courage and 
lead  us back to our place among the  nations"[127]. But, unlike 
Hadow and o ther appeasers, he felt th a t  such qualities only 
em phasised the need for denial of trea ty  revision and containm ent 
of Nazi Germany.
When Henlein came to London in May 1938, the notes of his
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m eeting  w ith  C hurchill, th e  L iberal L eader S ir A rchibald  
Sinclair, and the M.P. Sir Harold Nicolson were sent by Churchill 
to the E arl of B irkenhead who sen t a copy of these to Hadow. In 
his le tte r accompanying the notes Churchill wrote th a t, as far as 
he could see, Henlein was adhering to w hat he had  said to them , 
and it  was understood from Ja n  M asaryk th a t the Czechoslovak 
Governm ent would agree to the term s proposed. "Therefore, if  
negotiations b reak  down, i t  will alm ost certainly be because of 
m alig n an t outside in terference"!! 28]. Hadow took the  la t te r  
statem ent to refer to a desire by Germany to see no settlem ent and 
felt th is statem ent to be unjust. I t  was Hadow's opinion th a t the 
Czechoslovak Governm ent and the SdP had  not come to grips 
regard ing  fundam en ta ls and  the  fau lt lay  largely  w ith  the  
Czechs[129]. U nlike Churchill, Hadow could no t read  deeper Imotives in  the actions of Germ any other th an  those he wishfully j
Ia ttribu ted  to a  desire for raised sta tu s and acceptance in  Europe.
The notes for Churchill's m eeting with H enlein had  been 
p repared  by Professor F.A. Lindem ann, a well-known physicist 
who did pioneering work on aircraft during the F irs t World W ar 
and  became p a rt of C hurchill's entourage during  the  1930s.
L indem ann's adm iration for Churchill was profound, and in  the 
a rea  of science and technology, especially regarding the  G erm an 
a ir  m enace, he became th is  m an 's one-m an advisory service.
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H adow  m et L indem ann in  Sep tem ber 1938 and  w rote to 
B irkenhead th a t he wondered if  the professor did not classify him  
as a Nazi. 'Tf not he is a most generous m an for I opposed alm ost 
every one of his established ideas as I have read these in  reports by 
o thers in  th is  office"[130]. I t  is no t surprising th a t  Hadow and 
Lindem ann did not see eye to eye, as Lindem ann did more th an  
read  dangerous m otives in  H itle r's  policy. According to R.R. 
Jam es in  Churchill: A  Study in FailurCy L indem ann was "almost 
pathologically  anti-G erm an", em phatic  on th e  peril of the  
G erm an m enace, and expressed his views "with a sharpness, 
and often a  harshness, which was unattractive, and his a ttitudes 
often  seem ed to be based  less on know ledge th a n  on 
prejudice"[131]. The conversa tion  betw een  H adow  and  
L indem ann represen ts a clash of two extrem es in  appeasem ent 
and anti-appeasem ent in  regard to prejudice tow ard and against 
Germany.
A lack of sym pathy in the  anti-appeasers towards Germany 
m ade them , if  not pro-com m unist, a t  least more am enable to 
Soviet Russia. While Hadow viewed the Soviet experim ent w ith 
imm ense distrust, those deploring the excesses of the Nazi regime 
saw the  Soviet Union as the  lesser of the two evils. In  1937 
C hurchill declared th a t  he preferred  com m unism  to Nazism , 
although "I hope not to be called upon to survive in a  world under
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a Government of e ither of these d ispositions'll 32]. While some 
were outwardly adm iring of the  planned R ussian economy, m any 
w ere m erely willing to suppress th e ir d istaste  for the Soviet 
dictatorship  in  order to use th is country as an  ally to res tra in  
Germany. The argum ent was th a t the vital in te rests  of B rita in  
and  R ussia  did not conflict and the  la tte r  needed peace to 
m ain ta in  domestic order. Moreover, i t  was felt th a t  B rita in  
should  no t be m anoeuvred in to  an  an ti-S ov iet c rusade  by 
Germany. This las t a ttitude  was in  direct contrast to the  attitude 
of Hadow and other appeasers who would go to any lengths to 
suppress communism which they  saw as the g rea ter th re a t to 
peace.
As regards the argum ent th a t there was no real conflict of 
in te res ts  betw een the Soviet Union and B ritain , Hadow would 
have contended th a t the ideological difference was radical enough 
to hinder any proper relations between the two countries. B ut the 
critics of appeasem ent were too concerned w ith  the rea lity  of 
power politics in  foreign affairs to a ttach  g rea t im portance to 
ideology, unless, as in  the case of Germany, a country's doctrine 
justified  b la tan t aggression. D uring the press for negotiations 
w ith R ussia after the G erm an invasion of Prague, Eden stated, 
"in the conduct of foreign affairs i t  is really not our business w hat 
political colour a Governm ent has, nor even how it  conducts its
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affairs a t home, although it  is desperately our business how it  
conducts itself abroad '[133].
B oth  th e  ap p ease rs  and  th e  an ti-ap p e ase rs  view ed 
them selves as being realistic. To the appeasers i t  was realistic to 
m ake concessions in  o rder to avoid d isru p tio n . To the  
an ti-appeasers such concessions could only be m ade from a 
position of strength built on sturdy alliances and a strong defence. 
The la tte r  viewed the former’s realism  as not only false, bu t based 
on a  certain  am ount of cynicism and imm orality. Hadow was no 
cynic, nor would he have considered him self imm oral; to him  it  
was im m oral to ostracise Germany, ignore the fate of the Sudeten 
G erm ans, and  encourage th e  sp read  of com m unism . B u t 
ignoring the b ru ta l na tu re  of Nazi Germ any required a lapse in  
principles which did not always sit well w ith Hadow's idealistic 
protestations. Nor did the increasing aggression of th is country 
m atch  his em phasis on the belief th a t  she could and would be 
appeased. I t  was on these points th a t  Hadow was taken  up by 
those more doubtful in the Foreign Office such as Sargent. It was 
also in  contention of such points th a t  critics of appeasem ent 
outside the Foreign Office gradually made themselves heard.
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Epilogue
In  Septem ber 1939 Hadow wrote th a t  the  ensuing  w ar 
offered poor hopes of victory for m any years, bu t prom ised "the 
m assacre of the flower of youth and manhood of England, France, 
and  Germany, the destruction of th e ir cities, the ir a r t  and the ir 
trea su re , the  dislocation, w hich has a lready begun, of th e ir  
populations, and the dem oralisation which will follow, of th e ir 
whole society. In  a  word, the  destruction of W estern civilisation 
in  a catastrophe the most horrible in  history"[134]. The statem ent 
reveals the extent of Hadow's fear of another w ar by 1939. In  
Hadow's eyes, the  society he knew and respected was lite ra lly  
falling to pieces. A rt and  architecture  would be decim ated by 
bombs, national iden tity  would be lost, and the  over-all m oral 
effect would leave th e  p a th  clear for comm unism . W estern  
civilisation, however, m anaged to survive - though, perhaps not 
as Hadow had known it  before the  w ar - and Hadow w ent on to 
postings in  Argentina, W ashington, and California.
D uring the  early  p a r t  of the Second World W ar Hadow 
produced plans for reconstruction after the war involving a pooled 
trusteesh ip  of African colonies. He pointed out the dangers of 
n a tio n a lism  in  e v e n tu a l p e ac e -se ttle m e n ts , an d  w ro te  
en thusiastica lly  - and  perhaps idealistically  - of "sacrifice of 
unneeded sovereignty to the common good" and the idea of "moral
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citizenship of a. . . m aterially  non-existent super-state". B eneath 
th is continuing faith  in  a m orality-based world government, one 
m ight detect Hadow's uneasiness over the fu ture of the world 
and, in  particular, B ritain 's role in  the world[135].
Hadow, nonetheless, adapted him self to post-World W ar II 
circum stances. Prom oted to Counsellor in  Buenos Aires, he 
threw  him self with ardour into studies for the M arshall Aid Plan, 
and from 1945 to 1948, acted as adviser on Latin American Affairs 
to the  British delegation a t the U nited Nations assemblies in  San 
Francisco. In  the 1950s he defended Eden's actions during  the 
Suez Crisis as w holeheartedly as he had defended the policy of 
appeasem ent.
Domestic characteristics of B rita in  moulded by historical 
tradition, meanwhile, continued to have their effect on the actions 
of th e  Foreign  Office in  th e  post-w ar period. A lthough 
appeasem ent became a d irty  word, cooperation was still felt to be 
p referab le  to conflict, and  compromise reached by ra tio n a l 
discussion was still a m ajor priority. Hadow dem onstrated an  
ironic realisation of th is aspect of B ritish foreign policy during the 
Second World War: "the laissez-faire', which lies a t the  root of 
B rita in 's  inability  to announce beforehand h e r peace-aim s and 
objectives, is likely - as m uch as ever before - to lead to a 
lackadaisical helplessness in  the  face of cut-and-dried dem ands
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by determ ined m en of the category already named [those bent on 
retribution]. These know th a t  if  they  begin w ith an impossibly 
high price they can reckon on Anglo-Saxon love of a compromise 
to give them  a t least a substan tia l p a rt of the ir dem ands; even 
though the la tte r may, in  the  first place, have neither justification 
nor possibility of promoting peace, tranquillity  or true  Democracy 
am ong nations"[136]. C ontradictory  as th is  s ta tem en t m ight 
seem in  correlation w ith Hadow's despatches prior to the  war, i t  
was m ost likely m ade in  reference to Russia, as Hadow had 
adopted a  Cold W ar a ttitu d e  even before the Foreign Secretary 
E rn est Bevin and la te r Eden as Prim e M inister made i t  p a rt of 
the ir post-war policy.
I t  is perhaps to Hadow's credit th a t he saved copies of 
alm ost all of his despatches from the 1930s, despite the ir reflection 
on his judgm ent, although he did re ta in  many of the opinions he 
held during the 1930s. Benes, for example, he continued to hold in 
low regard  and he did not change his views on the  Czechs as a 
whole. H is ha tred  of com m unism  lasted  th roughout h is life. 
After the w ar he linked the question of the break-up of colonies 
and  quick independence to the  spread of communism. Working 
on the  question of L atin  Am erica, Hadow focussed in  1948 on 
proposals such as the G uatem alan anti-colonial resolution a t the 
Conference of the O rganisation of American S ta tes a t  Bogota,
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telling  a  U nited S ta tes official th a t  his country should ab sta in  
from  such recom m endations: "Even b e tte r  would be a U.S. 
absten tion  from the Commission as a  m ark  of disapproval of 
proposals which could only serve to help Moscow"[137]. Hadow 
believed the U nited S ta te s ’ ingrained  fear of colonialism was 
causing th a t  country to support the  independence of countries 
which would then  succumb to communism. "It rem ains for us to 
teach a  very ignorant continent", Hadow wrote, "what colonialism 
and its  evolution really  rep resen t and I can th ink  of no more 
im p o rtan t work in  th e  defence of democracy ag a in st subtle  
Soviet-directed insinuations' ^  38].
As th is la tte r sta tem ent illu stra tes, Hadow rem ained firm  
in  his belief in  B ritain 's prom inent role internationally despite his 
country's diminishing power. He also rem ained fiercely patriotic. 
A la te r  defence of h is  co u n try 's  policy reg a rd in g  C hina  
dem onstrates not only th is sentim ent, b u t also the fact th a t his 
anti-com m unism  was alm ost wholly focussed on Russia. In  May 
1952, an  article appeared in  The Los Angeles Examiner w hich 
was headed "B itter and  Costly Lesson" and which reflected the 
p reva len t conservative a ttitu d e  in  the  U nited  S ta tes tow ards 
Anglo-Chinese re la tions. B rita in 's  Socialist G overnm ent, i t  
sta ted , "rushed headlong to recognise Mao, abruptly  casting off 
C h iang  K ai-shek who w as th e n  th e  only hope of C hina 's
320
liberation". The article pointed out th a t th is action had  p u t a 
s tra in  on Anglo-Am erican re la tio n s, "for Am erica properly  
refused to have any truck with Mao whatsoever. B ritain  kept on 
selling w ar m ateria ls to Mao while B ritish  and  American lads 
were being shot down in  Korea by Mao's men "[139].
In his reply to th is letter, Hadow pointed out the error in  the 
article in  confusing recognition w ith approval. "Recognition", he 
w ro te , "m erely  ad m its  th e  v a lid ity  of a new ly-form ed 
governm ent's claim  to be in  physical control of a  people or an 
area. I t  signifies no approval of the system  or methods by which 
th a t government rules". Hadow stated  th a t B ritain had made this 
d istinction  clear when, in  announcing her recognition of the 
Governm ent of Red China, h e r governm ent had  s ta ted  in  the 
House of Commons th a t i t  was opposed to and would continue to 
figh t Com munism. In  defence of h is country Hadow wrote, 
"Those who recklessly fling b itte r, unfounded and unsupported  
accusations a t America's m ost steadfast ally presum ably do so in  
full knowledge of the encouragem ent they afford to Moscow"[140].
Hadow's la te r  a rden t defence of his country in  term s of 
Eden's actions during the Suez Crisis showed no signs of fatigue 
or cynicism although he again  m ade an  ironic s ta tem en t in  
reference to prew ar events: "I w atched the  League of N ations 
im pose sanctions upon Ita ly ; and  hav ing  done so fail to
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im plem ent them . From  the m om ent th a t Mussolini flouted the 
League of N ations i t  was dead; k illed  by the  impotence and  
unw illingness of the G reat N ations to answ er FORCE (which 
N a sse r used  firs t) by ACTION no t W O R D S ". Hadow, 
characteristically, viewed N asser as a  pawn of Russia[141].
In  term s of energy, Hadow seemed unflagging even after 
his re tirem ent in  1957 (having received a knighthood in  1953), 
although he died not soon after in  1963. There is is one ra re  
statem ent he made in 1950 which perhaps portrays a slight regret 
or w istfulness over his role in  the  Foreign Office. Implying th a t 
those such as h im self were being  su rpassed  by a  d ifferent 
generation of Foreign Office officials w ith a different approach to 
diplomacy, he wrote to a colleague, "We shall go on till we are 
moved or retired; and such is the way of the "Machine" as it  was 
th irty  years ago when I got in. So there  is little  to wonder at; 
though m uch to be sad over if  one th inks how scorched are the 
pants of democracy by a  fire they are not even able to extinguish in  
W ashington"[142].
Hadow, on the whole, however, was not a  m an to look back, 
and, not being one for self-analysis, i t  is unlikely th a t he la te r 
exam ined his motives too deeply in  h is support in  the 1930s of a 
policy which came into such d isrepute  a fte r the  Second World 
W ar. H is defence of Cham berlain a t  the  time, in  fact, causes him
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to fit b e tte r  in to  the  trad itio n a l view of C ham berla in  as 
w ell-m eaning b u t hopelessly naive, th a n  C ham berla in  does 
him self, as shown in  recen t exam inations of the  la tte r  (see 
Fuchser). Hadow was not a cynical m an, and the outbreak of war 
in  1939 did not make him cynical. World W ar II, in  his eyes, was 
as unfortunate as World W ar I, although, being a  staunch patriot, 
he probably came to view the former as necessary. I t  is likely th a t 
Hadow la te r looked upon th e  Second World W ar as th e  fau lt of 
H itler being an  aggressive leader, b u t he would have been less 
likely  to hold dynamic forces in  G erm any accountable as he 
continued to cling to an  affinity w ith the  Germans.
W hile m uch of Hadow’s personality  and the influences on 
his character account for his m isinterpretation of the events of the 
1930s, his personal experiences - even of w ar - cannot be held as 
wholly accountable for his support of appeasem ent. Eden, for 
example, was the same age as Hadow, had  fought ju s t as bravely 
in  the F irs t World W ar, and suffered num erous family losses. In 
the  1930s, however, his vision did not become clouded once the 
in ten tions of the dictators had  been m ade plain. Eden, a t th is 
point, could not bring him self to avoid the  facts. Hadow, although 
by no m eans a cowardly or ill-intentioned m an, did m anage to 
avoid the  facts, up until and even after the  outbreak of war. His 
idealism  had  reached a  point where it  based itself increasingly on
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wishes and hopes, ra the r th an  a careful analysis of the situation.
I t  is often the case th a t when people fear or feel threatened 
by a certain  tru th , they do their best to convince themselves of the 
opposite. T his w as the  case w ith  Hadow. Som ething was 
developing in  E urope w hich w as u n fam ilia r to h im  and 
menacing. I t  was som ething he and the  o ther appeasers could 
not come to grips w ith and the th rea t itse lf was m isinterpreted. 
The role of his own country was undergoing a  subtle change and 
th is  also created  an  unease in  Hadow and  prom pted h im  to 
overstress B ritish  involvement and importance. The m istake th a t 
had been made in  the 1930s, however, was not, as Hadow believed, 
the failure to bring potentially cooperative nations together, bu t a 
failure to recognise naked aggression. In  his m istaken altruism , 
Hadow advocated a policy which, far from appeasing  H itler, 
encouraged th a t leader to the detrim ent of other nations.
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Appendix
[Hadow to Sargent - Hadow Papers]
9th August ,1932
D ear Sargent,
I enclose w ith  th is le tte r a  M emorandum setting  forth the 
results of the Lausanne Loan battle  on the Anschluss problem in  
so far as I have been able to gather and weigh them . The corollary 
seems to be:
a) is G reat B rita in  as sure as France seems to be th a t the 
A ustro -G erm an  "Zusam m en-Schluss"  is a  rea l and a 
p ressin g  d an g er by com parison w ith  th e  economic 
stagnation if  not ru in  which now stares C entral Europe in  
the face?
b) i f  not w hat can G reat B ritain  do to p u t an  end to the  
political battle  which France and Germany are fighting in  
th is  cock-pit to th e  d e trim en t of our p rep o n d eran t 
economic in terests?
I have laid  s tre ss  upon th e  economic aspects of the  
"Zusammen-Schluss" (a word which has now taken  the  place of 
"Anschluss" w here A ustrians w ant to em phasise the  economic 
significance of the  m ovem ent) because i t  is  a t  le a s t doubtful 
w hether any political party  in  A ustria sees personal advantage in, 
and  would therefore be prepared to support in  fact as well as in
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theory, a  political-anschluss.
France, of course, argues th a t economic union would lead 
to political absorption of A ustria; bu t they choose to forget th a t 
Konigratz and Sadowa lie alm ost as close to A ustria  as Sedan 
still lies to France and  th a t  the  a ttitu d e  of P ru ssia  tow ards 
B avaria  - w ith  which A ustrians have much closer sym pathies 
and  affinities th an  w ith  a rrogan t P russia  - does no t tend  to 
strengthen the  cause of Anschluss in  this country.
Given the undoubted absence of any national spirit and the 
phlegmatic disposition of the  great m ass of A ustrians i t  does not 
seem as if  anything short of actual invasion would persuade the 
political cliques of th is  country to divest them selves of th e ir 
parochial and personal advantages by handing A ustria  over to 
Germ any; and invasion  I doubt w hether G erm any would risk  
even in  a disguised or H itlerian  form.
The economic aspects of the problem therefore seem those 
which need weighing above all else by an unbiased yet greatly  
in te rested  power such as G reat B rita in  which could, by ste rn  
counsel, res tra in  the  political zeal of the contestants and  in sist 
th a t na tu ra l tendencies, as well as economic forces, shall be given 
firs t consideration in  the  task  of laying a bogey which today 





[Sir Godfrey MicMson to Hadow - Hadow Papers]
23rd October, 1933
D ear Hadow,
Many thanks for le tte r  of October 18th and cheque. I have 
got marooned in Zurich. I am  in  a clinic having my stomach pu t 
right. I am  writing in  bed w ith a linseed poultice - hence pencil 
and bad writing.
I have m et a good m any in teresting people here both Swiss 
and  foreign, I don 't like th is  situa tion  - the danger is not 
im m ediate - bu t in  the la te  spring on the E astern  frontier. I am  
all for cooperation bu t not w ith the present regime. Many though 
the faults and failings of democracy may be, i t  does not depend for 
its  existence on the  suppression of freedom of speech and press. 
W hen you have public opinion absolutely under your thum b, to 
mould in any way you like, and when you can suppress any news 
from abroad which you feel is contrary to your ideas, w ar is a 
certain ty  sooner or la ter. The m istake we have made is to have 
recognised tyrannies w ithout protesting. We w ant to be friends 
w ith the m an in  the street, and to see him prosperous and happy; 
b u t we m ust have free access to h is mind. At the m om ent he 
intellectually, a slave and will do his m asters bidding, wherever
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th a t m ay lead him - and Europe. In my opinion, we m ust always 
be prepared for w ar as long as some of the G reat Powers are ruled 
by ty ran ts, good or bad. Everyday th a t these regimes persist we 
slip back fu rther and  fu rth e r tow ards the dark  ages- w ith  the 
added danger th a t nowadays scientific progress enables you to 
m ake 100% of your people th ink  100% as you w ant them  to - thanks 
to an  inspired press and the  w ireless, etc. T hat’s why I th ink  
England, the old champion of liberal thought, m ust come into the 
open for w hat she believes in. The disease is contagious, and the 
epidemic m ust be stopped.
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[Hadow to Lady Layton^ wife of S ir Walter Layton^ editor of The 
News Chronicle - Hadow Papers]
1st March, 1937
D ear Lady Layton,
F irs t of all let me th an k  you for a very kind le tte r  which 
showed me th a t, not only had  I righ tly  lea rn t to appreciate a 
wide-awake and open m ind (the la tte r  a rare  p a rt of the visitors 
we see here) bu t th a t you had  tim e to extend sympathy to one who 
not only appreciates i t  b u t is cheered thereby to m ake fu rther 
efforts.
I have no axe to grind o ther th a n  a desire to promote 
PEACE which is a resu lt of my personal knowledge of w ar and in  
th is I now know th a t I share your views.
Please then  do not th ink  I am  abusing your kind offer to 
help by drawing your atten tion  to the tone of the enclosed articles 
from the "NEWS CHRONICLE".
You will notice th a t  th roughou t both the  Correspondent 
gives his readers to believe th a t the HENLEIN party  are known to 
be Nazi agents. I can only answ er th a t for 2 full years I have tried 
by every m eans to obtain  proof - how ever sligh t - of th is  
H enlein-N azi connection; b u t in  vain. Even the  G overnm ent
330
Press cannot le t me have it privately and have never published a 
single document in  proof of the contention.
Yet, on the  principle of "giving a dog a bad name" The 
News Chronicle correspondent never refers to the Henlein party  
as o ther th an  "Henlein NAZIS".
Again, although the  artic le  of 18th  F ebruary  contains a 
declara tion  by the M in ister for Foreign Affairs h im self (Dr. 
Krofta) th a t  "talk of w ar is unwise and highly dangerous...I am  
convinced th a t  w ar can be avoided" and fu rth er on "there is 
ground for hope th a t our relations w ith Germany will improve", 
the article in  question begins in  large-type
"...reported hostile in tentions of Germany..."
"assiduous plotting of Nazi agents..."
Lady Layton, as an  E ng lishm an  and  no t an  official I 
ven tu re  to say th a t th is is ne ither fair-play, nor is i t  helping to 
prom ote "neighbourliness" and  consequently  u n d e rs tan d in g  
between the two peoples.
Such sta tem ents will have the  inevitable resu lt of tak ing  
aw ay from us the im m ense m oral power we have over C entral 
Europe today by m aking both H enlein and  Germ any believe th a t 
we are not willing either to be fair-m inded or to promote a better 
understand ing  betw een peoples; b u t ra th e r  th a t  we WANT b a d
331
relations to persist on the principle of "divide et impera".
I KNOW th a t such is not your wish or th a t of your husband 
who, like myself, have children who cannot escape another war.
I assu re  you th a t  we are  not far from prom oting a  far 
g rea ter m easure of goodwill and understanding  in  Europe th a n  
has existed for m any years. But for this we need the backing of all 
peace-loving peoples in  England and the great weight of the Press 
in  form ing m en's m inds.
Do no t th in k  I am  pleading for tolerance of kindliness 
tow ards Germany. I only ask for FAIRNESS in  the removal of 
these little  irrita tions of daily headlines and cutting words, and if  
you can help in  th is m anner, believe me, England will have good 
cause to be grateful to you.
"We do not w ant war" is the universal cry in  our country. 
"Then", I answer, as my fa ther taugh t me to do when I was still 
a t school, "leave the word unspoken th a t will cause another pain - 
especially i f  you cannot PROVE th a t  i t  is en tire ly  tru e  a n d  
necessary".
Be fair so th a t Germany has to recognise our im p artia lity  
and you will be in  an  im m easurably stronger position to say to 
th a t country;
"peace we w ant and WILL HAVE; so get on w ith the  job
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of m aking friends with your neighbours and to made sure 
of th is  we will w atch and  counsel w ith  SCRUPULOUS 
FAIRNESS, though we cannot and will not allow wrongs to 
go covered any longer ON EITHER SIDE'.
On these lines you will see th a t Germany will not only give 
heed to ALL England says, b u t you will be surprised how quick 
will be the  progress of peace-m aking in  Europe. W hereas a t 
p resen t we are  confessedly PREPARING FOR WAR however 
m uch we m ay pro test to the contrary; for people are ceasing to 
believe in  our FAIRNESS and  th a t, and  th a t  alone, gives our 
STRENGTH in Europe today.
I have spoken too fully and from the depths of my heart to be 
even prudent. For of such open expression of opinion an  official 
who w ants to "get on" should never be guilty. B ut I really do not 
care; for of w hat use would promotion be to me if  I had to ^erve in 
or watch another war?
Every proof I can give you is therefore freely a t your disposal 
a t any tim e and all I ask is th a t others shall not get to hear of my 
so doing. For the Foreign Office is easily shocked and I w ant to go 
on fighting in  C entral Europe for "Peace and appeasem ent" such 
as I am  convinced we can a tta in  w ithout for a moment sacrificing 
democracy or our own principles, or bringing on w ar by refusing 
a  fa ir hearing  to those who are the causes of o ther countries' 
b itterness.
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If  you have hom e w ith me thus far I will not overtax your 
patience b u t ask  to be excused for pu tting  before an  im partial 
tribunal a  m atte r of very great importance to the  peace of Europe 
and the future of my country.
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[Hadow to Peter Matthews - Hadow Papers]
28th July, 1938
Dear M atthews,
Very m any th an k s  for sending  me your ana ly sis , a 
prelim inary glance a t  which does not in  the least reveal to me the 
"profound disagreement" you mention; bu t ra th e r the contrary!
And in  any case i t  is always very interesting to me to ponder 
over the "other point of view" so th a t I hope to spend a  profitable 
evening going carefully through and noting w hat you have said.
If  i t  would in te res t you to run  over my notes p ray  ring me 
up and come to a m eal when we can discuss the  m atte r alone and 
w ithout the bustle and hurry  of th is Office.
If  I m ay venture one criticism from my prelim inary and 
hasty  reading it  is the  extreme sim ilarity of your d e d u c t i o n s  w ith 
regard  to the  inevitable antagonism  between the  Czechs and the 
Sudeten  to the  a rgum ents used by G erm an d ip lom atists and 
others to "prove" - to the  most unfortunate  conviction of th e ir 
Governm ent in  B erlin  - th a t  the  B ritish  Em pire was bound to 
disintegrate in  case of w ar because of the fundam ental differences 
of race and opinion between its component parts.
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The factor accurate-thinking and logical men like yourself - 
if  I m ay venture th is description - forget is the weariness and fear 
of the Masses, which tends to override, God be praised, even the 
Memories and  b itternesses you so rightly enum erate, and  which 
are today m aking for Peace, so long as i t  is accompanied by a 
certain  m easure of concession.
I t  is the  constan t harping, by educated m en, upon the 
im possibilities of such rough-and-ready settlem ents, w ith th e ir 
valuable fea tu re  of gaining tim e for the  nex t step, and  the 
apparen t inability  of Intellectuals ever to bury the  ha tchet and 
preach its  burial, by example as well as word of m outh, th a t is to 
me the m ost effective b a rrie r to the Peace which ALL ex-service 
men w ithout exception are working for.
This is not m eant as a lecture; bu t I feel strongly th a t if  we 
would only say "there IS a way and we WILL find it" instead  of 
always dissecting, analysing and m aking known our conclusion 
th a t there is NO way, or th a t the only road is so strew n w ith nails 
and  glass th a t  no car can possibly pass w ithout puncture  we 
should find to our surprise - as Temperley rightly  said of Benes - 
th a t, by h is constan t repetition  of a form ula two hopelessly 
opposed and divided "negotiators" suddenly found to the surprise 
of all concerned th a t they HAD achieved enough to be declared
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"agreed".
This "will to peace" and even more its prom otion is the task  
above all of our independent In tellectual opinion; and i t  is its 
absence in  m any cases, despite an unconvincing lip-service, th a t 
we of the last w ar m ost deplore.
Again I say th is has nothing to do w ith w ith you; for I do 
not seek to discuss m atters with the above type, knowing th a t he is 
far better equipped intellectually th an  I and able so to pick holes in  
w hat I claim  th a t  I do not convince b u t m erely send him  away 
more certain  of the rightness of his negative point of view; whose 
logic I do not dispute, b u t whose conclusions are  luckily often 
falsified by history.
T hat is why, for all the  tru th  of the Cham berlain statem ent 
th a t Lord Runcim an has been "set adrift in  m id-sea in  an  open 
boat" I believe th a t there  is a  hope of achieving, by exercise of 
m o d e r a t io n  and f a i r p la y  in  th is  land, the  beginning  of a 
settlem ent not only of the  Sudeten question but, as you entirely 
rightly say, of Germ any's far great in terest: an  independen t bu t 
N eutral Czechoslovakia strong for self-defence as is Switzerland, 
and therefore by no m eans a negligible quantity  in  case of war, bu t 
not the  n a tu ra l i r r i ta n t  and  fear to G erm any th a t  Belgium or 
H olland would be to nâ. were one were one or o ther of these
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countries to conclude an  alliance with let us say Germ any which 
would place th e ir  aerodrom es and  ports theore tically  a t  the 
disposal of the la tte r  in  case of, as well as enabling G erm any to 
ship aeroplanes, survey aerodrom es and  a rran g e  depots for 
spare-parts etc. in  tim e of peace and in  preparation for "der Tag".
May I bespeak your not unpowerful help in persuading the 
Intellectual circles who to a large extent mould public opinion by 
their writings to prepare the way of peace by insisting both in  and 
out of season th a t  WE can  achieve and ensue i t  by resolute 
FAIRNESS to both sides.
W ith apologies for th is long diatribe.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
[Given to Lord Halifax and discussed at breakfast Sunday 
25f9[1938] - 9:00am. He promised to ascertain PM's views and let 
Hadow know as soon as possible whether the Legion might go 
ahead with approval to Hitler. Copy given to F. Godley, British 
Legion at Croydon Aerodrome 5:00pm, 2519 - Hadow Papers]
In  a  m em orandum  subm itted yesterday i t  was suggested
that:
A B ritish  volunteer-force be sent forthw ith to facilitate 
the su rre n d e r of th e  S udeten  te rrito rie s  by ac ting  as 
MILITARY POLICE
a. in  th e  d is tr ic ts  a lready  accepted by the  
Czechoslovak Governm ent for surrender to G erm any under 
the Anglo-French P lan  un til the Germ an forces en te r and 
take over.
b. In  the PLEBISCITE areas as dem anded in  the  
H itler m em orandum  until (25th November) a fte r the  above 
Plebiscite.
THE BRITISH LEGION HAS NOW OFFERED TO SUPPLY
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10,000 PICKED MEN FORTHWITH 
up to another 10,000 m en within a week.
I t is therefore suggested that, if  the Cabinet approve
1. The GERMAN GOVERNMENT be asked  to afford 
them  fac ilities for ra il- tra n sp o rta tio n  across G erm any 
during the  coming week.
2. The first 10,000 men be sent
7000 to the  Sudeten areas of NORTHERN and 
WESTERN BOHEMIA.
1000 to the SOUTH BOHEMIAN DISTRICTS 
2000 to the MORAVIAN-SILESIAN districts.
3. As soon as possib le  th e  CZECHOSLOVAK 
Government be asked to facilitate the ir d istribu tion  to the  
principle GENDARMERIE and STATE POLICE posts and 
thence to the minor posts of the same forces.
4. U ntil 30th Septem ber they would be occupied only on 
patrol work; being for th is purpose unarm ed save possibly for 
a revolver.
5. They would reinforced by the second 10,000 in  order if 
p o ss ib le  to  h a v e  th e  fu ll force o f 20 ,000  in
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA before 1 st October.
6. On the en try  of the GERMAN FORCES - upon prior 
GERMAN guarantee  th a t  these would not go beyond
the Anglo-French Line -
a quarter of the above volunteer forcé would rem ain in  
the districts un til the  Plebiscite if  th is be thought necessary 
in  order to reassure  B ritish  public opinion th is protection 
was being afforded to the  dissident-m inority against acts of 
revenge on the p a rt of the SUDETEN during the first days of 
the letters' return ,
th e  rem a in d e r w ould be moved forw ard in to  the
PLEBISCITE AREAS, which they would occupy un til 
25th November.
7. A special force of Ex-officers - for which over 75 
qualified men have already offered themselves - would act as 
in terp reters and  Liaison officers betw een the Czechoslovak 
and la ter the Germ an forces.
8. Accommodation would provide no difficulty as the  
INNS of the districts are  mostly clean and the food good.
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9. The m ain duty of the above force would be
To see th a t  the  CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY 
FORCES were evacuating the  districts before 1 st October to 
avoid the risk  of "collisions".
To take over the  districts between the tim e of the 
departure of the  CZECH GENDARMERIE, and POLICE and 
the arrival - on their heels - of the German forces.
F u rth e r details would need to be worked out both  here 
and on the spot without delay.
The m ain object of the  scheme is, however, to provide a 
m eans of Czech w ithd raw al and  G erm an advance w ithou t 
collision and acceptable to both Governments. For th is purpose 
B ritish  ex-service m en are particularly  suitable.
They have during late years had excellent relations w ith the 
Ex-service organisations in  both Germanv and Czechoslovakia.
As ex-soldiers who have retained some loose discipline they 
can act as MILITARY POLICE, though their verv presence would 
§Q rç^gsprq both gidgs to fulfill the,..obje£t.
By working in  w ith  both  sides they would dem onstra te  
BRITISH IMPARTIALITY to Europe as a  whole and  to both
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countries in  particu lar.
The inhab itan ts - Sudeten-Germ ans - are very friendly and 
would themselves, as proved by recent months, reduce anv risk  to 
the  volunteers, to a minim um; since they are highly-disciplined 
and w ant to show it.
Being VOLUNTEERS and picked-men the force would not 
be a liability to HMG as would be armed-forces.
The id ea  of accom plish ing  an  ANGLO-GERM AN 
understanding  through the  EX SERVICE MEN of both countries 
is  one of HERR HITLER'S m ain  them es. The presence of 800 
Germ an ex-service men in th is country is proof of his not having 
given up th is idea.
It is therefore suggested th a t the  heads of the B ritish Legion 
be sen t a t once to m ake th is proposal to H err H itler personally; 
arm ed only w ith the  au tho rity  of HMG to do so, as th e ir plan. 
HMG would then not be involved if  it were rejected.
The plan for an  "UNARMED PEACE ARMY" of MEN who, 
hav ing  know n th e  ho rro rs of w ar are  now ag a in  offering 
them selves to prevent i t  would, i t  is suggested, m ake an  in s ta n t 
appeal to the im agination of the  Public in  GREAT BRITAIN, and 
th u s satisfy the PACIFIST OPINION IN GREAT BRITAIN of the 
"rightness" of B ritish policy and of this move.
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If  accepted in  principle the plan would be worked out and 
subm itted in  detail w ithin the next 48 hours or less.
The first steps would be
a. an approach to H err H itler by the Legion
b. if  re s u lts  a re  favourab le  n o tifica tio n  to th e  
Czechoslovak Government for the ir acceptance and cooperation.
c. recru itm ent and despatch of the force not la te r  th an  
28th September.
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I noticed th a t in the las t plan of settlem ent which you pu t 
forw ard you were contem plating the  possibility of the  B ritish  
Legion playing some p art in  the  tem porary occupation of the ceded 
territories. Personally I feel th a t i t  would be unwise to make any 
such use of them . The G erm ans have not tu rn ed  down the 
suggestion, but, no doubt, the analogous body in  Germ any is a 
d rilled , d iscip lined  and  uniform ed form ation  w ith  officers, 
non-commissioned officers and  a proper organisation. As you 
know however our B ritish  Legion is simply a collection of middle 
aged and elderly men who have been a t some tim e in  one of the 
Services and now m eet together occasionally w ith the laudable 
purpose of wearing their m edals and  drinking beer. They differ 
in  hard ly  any respect from a collection of Conservative working 
m en's clubs. They have no uniform, m ost of them  have had  no 
tra in ing  for the la s t 20 years and  they  have no organisation or 
officers. If  they were sent out to the Sudetenland in  order to carry 
out complicated duties requiring above all discipline, train ing  and
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tact, I am  afraid the resu lt would be disastrous. I did m ention 
th is  m a tte r  to Ashton-G watkin a t  the  aerodrome th is  m orning 
and I hope he will report w hat I said to the Prim e M inister.
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[Halifax to D uff Cooper C11431111169/18, F0371-21783]
29th September, 1938
My D ear Duff,
M any thanks for your le tter. I have been fully conscious 
m yself of the  difficulties in  th e  B ritish  Legion p lan , I saw 
M aurice th is afternoon; he told me th a t if the  p lan m atured  they 
h ad  i t  in  m ind to m ake th e ir  selection from  officers and  
ex-N.C.O.s. B ut th is only partly  relieves the doubts th a t I share 
w ith  you which were also, I understand , felt in  the  course of 
d iscussions w ith  th e  W ar Office th is  afternoon. We are, I 
understand, sending a  telegram  to Munich tonight to suggest th a t 
i t  m ight be be tter to use the Belgians and Dutch who, marvellous 
to rela te , seem quite anxious for the  job. We are pu tting  all the 
difficulties of the British Legion plan to Munich.
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[Memorandum by Hadow, August 31, 1939 - Hadow Papers]
GERMANY and GREAT BRITAIN 
SETTLEMENT
There is now every sign th a t H itler will not fight, because 
he knows th a t his people no longer believe he can win.
His re trea t lies, therefore, by way of the promises th a t are 
inheren t in  Mr. Cham berlain's first le tte r to H itler (24th August) 
indicating th a t, while firmly resolved to prevent a  settlem ent of 
the  Polish problem  by force, we are p repared  - i f  the  Polish 
problem be solved by negotiation - to discuss the wider problem s 
affecting in ternational relations w ith Germanv.
A lready H itle r has indicated th a t  he in tends to use th is  
bridge, for he has clearly stated  th a t the Polish settlem ent is to 
him  only p a rt of the Anglo-German settlem ent which he desires 
above all else.
Moreover he has asked for some "token move" on our p a rt 
about Colonies, and shown th a t the problem of raw  m aterials and 
credits are ever-present in  his mind and th a t of Mussolini.
W hen, there fo re , Poland and  G erm any  decide upon 
negotiations Germ any’s a ttitude w ith regard to every claims other
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th a n  Danzig will be governed alm ost entirely by th e ir hopes of 
concessions on the three great international issues:
RAW MATERIALS and ECONOMIC AID
COLONIES
DISARMAMENT
To obtain disarm am ent - our chief need for w ithout i t  the 
whole economic fabric of Europe will fall to bits under the waste of 
unproductive and prodigal spending - we shall have to be ready for 
concession on Raw M ateria ls and  some accom m odation as 
regards Colonies.
I t  is, I suggest, v irtua lly  certa in  th a t  - in  h is p resen t 
situation  - H err H itler will make his demand for an  indication of 
OUR PLAN for an  INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT of the  above 
issues h is FIRST step a t  the  Germ an-Polish conference should 
such take place.
B ut the  problems are essentially NOT for th is country alone, 
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